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ABSTRACT
The  phenomenon  of  territorial  cooperation  between  local  and  regional 
authorities  has  gradually  evolved  from  the  perspective  of  a  merely  factual 
phenomenon  to  a  legally  recognized  form  of  relation  at  sub-national  level.  The 
attempt to find legal solutions and the definition of common rules have been hardly 
implemented  due  to  the  differences  among national  legal  orders.  The  Council  of 
Europe  and the  European Union have  recently  adopted  new legal  instruments  in 
order to create suitable standard frameworks in this field. This study, considering the 
state of the play about the legal tools adopted for territorial cooperation, intends to 
evaluate  the degree of legitimation for local and regional authorities in particular 
after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  establishing  a 
European  Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC).  In  this  view,  a  peculiar 
attention  is  drawn  on  the  interaction  between  levels  of  government  in  order  to 
estimate the potential affirmation of a “sub-national right to territorial cooperation”. 
As a general and essential background, the development of a wider European 
territorial  dimension represents a  key-concept  and a cross-cutting issue.  Different 
methodologies have been utilized for this research. The literature available on the 
topic  has  been  useful  to  identify  some  preliminary  concepts  such  as  the 
differentiation between the competence to deal with territorial cooperation and the 
law  applicable  to  the  consequent  sub-national  transfrontier  relations.  The  direct 
analysis of the most important legal sources outlines the evolution and the current 
situation about the different legal instruments for territorial  cooperation,  trying to 
sum-up the “law of territorial cooperation”. In conclusion, the clear improvement of 
sub-national  prerogatives  has  to  be  underlined.  However,  despite  the  innovative 
European legal framework, the national supervision on the activities of regional and 
local communities and the equilibrium between central and sub-national authorities 
in  case  of  foreign  actions  is  still  a  sensitive  question.  Territorial  cooperation 
demonstrates that legal rules are necessary to recognize the phenomenon, but their 
implementation needs a mature system of multilevel governance and fair cooperation 
in order to deal with such a complex phenomenon.
7

CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY NOTIONS TO THE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
1. Introduction
1.1. Frame and purposes of the study
For the purposes of this research, territorial cooperation could be considered 
as a new concept comprehending different forms of so-called transfrontier or cross-
border relations between sub-national authorities and should be generally intended as 
every  kind  of  relation  or  activity  between  sub-national  territorial  communities, 
belonging  to  different  States,  concerning  the  geographic  area  covered  by  these 
communities. Main interest of this study is related to the role of public actors or, in a 
broader sense, to the exercise of territorial public functions across borders in Europe.
Territorial cooperation is a controversial phenomenon and a manifestation of 
a legal reality  in fieri.  Transfrontier activities between local and regional subjects 
have been developed in several ways, both through informal and formal instruments. 
In  particular,  the  formal  solutions  are  different  in  their  legal  nature  and  make 
reference to different normative sources. Despite the importance of cooperation for 
territorial  communities,  the  national  systems  have  not  autonomously  advanced  a 
coherent legal support in order to give a clear frame of reference for sub-national 
transfrontier activities, but the most relevant legal frameworks have been set up at 
European level. The Council of Europe represents the first institution devoted to the 
elaboration of  a  common standard framework for  territorial  cooperation  with the 
European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation  between  Territorial 
Communities or Authorities  (adopted in  Madrid in  1980) and its  three additional 
protocols. More recently, the European Union, after a long experience of regional 
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policies, has adopted the Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 establishing a European 
Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC),  drawing  a  new  approach  to  sub-
national transfrontier relations.
The rather slow development of common legal rules in this filed demonstrates 
the difficulty to find suitable and shared solution. In particular, the acknowledgement 
of a form of sub-national foreign power has always been, and still is, a sensitive issue 
for national systems.
Within  this  panorama,  the  basic  hypothesis  of  this  work  consists  in  the 
affirmation  that,  after  the  progressive  evolution  and  implementation  of  legal 
instruments for territorial cooperation, a fundamental “European territorial  acquis” 
does  exist  and  sub-national  authorities  have,  if  not  a  proper  right,  at  least  a 
recognised  capability  to  territorial  cooperation.  The  wide-range  analysis  about 
various aspects  of territorial  cooperation,  both at  European and at  national  level, 
focuses  on  the  progressive  acknowledgement  of  territorial  cooperation  as  an 
indispensable method of governance. In particular, the main objective is to highlight 
and demonstrate that, despite the formal position of sub-national authorities has not 
changed from a  strictly  legal  point  of  view,  however  these  authorities  have  new 
possibilities and means to undertake transfrontier relations.
This study takes  into  consideration different  legal  aspects  about  territorial 
cooperation between regional and local authorities in Europe, covering issues like 
the  legitimation  of  sub-national  authorities  as  well  as  the  legal  nature  of  the 
agreements between foreign local and regional subjects. The identification of some 
preliminary  concepts  is  necessary  in  order  to  have  a  clear  focus  on  the  topic 
concerned.  First  of  all,  it  is  of  a  fundamental  importance  to  highlight  that  the 
phenomenon of territorial cooperation in Europe shows some distinctive peculiarities 
if  compared  with  other  experiences  worldwide.  In  particular,  the  European 
experience  is  characterised by  a  high level  of  institutionalization  of  transfrontier 
relations  at  sub-national  level,  while  other  examples,  such  as  cross-border 
cooperation between Canada and the US, are distinguished by the major presence of 
private  actors  or,  anyway,  by  a  modest  involvement  of  sub-national  public 
institutions1. 
1 See I.K. BLATTER, Debordering the World of States: Towards a Multi-Level System in Europe and a 
Multi-Polity System in the North America? Insights from Border Regions, in  European Journal of  
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The  following  survey  concerns  activities  and  relations  which  are  usually 
identified  in  different  ways,  such  as  cross-border,  transfrontier,  interregional, 
transnational,  interterritorial  and  territorial  cooperation.  However,  all  these  terms 
shall necessarily be associated to activities at sub-national level. Furthermore, in the 
optic of this work the word “territorial” is intrinsically connected to the sub-state 
level. Thus, territorial cooperation represents a binomial whose inherent components 
refer  to  peculiar  relations  developed  by  sub-national  actors  within the  respective 
territories. Far from pretending to be exhaustive, this research concerns both the state 
of  the  play of  the  various instruments  that  have been developed for  cooperation 
between sub-national authorities or communities and a general evaluation on the role 
of  legal  factors  about  the  regulation  of  this  complex  subject  at  European  level. 
Moreover,  the  increasing  legitimation  for  sub-national  authorities  to  engage  in 
transfrontier  relations  and  the  evolution  of  a  distinctive  European  territorial 
dimension are important key-elements in this work.
Like almost every social and institutional aspect, territorial cooperation is a 
very intricate matter and involves also a multi-sided legal approach. Anyway, bearing 
in mind the importance of legal aspects, it is fundamental not to forget the role of 
non-legal  or  soft-law  factors,  mainly  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  sub-
national  cooperation.  The long experience  of  transfrontier  relations  between sub-
national authorities shows how legal aspects are extremely complex. Many juridical 
complications  and  ambiguities  surround  the  systematic  profile  of  territorial 
cooperation. Namely, different branches of law are involved in this topic, such as 
international law, Community law and national legislations, each of them applying 
different  schemes in  order to display suitable  and feasible  legal  solutions for the 
creation of sub-national transfrontier relations and activities. And, as just mentioned, 
even the contribution of so-called soft-law factors is essential for an effective and 
efficient implementation of institutional cooperative phenomena. 
The  analysis  about  the  evolution  of  these  legal  and  meta-legal  tools  is  a 
primary  object  of  the  study.  In  fact,  the  examination of  the  legal  instruments  of 
territorial  cooperation  generates  a  better  comprehension  of  the  mechanisms  and 
functioning concerning this broad and yet non-systematized phenomenon. A special 
International Relations, 2001; 7, p. 180.
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attention shall be necessarily drawn to the comparison between the European Union 
and  the  Council  of  Europe's  legal  attitudes  towards  territorial  and  transfrontier 
cooperation in order to evaluate the impact of these extra-national legal system on 
the national legal  orders,  mainly with regard to the development  of the potential 
rights of sub-national communities to build up and extend autonomous transfrontier 
activities. In particular, the core of the research considers the normative aptitude of 
the  European  Union  and  Council  of  Europe  to  give  implementation  to  the  sub-
national  capability  to  the  exercise  of  foreign  powers  beyond  a  discretionary 
involvement of the State. Namely, from the state perspective, the undertaken of sub-
national  foreign  activities,  as  territorial  cooperation  is,  implies  a  high  degree  of 
potentially reverse effects: on the one hand the possible reference of sub-national 
authorities  to  a  foreign  national  law  generates  some  weaknesses  of  the  central 
authorities about the control towards territorial communities; on the other hand the 
presence  within  the  national  borders  of  a  foreign  public  authority  determines 
ambiguities with regard to the law applicable to the relations between the own and 
foreign territorial authorities. These are only brief and general examples about the 
complexity of the legal  aspects  concerning territorial  cooperation,  but other legal 
questions are related to, in particular, the establishment of transfrontier structures.
Behind  the  issue  related  to  the  concrete  methods  for  implementing 
transfrontier  activities  of  territorial  communities,  another  relevant  crosscutting 
reflection concerns the functions and tasks of legal disciplines in regulating this kind 
of relations. In this sense, it is appropriate to point out that distinctive areas of the 
law are bound with the problematic questions presented by transfrontier/territorial 
matters.  The  way  through  which  territorial  communities  approach  territorial 
cooperation and the way they exercise their powers and competences, represents a 
multi-dimensional  argument  in  the  legal  field,  mainly  in  the  area  of  public  law. 
Different aspects of this legal branch are involved. However, not only public law, but 
also private law has played and still plays a relevant role, having a broad application 
in the relations between sub-national foreign subjects. 
Thus, this work is not to be considered as a mono-thematic approach towards 
territorial cooperation in Europe by giving account of the  status  materiae  from the 
perspective of one legal discipline. Namely, it is not an attempt to reconstruct the 
12
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discipline of territorial cooperation from a static point of view for the simple reason 
that the nature of territorial cooperation as such needs a multi-dimensional approach. 
In  fact,  since  its  very  beginning,  the  analysis  has  started,  form  the  concrete 
observation of the phenomenon and the related practical solutions trying to observe 
the effects of different legal instruments on it. 
About  the  impact  of  legal  instruments  on  territorial  cooperation,  it  is 
necessary to precise that the aim of this study has a double objective. On the one 
hand, the attention is directed towards the implementation and interaction of the legal  
solutions available for the cooperative activities between sub-national communities 
and towards the evaluation of the possible improvement of sub-national powers in 
this field. On the other hand, the survey focuses on the capacity of the European 
Union  and  the  Council  of  Europe  to  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the  legal 
framework of territorial cooperation. More precisely, this last assumption is related 
to  the  function  of  the  two “super”-national  subjects  to  shape  the  operative  legal 
instruments  for  sub-national  subjects.  From another  point  of  view,  an  interesting 
question is whether the legal solutions adopted for territorial cooperation affect, or in 
some ways shape,  the role of the actors involved. With other words, the point is 
whether  the  instruments  of  territorial  cooperation,  in  particular  the  recent  legal 
documents  adopted  by  the  European  institutions,  enlarge  the  competences' 
attributions of sub-national authorities, thus shaping the national legal orders.
Among the legal tools for territorial cooperation, the entry into force of the 
EC  Regulation  on  a  European  Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC)  is 
peculiar in regard to the last question. Namely, it is possible to wonder if the new 
Community discipline has some effects on the role of sub-national authorities with 
regard to the State's supervisory attitude. In fact, according to some interpretations, 
the EGTC Regulation could represent an instrument for an autonomous sub-national 
approach  to  territorial  cooperation,  much  more  innovative  than  other  European 
provisions. An issue of this kind, however, could be suggested not only by this new 
legal instrument, but even in general,  by the comprehensive analysis of the other 
several tools available for territorial cooperation. In fact, the gradual but progressive 
evolution of new solutions and the escalating debate about territorial  cooperation 
have brought to its current acknowledgement. More generally, this work is far from 
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challenging a theoretical approach to the study of territorial cooperation,  rather it 
aims at analysing the effective development of practical solutions from a legal point 
of view2.
1.2. Methodological note
This study is basically divided into two parts, which correspond respectively 
to a theoretical and to a practical approach. Namely, the second and the third chapter 
present a conceptual analysis about the background of territorial cooperation, while 
the fourth and the fifth chapter consider the development of different experiences 
regarding  the  legal  instruments  for  territorial  cooperation.  The  reasons  of  this 
“structural” choice reside in the fact that, although quite extensive, the presentation 
of some basic notions, such as the terminological issues or the overview concerning 
the  European  territorial  dimension,  are  fundamental  and  functional  conditions  in 
order to comprehend the progressive development of the various means adopted as 
legal solutions for territorial cooperation. This subdivision of the work seems to be 
quite helpful in order to delineate, on the one hand, some basic achievements about 
the  theoretical  framework  of  the  topic  concerned.  In  fact,  as  far  as  territorial 
cooperation has originally developed as a mere factual phenomenon, it has currently 
a  relevant  conceptual  background.  On  the  other  hand,  the  analysis  about  the 
instruments  that  have  been  developed  for  cooperation  gives  the  idea  of  a 
progressively  evolving  phenomenon,  thus,  underlining  the  dynamic  aspect  of 
cooperation between sub-national authorities. 
This  distinguishing  between  the  conceptual/static  part  and  the 
concrete/dynamic part  is  not  the only key available for the interpretation and the 
2 See  J.  GRIX,  Towards  a  theoretical  approach  to  the  study  of  cross-border  cooperation,  in 
Perspectives. Review of Central European Affairs, 2001-2002, n. 17, p. 5 et seq., who approaches both 
sides of cross-border cooperation, the formal and informal one, and their interaction within European 
integration. Grix intends the formal integration as a sum of “deliberate actions by authoritative policy-
makers to create and adjust rules, to establish common institutions and to work with and through those 
institutions”,  while  “informal  integration  consists  of  those  intense  patterns  of  interactions  which 
develop without the intervention of deliberate governmental decisions, following the dynamics of the 
market, technology, communication networks and social exchange […]”. Nevertheless, any reference 
to formal or informal cooperation further in this work does not deal with this definition. Namely, this 
study  does  not  regard  the  formation  of  communication  networks  and  social  exchange  outside 
governmental  issues,  rather  it  concerns  the  exercise  of  public  power in  the  field  of  cross-border 
cooperation. In this regard, the mention of informal actions is seen as those exercised outside from 
proper legal instruments.  
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analysis of territorial cooperation. In fact, other cross-cutting issues are spread within 
the study. In particular,  the relation between levels  of government,  the impact  of 
super-national  legal  orders  and  the  development  of  suitable  principle  for  the 
multilevel governance represent a sort of constant presence. 
The analysis of the different aspects that have been taken into consideration 
and the following drafting have been conducted through the study of the literature 
available on the topic and through the examination of various legal texts. Moreover, 
the (brief) working-experience at the Committee of the Regions and at the Congress 
of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities  of  the  Council  of  Europe  has  been extremely 
useful in order to favour a more aware comprehension of the argument concerned. 
These experiences have conferred an added value to the personal reflections about 
territorial  cooperation.  In  particular,  it  has  been  observed  that  the  legal 
acknowledgements  need  a  constant  political  will  in  order  to  be  implemented. 
Moreover,  the effective application of the new instruments such as the European 
Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) or the European Cooperation Grouping 
(ECG) require a persistent action both at European and at  national level for their 
extensive application and development. 
2. Terminology
2.1. A complex and multiple terminology
As far as this study aims to give some clarifications about essential concepts, 
the  analysis  of  territorial  cooperation  imposes a  digression  on the terminological 
aspect in this sense. One of the first difficulties related to the study of the argument 
concerned emerges in relation to the semantic  approach. Moreover,  it  is  better to 
specify  in  advance  that  this  semantic  approach  knows  also  some  variations 
depending on the language concerned3. Thus, the following digression doesn't have 
an all-comprehensive intent with regard to the various possible linguistic differences.
3 As an example, the English terms “cross-border” or “transfrontier” could be easily translated with 
the  same  meaning  of  the  French  “transfrontalière”,  the  Italian  “transfrontaliera”  or  the  German 
“grenzüberschreitend”, while the French neologism created by Levrat “transfrontière” is not easy to 
translate into English.
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As already mentioned, territorial cooperation is a multiform phenomenon and 
has different terms of identification. The use of the adjective “territorial” is quite new 
and derives mainly form the EU's experience4. The term “territorial cooperation” is 
applied in this survey as a general  and major “container” in order to individuate 
various transfrontier activities between sub-national authorities. Thus, it necessarily 
implies the concept of activities or relations that overcome national borders. 
At the time of writing the term “territorial”, used as adjective for cooperation 
between sub-national entities, is not a common or conventional indicator for every 
kind of cross-border activities yet. Since it is a new and general concept related to 
the European Union's  approach,  this is  not  the same for the Council  of Europe's 
system or for the various national  legislations involved.  However,  the expression 
“territorial cooperation” will be utilized in the course of this work for the reason that 
it  seems the best conventional way and the less confusing manner to analyse and 
identify the object of the present research. In any case, some cautions have to be 
applied when using the term territorial cooperation. Namely, it doesn't represent the 
sole term to distinguish the phenomenon. In fact,  among a quite large amount of 
adjectives, it has been only recently utilised in official documents and it is still a non-
harmonized concept, while the most part of the documents considered, in particular 
those not pertaining to the EU sphere, deals with other adjectives. To be precise, 
“territorial  cooperation”  doesn't  necessarily  imply  a  peculiar  legal  connotation, 
especially  for  the  case  it  is  not  linked  to  the  EC  Regulation  on  the  European 
Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), rather it aims to categorize a specific 
phenomenon,  which  take  place  in  various  forms.  In  this  sense,  an  expression 
originally  born  as  a  typical  EU  concept,  could  identify  a  broader  European 
phenomenon.
What it is called “territorial cooperation” is originally known as transfrontier 
or  cross-border  cooperation.  The  first  relations  between  sub-national  authorities 
begun, quite understandably, for reasons that were functional to proximity, thus, they 
were essentially  and factually cross-border.  Transfrontier  cooperation traditionally 
identifies, as well, the same kind of relations as a form of cooperative neighbourhood 
4 See A. PAPISCA, L'avvento del Gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale, GECT. Nuovi orizzonti  
per la multilevel governance democratica, in  A. PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione 
territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, Venezia, 2009, p. 15.
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along  the  same  border.  After  a  first  phase,  cooperation  between  sub-national 
authorities knew also a more complex way to develop common actions, namely not 
necessary  bounded  to  the  contiguity  of  the  territory.  Different  terms  have  been 
applied without a really clear distinction. The use of different expressions has not 
been harmonised or conventionally established, neither from a substantial nor form a 
legal point of view. As a result, after a long experience, the structure of cooperation 
across the national borders is, still nowadays, far form being well framed both from 
the legal and from the lexical point of view. Up to now, a middling amount of legal 
solutions have to be added to a huge informal praxis, which is not based on strictly 
normative documents. Moreover,  these different forms of cooperation – legal and 
non-legal  –  are  not  framed  or  determined  by  uniform  concepts,  so  that  the 
identification  of  a  precise  type  of  cooperation  is  not  easy.  With  regard  to  this 
situation, the choice to use the comprehensive expression of territorial cooperation 
has, rather than a theoretical ground, a reason of convenience.
Trying to outline the most general features of territorial cooperation, it has to 
be said, firstly, that it represents a dynamic process, rather than a static phenomenon, 
which  is  characterized  by  relationships  among  local  communities  or  authorities, 
mostly located along land or maritime borders5. Actually, the very first term used in 
informative,  political  and  legal  documents  is,  more  intuitively,  “cross-border”  or 
“transfrontier”. The image of cross-border cooperation is, at a first glance, instinctual 
and it doesn't apparently appoint a very complex concept. However, several different 
relations  have  been  developed  in  the  panorama  of  cross-border  cooperation  and 
various instruments have been used to legitimize this kind of activities across the 
borders. However, the issue of terminology is not a superfluous problem, indeed, and 
requires to be shortly examined. The adjective “cross-border” is not the only one that 
has been used for identifying cooperative activities between local public or private 
subjects as members of different States, such being straddle at least one frontier. It 
has to be observed that territorial issues have marked, and still mark, not only the EU 
field,  but  even other geo-legal  fields,  such as the Council  of Europe (CoE).  The 
increasing  role  of  this  topic  at  European  level,  has  progressively  brought  to  a 
5 See MISSION OPÉRATIONELLE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE (MOT), Practical Guide to Transfrontier Co-operation, 
Council of Europe, 2006, p. 9. MOT, founded in 1997, is a network composed of at least 30 groups of 
delegated elected by local authorities or communities locate along French borders and involved within 
the development of cross-border projects regarding metropolitan, rural and natural areas. 
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rationalisation of the terms. In this sense, it has not been found a shared conceptual 
identification for transfrontier/cross-border cooperation, but some expressions have 
prevailed over other terms and a slow systematization of the semantic approach has 
begun.
The  concept  of  territorial  cooperation  is  the  newest  linguistic  expression, 
however the use of other terms needs also to be taken into consideration during this 
study, as long as many documents made, and still make reference to these various 
terms. In particular the word “transfrontier” has been used for the first European 
common legal framework in the Madrid Outline Convention adopted by the Council 
of Europe in 1980 and has been used by subsequent international treaties on the 
matter.  Nowadays  “transfrontier”  cooperation  is  the  main  general  term  utilized 
within the CoE's terminology and is still inserted in the upcoming documents6. 
Regarding  the  terminology  firstly  used  in  the  EU's  documents7,  the 
development  of  several  kinds  of  cooperation  has  highlighted  the  existence  of 
different  basic  terms:  transfrontier  cooperation8,  inter-territorial  cooperation9,  
transnational cooperation10, cross-border cooperation11, interregional cooperation.  
According to the studies promoted by the Committee of the Regions, the mentioned 
6 As we will  see,  the  CoE's  documents  also  utilise  the  term “inter-territorial”  cooperation  when 
dealing with relations between non contiguous territorial communities. However, on the basis of a 
general analysis of the documents concerned, it is possible to say that the major general term used by 
the CoE is that of “transfrontier cooperation”.
7 Primarily,  it  is  useful  to  remind  the terminology used  by  the  Committee  of  the  Regions.  This 
Institution, even if not affected with mandatory powers, is deeply interested in the development and 
implementation  of  territorial  cooperation,  mainly  among  territorial  communities  such  as 
municipalities and regions. 
8 See COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS, La coopération transeuropéenne entre collectivités territoriales, cit., p. 34, 
where  the  term  “transfrontier  cooperation”  is  intended  as  that  associating  at  least  two territorial 
neighbouring powers (regional or local communities), which stand on geographically continuous areas 
along a common border.   
9 Ibid.,  p. 35:  “Inter-territorial  cooperation draws bilateral,  trilateral or multilateral collaborations, 
which are widely and essentially structured among local and regional communities, not necessarily 
linked by strict geographical neighbourhood”; for instance, let's think to twin cities. It is to mention 
that the term “interterritorial” is often used as synonym of “interregional”. 
10 Ibid., p. 36-39. The concept of “transnational cooperation” is mainly developed in regard to the 
promotion of  a  more  integrated  territorial  development  between  contiguous geographical  areas  or 
groups of regions and, in some ways, along, at least,  two EU Member States or contiguous third 
countries.  The original  tri-partition between transfrontier,  interterritorial  and transnational  saw the 
addition  of  another  element,  namely  the  so-called  cooperation  among  European  associations  of  
regional  and  local  communities. Associations  formed  by  local  or  regional  communities  cover 
activities and interventions representing a supplementary and complementary form of transfrontier, 
interregional or transnational cooperation, which are distinguishable, case by case, on the basis of the 
different activities and subjects involved. However, this last form has not a peculiar value for this 
survey.
11 Mentioned in Article 265 TEC.
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concepts  have,  even  with  some  distinctions,  something  in  common.  Since 
cooperation is often qualified as bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, this doesn't denote 
a  peculiar  characteristic  of  differentiation.  An  element  of  distinction,  rather,  is 
considered with regard to the geographical position of the actors of cooperation. In 
particular,  this  difference  has  traditionally  been  observed  in  the  geographical 
contiguity or non-contiguity. Another differential element concerns the development 
of  some  types  of  EC  programmes,  which  are  specifically  elaborated  only  for 
determined scopes12. However, the implementation of Community programmes do 
not  individuate  an  autonomous  category  of  cooperation,  rather  they  fit  into  the 
already  mentioned  forms,  depending  on  the  modalities  and  territorial  extension 
involved in the cooperation13. In any case, as the further chapters demonstrates, the 
programmes developed under the Community initiative have played a fundamental 
role in the development of territorial cooperation. 
After the entry into force of the Regulation (EC) 1082/2006 on a European 
Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, a new terminological element has to be added 
to  the  previous  categories  of  cooperation.  In  particular,  the  concept  of  territorial 
cooperation has  been rationalized in  a  well-defined legal  instrument  and aims at 
comprehending,  without  replacing,  cross-border,  transnational  and  interregional 
cooperation.  The  introduction  of  this  new term has  been mainly  fostered  by  the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) and by the European Parliament (EP) as a new 
overall term in order to identify different existing transfrontier relations. At a first 
glance,  the notion of  territorial  cooperation seems to  be much broader  and more 
vague than the previous ones. According to our opinion, the reasons justifying the 
adoption of the new concept at Community level are twofold. On the one hand, the 
development of the EU's approach related to regional policies and cohesion policies 
brought  to  an  official  territorial  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  attempt, 
coming form the EU institutions, to give a major uniformity to the phenomenon of 
cooperation between territorial communities. The effective realization of this attempt 
remains, however, quite difficult because new instruments and new approaches to 
12 For  example,  the  INTERREG  Initiative  and  subsequent  modifications,  which  will  be  widely 
analysed further.
13 INTERREG, INTERREG II A and INTERREG III A are a model of transfrontier cooperation; 
INTERREG II C and INTERREG III B deal with transnational  cooperation; INTERREG III C is 
qualified as interregional cooperation.
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territorial cooperation do not substitute the traditional concepts of cooperation and, 
therefore,  need  to  coexist  with  them14.  Thus,  the  imposition  of  an  official  and 
conventional  terminology  is  not  easily  enforceable,  in  particular  when  the  legal 
references and soft law-documents are also quite confusing and still linked to the 
original expressions.
In this regard, it is interesting to observe that at the EU level the term cross-
border is mentioned in the English version of TEC at Article 265, pararagraph 1, as 
modified by the Amsterdam Treaty15, whereas in other legal and non-legal documents 
the use of the other terms – transfrontier, inter-territorial, transnational – is preferred 
in  order indicate  a precise  type of cooperation and avoiding the reference to the 
general  term “cross-border”16.  As observed,  the  attempt of  a  legal  harmonization 
through the new Regulation on EGTC did not lead to a semantic uniformity yet.
Moreover,  it  has  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  terminology  concerning 
transfrontier relations between territorial communities has been originally shaped by 
the semantic distinctions drawn by the Council of Europe (CoE)17. This institution, as 
it is possible to observe from different documents, makes a major use of the term 
transfrontier  in order to highlight common activities among authorities or subjects 
separated  by  one  or  more  borders.  Nevertheless  the  expression  cross-border 
cooperation  is  substantially  recognised  as  a  synonym.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
14 See  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European  Grouping  f  Territorial  Cooperation  –  EGTC –  
Bruxelles, 2007, p. 17. In this regard: “[…] the practitioners consulted during the writing of this study 
did not seem overly enthused by the new name, and most of them announced that, for now, they 
would continue to use the terminology they employed before, unless they were to form an EGTC”.
15 Art. 265, par. 1 TEC: “The Committee of the Regions shall be consulted by the Council or by the 
Commission where this Treaty so provides and in all other cases, in particular those which concern 
cross-border cooperation, in which one of these two institutions considers it appropriate”.
16 A terminological curiosity  coming from the comparison of the different official  EC languages 
points out that the adjectives “transfrontier” and “cross-border”, used with some semantic undertone, 
are  translated  in  French  respectively  with   “transfrontaliére”  and  “transfrontiére”,  whereas  they 
correspond in  Italian  to  the  only term “transfrontaliera”.  This  brief  digression represents  a  banal 
example,  but  symptomatic,  to  doubt  the  real  effectiveness  and  usefulness  of  such  a  kind  of 
terminological distinctions.
17 The term  “transfrontier  cooperation”  is  the  only  one  which  is  drew in  the  European  Outline 
Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, signed in 
Madrid on the 21st of May 1980 and entered into force on the 22nd of December 1998. The adjective 
“interterritorial” comes out in the Second Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention, approved in 
1998.  Within  the  CoE,  transfrontier  cooperation is  meant  as  an  activity  “between  territorial 
communities  or  authorities  in  a  geographical  area  that  spans  a  border  between  two countries.  It 
concerns frontier zones”, while interterritorial cooperation is represented by “relations between non 
contiguous  territorial  communities  or  authorities  located  in  different  countries”,  see  C.  RICQ, 
Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2006, p. 40, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/documentation/library/transfrontie
r_cooperation/tfc_handbookTC2006_EN.pdf.
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reference to  interterritorial cooperation  has been introduced in order to deal with 
cooperation between geographically non contiguous communities.  Furthermore, the 
development of new legal instruments within the CoE has quite recently introduced 
the  concept  of  “euro-regional  cooperation”18 with  regard  to  the  potential  future 
implementation of the so-called Euroregional Cooperation Grouping (ECG). 
All  the  mentioned  expressions,  referring  to  relations  across  the  national 
borders, do not certainly contribute to a simplification and to a better understanding 
of the whole issue. In addition, they contribute neither to an easier individuation of 
the kind of activity involved, nor to a legal categorisation of cooperation. 
Furthermore, another semantic dichotomy among the terminology of the CoE 
– which is,  apparently, less formalistic  –  and that  of the EU, more tortuous and 
complex,  remains open.  Namely,  both institutions have  a  different  terminological 
approach  referring  to  the  general  terms  “transfrontier”  or  “cross-border”,  which 
could  be  substantially  considered  as  synonyms.  The  CoE  applies  the  term 
“transfrontier” in the field of cooperation between contiguous territorial communities 
or authorities belonging to different States and separated by a common border. The 
Committee of the Regions, and the other EU institutions, make use of the adjective 
“cross-border”  in  order  to  indicate  the  cooperation  among contiguous regions  of 
different  States  in  the  view  of  the  implementation  of  Community  initiatives 
programmes19. In this sense, the terminology of territorial cooperation within the EU 
is in a peculiar relation with the regional policies of the Community.
Conclusively,  this  brief  report  on  terminology  describes  a  very  complex 
semantic panorama about territorial cooperation. The purpose of the present work 
doesn’t consist in the personal suggestion of a semantic systematization, even if a 
major uniformity would be desirable,  in particular  between the EU and the CoE. 
Concerning  the  further  development  of  this  work,  the  option  suggested  at  the 
beginning  of  the  paragraph  will  be  followed.  Namely,  the  term  “territorial 
cooperation” will be used as a general and most updated terminological designation 
for the phenomenon under analysis. However, the utilization of other terms, such as 
18 See the Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention.
19 See  Committee  of  Experts  on  Transfrontier  Co-operation,  Similarities  and  differences  of  
instrument and policies of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the field of Transfrontier  
Co-operation, Council of Europe, 2006, p. 10, available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/documentation/library/transfrontie
r_cooperation/tfc_SadowskiReport2006_EN.pdf.
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“cross-border”  or  “transfrontier”,  should  not  be  considered  as  a  mistake  or  as 
inaccuracy. In fact, the analysis of the earlier instruments of cooperation requires the 
references to those terms. 
2.2. Does a semantic distinction legally matter?
While  it  is  possible  to  delineate  some  basic  common  understandings  in 
relation to  the  terminological  aspect  of  territorial  cooperation,  there  is  still  some 
confusion. This confusion, in particular, has some grounds in the misunderstanding 
of theoretical concepts. In fact, there is a general incorrect mixing up of two different 
elements:  the  description  of  cooperation  as  a  factual  phenomenon  and  the  legal 
instruments  related  to  that  phenomenon.  The  different  terms  related  to  territorial 
cooperation  are  used  to  designate  several  elements:  material  phenomena, 
governance's  means  and  legal  instruments.  However,  there  is  not  a  real  legal 
consequence in this differentiation affecting the instruments of cooperation between 
sub-national subjects. With other words, there is no bi-univocal correlation between 
the expressions used for a determined phenomenon and the related legal aspects: i.e. 
cross-border cooperation,  as a form of cooperation between contiguous territorial 
communities,  is  not  identified  through  typical  legal  instruments  or  binding  legal 
means. 
In  particular,  the  geographical  distinction  between  contiguous  and  non-
contiguous territories, which seems to be considered as one of the most important 
distinctions among different types of cooperation,  is  not understandable from the 
legal perspective. As N. Levrat explicitly explains, the element of contiguity or non-
contiguity (an the related terms) does not qualify a different kind of cooperation in 
legal terms20. 
The  fact  that  cooperation  between  contiguous  authorities  seems  to  be 
something  different  in  nature  is  only  an  appearance  due  to  a  quantitative 
development of the phenomenon21, but it  doesn't have a qualitative impact on the 
20 See  N. LEVRAT,  Droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, Paris, 1995, p. 145 et seq. To be precise, Levrat proposes this evaluation in 
relation to the geographical criteria of cooperation and not within a dissertation about the semantic 
approach. Anyway, it seems to be appropriate to quote this relevant statement even in relation to the 
terminological issue, which is really connected to the geographical approach.
21 Cooperation between contiguous territorial community is, actually, the most common and therefore 
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legal  solutions  for  the  implementation  of  cooperation.  In  fact,  for  quite  easily 
comprehensible  reasons,  cooperation  between  physical  neighbours  is  numerically 
more developed than cooperation between non-neighbours. 
In this sense, it is possible to give conventional definitions in order remark 
the geographical difference. However, such a distinction has no relevance from a 
strictly legal point of view, because it does not change the legal dimension for sub-
national  authorities  to  act  outside  the  respective  national  borders.  Namely,  this 
evaluation  concerns  the  same  actors  of  the  cooperation,  i.e.  the  sub-national 
authorities,  and  there  is  no  substantial  legal  difference  if  cooperation  is  played 
between communities along a common frontier or not. Maybe the political reasons 
for  the  establishment  of  cooperation  are  different,  but  not  the  process  of 
legitimization  for  sub-national  authorities  or  the  legal  instruments  applied  for 
transfrontier activities. What makes a relevant difference are, instead, the procedures 
and the means used to set up the cooperation. Therefore, the creation of different 
terminologies  is  quite  confusing  for  the  understanding  of  the  effects  and  the 
consequences related the instruments used and the solutions proposed. 
Thus,  the  most  utilized  terms  (cross-border,  transfrontier,  transnational, 
Euroregional,  inter-territorial,  territorial),  do  actually  have  some significance  and 
some conventional meanings, but not in legal terms. Anyway, trying to select the 
most common and general words to utilize during this legal study in addiction to the 
term “territorial cooperation”, it is possible to consider the adjectives “cross-border” 
and “transfrontier” as the most suitable ones because of their broad, comprehensive 
and self  explaining meaning.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  keep in  mind that they 
generally  are  used  with  a  specific  geographical  connotation.  In  order  to  find  a 
general and non-confusing term, N. Levrat proposes the French word “cooperation 
transfrontière”, instead of the traditional adjective “transfrontalière”. 
This new term has the privilege not to have been abused or confused and to 
draw clearly the concept of a “cooperation that crosses a national border”, without 
necessarily been connected with the idea of geographical contiguity22. Actually, this 
French term doesn't have a proper English translation. But, as far as we agree with 
the number of relations is quantitatively higher in comparison to cooperation between non-contiguous 
communities.
22 Ibid., p. 152 et seq.
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the proposed interpretation, we suggest to use the newest concept of “territorial” in 
the same sense. Anyway, the utilisation of “cross-border” and “transfrontier” has to 
be considered suitable together with the main category of “territorial”.
2.3. Why to choose the term “territorial”?
Despite  the  substantial  legal  indifference  regarding  the  semantic  approach 
towards cooperation across borders, a common term of reference is recommendable 
for two reasons. The first reason concerns the practical utility of having a common 
term of reference. The second has a more theoretical implication, thus, residing in the 
need to find a unique concept for the constituent factors (institutional subjects and 
geographical  space)  involved  in  common  territorial  transfrontier  activities  that 
concern  an  individuated  geographical  space,  notwithstanding  the  presence  of 
borders23.
Occasionally  some  documents  report  the  expression  “trans-european 
cooperation”,  but  the  word  has  not  became  a  common  term  of  reference24. 
“Territorial”  officially  compares  only  in  EU documents:  the  official  texts  of  the 
cohesion  policy  2007-20013  foresee  a  “Territorial  cooperation  objective”,  the 
Regulation  No  1082/2006  creates  the  instrument  of  the  “European  Grouping  of 
Territorial  Cooperation”,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  explicitly  introduces  the  concept  of 
“territorial cohesion”. Other soft-law documents mention the term. Using a concept 
that mainly concerns the EU level, could be perceived as partial or limited point of 
view. However, according to our opinion, “territorial cooperation” could be a suitable  
concept for a conventional uniform terminology. The following observations intend 
to clarify this choice. 
Of course, it is quite patent that the word “territorial” doesn't have a peculiar 
descriptive attitude in order to individuate the phenomena that take place in form of 
transfrontier relations between sub-national authorities. In fact, it has more general 
and  “neutral”  implications.  The  first  meaning  of  territorial  cooperation  doesn't 
23 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, Madrid, 
2008, p. 47.
24 Some institutional studies utilizes the mentioned expression, for example see  COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS,  The  Status  quo  of  Transeuropean  Co-operation  between  Territorial  Authorities  and  the  
Future Steps that contribute to realise a New Model of European Governance, study developed by J. 
Gabbe, Th. Stumm, Gronau, 2001.
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remind prima facie to presence of a border, thus, it doesn't evoke the primary aspect 
of this kind of relations, which is, in fact, the overcoming of a national border. In this 
sense, the term suggested by N. Levrat –  cooperation transfrontière – has both a 
strong descriptive and theoretical ground. On the same trend, other terms have been 
proposed in order to replace the different terminology in use for having a unique 
standard semantic references. One concept that has been used is “cooperation beyond 
borders  (cbb)”25,  which  describes  a  non-temporary  transfrontier  activity  between 
public or semi-public subjects acting outside the state intergovernmental law. As far 
as this and other similar expressions have a strong theoretical and descriptive ground, 
they reveal their limitation of being proposed only within the academic sphere or, at 
least, by external observers: they do not derive from the active subjects dealing with 
cross-border  relations.  From  a  certain  point  of  view,  this  occurrence  could  be 
considered as positive, insofar as these kind of terminology is created by competent 
and  “neutral”  subjects.  Moreover,  the  terms proposed have  the nature of  general 
collectors and they are not limited to a geographic scope. However, according to our 
opinion, it is quite difficult to introduce one of these terms in the concrete praxis of 
transfrontier  cooperation  in  order  to  propose  it  as  a  general  conventional 
denomination for the phenomenon under analysis. With other words, the alternative 
terms that has been mentioned are somehow outside the development of the concrete 
phenomenon, they are not part of it.
On the contrary, the adjective “territorial”, as the partner of “cooperation”, 
derives  directly  from  the  concrete  experience  and  from  the  long  experience  of 
interaction  between  the  daily  praxis  and  the  legal  instruments.  “Territorial 
cooperation”  is  the  product  of  a  complex  and  complicated  process,  that  hasn't 
reached an end yet. Of course, it is necessary to be aware that the expression has 
been developed only at  EU level  (thus,  not  by the  Council  of  Europe or  by the 
national or sub-national levels) and that at the moment it's not going to replace the 
other existing terms, such as cross-border, transnational or interregional. However, it 
reflects and summarizes the newest approach towards cooperation across the borders 
25 See J. MAIER,  European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) – Regions’ new instrument  
for ‘Co-operation beyond borders’. A new approach to organize multi-level governance facing old  
and new obstacles,  2008,  http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx,  p.  5  et  seq.  Cbb is 
defined as "any concerted initiative or action going beyond national state borders, in which public 
authorities or semi-public organisations are regularly involved and which is not exclusively part of 
actions of states acting within intergovernmental law". 
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that is typical of the European dimension26. A fundamental change has shaped the 
approach  to  transfrontier  cooperation:  the  main  attention  has  shifted  from  the 
essential role of the national borders to the concept of territory. With this meaning, 
however, the neologism “territorial cooperation” doesn't  eliminate the presence of 
borders. The frontier is no more explicitly mentioned, but it is somehow gobbled up 
and assimilated as element of territorial cooperation without being the protagonist. 
The  legal  instruments  have,  as  well,  carefully  followed  this  attitude  in  order  to 
correspond to a phenomenon, which is characterized by a strong variety, but which 
also requires some general standards and common references. 
The expression “territorial cooperation” permits also to update the public-law 
notion  of  “territoriality”,  which  is  traditionally  bound  to  the  national  borders. 
According  to  the  traditional  doctrine,  the  principle  of  territoriality  “means  that 
regulative activities normally 'end' at the borders of the institution empowered to do 
so”27.  Thus,  when referred to cooperation,  the territory and the regulative powers 
play a more dynamic role.
3. Territorial cooperation as an object of study
3.1. The development of territorial cooperation beyond the State
Territorial  cooperation  started  in  the  form  of  de  facto  cross-border  or 
transfrontier cooperation, which represent the mostly common expressions for this 
subject. In fact, the development of this phenomenon spread out for reasons related 
to the geographic contiguity of territorial communities. Many academic disciplines 
have dealt with the theme of cooperation across the borders in Europe. Namely, this 
phenomenon  has  its  origin  in  the  need  to  find  solutions  to  practical  common 
problems,  including  environment,  water  supply,  natural  disasters,  waste 
management,  transports,  work-,  social-  and  minority-issues.  Since  a  long  time 
26 “Cooperation, which was originally cross-border, and is now territorial, is an intrinsic and distinct 
factor of European integration”, see COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial  
Cooperation  –  EGTC  –,  Study  carried  out  by  GEPE  under  the  supervision  of  Prof  N.  Levrat, 
Bruxelles, 2007, p. 55.
27 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The Status quo of Transeuropean Co-operation between Territorial  
Authorities and the Future Steps that contribute to realise a New Model of European Governance, cit., 
p. 11.
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politicians, practitioners and scholars – economists, sociologists, political scientists 
and, maybe more gradually, lawyers – get involved in the matter. Numerous interests 
are concerned with activities across the borders, for the simple fact that problems do 
not strictly follow the border-lines to be solved, rather they need common solutions 
in order to give a practical and effective response28. In this regard, an appropriate 
question is whether territorial cooperation could represent an autonomous object of 
study or whether it is formed by the sum those disciplines to which it is related case 
by  case.  Albeit  not  necessarily  persuasive,  the  possible  answer  deals  with  the 
capacity of territorial cooperation to constitute a fundamental way to find common 
solutions to problems and, in this sense, an essential component dealing with issues 
that are common to entities belonging, at least, to two different States. Analysing the 
phenomenon of territorial cooperation requires to focus the attention on its concrete 
subjects  and  objects.  Starting  from  the  second  element,  territories  are  primary 
recipients of transfrontier activities, as well as tasks of European integration29. In this 
regard the principal subjects which are responsible for specific territories are public 
bodies, invested by determined competences to exercise proper powers within these 
territories.  Moreover,  several  times the territorial  concern and the power-exercise 
display a necessary trans-border involvement. 
Dealing  with  questions  or  problems  that  are  settled  “across  the  national 
borders”, the existence of an international dimension is undoubted, even if restricted 
at  local  or  regional  level.  However,  such  geographically-limited  and  locally-
concerning problems have been rather  very relevant  for the central  authorities in 
terms of national foreign policy.  According to this statement,  a major role in the 
development of territorial cooperation has been carried out, even beyond the action 
and  the  powers  of  single  States30,  by  sub-national  actors,  supported  by  the 
progressive  encouragement  of  supranational  and  international  organisations.  The 
28 See F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of  
Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, in  Z.A. SKURBATY (eds.), Beyond a One-Dimensional  
State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 278.
29 In this introductory digression the concept of European integration has to be intended in a broad 
and non-legal sense, thus comprehending the EC and the Council of Europe levels. Being aware that 
these institutions have different tasks, powers and objectives, it can be argued that both persecute, 
albeit in different ways, a general intent of European integration.
30 See J. MARKO, Beyond the Nation-State: Problems of Regionalisation in Western and East Central  
Europe, in R. KICKER, J. MARKO, M. STEINER (eds.), Changing Borders: Legal and Economic Aspects of  
European Enlargement, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p.70.
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development of sub-national activities outside the respective national territories has 
covered a kind of nebulous space regarding the definition and attribution of powers. 
In fact, transfrontier activities emerged in alternative to the traditional unitary action 
of  the State in  the foreign context.  Therefore,  while  non-state entities  have been 
progressively  becoming  the  main  actors  of  territorial  cooperation,  as  the  further 
analysis will reveal, an indisputable assumption cannot forget the essential relation 
with  the State  and the  national  legal  order.  Even after  a  substantial  evolution  of 
cross-border sub-national relations, it is possible to argue that borders are fare away 
form disappearing31,  rather they continue to sign the visible boundary of national 
constitutional orders. However, while territories were once exclusive prerogative of 
the national public power, legitimate territorial approaches are growing even beyond 
the concept of sovereignty32, thus creating a multi-dimensional figure of territorial 
cooperation.
Being  traditionally  an  univocal  function  of  the  States,  territories  seem to 
achieve some degree of self sufficiency as actors within a necessarily compound and 
multi-player system of powers. In this regard, historically and legally unambiguous 
notions  –  such  as  sovereignty,  territory,  State,  constitutional  order,  legal  power, 
exercise  of  competences  –  become necessarily  dynamic  in  the  perspective  of  an 
integrated  and  multilevel  system  of  institutional  subjects,  such  as  regions,  local 
communities, EU, etc., which are lawfully legitimated or informally devoted to take 
actions  dealing  with  the  territorial  dimension.  These  territorial  effects  of  policy 
dynamism  can  be  interpreted  with  the  expression  of  “transnational  governance 
‘above’ and ‘below’ the State, as a “construction of new, alternative spaces of policy-
making”33.  The  involvement  of  sub-national  authorities  within  a  foreign  context 
arises a first theoretical issue, which concerns the legitimacy of such activities. In 
fact,  the   traditional  legal  theory  has  developed  the  paradigm  State-sovereignty-
legitimacy as a linear and innate phenomenology of the exercise of public powers 
31 Ibid. p. 74 : “Borders are not disappearing, they are being reproduced and multiplied. There is no 
withering anyway neither of states nor borders, but the ‘one to one match between state and borders’. 
What is being challenged, thus, is the one-dimensional concept of the nation-state.” 
32 See J.B. HARGUINDÉGUY, La frontière en Europe: un territoire? Coopération transfrontalière franco-
espagnole,  Paris,  2007,  p.  10  and  J.  ANDERSON,  The shifting stage of  politics:  new medieval  and  
postmodern territorialities?, in Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, no. 14(2) 1996, p. 
135.
33 See T. CHRISTIANSEN, K.E. JØRGENSEN, Transnational governance ‘above’ and ‘below’ the state: The 
changing nature of borders in the new Europe, in Regional & Federal Studies, 2000, Vol. 10/2, p. 70.
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outside  the  national  borders.  The  principle  of  the State-unity  in  the  international 
context  is  a  cornerstone  of  public  international  law.  But  new  dynamics  of 
manifestation of public powers seem to partially alter the above mentioned paradigm 
with  the  inclusion  of  other  categories.  In  particular  with  regard  to  territorial 
cooperation,  it  will  be  observed  how  other  forms  of  foreign  relations  could  be 
developed in alternative to the State international relations. Namely, it is a fact that 
sub-national  authorities  develop  foreign  activities.  But  foreign  activities  of  sub-
national  actors  have  progressively  gained  legitimacy  and  emerged  from  a  non-
defined praxis to a new legal rationalization. Moreover, notions like subsidiarity and 
governance (instead  of  government),  if  not  fully  substituting  the  traditional 
expression  of  statehood,  have  introduced  the  space  for  different  and  advanced 
conceptions of power-exercise. Territorial cooperation represents a tangible example 
of  an  effective  and  practical  demonstration  of  such   theoretical  statement.  Thus, 
traditional juridical key-terms are useful for the analysis of cross-border phenomena 
in Europe, for the reason that they represent a parameter for the study of nowadays 
evolving forms of governance. It is quite superfluous to spend many words about the 
fact that concepts like  Nation-State and  sovereignty have lost the prominent legal 
position  they  had  in  the  past.  So  far,  other  legal  elements  like  legitimacy and 
subsidiarity,  efficacy  and  efficiency increased their role among public lawyers34. A 
very relevant field of investigation consists in the attempt to evaluate the potential 
accountability  deficit  within  the  growing  exercise  of  transnational  regulatory 
power35.
3.2. A legal approach to territorial cooperation
Although transfrontier  relations gain a growing importance,  there is  not  a 
common  classification  or  systematization  of  the  phenomenon  from  a  legal 
perspective yet36. Nowadays territorial cooperation is a miscellaneous ensemble of 
praxis, good neighbourhood-relations, legal documents and non-binding agreements. 
34 See  R. SCHOBBEN,  ‘New governance’ in the European Union: a cross-disciplinary comparison, in 
Regional & Fedreal Studies, 10:2, 2000, p. 42.
35 See B. KINGSBURY, N. KRISCH, R.B. SEWART, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, in Law & 
Contemporary Problems, 2005, p. 16. 
36 See  Comité  des  Régions,  La  coopération  transeuropéenne  entre  collectivités  territoriales, 
Bruxelles, 2001, p. 26.
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Since the late Fifties a numerous amount of transfrontier structures has been created 
at regional and local level. However, it is difficult to find common features, as most 
of the time they differ in size, competences, financing means and juridical status37.
Despite  the  huge  variety  of  legal  components  concerning  territorial 
cooperation, some basic factors represent fundamental notions for its comprehension 
as a form of sub-national capability. With regard to the general context of territorial 
cooperation, the first two main legal aspects concerning relations between foreign 
sub-national authorities are the following: the rules about the legitimacy/capacity of 
sub-national authorities to develop territorial cooperation and the rules applicable to 
the cooperation between foreign sub-national authorities. In this sense, it is important 
to  to  distinguish  the  two  mentioned  legal  elements,  in  order  to  understand  the 
peculiarity of the matter and its multidimensional legal nature.
Concerning the first issue – the law founding sub-national competence to deal 
with territorial cooperation – it is worth to anticipate that it is necessarily connected 
to  the  national  constitutional  systems  and  to  the  powers  of  sub-national  entities 
within the respective national legal order: a very clear and detailed analysis has been 
developed by N. Levrat and will be briefly mentioned further on38. The second issue 
– the law applicable to the relations or agreements of territorial cooperation – could 
derive both from national laws and from super-national contexts. In general, the law 
applicable  to  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-national  subjects  has  a  more 
dynamic character, because new legal forms and instruments for cooperation are still 
under development. What is important to keep in mind is the possibility that such 
relations could have effects not only between the subjects of cooperation, but also 
towards third parties, mainly other institutional subjects and individuals, which also 
concern the law applicable to territorial cooperation.
Beside  those  fundamental  elements,  the  legal  analysis  of  territorial 
cooperation  between  sub-national  actors  involves  other  cross-cutting  issues.  In 
particular, as far as it is an undoubted fact that sub-national actors get involved in 
37 See J. GABBE, V.  VON MALKUS ET AL. , Cooperation between European border regions: review and  
perspectives, Baden-Baden, 2008, p. 45-49, where a very complete list of transfrontier structures is 
individuated. Between 1958 and 2007 around 130 cross-border subjects have been established in order 
to foster  common programmes and projects.  Gabbe and Malkus identify  specific problems in the 
functioning of these bodies mainly due to “inability to convert [their] ideas into concrete projects, 
since frequently political problems and jurisdictional difficulties still need to be overcome”.
38 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, Paris, 1995.
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transfrontier activities, the existence of a correspondent capability in legal terms has 
not to be taken for granted. With other words, an essential question concerns whether 
sub-national  entities  are  entitled  to  develop  cross-border  activities39 according  to 
some  codified  legal  parameters.  And,  in  case  of  a  positive  answer,  the  further 
question concerns the correct individuation of such legal parameters. Moreover, in 
addiction  to  the  last  enquiry,  another  point  is  relevant  for  a  legal  approach  to 
territorial  cooperation.  Namely,  the  dynamic  between  national  and  supranational 
legal orders to develop suitable legal tools and the subsequent involvement of sub-
state authorities are very current arguments. 
Within this scenery, approaching territorial cooperation form a legal point of 
view seems to  be,  however,  still  quite  a  challenge,  firstly,  because  ad hoc  legal 
instruments  do  not  often  appear  as  the  favourite  tool  to  carry  on  transfrontier 
activities40. The second reason is represented by the difficulty to find shared common 
legal  measures among the actors of cross-border activities. As strictly legal  tools 
often lack flexibility,  most of the times flexible and non-codified instruments are 
preferred.  The  models  of  partnerships  and  working  communities,  which  do  not 
generate true legal obligations between the contracting parties, offer a good example 
in order to demonstrate the clear intention of public authorities to cooperate, but at 
the same time their intention to recur to soft structures for cooperation. In any case, 
the progressive development of sub-national relations shows the necessity of clearer 
and suitable legal frameworks for sub-national authorities in order to undertake long-
term structured activities. Devoted to an objective of public advantage, the definition 
of  common  legal  instruments  for  territorial  cooperation  is,  thus,  considered  to 
incorporate some added value41 in comparison to the sum of distinct actions taken by 
single actors. In this regard, the concept of  “added value” has to be analysed at the 
same time with the development of legal instruments, in order to have a whole image 
of the efficiency and efficacy of the measures provided. 
39 For such an hint of reflection see F. PALERMO, Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave  
comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, Padova 1999, p. 1.
40 Ibid.,  p.  180:  “[…]  il  faut  bien  comprendre  que  développer  des  structures  transfrontalières 
n’équivant pas à créer des strates administratives ou entités juridiques nouvelles […]”. 
41 See J. GABBE, V.  VON MALKUS et al.,  Cooperation between European border regions: review and 
perspectives, cit., p. 26-27, where several aspects of added value are mentioned, such as European, 
political, institutional, socio-economic, socio cultural. From another point of view the question arises, 
whether it is also possible to speak about a legal added value. The ongoing research will try to find a 
satisfying answer.
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The  legal  analysis  is  also  relevant  to  other  two  topics,  such  as  the 
individuation  of  the  most  appropriate  institutional  level  to  implement  territorial 
cooperation and the impact of public powers in relation to European integration and 
territorial management. These two issues are, then, deeply connected to the concepts 
of subsidiarity and multilevel governance (MLG). As both aspects seem to be quite 
overused,  however,  they  couldn’t  be  left  aside  from  the  analysis  of  territorial 
cooperation in Europe, since directly dealing with the exercise of competences and 
public powers. 
In this sense, what could be a typical political/sociological topic concerning 
power exercise  and multilevel  governance,  has  also great  relevance  for  the legal 
analysis42.  In particular,  the role  of peculiar  juridical  concepts is  relevant for this 
legal  approach.  Namely,  the  effects  of  normative  regulation,  the  attribution  of 
competences, the legitimacy of public authorities to exercise these competences, the 
role of supranational powers with regard to their influences on the national legal 
orders,  the  autonomy-rights  of  sub-national  communities,  the  coincidence  of 
territories with State-borders, and similar themes, are decisively linked with the legal 
factors of territorial cooperation. 
By  the  way,  it  seems  of  extreme  interest  to  understand  if  and  how  the 
European Union and sub-national entities, respectively, have the power to regulate 
the  territorial  phenomenon  or  to  enact  transfrontier  activities  beyond  the  State 
exclusive right to sovereignty. A positive or negative answer is full of symptomatic 
consequences,  given the  fact  that  cooperation  between sub-national  authorities  is 
currently a consolidated reality. 
As already mentioned, territorial cooperation is a complex and fragmented 
phenomenon.  In  this  regard,  it  is  however  quite  hard  to  clarify  the  cause-effect 
42 The concept of governance is used with reference to the “institutional” definition given by the EC 
White Paper on European Governance,  where it  is meant as  “rules, processes and behaviour that 
affect the way in which powers are exercised at  European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence”. Apart from this definition, other academic 
definition are structured on a different conception of networking and social phenomena. See R.A.W. 
RHODES,  Foreword,  in J.M.  KICKERT,  E.H.  KLIJN,  J.F.M.  KOPPENJAN (eds.),  Managing  Complex 
Networks, London, 1997, p. XI-XIII. The meaning of an institutional aspect of governance is dealing 
with the idea of authoritative bodies (such as States, regions or local authorities) as primary actors 
among socio-political phenomena, rather than homologous actors as other private subjects. The legal 
meaning subtended regards the capacity and legitimacy of public authorities to enact public regulatory 
powers  as  instrument  of  government,  which  is  rather  different  from the  self-capacity  of  private 
organizational structures to shape socio-economic realities. 
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connections between the fragmented reality of cooperation and the complex system 
of legal means. With other words, it seems superfluous to explain if the existence of 
a complicated reality is the cause for a non-systematized legal background or  vice 
versa. Thus, given the existence of a variegated dimension, the importance of a legal 
approach to territorial cooperation consists mainly in the definition of clear paths for 
the  legitimate  construction  of  sub-national  transfrontier  relations.  The  already 
mentioned capability to exercise public institutional competences represents the first 
pre-condition  in  this  sense.  Secondly,  the  function  of  a  juridical  approach  is 
connected to the possibility of creating legal instruments and conditions, which can 
efficiently  consent  the  development  of  transfrontier  relations  and  find  practical 
regulatory solutions. Moreover, although the existence of legal tools for territorial 
cooperation is not always considered as essential, sub-national authorities, in some 
ways,  often  show a  need  to  refer  to  certain  legal  sources  in  order  to  build  up 
legitimate and transparent activities43.
3.3. Borders still matter
Dealing with the field of territorial cooperation in Europe requires to dedicate 
few words about  the  “silent”  constituent  element  of  this  matter,  i.e.  the  national 
border. In fact, the concept of border (or frontier) represents a necessary assumption 
in  the  analysis  of  cross-border/transfrontier  phenomena.  However,  despite  its 
essential and connotative role, “the border” is often an omitted argument within the 
analysis of territorial cooperation. In this sense, the study of such a vast theme is 
more and more oriented towards the investigation about integration and cooperation 
and the presence  of  borders is,  quite  paradoxically,  viewed as  an imperative but 
negligible  factor.  In  any  case,  despite  the  progressive  European  integration,  the 
function of borders seems to be still  a remarkable  issue.  Namely,  the analysis of 
effective and potential instruments of territorial cooperation is based on the existence 
43 See  COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS,  La  coopération  transeuropéenne  entre  collectivités  territoriales, 
Bruxelles, 2001, p. 181. As this last issue could be intended as exclusively political, it is to say that it  
has also legal implications. Namely, the question of the legitimacy of transfrontier cooperation is a 
core element of the action taken by sub-national actors, since they often need to find a justification for 
the power-exercise,  which is  not  only to be connected to the State-transferred powers, but  to the 
validity of the legal ground per se.
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of invisible lines of separation. These lines have precise legal implications, which 
denote the existence of national territorial realities.
The term “border”, while having a multidisciplinary attitude44, is politically 
and geographically considered as a dividing line between territories. Synonyms like 
frontier, boundary, edge, etc., entail in their ontological essence the idea of limit and 
end,  which  outline  the  presence  of  “something  different”  outside  this  border45. 
Namely, what is “outside” the line doesn’t belong to what is “within”46. In general 
terms, the space surrounded by the same line entails something which is, for different 
reasons, considered as homogeneous. This is true, for instance, in mathematics as 
well as in economics, geography and political science47. Traditionally, the concept of 
territorial  borders  is  strictly  connected  to  the  constitution  and  perception  of  a 
collective identity48 and, mainly with reference to the European historical process, to 
the  formation  of  the  State49.  From a  legal  point  of  view,  the  affirmation  of  the 
national power is directly related to the concept of territory: namely the legal order 
44  D. NEWMAN, Boundaries, Borders and Barriers: Changing Geographic Perspectives on Territorial  
Lines, in M. ALBERT, D. JACOBSON, Y. LAPID (eds.), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International  
Relation Theories, Minneapolis, 2001, p. 137-151. See also M. CACCIARI,  Nomi di luogo: confine, in 
Aut aut, 299-300, 2000, p. 73-79.
45 See S. GADAL, R. JEANSOULIN, Borders, frontiers and limits : some computational concepts beyond 
words, available at the website http://www.cybergeo.eu/index4349.html. According to these authors 
the term “border” contains two main aspects, respectively that of political frontiers and structural 
frontiers. The first concept indicates “the outer line of a surface or a totality of surfaces on which a 
political,  economic,  social  system exerts  its  sovereignty.  Its  layout  is  a  decision  or  a  totality  of 
decisions  that  have  been  taken  by  this  territorial  system  and  is  the  result  of  force  reports, 
confrontations or negotiations with neighbour systems”, while structural frontiers “have a determinist 
character in that they are the result of adjustments of a society to a territory in the course of time, i.e.  
the result of relationships that a society maintains with the space and constraints that exert natural 
objects.  The  location,  the  nature,  the  form of  frontiers  are  determined  by  the  nature  of  spatial 
structures and dynamics of a territory and the geo-historical inheritance. It results from the conjugated 
action of the society and the ecosystem.”
46 With reference to the ancient Greece, the dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion was found between the 
pòlis, where the application of the nòmos was granted, and the spaces outside its borders, which were 
identified as barbarous territories.  In these terms, people who was not recognised as citizens were 
treated differently and defined with the status of bàrbaros.
47 Such an assertion is only partially valid for the legal science, mainly in relation to the citizenship’s 
principles.  Namely,  while  recognising the concept  of a legal order  effective on a certain  territory 
within  determined  borders,  even  the  concept  of  “personal”  right  is  known,  which  founds  its 
application independently from the legal meaning of national frontiers. A concrete example is given 
by the existence of two Peoples – such as Roma and Jewish – representing groups that are not bound 
to a specific territory and, therefore, outside the “logic” of the State.
48 See  D. PALANO,  Lo spazio politico: territori,  confini, potere,  in  A. AGUSTONI,  P. GIUNTARELLI,  R. 
VERALDI, Sociologia dello spazio, dell’ambiente e del territorio, Milano, 2007, p. 60-61.
49 See R. TUCK,  The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries from the Natural Law Perspective, in A. 
BUCHANAN, M. MOORE,  States, Nations and Borders, Cambridge, 2003, p. 143-170. Traditionally and 
almost  conventionally,  the beginning of  the  modern  European  Nation States’ concept  and  that  of 
sovereignity  are identified  with the  Peace  of  Westfalia  of  1648,  which  put  an end to  a  series  of 
religious wars in Europe.
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of a certain State is valid and effective,  in primis, on a determined and delimited 
space50. Thus, the existence of frontiers draws the visible element of the internal and 
external  authority  which  is  traditionally  identified  in  the  national  entitlement  of 
power and in the legitimacy of the State as international subject. In this sense the 
State represents the legal subject entitled to the genuine and rightful use of power, 
rules and supremacy on its territory51. According to the political theory, such a self-
legitimizing body is acknowledged as concept together with the notion of modern 
State, whereas other ages saw the existence of even different centres of power52. As 
the sovereign political power is a condition of the contemporary legal orders, the 
legitimated  existence  of  a  juridical  and  administrative  system is,  in  some ways, 
dependent  from  the  identification  of  borders,  which  are  the  non-visible 
materialization  of  the  conceptual  relation  between  natural  and  political  (human) 
space53. But, while the last assertion could be always true for a “classical” theory of 
the State, it does not conserve its absolute validity, for instance, after the creation of 
organizations like the European Union, or, in other terms, with the development of 
phenomena such as the economic globalization54.
The connections between political space and natural space bring numerous 
problematic issues. One of the biggest questions related to the legal analysis is, as 
briefly mentioned above, the validity of the norms. In this regard, the core of such a 
50 P.J. TAYLOR,  The State as Container: Territoiality in the Modern World-System, in N. BRENNER, B. 
JESSOB, M. JONES, G. MACLEOD (eds.),  State/Space: A Reader, Boston-Oxford, 2003, p. 101-114. See 
also T. CHRISTIANSEN, Borders and Territorial Governance in the New Europe, in R. KICKER, J. MARKO, 
M.  STEINER (eds.),  Changing  Borders:  Legal  and  Economic  Aspects  of  European  Enlargement, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p. 79.
51 We do not forget that the traditional theory of the State considers its three main constituents in 
sovereignty, people and territory. A dissertation about the contextual subsistence of these elements as 
necessary condition for the State’s existence will bring to an endless theoretical investigation on the 
political nature of the European Union. 
52 Such a reference is particularly referred to the Middle Ages, where the exercise of power was not 
really connected to a centralized body, but different subjects of power created a legal pluralism. Under 
these circumstances a cohabitation of different legal orders took place. Such a proliferation of juridical  
systems needs to be linked to different social groups or intermediate communities existing on the 
same territory. For a very deep and detailed analysis of the European legal orders across history see 
the recent publication of one of the most important Italian scholars of the history of law,  P. GROSSI, 
L’Europa del diritto, Roma-Bari, 2007, p. 15. See also J. LÉVY, Europa. Una geografia, Torino, 1999, 
p. 82.
53 Being aware of the important and deep theoretical analysis on the matter of territory, power, State, 
and legal orders (see Weber and Schmitt first), it has been deliberately chosen not to handle with such 
authors for the main reason that it will lead away from the core of the present study. The very brief 
mention of those concepts and the respective historical  phenomenon is  considered as a necessary 
condition for the introduction of the study and from a theoretical perspective.
54 See  D.  NEWMAN,  Boundaries,  Borders  and  Barriers:  Changing  Geographic  Perspectives  on 
Territorial Lines, cit., p. 138.
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topic concerns whether a juridical norm – coming from a source, which is recognised 
by a legal order – needs, or not, a determined national space to be valid55. As far as 
the national territory is, conventionally and traditionally, an essential element of each 
normative  effect56,  nevertheless  this  statement  is  not  always and univocally  true. 
Namely the territorial  space is  not originally constituted as a  normative element, 
rather shaped and established by the political will and the borders represent a non-
natural  constituent  of  the  territory57.  According  to  this  view  there  is  a  strict 
connection between the crisis of concepts such as State and sovereignty and the new 
dimension of territories58. The relevance of public entities like the European Union59 
and the progressive role of sub-state units determine a pluralistic dimension of the 
normative  spaces,  which  are  not  inevitably  thought  as  unique  prerogative  of  the 
State60. 
Thus, on the one hand it is true that the State hasn’t lost its significance and 
its political  and legal legitimacy61;  however,  on the other hand, supranational and 
sub-national  subjects  gain  significant  weight.  Certainly,  up  to  now,  the  formal 
entitlement  for  the  use  of  public  powers  comes  from  the  State.  But  it  is  also 
acknowledged that  such a  statement  has been partially  overlapped by the formal 
attribution of competences and normative powers to non-State entities, as well as by 
the  put  into  place  of  informal  or  soft-law  praxis.  One  of  the  most  interesting 
55 See N. IRTI,  Norma e luoghi.  Problemi di geo-diritto, Roma-Bari, 2006, p. 37, where the relation 
between norm and space/territory is not considered as essential. Namely “the certainty of the law 
subsists in its procedural legitimacy, while is passed in conformity with rules on the legal production 
of norms. The legal system does not need, as such, any means with parts of the earth surface” (our 
translation).
56 The mention about  the  so-called  personal  rights  or  personality  principles  seems to  be,  at  this 
moment, quite superfluous.
57 Ibid. p. 54.
58 G.  TOTZTBERGER,  Visioni  spaziali  transnazionali  in  Europa:  contesti  e  significati  diversi,  in  R. 
MASCARUCCI (cur.),  Vision,  territori  d’Europa,  Roma,  2004,  p.  91,  while  highliting  the  declinino 
importance of national borders, stresses the idea of “functional regions”, which should be based on 
homogeneous charateristics.
59 See A. BADINI, Sovranità ed interessi nazionali nel cammino dell’Europa, Torino, 1994, p. 40-47.
60 S.  ORTINO,  Il  nuovo  Nomos  della  Terra.  Profili  storici  e  sistematici  dei  nessi  tra  innovazioni  
tecnologiche,  ordinamento  spaziale,  forma  politica,  Bologna,  1999,  p.  128,  affirms  that  “[...] 
sovereignty is dissolving itself into fragments that follows similar and, at the same time, differing 
vectors such as internationalism, regionalism and localism” (our translation).
61 By the time of writing the nowadays global status would bring to the opposite statement. Namely, 
for trying to face a deep financial crisis, as well as a non-stable Middle-East situation, etc., the role of 
international and supranational organisation, such as the UN and the EU, seems to be un-influent at 
all. But, single and individual Sates show their will to reclaim their “natural” role of international 
subjects within the international arena, thus proving the complete legitimacy and entitlement of their 
interventions.
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examples is the so called process of “regionalization” and “localization” within the 
European Union62. In addition, similar approaches, such as the self-government of 
local and regional communities, are also a priority for the Council of Europe.
As  the  historical  perspective  demonstrates,  the  territory  has  not  to  be 
considered only as a conceptual element of the State, rather as a dynamical function 
which witnesses the erosion of certain borders and the creation of other frontiers63. 
So, if we look at the European situation, not only State-borders matters, but also 
other  lines such as  regional,  local  or  supranational  frontiers  in  relation to  multi-
centric – political and normative – systems of reference. From this point of view, it is 
possible to argue that, if we do not conceive borders only as a state peculiarity64, it is 
easier  to  comprehend the  conceptual  and,  at  the  same  time,  potentially  effective 
existence of multiple, moving and dynamic borders, which take the form of their 
system of reference, thus determining every single time a different territory65. 
But the evolution of the role of “meta-state” elements (both public subjects 
and  territories)  has  not  eliminated  the  legal  and  political  significance  of  State 
borders. Namely, if sub-national authorities claim on their role in managing cross-
border activities,  those authorities have still  formally to  cope with the respective 
national constitutional orders and the derived attributions or competences. In these 
terms,  while  different  types  of  borders  can  develop  –  both  being  created  or 
62 See L. CHIEFFI, La dimensione statale tra integrazione europea e disarticolazione del sistema delle  
autonomie, in L. CHIEFFI (cur.), Regioni e dinamiche di integrazione europea, Torino, 2003, p. 16.
63 See  D.  NEWMAN,  Boundaries,  Borders  and  Barriers:  Changing  Geographic  Perspectives  on 
Territorial Lines, cit., p. 138: “[…] the  function and the the role of the lines that divide states have 
undergone significant  change, as transboundary movement is  eased and as political  and economic 
interaction takes on new super-state  and inter-state  dimensions,  in  many cases  ignoring the states 
altogether. While some boundaries are being opened up to movement and becoming more permeable, 
many countries are creating their own new fences of separation in an attempt to establish their own 
sovereign  rights  as  part  of  a  process  through  which  national  and/or  ethnic  groups  attain  self-
determination  as  ethno-territorial  conflicts  are  resolved.  The  geographical  differentiation  of 
boundaries is such that, at one and the same time, some fences are being destroyed while others are 
being erected”.
64 T.  CHRISTIANSEN,  Borders  and  Territorial  Governance  in  the  New  Europe,  cit.,  p.  80  and  96, 
underlines  the  double  issue  of  the  current  relevance  of  State  borders  as  well  as  the  progressive 
changing of political realities, which is characterised by “[the] emerging structure of new borders and 
meso-regions […]”.
65 A brief example will better explain the statement. Namely, speaking with traditional categories, it is 
possible to observe only a mono-dimensional border/territory reality, which is that of national frontiers 
and national territories. But, it is also possible to notice, quite easier, that States are often divided into 
other units or territorial/administrative entities and, more subtly, single parts of different States form a 
territory which is homogeneous for peculiar reasons, thus identifying areas such as the Euroregions. In  
this regard, the intent is not directed to show the existence of territorial bodies in alternative to the 
State. Rather, it is relevant to observe the simultaneous and multidimensional contextual presence of 
diversified systems and  multi-faced views to the territorial approach.
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eliminated  –  national  frontiers  are  still  relevant.  By the  way,  if  the  principle  of 
sovereignty does not completely loose its effects, it would be interesting to discover 
ways of territorial cooperation adopted by sub-national authorities that materially go 
over the implications of national borders66. 
Conclusively,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  approaching  transfrontier  issues 
normally remains far form a theoretical and abstract dissertation on concepts, thus 
being structurally connected to everyday matters. Nevertheless, the principal aim of 
this  dissertation  about  the  notion  of  border  was  the  attempt  to  draw some key-
elements for the interpretation and analysis of territorial cooperation as a complex 
and  dynamic  phenomenon,  which  –  sometimes  unwilling  –  touches  ancient  and 
composite theoretical issues.
66 J.  MARKO,  Beyond the Nation-State:  Problems of  Regionalisation in Western and East  Central  
Europe, cit., p.74 remembers that “[…] for the sake of theoretical construction of political ‘unity’ and 
the  actual  practice  of  group-formation,  the  epistemological  code  of  identity/difference  and  the 
normative  question  of  inclusion/exclusion  will  never  be  overcome so  that  the  notion  of  a  ‘order 
without borders’ is simply illusionary. […] What is being challenged, thus, is the one dimensional 
concept  of  the  nation-state.  The  ‘real’ problem  hence  is  the  question  of  how  to  overcome  the 
exclusionary function of borders in both the traditional concepts of state and nation multiplied through 
the  nation  state  model,  in  particular  the  question  of  the  conceptualisation  of  further  European 
integration on different ‘regional levels’, namely the sub-national, supra-national and the continental 
level and how to create a post-national territory?”. Moreover,  M. KEATING, Europe, the State and the  
Nation, in J. MCGRAY, M. KEATING (eds.), European Integration an the Nationalities Question, London 
and New York, 2006, p. 23, argues about the idea of rethinking the principle of sovereignty, keeping 
attention to concepts such as cultural and regional diversity. In these terms the territories could follow 
a functional transformation in order to foster local communities’ opportunities. 
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1. Territorial cooperation as a typical sub-national activity
1.1.  About  territorial  communities  and  cooperation  within  the  context  of  
“decentralization” and “Europeanization”
As already said in the previous chapter, territorial cooperation (or whatever it 
is denominated) between sub-national communities is really not a new fact. Although 
it is a rather recent field of study for lawyers, it represents a reality since the end of 
the 1940s1. After the Second World War various community-twinnings with a high 
symbolic value, rather than with structured programs, have been set up2. As often 
happens, factual reality has anticipated well defined political paths and codified legal 
instruments.  In  these  terms,  cross-border  cooperation  between  territorial 
communities has found its ground in the actual necessity to establish foreign relation 
between non-state territorial foreign subjects. This type of relation has been firstly 
established without  specific legal basis, but quite informally in order to build up 
mutual trust and good partnership mainly after the disastrous armed conflict. With 
regard to this kind of cross-border activities, two different aspects need to be taken 
into consideration. 
1 The mentioned timeframe is certainly useful to have an idea of the development of cross-border 
relations across contemporary age. Nevertheless, as far as territorial cooperation represents a quite 
basic need of communities, it seems that, in some ways, it has “always” existed as a matter of fact. 
Surely, what has begun with the increasing political and legal awareness of the phenomenon is a will 
of systematization, better comprehension and development of suitable legal and political instruments 
for granting an effective end easy cooperation.
2 See M. ROUSSET,  L’action internationale des collectivités locales, Paris, 1998, p. 5.  In particular it 
was the case of French communities, which were dealing with foreign communities. This happening 
was quite unusual as local communities touched a field – the foreign relations – that was a typical 
peculiarity of state prerogative. 
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On the one hand there is a progressive expansion of transfrontier activities 
directly run by sub-national entities in shape of informal agreements or organisations 
of local and regional authorities3. These organisations, like the Council of European 
Municipalities  and  Regions  (CEMR)4,  represent  a  kind  of  centralizing  gathering 
which  has  been  especially  formed  for  approaching  common problems or  just  to 
develop para-diplomatic relations.
On  the  other  hand,  a  promoting  role  of  international/supranational 
organisations has encouraged the development of transfrontier cooperation, both with 
hard-law and soft-law instruments. A good example of soft law approach are the EU 
sectoral policies with territorial and spatial significance5, which, even if not directly 
concerned  with  territorial  cooperation  as  a  main  subject,  nevertheless  affect 
transfrontier relations among sub-state entities and, more generally, create a sort of 
sub-national “soft foreign policy”6.
A very frequent statement asserts that the process of integration at European 
level is accompanied by a progressive affirmation of regional/local identity7. Namely, 
this  twofold  process  seems  to  be  essentially  interrelated:  the  more  European 
integration gets further, the more local purposes obtain relevance. As far as those 
3 It is the case of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), which has been 
originally founded in Geneva in 1951by a group of European majors, see 
http://www.ccre.org/presentation_en.htm.
4 This organisation has been first set up in 1951, originally as Council of European Municipalities 
(CEM).
5 See O. SYKES, D. SHAW,  Investigating Territorial Positioning by Sub-state Territories in Europe, in 
Regional & Federal Studies, 2008, Vol. 18/1, p. 56.
6 Ibid.,  p.  61:  “The  notion  of  spatial  positioning  and  allusion  to  local  and  regional  authorities 
conduction  of  their  own  ‘foreign  policy’ can  be  conceptualized  […]  as  instances  of  territories 
(territorial  systems)  interacting  with  their  system environment  and  seeking  to  shape  and  use  the 
European  integration  process  as  an  arena  of  transnational  learning  in  order  to  foster  regional 
development via external (transnational) cooperation”.
7 K. SODUPE, The Euroepan Union and Inter-regional Co-operation, in F. ALDECOA, M. KEATING (eds.), 
Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, London, 1999, p. 58. 
Differently from the quoted bibliographical reference, the term “European level” is related both to the 
EU as to the Council of Europe. As most of the academic literature is dedicated to the phenomenon of 
regionalism and local government at the Community level, nevertheless it is also useful to make a 
general reference to a broader concept of Europe, namely taking also into consideration then role of 
the  Council  of  Europe  in  fostering  and  developing  the  prerogatives  of  local  authorities.  A good 
example is given by the Preamble of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which states at 
the 8th alinea: “Aware that the safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government in the different 
European countries is an important contribution to the construction of a Europe based on the principles 
of democracy and the decentralisation of power.” Moreover, the Council of Europe had a pioneer role in 
order to deep the powers and the related autonomy of local and regional communities; see M. ROUSSET, 
L’action internationale des collectivités  locales,  cit.,  p.  8;  see also  M. KEATING,  Europeanism and 
Regionalism, in B. JONES AND M. KEATING (eds.), The European Union and the Regions, Oxford, 1995 
p. 4.
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sub-national  subjects  do  not  have,  indeed,  an  explicit  constitutional  recognition 
within the EU legal order, nevertheless regions and local authorities have challenged 
the so called “European regional blindness”8. As the “regional concern” increasingly 
inhabits the debate at EU level, a parallel question is even compelling at international  
level within the Council of Europe. In fact,  the establishment of the Congress of 
Regional  and Local  Authorities  of  the  CoE corresponds to  the  same (or  similar) 
requirement for sub-national authorities to gain a more relevant acknowledgement 
both at national and at European level. 
Whereas the major role of regional and local authorities within the respective 
States  has  been  identified  with  partially  different  phenomena  like  “federalism”, 
“regionalism”,  “decentralization”,  “devolution”  or  “local  self-government”9,  the 
function  of  sub-national  public  entities  has,  in  fact,  increased  at  national  and 
European level. Being aware that the previous concepts imply different constitutional  
structures10 with  considerable  theoretical  variations,  their  common  denominator 
8 S. WEATHERILL, The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union, in S. WEATHERILL, 
U. BERNITZ, The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe, Oxford and Portland, 2005, p. 1-
31,  approaches  critically  the  issues  of  regional  blindness  within  the  EU  legal  order.  As  this 
phenomenon  involves  a  formal  disregard  towards  the  “internal  territorial  and  constitutional 
arrangements  of  the  Member  States”  (p.  1),  not  only  in  the  Treaties  but  also  in  relation  to  the 
responsibility of States for the EC law implementation, however in several circumstances regions and 
sub-national entities practically assume an active position in the EU. Let’s think, for example, to the 
fact  that  “regions  are  subject  to  obligations  imposed  by  EU  law,  which  are  commonly  directly 
enforceable” (p.3) and to the functions, even if advisory, of the Committee of the Regions (p. 19). See 
also  O. PORCHIA,  Indifferenza dell'Unione nei confronti degli Stati Membri e degli enti territoriali:  
momenti  di  crisi  del  principio, in  L.  DANIELE (cur.),  Regioni  e  autonomie  territoriali  nel  diritto  
internazionale ed europeo, Napoli, 2006, p. 269-286.
9 See M. KEATING, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, Cheltenham, 1998, p. 51.
10 M. CALAMO SPECCHIA,  Le variabili istituzionali del “multilevel system of governance”: tendenze  
devolutive in alcune esperienze dell’Europa occidentale, in  L. CHIEFFI (cur.),  Regioni ed enti locali  
dopo la riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione fra attuazione e ipotesi di ulteriore revisione, Torino, 
2004,  p.  99-150,  clearly  highlights  a  distinction  among  the  terms  devolution,  decentralization, 
federalism and regionalism. Very interesting is the analysis of the phenomena related to “devolution” 
and “decentralization”. Being linked by a tight correlation, the two terms are not synonyms. Namely, 
principally with reference to the UK, the concept of devolution implies the creation of “constitutional 
autonomies” grounded on the institutionalization of national identities, such as Scotland or Wales. For 
a clear definition of “federalism”, see J. KINCAID, Introduction, in A.L. GRIFFITHS, Handbook of Federal  
Countries 2002, Montreal-London-Ithaca, 2002, p. 4-5. See also,  R.L. WATTS,  Federalism, Federal  
Political Systems, and Federations, in  Annual Review of Political Science, 1998-1, p. 117-137;  A. 
GAMPER, A Global Theory of Federalism: The Nature and Challenges of a Federal State, in German 
Law  Journal,  6  No.10  (1  October  2005),  p.  1297-1318.  While  the  concept  of  federalism,  as 
constitutional structure and method of governance, implies division of powers and competencies that 
are shared by the so called Federation and the constituent units, the notion of regionalism involves a 
transfer of competencies and functions from he State to peripheral structures or units of government, 
which  possess  a  certain  degree  of  constitutional  autonomy;  see  M.  CACIAGLI,  Regioni  d’Europa: 
Devoluzioni, regionlismi e integrazione europea, Bologna, 2006, p. 13. The notion of decentralization 
is  also  conceptually  and  legally  different.  In  this  regard  Kincaid  (see  Ibid,  p.  9)  explains  that 
“[d]ecentralization involves a central power possessing authority to decentralize or devolve functional 
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could be broadly individuated in the attribution of  formal  competences or in  the 
exercise  of  functions  to  sub-national  subjects.  In  this  regard  it  is  of  primary 
importance  to  verify  the  nature  of  such  competences  in  relation  to  transfrontier 
activities.  With  other  words,  it  could  be  interesting  to  comprehend  whether  the 
progressive role  and attribution of  powers to  sub-national  authorities have a  real 
impact on the development of territorial cooperation. 
At a first glance, this seems quite an easy question to answer. Namely, while 
the process of globalization is widening and opening new ways of exercising powers, 
the role of regional and local actors is earning political consensus11. But, more than 
consensus,  the  progressive  importance  of  sub-national  actors  is  dealing  with  the 
possibility to exercise powers and to take autonomous decisions.  This process of 
decentralization12 has  affected,  even  if  differently  in  relation  to  the  single 
constitutional structure, quite every State within Europe. Such a banal statement has 
been mentioned just  to  remember the pluralistic dimension  of political  and legal 
State-structures as well as the different level of decentralization and the multiform 
reality of sub-national actors, having a direct impact on the development of cross-
and  administrative  responsibilities  to  lower  levels  of  government.  The  authority  to  decentralize, 
however,  also  includes  the  authority  to  recentralize  power.  Decentralization  is  concerned  with 
administrative efficiency and functional efficacy in an otherwise unitary system”. For an interesting 
analysis  of  the  phenomenon  of  regionalization,  see  also  A.  GAMPER,  Die  Regionen  mit  
Gesetzgebungshoheit,  Frankfurt  am  Mein,  2004,  p.  72:  “Der  Regionalismusbegriff  bezieht  sich 
jedenfalls nicht auf Regionen im Sinne eines nach technischen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Kriterien 
charakterisierbaren Gebietes (z.B. Arbeitmarktregion, Verkehrsregion, Klimaregion, Montanregion), 
sondern  auf  Einheit,  die  zwar  territorial  dimensioniert  sind,  jedoch  im  unauflöslichen  und 
wesensimmanenten Bezug zu derdort ausässigen Bevölkerung, ihrer Kultur, Sprache, Geschichte und 
Ethnie stehen.” Referring to the concept of “local self-government”, the idea is that emerging from the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government of the Council of Europe; Art. 3, par. 1 affirms that “ local 
self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to 
regulate  and manage a substantial  share of  public  affairs  under their own responsibility and in the 
interests of the local population”.
11 The merger of the mentioned two figures of globalization and localization is identified with the 
term  “glocalization”.  Maybe  often  abused,  this  neologism  is  of  a  very  clear  efficacy  in  easily 
conveying   the  idea  of  a  complex  and  bi-directional  process.  See  B.  HOCKING,  Patrolling  the 
‘Frontier’:  Globalization,  Localization  and  the  ‘Actorness’ of  Non-Central  Governments,  in  F. 
ALDECOA,  M.  KEATING (eds.),  Paradiplomacy  in  Action.  The  Foreign  Relations  of  Subnational  
Governments, London, 1999, p. 19.
12 As mentioned above there are different concept dealing with the power exercise by sub-national 
authorities.  However,  the  notion  of  “decentralization”  can  be  used  as  general  term  in  order  to 
individuate the phenomenon in a broader meaning, thus having a more “neutral” connotation; see  M. 
CALAMO SPECCHIA, Le variabili istituzionali del “multilevel system of governance”: tendenze devolutive 
in alcune esperienze dell’Europa occidentale, cit., p. 99-150. Namely, “decentralization indicates a 
general formula, but differently graduated from a maximum (conferring of primary normative power 
[…]) to a minimum (attribution of administrative functions or merely executives competences) of 
allocation of traditional State-functions among the centre and the periphery” (our translation).
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border  relations.  In  any  case,  it  is  rather  challenging  to  demonstrate  how 
competences-delegation,  tasks-attribution  and  the  respective  exercise  affect 
transfrontier cooperation among territorial communities belonging to different States. 
Certainly,  the  progressive  enlargement  of  sub-national  competences  to  deal  with 
transfrontier matters has been anticipated by a huge praxis, which demonstrates the 
significance  of  de  facto activities.  And  this  is  even  particularly  true  for  frontier 
communities. While States are mostly concerned with the national foreign policy or 
international  relations,  which  seems  to  be  more  relevant  for  the  whole  State, 
peripheral communities increase their capacity to deal with matters that do not really 
engage  State  concern.  In  these  terms,  sub-national  entities  have  progressively 
increased their typical know-how with “familiar” aspects of cooperation. This means 
that communities along the same border, sharing common aspects of everyday life, 
often develop common strategies which are better improved by decentralized public 
actors13. 
Bearing such situation in mind, it is possible to argue that the development of 
transfrontier cooperation between territorial communities has been generated from 
three  different  and  complementary  factors.  Firstly,  an  horizontal  and  direct 
cooperation between sub-national authorities spread out across frontiers in form of 
different  kind  of  partnership.  Secondly,  territorial  communities  obtained 
progressively  more  power  of  action  from  their  respective  States.  Thirdly,  the 
progressive  recognition  of  territorial/transfrontier  cooperation  by  the  European 
Union and the Council of Europe, which made those local and regional authorities a 
decisive element of their policies, promoted and stigmatized these developments14.
In  general  terms,  it  is  possible  to  outline  two main  types  of  cooperation 
between sub-state communities15. On the one hand, common activities of regions or 
13 M. ROUSSET,  L’action internationale des collectivités locales,  cit.,  p. 14, speaks about “pouvoir 
d’expertise” and “capacités techiques” wihin the different sectors covered by public local services. 
Actually,  these common strategies of cross-border cooperation have been developed starting from 
those twinning-relations that  generated partnership and mutual  trust.  See also  EUROMOT,  Manifeste 
pour la coopération transfrontalière en Europe, Avril 2008, p. 5.
14 According to this perspective, a brief reflection has to be pointed out. Namely, at EU level the local 
actors do not have the same attention as regional actors. Actually, there is not even an intention to find 
out a common definition of “local government”, which only compares in the European Charter of 
Local Self Government of the CoE. On the contrary, within the CoE filed the regional level hasn't 
found  its  collocation  yet,  as  far  as  the  hypothesis  of  a  Charter  on  regional  self-government  fell 
through.
15 M. CACIAGLI, Regioni d’Europa: Devoluzioni, regionalismi e integrazione europea, cit., p. 76.
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local authorities are realized among these subjects, not necessarily geographically 
contiguous, in order to create a sort of shared “lobby” to give weight to their main 
interests or to find joint solutions. A clear example is given by the  Conference of 
European  Regions  with  legislative  power  (REGLEG)16 or  by  the  Association  of 
European Border Regions (AEBR), whose main aim is to achieve a more active role 
of these regions at European level. On the other hand, cooperation takes the form of 
specific  activities  or  agreements  between  geographically  contiguous  or  non-
contiguous foreign territorial communities. This type of cooperation can be bilateral 
or multilateral, depending on the number of authorities participating in it, and its 
principally directed to find common solutions to everyday problems. 
As both the forms of cooperation could be intended, in some ways, as “across 
borders”, thus being a sort of potential (or real) means of doing actions outside State 
borders, nevertheless only the latter can be considered as typically cross-border17, for 
the simply reason that it involves everyday activities that “cross a frontier”. Given 
this  latter  distinction,  it  is  also  possible  to  verify  the  practical  manifestation  of 
different  solutions  that  could  be  generally  intended  as  “territorial  cooperation”, 
because  dealing  with  the  peculiar  territorial  level  of  the  sub-national  subjects 
involved.
1.2. The concept of sub-national authorities
As the term suggests,  sub-national authorities are territorial political entities 
below the State. Trying to give an exact definition of sub-national authorities is quite 
a  hard  challenge,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  very  diversified  factors  should  be 
considered. This study will not attempt to find the best way to delineate the concept 
concerned for any other purpose except for the analysis of the instruments of cross-
border activities. To begin with, it seems appropriate to underline how the term “sub-
national”  could be considered as a general  container  for  reasons  of  convenience, 
even if identifies a kind of non-technical term, mainly for two reasons. 
16 See the official website at http://www.regleg.eu/.
17 See  K. SOUPE,  The European Union and Inter-regional Co-operation, in  F. ALDECOA, M. KEATING 
(eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, London, 1999, 
p. 62. The Author distinguishes among two types of organizations: the former, which can be intended 
as  traditionally  cross-border,  refers to  actors  along the same frontier;  the latter,  instead,  is  called 
transregional and does not concern only strictly contiguous cross-border subjects.
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Firstly, the term encompasses several subjects having their respective legal 
and political identity, both in regard to the different constitutional models of State 
they refer to and to the level of government they concern18. Namely, on the one hand, 
we  recognise  political  entities  like  Länder (Germany),  Regioni  (Italy),  Régions  
(France and Belgium),  Comunidades Autonomas (Spain), etc. From the other hand, 
within  the  same country there are  different  tiers  of  government  below the  State, 
which are at least identified by a second tier (normally known as a regional level) 
and a third tier (in general corresponding to a municipality level)19. 
Secondly,  as the adjective “sub-national” evokes concepts such nationality 
and nation, its general  use seems to be quite imprecise  if considered in its exact 
meaning. According to this last  assertion, the adjective “sub-state” suggests more 
accuracy20.  Nevertheless,  it  is  quite  common,  among  scholars,  to  identify  those 
public subjects as “sub-national”.
Another  brief  clarification  needs  to  be  suggested  with  regard  to  some 
differentiations between Western and Eastern Europe. Since the States of Western 
18 N. LEVRAT, L’Europe et ses collectivités territoriales. Réflexions sur l’organisation et l’exercice du  
pouvoir territorial dans un monde globalisé, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 53, proposes different approaches of 
analysis. Referring to the territorial organisation of power it is possible to observe four models on the 
European  territory :  a  “French  model”,  a  “German  model”,  an  “Anglo-Saxon  model”  and  a 
“Scandinavian  model”.  A classification  according  to  the  State-type  refers  to  three  main  State-
categories:  unitary States, regional States and federal States, in relation to the distribution or sharing 
of  legislative  power  and  the  representation  within  the  national  central  power.  This  last  criterion, 
according to the author, denotes the existence of federal States in Europe – Germany, Austria and 
Belgium  –  while  the  others  can  be  considered  unitary  States  with  more  or  les  accentuated 
decentralization of  power,  thus originating the model  of  regional  States.  See also other  academic 
studies as A. DELCAMP, J. LOUGHLIN, La décentralisation dans les États de l’Union europèenne, Paris, 
2003 and J. LOUGHLIN, Subnational Democracy in the European Union. Challenges and Opportunities, 
Oxford, 2001.
19 This brief description has only an explicative aim, as the system of government within each State is  
generally more complex and diversified. In Italy, for example, the Constitution (Art. 114) recognises 
the existence of several autonomous entities, which constitute the Italian Republic beside the State: 
Comuni,  Province,  Città  Metropolitane,  Regioni.  The  German  Constitution  (Art  28  GG)  makes 
references to  Länder, Kreisen, Gemienden.  The French Constitution dedicates an entire Title to the 
territorial  communities  (collectivités  territorilaes)  mentioning  (Art.  72):  communes,  départments, 
régions,  collectivités à statut particulier,  collectivités d’outre-mer.  The Spanish Constitution, under 
the Title  “De la  organizaciòn territorial  del  Estado”,  refers to (Art.  137):  municipios,  provincias, 
Comuniades  Autónomas.  The  Portuguese   Constitution  refers  to  “autarquias  locais”,  which 
comprehend (Art. 236): for the continental territories freguesias, municipios, regiões administrativas; 
for the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira only freguesias and municipios. 
20 See M. CACIAGLI, Regioni d’Europa: Devoluzioni, regionalismi e integrazione europea, cit., p. 18. 
The author considers the concept of sub-national even an error if used to indicate the political unity 
which is just at the first lower level below the State. The best term to use would be, in fact, “sub-state” 
because of its disaffection form the concept of nation, which doesn’t necessarily correspond to the 
political connotation of the State. Aware of this quite subtle clarification,  this study will consider 
these two terms a synonyms. Namely, as the core of the research is focused on the instruments of 
territorial cooperation, the aim is to try to simplify the surrounding concepts and terms.
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Europe  know  a  longer  historical  process  of  decentralization,  Eastern  Europe  is 
approaching the phenomenon after the communist experience. As those countries are 
mainly settled as unitary central States, a progressive role o local self government is 
phasing out21. 
Moreover, if there is a progressive involvement of sub-national actors at EU 
and  CoE levels,  several  difficulties  and  divergences  about  the  classification  and 
definition of the terms “region” and “local government” plugged up the agreements 
on clear standard concepts.
Until  this  point  of  the  analysis,  what  emerges  is  the  extreme  diversity  of 
variables  regarding  the  classification  of  sub-national  authorities.  As  a  general 
consideration,  it  is  possible  to  think  about  the  sub-national  authorities  like  the 
representative subjects of territorial communities, therefore expressing a democratic 
legitimization.  Although  quite  broad,  the  last  statement  figures  out  a  general 
characteristic that associates different levels of governments, even if they could be 
better  individuated  through  general  territorial  categories  like  “region”  and  “local 
government”.  Furthermore,  approaching  the  concept  of  government-tiers  should 
even require to distinguish the experiences within those categories indeed, but the 
simplification of the term “sub-national”  is helpful, in particular when dealing at 
European level or when discussing general issues.
Since  the  above-mentioned  categorization  alludes  to  a  varying  reality,  it 
comprehends,  at  least,  two  common  factors  that  are  functional  to  explain  the 
peculiarity  of  those  public  subjects:  namely,  territoriality  and legitimization.  The 
latter,  in  particular,  entails  different  aspects:  firstly,  it  is  related  to  the 
political/representative  legitimization  and,  secondly,  it  is  linked  to  the  legal 
attribution of functions and competencies (either own or transferred). For reasons of 
completeness,  it  is  worth  to  observe  that  sometimes  the  actors  of  transfrontier 
cooperation could be also entities, which do not exactly correspond to the traditional 
concept of sub-national authority. Namely, in some cases, territorial communities act 
jointly,  for  instance  in  form of  association  of  municipalities,  and  other  so-called 
21 See P.H. RUSSEL, The future of Europe in an era of federalism, in S. ORTINO, M. ŽAGAR, V. MASTNY 
(eds.),  The changing faces of federalism: Institutional reconfiguration in Europe from East to West, 
Manchester, 2004, p. 4-20 and J. ROSE, J. TRAUT (eds.), Federalism and Decentralisation. Perspectives  
for the Transformation Process in Eastern and Central Europe, Hamburg, 2001.
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public  law bodies22 take  part  in  cross-border cooperation.  Insofar  as they are not 
considered as “stranger” subjects, these entities are also a sort of projection of the 
territorial  communities and they are concerned with the public interest:  thus they 
could  also  be  considered,  quite  a-technically  speaking,  a  kind  of  sub-national 
subjects.
With  reference  to  territorial  cooperation,  the  activities  of  sub-national 
authorities should promote the interests of their communities, so that there is a sort of 
correspondence  between  the  representative  authorities  and  the  represented 
communities.  Thus,  these  two  terms  –  sub-national  authorities  and  territorial 
communities – will be used as synonyms for general allusions to the sub-state actors 
of territorial cooperation23. In fact, what really matters for the present analysis is the 
potential or effective feasibility for sub-state subjects – any kind they are – to put 
into practice transfrontier cooperation.
About the activities in which these entities are concerned, the functions of 
sub-national  authorities  are  usually  analysed  by  dividing  them  principally  with 
regard  to  the  degree  of  recognised  autonomy (meaning  competences)  they  have. 
With other words, the attribution of competences is, formally and legally speaking, a 
precondition  for  the  legitimisation  to  undertake  the  correspondent  activities. 
According to the national legal orders, the existence and the garde of autonomy are 
set down either by constitutional provisions or by the law. Thus, the very first level 
below the State is, in general, constitutionally entitled to the exercise of own powers, 
while the tier corresponding to the so-called local government is more concerned 
with the exercise of administrative functions or delegated powers. If such differences 
can have a substantial value for the legal analysis of these entities per se and within 
the respective national systems, however they are not so relevant with regard to the 
study of territorial cooperation. Concerning this last aspect, it will be interesting to 
evaluate the capacity of sub-national actors to develop cross-border activities within 
or beyond the existence of a specific power to develop cross-border relations, rather 
22 Actually the legal meaning of “public law body” could differ according to the national legislations 
or even to the EC law. What is important to notice, however, is that also other organisms, which are 
not traditional sub-national authorities could be actors of cooperation when legitimized by the law as 
entities dealing with the public interests. Normally such structures are also somehow connected to the 
territory they refer to for the transfrontier activities.
23 Surely, the two terms do not totally correspond. Namely, there are sub-national authorities which 
cannot be considered as territorial communities,  as the case of the Belgian linguistic communities 
(Communauté flamande, Communauté française, Communauté germanophone). 
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than to draw and stigmatize the distinction of their legal nature within the national 
systems.
As the national and European political debate demonstrates, the category of 
regions is, if compared to the so-called municipalities, the most controversial. Not 
referring  to  the  legitimacy  of  its  existence,  indeed,  but  in  relation  to  their 
prerogatives  within  each  single  State,  and  on  their  international  dimension  and 
transfrontier  relevance.  Namely,  the  regions,  individuated  as  the  territorial  unity 
directly below the State24, represent the sub-national institutional subjects that are 
mostly involved in cross-border activities, for the specific reason that such entities 
have more detailed formal competencies, financial resources, political interests and 
regulatory powers. However, it should not be forgotten that even local authorities, 
within their tasks and interests, play a role in cross-border relations. 
Hence, being aware of the constitutional, legal and political diversification, 
regional and local authorities will be both considered within the general concept of 
sub-national entities as real or potential actors of territorial cooperation. From this 
point of view, different aspects need to be considered by dealing with transfrontier 
cooperation between sub-national authorities, keeping in mind that the development 
of foreign activities outside the national borders is concerned. Namely, the relation 
between  the  national  legitimation  of  such  power-exercise,  the  attribution  of 
competencies  and  functions,  the  existence  of  national  and  international  legal 
instruments for territorial cooperation and the influence of the European institutions 
are the most relevant key factors concerning this research.
24 See ASSEMBLY OF EUROPEAN REGIONS, Declaration on Regionalism in Europe, Strasbourg, 1997, p. 4. 
The Declaration has been adopted in December 1997 during the 4th meeting of the Assembly in Basel. 
Art. 1 provides for the concept and definition of “region”: “1)The region is the territorial body of 
public law established at the level immediately below that of the state and endowed with political self-
government. 2) The region shall be recognised in the national  constitution or in legislation which 
guarantees its autonomy, identity, powers and organisational structures. 3) The region shall have its 
own constitution, statute of autonomy or other law which shall form part of the legal order of the state 
at the highest level establishing at least its organisation and powers. The status of a region can be 
altered only in cooperation with the region concerned. Regions within the same state may have a 
different status,  in keeping with their historical,  political,  social  or cultural characteristics.  4) The 
region is the expression of a distinct political identity, which may take very different political forms, 
reflecting the democratic will  of each region to adopt the form of  political organisation it  deems 
preferable.  The  region  shall  resource  and  staff  its  own  administration  and  adopt  insignia  for  its 
representation. Although the reported definition is quite broad, some scholars do not agree with it, 
mainly because considered too restrictive when applied to the European regions. See  K. SOUPE,  The 
European Union and Inter-regional Co-operation, cit., p. 59.
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1.3. Sub-national authorities and territorial cooperation: a question of legitimacy
It has already been anticipated that foreign activities of sub-national subjects 
are, in theory, a sort of exception to the unitary dimension of the State within the 
international context. Being aware of the complexity of the sub-national dimension, 
it  is  possible  to  evaluate  the  position  of  these  various  and  multiple  subjects  in 
relation to territorial cooperation. In this regard the distinction between the local and 
regional tiers and between different kinds of regions is not necessary. Namely, what 
is  mostly  relevant  is  the  existence  of  public  and  non-sovereign  legal entities 
(according  to  the  traditional  doctrine  of  sovereignty)  which  have  own  legal 
personality, which are established within the State, but which are distinct from the 
central national authority. 
The exact hierarchic position or the exact function of sub-national subjects in 
relation to the respective central authorities is a question concerning each national 
constitutional  order,  while  the  analysis  of  territorial  cooperation  considers  the 
competences  attributed  to  each  sub-national  authority  in  order  to  determine,  in 
general, their capacity to act legitimately. In this sense, the panorama of regionalism, 
decentralization, and similar processes, has to be to considered as a background of 
the  development  of  territorial  cooperation  and  the  scenery  where  sub-national 
authorities exercise and develop their competences. In fact, while the concept of non-
sovereign public legal entities remains quite static according to the legal traditional 
principles, the increasing role of sub-national authorities is somehow connected to 
the development of their competences and their capacity to act outside the national 
borders25. 
There is certainly an obvious observation to repeat, which deals with the fact 
that the theoretical attribution of competences to sub-national authorities represent 
the essential and preliminary condition of their actions, while the number or the the 
specific  subjects  concerned  to  these  competences  represents  the  concrete  and 
effective form of the action. In this sense, the untouchable unity of the sovereignty 
principle finds a theoretical balance in the perspective connected to the prerogative 
of sovereignty and the exercise of its  functions.  In this  sense,  the action of sub-
national authorities outside the national borders does not hinder the prerogative of 
25 See  C. TOMUSCHAT,  Component Territorial Units of States under International law, in  L. DANIELE 
(cur.), Regioni e autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, Napoli, 2006., p. 31-58.
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the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  but  participates  to  the  respective  functions.  These 
functions are necessarily exercised according to the inner distribution of powers and 
attributions  and,  therefore,  allocated  also  to  sub-national  subjects  even  if  with 
fundamental  limitations,  such as the unity of the foreign policy and international 
relations.  But,  as  far  as  sub-national  interests  and attributions  are  concerned,  the 
theory of sovereignty is not dismissed by the sole existence of sub-national foreign 
relations26. 
Moreover, according to the analysis of N. Levrat27 the distinction among the 
different sub-national authorities doesn't affect the legal nature or the juridical issues 
concerning  the  legitimacy  and  the  instrument  of  territorial  cooperation.  This  is 
because  sub-national  authorities  are  supposed  to  have  (more  or  less  wider) 
attributions which confer them an own capacity to act. The extension or degree of 
such attribution could influence the effective praxis of acting, but not the theoretical 
possibility to exercise the own legitimate attributions in form of foreign relations. 
The  focal  point  is  the  capability  for  these  non-sovereign  entities  to  employ 
legitimately such attributions even outside the national borders.
In general  terms, the development of sub-national territorial cooperation is 
part of the question related to the legal basis of the so-called sub-national foreign 
power  within  the  national  legal  systems.  Namely,  the  consolidated  praxis  of 
cooperation  and  the  evolution  of  sub-national  actors'  attitudes  needs  to  find  a 
national legal justification. 
In  these  terms,  national  legals  systems,  for  a  long  time,  didn't  consider 
territorial cooperation, in the sense of transfrontier activities between sub-national 
actors, as a subject-matter in the need of an explicit codification. In particular, this 
omission  was  related  to  the  mentioned question of  sovereignty  and to  principles 
concerning  international  relations.  However,  some general  legal  justifications  for 
26 The concept is explained by  F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave  
comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 73.
27 See  N. LEVRAT,  Droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 143. The Author, in his analysis, uses the concept of  collectivités  
publiques infra-étatiques (CPIE), which doesn't have a strict connection to the territory in order to 
comprehend also communities that do not really have a territory of reference (the example is related to  
the Belgian linguistic Communities) and which do not imply a link or a relation of sub-ordination to 
the State. Our use of the term sub-national authorities (as a synonim of territorial communities), aware 
of its less preciseness in respect to the definition of Levrat, is some how connected to the common use 
and understanding of such terms.
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these  transfrontier  activities  could  be  only  conceived  throughout  a  flexible 
conception of the different legal systems. In this regard, almost every national legal 
system shows some reactions or some solutions towards the general  issue of the 
exercise of sub-national foreign power.
2. Looking for legitimation from the national perspective 
2.1. Territorial cooperation as a form of sub-national foreign relation: the capacity  
to act outside the national borders
One first condition for a valid legal relation is the legitimacy of the act sealing 
that relation. Furthermore, a valid legal act is only put into practice by legitimate 
subjects,  entitled to  exercise  the power or  the faculty concerned.  Such a  general 
statement should be considered with regard to the capacity of sub-national authorities 
to create valid and legitimate relations of territorial cooperation. In this respect, N. 
Levrat28 spends an entire part of his work to justify the theoretical legal grounds for 
founding the  validity  of  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-national  authorities29. 
Concerning these institutional subjects, it is worth to remember that it is the national 
law which confers them the legal personality and the legal capacity. In particular, the 
legal  capacity,  namely the capacity  to  act  legally,  has its  equivalent  according to 
public  law  in  the  notion  of  competence.  Thus,  the  national  rules  conferring  the 
competences  to  sub-national  entities  determine  the  extent  and  the  limits  of  their 
capabilities. 
The  practice  of  transfrontier  cooperation  implies  that  the  actions  of  sub-
national authorities have, in general terms, transnational effects30. This means that a 
certain measure of power-exercise doesn't exclusively affect an inner element of one 
State,  but  generates mutual  relations among foreign territorial  communities.  As a 
28 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 181 et seq.
29 Ibid., p. 181: “Le droit qui fonde la validité d'une relation juridique […] est nécessairement lié au 
droit  qui  confère la  personalité  juridique,  et  plus précisément  au droit  qui  determine la  capacités 
juridique. Ainsi […] pour les collectivités publiques infra-étatiques, ce sera nécessairement au sein de 
l'organisation de l'État, donc du droit national, qu'il faudra chercher à identifier la capacité des CPIEs 
d'enterprendre des relations transfrontières”.
30 Of course, this field of action is not a part of the concept of territoriality as intended in international 
law, see I. BROWNLIE, Principles of public international law, Oxford, 2008, p. 109 et seq.
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consequence,  in  fact,  different  juridical  orders  get  necessarily  in  touch31. 
Approaching such an argument, thus, implies to take into consideration the effective 
powers that sub-national entities have in order to develop this kind of activities and 
the respective legitimation. 
Looking at  the different constitutional  structure of the European States,  the 
legitimacy to deal with foreign affairs is usually a prerogative of the State32, which 
owns the capacity to engage with other international subjects and has the consequent 
responsibility  according  to  international  law.  But,  since  this  statement  could  be 
considered generally valid for what concerns the traditional matter of foreign affairs 
within the frame of international law, external relations are currently put into practice 
even by sub-state subjects. In particular, transfrontier activities seem to be performed 
not only for a political claim of autonomy; rather for functional and practical needs 
which are often concerned with territorial or economical competitiveness33 and with 
everyday problems.  As a  matter  of  fact,  the  existence  of  a  “sub-national  foreign 
power” within the European national legal orders has been recognised34. However, 
outside  the  framework  of  the  traditional  concept  of  international  relations  and 
international law35, sub-national actors need to find, not only a political36, but even a 
legal justification regarding this kind of foreign power-exercise. 
31 See  H.  COMTE,  N.  LEVRAT,  Aux  coutures  de  l'Europe.  Defis  et  enjeux  del  la  coopération  
transfrontalière, Paris, 2006, p. 16.
32 See  J.  MONAR,  Regional  external  relations:  Problems  and  Potential,  in  R.  HRBEK (Hrsg.), 
Auβenbeziehungen von Regionen in Europa und der Welt, Baden-Baden, 2003, p. 39 et seq.
33 R. HRBEK, Rahmenbedingungen und Faktoren für die Auβenbeziehungen von Regionen, in R. HRBEK 
(Hrsg.), Auβenbeziehungen von Regionen in Europa un der Welt, Baden-Baden, 2003, p. 12 and 14, 
refers to the “funktionale Notwendigkeiten und Bedürfnisse”; see also P. DELOIRE, Guide européen du 
cadre territorilal. L'art e la manière d'utiliser l'Union européenne, Paris, 1996, p. 139 et seq.
34  The reference to a “sub-national foreign power” widens the notion of “regional foreign power”  in 
the sense to comprehend a broader range of institutional subjects, also related to the local level of 
government.  However,  the  “substance”  of  this  concept  is  not  essentially  damaged  and  could  be 
referred  to  the  definition given,  among other  scholars,  by  E.  GIZZI,  Il  potere  estero regionale,  in 
Quaderni regionali, 1981, p. 90-91, as “the ability to create, with subjects belonging to other States, 
agreements, accords, declarations and other similar acts that produce effects on the legislative and 
administrative policy of regions and, often, even generate legal obligations”, see F. PALERMO, Il potere 
estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, 
Padova 1999, p. 14.
35 According to this different conceptual framework, the existence of a sub-national foreign power is 
quite  different  from the  treaty  making  power,  which  is  a  peculiar  prerogative  of  the  States  and, 
concerning the federal  States,  eventually  attributed to  the constituent  unites  within their  fields of 
competence.
36 See  H.M.  TSCHRIDI,  Chancen  und  Probleme  regionaler  Auβenbeziehungen  aus  der  Sicht  der  
Politischen Praxis, in  R. HRBEK (Hrsg.),  Auβenbeziehungen von Regionen in Europa und der Welt, 
Baden-Baden, 2003, p. 45 et seq.
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The general concept of “sub-national foreign power” is quite broad and could 
be considered as the general container of territorial cooperation.  An example will 
clarify this statement. If territorial cooperation comprehends the relations between 
sub-national authorities belonging to different States concerning the establishment of 
activities  with  a  determined  territorial  dimension,  the  category  of  “sub-national 
foreign power” concerns also other elements, such as the relations of sub-national 
actors with the EU, their participation in the international arena, for example of the 
Council of Europe, the implementation of Community and international legal acts, 
etc.
First of all, it could be currently considered as accepted that such sub-national 
foreign relations, although they undoubtedly have international aspects, do not fall 
under the rules of international law. A simplified explanation is related to the fact that  
transfrontier  cooperation  between  sub-national  entities  neither  is  decided  by  the 
State, nor is chargeable to the State in terms of international responsibility. In this 
sense, the principles of international law cannot serve as justification for the creation 
of sub-national transfrontier cooperation. 
Considering the positive dispositions,  actually, it  is quite difficult  to find in 
national constitutions or general laws on sub-national communities specific norms, 
which  concern  territorial  cooperation  specifically,  thus  entitling  sub-national 
communities  to  develop  territorial,  cross-border,  transnational  or  international 
cooperation.  Of  course,  it  has  to  be  remarked  that  constitutional  provisions  of 
different States, in particular federal or regional countries, confer to the constituent 
units a so-called  treaty-making power.  According to this occurrence, the fact  that 
some legal  orders provides for  a  competence  of  sub-national  units  to  act  abroad 
could bring to the idea that where such provisions are not foreseen the sub-national 
authorities of that State are not entitled or justified to establish cross-border relations 
with  other  foreign  sub-national  entities.  Actually,  the  capacity  of  sub-national 
authorities falling outside the field of international law has not to be considered as 
necessarily  connected  to  such  a  treaty-making  power.  Namely,  different  scholars 
affirm how such a treaty-making power is basically concerned with international law, 
whereas  cross-border  cooperation  conceives  a  different  space  and  a  kind  of 
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autonomy in relation to the traditional dynamics of international law37. According to 
this point, it is possible to affirm that there are some extra-national actions with legal 
effects that are not relevant for international law. However, having such actions an 
international aspect, it is not possible to say that they are not allowed just because 
they  do  not  follow  the  principles  of  international  law  or  because  they  are  not 
explicitly foreseen within Constitutions or legislations. Namely, the national rules 
conferring (or eventually omitting to confer) the “treaty-making” competence do not 
cover the entire field of public relations with international dimension. “Il doit donc 
exister  un  espace,  ou  à  tout  le  moins  un  interstice  dans  lequel  se  situent  
vraisemblable les relations qui font l'objet de notre recherche”38.
The  filed  of  territorial  cooperation  doesn't  usually  constitute  a  matter  of 
competence ex se for sub-national authorities39. Instead it is generally composed of a 
set of procedural means and tools determined by public or private law within the 
domain of transversal  matters like environment, transport, culture,  etc. In fact,  as 
already  mentioned  above,  the  instruments  of  cooperation  between  foreign  sub-
national actors are various and deriving from different sources, which aren't limited 
to  a  unique  applicable  law.  And,  in  general,  the  legal  effects  depend  and  vary 
according to the legal instrument used. For instance, it is quite easy to observe that 
transfrontier  agreements related to  the establishment of informal  relations do not 
create  legal  obligations,  while  agreements  on  the  basis  of  public  or  private  law, 
normally generate different, but enforceable and binding relations.
According to what has been said, territorial cooperation can be considered, if 
not  a  form  of  competence,  an  expression  of  sub-national  foreign  power  that  is 
exercised throughout  different –  legal  and non-legal,  national  and non-national  – 
means  and  that  should  be  considered  as  legitimate  according  to  the  respective 
national systems. Thus, concerning a set of potentially different instruments, the core 
of the issue goes to the potential legitimation for sub-national authorities to use such 
devices. In this regard, two different aspects are relevant and necessarily interrelated: 
37 See  N. LEVRAT,  Droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 203: “En effet, ces normes ne réglementent que l'accès par certaines 
CPIEs au droit international, sous  certaines conditions particulières, mais ne sauraient empêcher ces 
CPIEs de développer  d'autres formes de relations hors du droit international, ci cela est possible". 
38 Ibid., p. 205.
39 See  R. TONIATTI, Potere estero e politica economica delle Regioni: il nuovo assetto istituzionale e  
le ragioni dell'economia territoriale, in Le Regioni, a. XXIX, n. 5, ottobre 2001, p. 924.
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the formal entitlement of power-exercise,  with the respective limitations, and the 
“material” manifestation of this power.
In addition, it  is necessary to mention that the legal evolution concerning a 
“sub-national foreign power” has been mainly developed with regard to the so-called 
“regional  foreign  power”,  referring  to  the  first  sub-national  level  of  government 
“below” the State. However, with reference to what has been said above and to the 
further  analysis,  it  will  be  quite  clear  that  the  development  of  a  broader  “sub-
national”  foreign power is  open,  in  particular  if  we look at  the  newest  common 
instrument of territorial cooperation within the European panorama.
2.2. The development of sub-national foreign power: comparative perspectives
The previous paragraph has introduced a general analysis about the idea of 
territorial cooperation as a form of sub-national foreign power. Some steady elements 
have  been  pointed  out,  namely:  the  development  of  a  consolidated  praxis  of 
cooperation  between sub-national  foreign  subjects  and  a  mutual  engagement;  the 
existence of a sub-national dimension of foreign power doesn't necessary hamper the 
principle of State's sovereignty; the exercise of sub-national foreign powers is not 
(exclusively)40 a  matter  of international law. Such premises  lead to the necessary 
assumption that foreign activities of sub-national authorities are somehow permitted 
(or tolerated) within their respective national legal systems. 
The  following  analysis  will  take  into  consideration  the  development  of 
national  mechanisms  for  sub-national  authorities  to  exercise  foreign  powers 
according to the respective constitutional and legislative systems. As already said, 
despite the lack of specific provisions about territorial/transfrontier cooperation, the 
existence of a certain degree of  autonomy attributed to sub-national actors has left 
the space for the legitimization of the action of sub-national  subjects  outside the 
national  territory.  This process  is  visible,  even if  with some distinctions,  both in 
federal and regional States, but also in unitary countries. It is true that the traditional 
constitutional  provisions  about  the  treaty-making  power  for  constituent  units  of 
40 A different observation can be made with reference, for example, to a treaty concluded between a 
unit of a federal country and another State. But this is not the case considered within this survey, in 
particular because the conclusion of treaties about transfrontier cooperation between States and sub-
national entities of composed countries is rather unusual. 
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federal  States  seem to  present  a  sort  of  codification  for  the  sub-national  foreign 
power, while the situation of territorial authorities in regional and, in particular, in 
unitary States is different. However, as it has been already said, the treaty-making 
power doesn't represent the unique source of legitimization in this sense and regional 
as  well  as  unitary  systems  demonstrate  that  other  constitutional  solutions  are 
possible. 
Currently,  almost  every  legal  system  has  developed  mechanisms  for  the 
possibility for sub-national actors to develop foreign activities,  both formally and 
informally. This is the result of a combined dynamic process between the provision 
of explicit norms and the flexible interpretation of legal principles. In this sense, also 
traditional  unitary  countries,  like  France,  have  progressively  developed  clear 
solutions for sub-national authorities in order to deal with foreign relations. In these 
terms,  the  existence  and  the  awareness  of  a  consolidated  praxis  brought  to  a 
progressive  reaction  of  the  national  constitutional  systems  in  the  direction  of  a 
feasible coordination between central  and sub-national authorities. In addition, the 
analysis of the positive legal elements in a comparative perspective demonstrates that 
a distinction between federal and regional systems is quite obsolete in this regard, as 
far  as  the  development  of  feasible  solutions  for  sub-national  authorities  doesn't 
necessarily have a direct correspondence in the federal or regional structure of the 
single countries41. Moreover, also the configuration of unitary countries, with the due 
distinguishing,  shall  not  be  over-estimated  in  the  sense  of  showing  a  high 
differentiation in comparison to composed legal systems. In this case, the relations 
between institutional subjects should not be considered from the point of view of the 
vertical repartition of competences between central and sub-national authorities, but 
from the point of view of the possibility recognized to sub-national authorities to deal 
with foreign activities.
Furthermore,  a  comparative  analysis  of  different  national  systems  is 
particularly interesting in order to examine the dynamics between central and sub-
national  authorities  in  this  field  and,  in  particular,  the  limitations  and conditions 
imposed to or arranged between the State and territorial communities.
41 This reasoning is borrowed by F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave  
comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 23-25 and 66 et seq.
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The following comparative analysis of different countries will, anyway, keep 
the (almost) traditional distinction between federal, regional and unitary countries for 
expositive reasons. 
a) Federal countries
Although the regulation of  the sub-national  foreign power  in  federal  countries  is 
generally associated with the provisions of a treaty-making power for the federated 
entities,  the  exercise  of  sub-national  foreign  power  shows  different  dynamics  in 
relation to each single legal systems.
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz) entails explicit provisions about the 
foreign power of the Länder42. As far as Article 73, paragraph 1 confers the exclusive 
legislative competence to the Federation (Bund)  about foreign affairs like foreign 
policy, diplomatic relations and defence, it doesn't cover every foreign relation and 
leaves  space  for  the  Länder's  activities43.  The  explicit  provision  about  the  sub-
national foreign power is stated in Article 32 GG, which draws a balanced repartition 
of  the  treaty-making power  between  the  Bund and  the  federated  units44.  In  fact, 
according to this provision, the conduct of relations with foreign States is the concern 
of the Federation, but before the conclusion of a treaty affecting the special interests 
of a Land, this Land must be consulted in sufficient time. Moreover, the Länder can 
conclude  treaties  with  foreign  States  within  the  limits  of  their  legislative 
competences and with the consent of the Federal Government. Apparently clear, this 
disposition could be interpreted in different ways and it seems to cover only the field 
of international agreements without considering other foreign relations or activities. 
However,  other  interpretations  are  inclined  to  perceive  Article  32  GG  as 
encompassing all foreign relations instead of the unique acts of international law45. 
42 See  B. FASSBENDER,  The weight of tradition and the challenges of political, economic and legal  
convergence: The  status of the German  Länder  in International and European law,  in  L. DANIELE 
(cur.), Regioni e autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 339-357; and also 
A. KATZ, Staatsrecht, Heidelberg, 2003, p. 130.
43 See  F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere  
interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 26.
44 D.  FLORENZANO,  L'autonomia  regionale  nella  dimensione  internazionale.  Dalle  Attività  
promozionali agli accordi ed alle intese, Padova, 2004, p. 248.
45 Ibid, p. 252-253. A part of the international literature on the topic do not consider the federated 
entities  of  federal  countries  as  international  subjects  because  only  the  federation  should  have 
international  personality.  According  to  this  opinion,  the  international  agreements  concluded  by 
federated entities with international subjects (i.e. foreign States) should be considered as stipulated by 
the Federation as a whole.  See, in this regard,  R. QUADRI,  Diritto internazionale pubblico,  Napoli, 
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Namely, besides traditional international relations, the Länder develop other forms of 
foreign  relations,  which seem to  be all  the  more  so legitimated  by and included 
within this general constitutional provision. In any case, the Article remains literally 
undefined  and  open  to  more  than  one  interpretation.  In  this  regard,  the  vague 
constitutional text has been completed throughout a collaboration between Bund and 
Länder, in particular with the Lindau Agreement of 14 November 1957. With this act 
the German Länder have recognized to the Federal Government a general power for 
the  conclusion  of  international  agreements,  while  the  Government  has  given 
guarantees to consult the Länder in case the agreements concern their competences. 
With other words, the German case abandons a sort of “geometric model” following 
a division of the international competences on the base of the internal competences 
and favours  a  “participative/cooperative model”46.  In  this  regard,  the principle  of 
cooperation  between  the  Federation  and  the  constituent  units  gives  a  peculiar 
characterization  to  the  normative  texts  and  fills  it  with  living  constitutional 
ingredients. Article 24 GG seems to operate in this sense affirming that the Länder 
may, with the approval of the Federal Government, transfer part of their sovereignty 
to transfrontier institutions insofar as they are responsible for the exercise of state 
competences and for the implementation of state functions. In this regard, the general 
principle of cooperation is also applicable within the relation between the Federal 
Government  and  the  federated  entities.  An  overall  evaluation  about  the  German 
system brings to the conclusion that explicit rules about the foreign power of sub-
national  authorities  are  shaped  by  the  concrete  implementation  according  to  the 
political dynamic between the institutional subjects involved. Thus, according to the 
constitutional system, the possibility to develop territorial cooperation seems to be 
not difficult indeed. 
The  case of  Austrian  federalism is  quite  different.  In  fact,  the  text  of  the 
Austrian Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), in particular at Articles 10-15, but 
also in other provisions, has a strong centralized structure regarding the repartition of 
the  competences  between  Bund and  Länder,  which  have  only  few  enumerated 
1989, p. 427 et seq.; B. CONFORTI, Diritto internazionale, Napoli, 2006, p. 14; I. BROWNLIE, Principles 
of public international law, Oxford, 2008, p. 59. However, other interpretations admit the existence of 
the international personality of sub-national entities, althoough it is not equivalent to that of States. 
See also A. ANZON DEMMING, Sovranità, processi federalistici, autonomia regionale, in Giurisprudenza 
Costituzionale, N. 6, 2007, p. 4999 et seq.
46 Ibid., p. 252. 
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competences of executive and integrative nature47. After the reform of 1988, Article 
10, paragraph 1, No 2 states that the matter of foreign affairs, including the political 
and  economic  representation  abroad,  in  particular  the  conclusion  of  international 
treaties, pertains to the executive and legislative competence of the Federation with 
the exception of the Länder's competence according to Article 16, paragraph 1. This 
disposition confers to the  Länder, within the limits of their competences, a treaty-
making  power  with  States  bordering  on  Austria  or  with  their  territorial  entities. 
However, the rest of Article 16 provides a complex mechanism of information and 
approval  from  the  Federal  Government  which  has  a  clear  prerogative  on  the 
conclusion of the international agreement. A faculty of substitution in favour of the 
central authority is also foreseen as well as its supervision on the implementation of 
the treaties concluded by the Länder. Although the provision gives strong guarantees 
for the Federation, allowing an almost apparent foreign power to the Länder, it has 
been never applied yet: this means that, despite the provisions of the Constitution, 
Austrian  Länder  haven't concluded any international treaty with foreign States yet. 
Thus, the development of an autonomous sub-national foreign power took place in 
the form of non-institutionalized and non-formalized actions or throughout private 
law acts48,  or,  in any case,  without  the adoption of an international  treaty by the 
Austrian Länder. With reference to the specific case of transfrontier cooperation, the 
relations with foreign sub-national authorities emerging from an informal level are 
framed by international treaties concluded by the Federation. A clear example in this 
sense  is  given  by  the  Vienna  Treaty  between  Italy  and  Austria  on  transfrontier 
cooperation  between territorial  communities.  Thus,  as  far  as  sub-national  foreign 
activities increase consistently49, they are rather based on a public international legal 
ground as  granted  according  to  the  Austrian  Constitution.  On the  contrary,  these 
foreign  relations  are  established  on  an  informal  ground  or,  more  interestingly, 
through  private  law  instruments  that  should  not  follow  the  repartition  of  the 
47 See A. GAMPER,  Il potere estero dei  Länder austriaci,  in  Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 
2/2004, p. 689 and A. GAMPER, Die Regionen mit Gesetzgebungshoheit, cit., p. 362 et seq. 
48 In this sense, Article 14 B-VG affirms that the dispositions contained in Articles 10-15 have no 
incidence on the status of the Federation or of the Länder as subjects of private law.
49 The  participation  of  Austrian  Länder  working  communities  is  an  example  of  transfrontier 
cooperation without formal obligations. See, for instance, the participation to the Argealp, a working 
community between the alpine regions. It has also to be remarked the existence of Länder's offices in 
Brussels as a form of lobby towards the EU institutions.
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competences  as  foreseen  in  Article  17  B-VG50.  This  constitutional  settings  has 
created  some  difficulties  with  regard  to  the  implementation  in  Austria  of  the 
Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 which provides for the possibility of sub-national 
authorities to engage in territorial cooperation through the establishment of common 
structures with legal personality. 
The Swiss Constitution of 1999 attributes to the Cantons the right to conclude 
treaties  with  foreign  States  on  matters  that  lie  within  the  scope  of  their  powers 
(Article  56).  The same provision continues by saying that  such treaties must  not 
conflict with the law or the interests of the Confederation or  with the law of any 
other Cantons. The Canton must inform the Confederation before concluding such a 
treaty.  Moreover,  each  Canton  may  deal  directly  with  lower  ranking  foreign 
authorities.  In  other cases,  the Confederation shall  conduct relations with foreign 
states on behalf of a Canton. Despite this constitutional provision, Article 62 of the 
Federal Law of 21 March 1997 states that the Cantons shall inform the Confederation 
before concluding a treaty. Within this procedure, the central authorities shall verify 
the  conformity  of  the  treaty  with  the  federal  law  and  with  the  interests  of  the 
Confederation as well as the rights of the other Cantons. In case of a violation of 
such principles the competent authority proposes to the Federal Council to compose 
the question with the Canton. In the eventuality of a negative solution, the case is 
submitted to the Federal Assembly and it is, practically, solved on a political base51. 
Thus,  the  Swiss  constitutional  dynamic  about  the  foreign  power  of  the  Cantons 
cannot take place, in principle, without the intermediation of the Confederation in 
order to safeguard the federal interest52. 
50 See  F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere 
interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 38-39.
51 Although Article 56 of the Constitution and Article 62 of the Federal Law of 21.03.1997 show 
patent contrasting aspect, it is possible to find an “conciliatory” interpretation according to Article 54 
establishing that foreign relations are responsibility of the Confederation. Even if it  is possible to 
separate the substantial application of the two constitutional disposition, it  is also true that foreign 
relations of the Cantons contrasting with general policies or specific laws of the Confederation seem 
to be, at least, inopportune.
52 See,  Y. LEJEUNE,  La surveillance des relations internationales conventionnelles des collectivités  
fédérées, in  RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État et la 
coopération transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 
126.
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The last case about federal countries is about Belgium53. The Constitution of 
this  peculiar  federal  country  establishes  that  the  King  manages  international 
relations, without prejudice to the ability of Communities and Regions to engage in 
international  co-operation,  including  the  signature  of  treaties,  for  those  matters 
within their responsibilities as established by the Constitution and in virtue thereof 
(Article 167, paragraph 1). In fact, Community and Regional Governments have the 
power to conclude in matters that concern them, treaties regarding matters that are in 
the scope of the responsibilities of their Councils (Art. 167, par. 3). In case of a treaty 
involving different fields of competences – i.e. belonging to Communities, Regions 
or to the State – a specific law is adopted according to Article 4 Const. Other laws 
rule the procedures, coordination and control from the central authority with regard 
to the conclusion of international treaties by the Regions or Communities, mainly for 
safeguarding the national unity abroad54. In comparison to the other federal countries, 
the  Belgian  sub-national  authorities  are  granted  an  easiest  way  to  conclude 
international treaties. In fact, the Belgian federal authority can oppose the conclusion 
or the execution of a treaty emanating form a Community or a Region only if there 
are some legal or constitutional irregularities. In particular, no federal intervention is 
needed in order to authorise a Community or a Region to deal with a foreign State or 
with  an  international  organisation55.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the  peculiar  political 
situation  of  Belgium  and  its  linguistic/regional  organisation,  which  induce  to  a 
consensual  management  of  the  foreign policy.  For  these  reasons,  the  recourse  to 
international treaties by Communities and Regions is quantitatively higher than in 
other federal systems, even if several  foreign activities are developed without the 
conclusion  of  treaties,  like  the  presence  of  Belgian  sub-national  authorities  in 
53 As  a  general  references,  see  W.  PAS,  The  role  of  the  Belgian  Regions  and  Communities  in  
International  and European law,  in  L.  DANIELE (cur.),  Regioni  e  autonomie territoriali  nel  diritto  
internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 312-337.
54 The law of the 5 May 1993 provides that Communities and Regions shall inform the King about 
the  negotiations.  Furthermore,  the  law of  8  August  1980 disposes  that  he  King can suspend the 
negotiations or reject the already concluded treaties for a series of enumerated reasons, i.e. in case of 
violation of  the  international  obligations  of  the  Belgian  State.  From the  same point  of  view,  the 
Federation has the power to substitute Communities or Regions. See F. PALERMO, Il potere estero delle  
regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 43-
44. About the development of foreign activities without the conclusion of international treaties, the 
participation of the Province Limburg to the Euregio Maas-Rhein could be an example. 
55 See  Y.  LEJEUNE,  La surveillance des relations internationales conventionnelles  des collectivités  
fédérées, in  RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État et la  
coopération transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit. p. 126-128. 
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different  experiences  of  transfrontier  cooperation  (Gran  Region  SaarLorLux-
Rheinland Pfalz-Wallonien, Euregio Maas Rhein, Euregio Scheldemond or the more 
recent Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai Eurométropole franco-belge)56. 
This  brief  presentation  of  the  constitutional  development  of  sub-national 
foreign powers in federal countries shows how written constitutional provisions are 
often influenced by other complex mechanisms depending on the political relations 
between  the  centre  and  the  federated  units.  In  particular,  a  comparison  between 
Austria and Belgium demonstrates that where the positive provisions do not allow or 
complicate the exercise of sub-national foreign relations, these find alternative paths 
other than the treaty-making power. Moreover, the most desirable solutions seem to 
invoke  a  system  of  cooperation  or  consensual  arrangement  in  order  to  adapt 
substantial and procedural provisions to effective and practical needs.
b) Regional countries
One first difference between federal and regional countries concerns the legal 
rationalization of sub-national foreign powers within the constitutional text or within 
other  legal  acts. Traditionally,  regional States do not  recognise a regional  foreign 
power. However, due to the progressive development of regional  de facto  foreign 
activities,  some  national  constitutions  have  recently  recognised,  if  not  a  treaty-
making-power, at least an explicit capacity of the regions to act abroad. If the starting 
point is different in comparison to federal countries, some common aspects could be 
found. In particular, it has to be observed that the exercise of a sub-national foreign 
power corresponds quite rarely to the constitutional written provisions. Thus, multi-
layer legal system react, in different ways, to find adaptations to the living conditions 
of the exercise of foreign relations. 
With regard to the Spanish system, the Constitution affirms at Article 97 that 
the Government shall conduct foreign policy and at Article 149, paragraph 1, third 
point, that the State has exclusive competence about international relations. There is 
no reference in the Constitution to foreign powers of Self-governing Communities, 
although  they  are  granted  a  peculiar  autonomous  status57.  However,  the  issue 
56 F. PALERMO, Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere interno  
alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 44-45.
57 J.A. DEL VALLE-GÁLVEZ,  Spanish regionalism in International and European law,  in  L. DANIELE 
(cur.), Regioni e autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 291-312.
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concerning  sub-national  foreign  relations  has  been  pointed  out  from  the  very 
beginning of the existence of Self-governing Communities after the evolution of the 
Spanish constitutional system. To be precise, transfrontier relations across the border 
with France and Portugal have been developed since the 19th century, but they have 
been conducted through the establishment of bilateral governmental commissions58. 
Although no provisions about the foreign relations of Self-governing Communities 
have been included in the Constitution, a progressive sub-national involvement in 
this sector is patent. In particular, two factors are rather relevant, one concerning the 
legal  rationalization  and  one  concerning  the  practice.  On  the  one  hand,  several 
competences  or  rights  of  participation  are  foreseen  by  the  various  Statutes  of 
Autonomy with regard to the conclusion of international treaties by the State59. On 
the  other  hand,  Self-governing  Communities  and  other  sub-national  entities  are 
effectively involved in transfrontier  cooperation.  In this regard,  it  is  true that the 
subject  is  often  covered  by  international  treaties  (for  example  the  Bayonne 
Agreement between Spain and France concerning transfrontier cooperation between 
territorial communities, adopted on 10 March 1995). However, several experiences 
have been realized without an inter-state covering agreement60.  In this regard, the 
recourse  to  alternative  ways  other  than  the  traditional  international  treaty  have 
permitted to bypass the legal implications related to the lack of clear constitutional 
dispositions. In this sense, the concentration of the power between the State and the 
Self-governing Communities is heading towards an homogenisation of the praxis, 
while  explicit  constitutional  provisions  do  not  play  a  very  leading  role.  Thus,  a 
58 See  J.B.  HARGUINDÉGUY,  La  coopération  transfrontalière  franco-espagnole  face  à  ses  
contradictions, in Études internationales, Volume 35, numéro 2, juin 2004, p. 307-322.
59 These competences range form the participation within the formation of some international treaties 
to  the  right  of  consultation  of  the  Communities,  to  the  right  of  information  from  the  central 
Government  in  case  the  treaty  concerns  any  competence  of  the  Communities,  to  the  executive 
competence of treaties concluded by the Government. See F. PALERMO, Il potere estero delle regioni.  
Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 54. About the 
Spanish system see also C.G. SEGURA, La actividad exterior de las entidades políticas subestatales, in 
Revista  de Estudios Políticos,  no 97,  Enero-Marzo 1996,  p.  235-263,  and  S. BELTRAN GARCIA,  La 
cooperación transfronteriza e interterritorial: un clásico renovado, in Revista d'Estudios Autonomics  
i Federal, n. 4, 2007, p. 215 et seq.
60 Transfrontier cooperation has taken place both at municipal and at regional level. Some examples 
of  cooperation at  local  level  are:  “Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi”,  based on an inter-administrative 
agreement between French and Spanish municipalities; “Eurocité basque Bayonne/Saint-Sébastien” 
based on a protocol between the France district Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz and the Spanish province of 
Guipuzcoa.  Examples  of  cooperation  at  regional  level  are  the  Euroregion  Catalogne/Midi-
Pyrénées/Languedoc-Roussillon, the Pyrenees working-community. Moreover, several projects have 
been developed through the EU Structural Funds. 
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principle  of  cooperation  between  national  and  sub-national  institutions  has  been 
considered  by the Constitutional  Court  as  implicit  within  the  system of  relations 
among the tiers of government also with reference to the international relations and 
deriving form the right to self-government (Article 2 Const.). A general constitutional 
principle,  then,  seems  to  guarantee  a  reasonable  guiding-factor  to  balance  a 
reasonable praxis61.  In particular, the Spanish Constitutional  Court  has recognised 
the existence of a sub-national foreign power of action62, especially with reference to 
the development of the European Community dimension63.
The  Italian  case  presents  some similar  aspects.  However,  differently  form 
Spain, explicit provisions about the regional foreign power have been introduced in 
the Constitution quite recently, namely with the reform of 200164. According to the 
modified wording of Article 117, paragraph 9, Regions (and Autonomous Provinces), 
within their filed of competences, may establish agreements with foreign States and 
arrangements with territorial entities belonging to foreign States, in the cases and 
forms provided for by state laws65. This provision, despite its vague content66, confers 
61 See  F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere 
interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 63.
62 Following decisions of the Constitutional  Court have acknowledged the existence of a foreign 
capacity of action for Spanish Self- governing Communities: 125/1984, 153/1989, 54/1990, 17/1991, 
76/1991, 80/1993, 175/1995, 148/1998. 
63 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
134-139.  In  particular,  the  exercise  of  these  foreign  powers  is  submitted  to  some  fundamental 
conditions, which are the ground for its validity and for its constitutionality, namely: the respect of the 
competences  attributed  to  the  Self-governing  Communities  and  the  respect  of  the  state  exclusive 
competences in the field of foreign relations and international affairs. For a further analysis in this 
field see C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  La acción exterior de las Comunidades Autónomas.  
Balance de una práctica consolidada, Madrid, 2003.
64 Constitutional Law No 3/2001. See in this regard G.F. FERRARI, G.PARODI, Stato e Regioni di fronte 
al diritto comunitario e internazionale, in G.F. FERRARI, G. PARODI (cur.),  La revisione costituzionale  
del Titolo V tra nuovo regionalismo e federalismo. Problemi applicativi e linee evolutive,  Padova, 
2003, p. 429-479 and F. PALERMO, Il potere estero delle regioni, in T. Groppi, M. Olivetti, Regioni ed 
enti locali nel nuovo titolo V, Torino, 2003, p. 165-175.
65 Paragraph 9 of Article 117 has to be read in connection with paragraph 3 of the same article, which 
enumerates  the  matters  falling  under  the  concurrent  competence  of  State  and  Regions,  also 
comprehending  international and European Union relations of the Regions. Moreover, paragraph 5 
states  that,  regarding  the  matters  that  lie  within  their  field  of  competence,  the  Regions  and  the 
Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano participate in any decisions about the formation of 
community law. The Regions and Autonomous provinces also provide for the implementation and 
execution  of  international  obligations  and  of  the  acts  of  the  European  Union  in  observance  of 
procedures set by state law. State law establishes procedures for the State to act in substitution of the 
Regions whenever those Regions should fail to fulfil their responsibilities in this respect. 
66 See  D.  FLORENZANO,  L'autonomia  regionale  nella  dimensione  internazionale.  Dalle  Attività  
promozionali agli accordi ed alle intese, cit., p. 259-260. The author presents an analysis regarding the 
interpretation of the constitutional text. In particular, some concepts need to find a clarification such as 
the process of adoption of agreements and arrangements between foreign subjects, the legal meaning 
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an undoubted foreign power to the Italian Regions67, even if an exact classification of 
the foreign regional activities falling under the constitutional provision is difficult. 
Furthermore, the conditions for the exercise of this power depends on the content of 
the covering state law. The relative discipline is contained in the Law No 131 of 5 
June 200368. Article 6 of this law introduces two distinct procedures with regard to 
the establishment of arrangements with foreign territorial entities or agreements with 
foreign States. The first procedure introduces the duty for the Regions of a previous 
communication to the Government's Presidency- Department for the Regional Affairs 
and to the Foreign Ministry that can propose their observations within the following 
thirty days. In case of agreements with foreign States, the duty of communication has 
to  be observed towards the same authorities which verify the  legitimacy and the 
political opportunity and confers the full powers to conclude the act69. In any case the 
Foreign Ministry can always submit to the Region or to the Autonomous Province 
concerned questions of opportunity  regarding those foreign activities  that  will  be 
examined  by  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  issue  concerning  the  “political 
opportunity”, thus, should not theoretically be intended as an arbitrary interference 
within the substantial competences of the Regions, rather as a supervision concerning 
the unity of the national  foreign policy.  However,  the national  supervision is  not 
immune from the exercise of discretionary interventions in order to limit regional 
foreign  actions70.  The  ratio of  these  procedures  is  directly  connected  to  the 
cooperative principle and tries to find a balance between the foreign power attributed 
to the Regions and the exclusive competences of the State about the foreign policy, 
as also confirmed by the Constitutional Court. In particular the Court highlighted that 
and  the  differences  between  'agreements'  and  'arrangements',  the  role  of  state  law  and  the 
determination of the exact competences of the Regions. 
67 See F. MARCELLI, Attività internazionali, in ISSIRFA-CNR, Estratto dal Quinto Rapporto sull stato 
del regionalismo in Italia, 2008, p. 2, available at www.issirfa.cnr.it.
68 This law contains the dispositions for the implementation of the Constitutional Law of 18 October 
2001, No 3 that modifies the V Title of the Constitutions on Regions, Provinces and Municipalities.
69 The agreements shall comply with the following categories: executive agreements, agreements that 
implement international treaties that  are legitimately in force,  technical-administrative agreements, 
programmatic  agreements  aiming  at  promoting  the  economic,  social  and  cultural  development  of 
Regions and Autonomous Provinces. Moreover, these agreements shall comply with the Constitutions, 
Community  law,  international  obligations,  Italian  foreign  policy  and  the  fundamental  principles 
established by state law in case of matters falling under the concurrent legislative competence of State 
and Regions.
70 See  F. PALERMO,  Il  potere estero delle  Regioni  dopo la riforma del  Titolo V,  in  G.  AVOLIO,  F. 
PALERMO (cur.),  La riforma del Titolo V, parte seconda, della Costituzione italiana, Bolzano/Bozen, 
2004, p. 171.
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the regional foreign relations need to be developed within the guarantees and the 
coordination of the State71. The current formulation of Article 117 and the respective 
procedure,  anyway,  could  be  considered  as  the  explicit  normative  result  of  the 
previous evolution of the regional foreign power in the Italian system and seems not 
to  introduce  an  innovative  contribution.  Namely,  despite  the  lack  of  an  original 
constitutional disposition, Regions have developed several foreign activities, which 
have been the occasion for litigation with the State to the Constitutional Court. Thus, 
starting from a simple tolerance of these activities by the State, the legitimation of 
regional foreign relations has been progressively acknowledged by the Constitutional 
Court through the interpretation of the previous version of the Italian Constitution 
already before the reform of 200172. The following modification of the Constitution 
does  not  demonstrate  an  effective  improvement,  rather  it  represents  a  necessary 
recognition  of  activities  that  have  already  been  developed.  In  particular,  the 
limitations  for  the  Regions  remain,  practically,  the  same  that  had  already  been 
underlined by the Court, namely: no interference with the national foreign policy and 
no legal or financial responsibility for the State73. As far as the exercise of a non-
well-defined  foreign  regional  power  has  a  constitutional  and  jurisdictional 
legitimation and as far as this power-exercise is necessarily conditioned by the duty 
of  information  and the  supervision  of  the  central  authorities,  the  maturity  of  the 
Italian  regional  system  could  be  evaluated  with  regard  to  the  degree  of  fair 
71 Judgement No 238 of 19 June 2004.
72 See  F. PALERMO,  The Foreign Policy of  Italian Regions:  Not Much Ado About  Something?,  in 
International Spectator, Vol. 42, No 2, June 2007, p. 199. Some of the most relevant judgements of 
the  Italian  Constitutional  Court  in  this  regard  are:  No  179/1987,  250/1988,  564/1988,  737/1988. 
739/1988,  924/1988,  256/1989,  276/1991,  472/1992,  124/1993,  204/1993,  251/1993,  290/1993, 
26/1994,  212/1994,  332/1998,  427/1998.  A  further  issue,  then,  is  represented  by  sub-national 
transfrontier  relation enacted within the Community legislation, in particular  under  the legislative 
framework of the Structural Funds and the INTERREG Initiatives. Here, the Court has considered that  
regional foreign relations need to follow the Community procedures as provided within the respective 
Regulations.  The  regional  activities  in  the  context  of  Community  Initiatives  develop  the 
implementation  of  Community  legislation  which  is  directly  applicable  and  which  doesn't  need  a 
national covering disposition, as the judgement No 258 of 8 July 2004 explains. 
73 Ibid.,  p.  201:  “In  sum,  the  constitutional  reform and  its  enactment  law  simply  formalise  the 
previous situation, in terms of both content and procedure. The real innovation is the regional treaty-
making power with other States, a rather symbolic provision […]. Moreover, the enactment law for 
the constitutional  reform limits the regional  treaties  […] thus  excluding all  treaties  of  a  political 
nature[...].  Nor has constitutional  adjudication changed after the reform. The Constitutional  Court 
continues to rule based on the principle of fair cooperation between Regions and State, meaning that 
Regions have the duty to inform the State of (potentially) every external activity they carry out and 
that the State cannot prevent Regions form exercising their foreign policy without providing that it is 
in conflict with national foreign policy”.
66
THE ACTORS OF TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
cooperation between levels of government. However, this cooperative attitude seems 
to lack in the praxis and Regions could more easily develop several activities which 
do not consist in agreements or formal arrangements according to the procedures set 
down in  state  law74.  In  this  regard,  the  development  of  specific  instruments  for 
territorial cooperation, mainly at Community level, is going to create a gap between 
the mentioned national legislation and other instruments.
c) Unitary countries
One of the most interesting examples about the development of a sub-national 
foreign power within unitary States is represented by the French system. Certainly, 
handling about a non-composed country, it is important to remember the substantial 
differences occurring in comparison to federal/regional countries, in particular with 
regard to the quality and the degree of sub-national autonomy. The national unity of 
the  French State  has  been  traditionally  against  a  self-sufficient  foreign  action  of 
territorial  communities.  Namely,  according to  the French Constitution the powers 
concerning the conclusion of international treaties and the management of foreign 
policy  are  prerogatives  of  the  central  authorities.  However,  the  progressive 
development  of  decentralization,  in  particular  after  the  constitutional  reform  of 
200375, has speeded up the debate about the “action à l'étranger” within one of the 
strongest  centralized  countries  in  Europe.  Likely  to  the  experiences  in  regional 
countries,  the  progressive  acknowledgement  of  sub-national  foreign  relations 
represents  the  recognition  of  already  effective  activities76.  Excluded  any  kind  of 
treaty-making power, the foreign relations of French territorial communities should 
be considered as “every juridical relation, formalized or not in a contractual form, 
74 See  D. RINOLDI,  Regioni italiane e cooperazione interregionale nell'ordinamento comunitario, in 
Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 1994, p. 87 et seq.
75 The current version of Article 1, paragraph 1 of the French Constitution recites: “La France est une 
République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les 
citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.  Son 
organisation  est  décentralisée”  (Italic  is  our).  It  is  important  to  highlight  that  one  of  the  most 
important  acts  related  to  the  decentralisation  has  been  the  Law  No  82-213  of  2  March  1982 
concerning the rights and freedoms of municipalities, departments and regions (better known as “loi  
de décentralisation”).
76 Despite  the  lack  of  an  explicit  legitimation  for  territorial  communities  to  deal  with  foreign 
relations, there are several experiences of transfrontier cooperation developed by French Regions. One 
example is given by the Region Rhône-Alpes, which has undertaken different agreements with other 
foreign regions, such as Catalogna, Baden-Würtemberg and Lombardia, in order to create the base for 
cross-border projects. Also the Region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur has been involved in different 
experiences of transfrontier cooperation. 
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undertaken on the basis of a deliberation of a local representative body and aiming at 
establishing collaboration with territorial  communities belonging to foreign States 
and not necessarily geographically contiguous”77. In this sense, the foreign relations 
of territorial communities have emancipated from an exclusive legitimation based on 
private law. The jurisprudence of both the Council of State and the Constitutional 
Council have recognised the existence of a sub-national foreign activity. Basically, 
this foreign activity has been acknowledged according to the general  principle  of 
“free  administration”  of  territorial  communities  enshrined  in  Article  72  of  the 
Constitution78.  The  further  academic  distinction  between  legislative/political 
competences and administrative competences has introduced a substantial difference 
between the foreign activities of territorial communities and the state competences 
about foreign policies, thus giving a legal and constitutional ground for this “regional 
foreign  action”.  The  prerogative  of  a  sub-national  free  administration,  also 
concerning  foreign  relations,  and  its  categorisation  as  administrative  act  have 
avoided  the  violation  of  the  state  competence  about  foreign  policy  and, 
consequentially,  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  related  acts79.  Moreover,  the 
progressive  evolution  of  decentralization  and  the  increasing  recognition  of 
transfrontier cooperation at European level, has brought to a positive recognition of 
sub-national  foreign  actions  within  the  “Code  Général  des  Collectivités  
Territoriales”80, which knew several modifications concerning the foreign actions of 
territorial communities. The current version of the code provides an apposite chapter 
concerning the decentralised cooperation (Articles L1115-1 to L1115-7). The most 
important  principle  is  affirmed  in  the  firs  article,  which  states  that  “territorial 
77 See  M. CALAMO SPECCHIA,  L' “action à l'étranger” degli enti  territoriali  francesi  tra interno e  
diritto europeo: alcune note di teoria e di metodo, in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2/2004, 
p. 666. In particular, the French system tends to make a conceptual distinction between transfrontier 
cooperation and decentralized cooperation. The first activity concerns all the neighbourly relations 
among  territorial  communities  across  the  French  frontier,  while  the  second  activity  concerns  all 
international  relations  between  French  territorial  communities  and  other  foreign  sub-national 
authorities  for  common  objectives  (also  dealing  with  humanitarian  or  economic  aids  for 
underdeveloped  areas).  Moreover,  the  French  system adopts  some  different  provisions  about  the 
territorial  communities  situated  in  the  European  continent  and  the  so-called  Oversea  Territories. 
Within this paragraph only the first group is taken into consideration. 
78 The principle of free administration is connected in the praxis with the existence of a so-called 
“local public interest”, which is also an important parameter within the decentralized administrations. 
See M. ROUSSET, L’action internationale des collectivités locales, Paris, 1998, p. 30 et seq.
79 Ibid., p. 667.
80 The General Code of  Territorial  Communities  has been adopted in two different sessions. The 
legislative part has been adopted in 1996 (Law No 96-142), while the regulatory part has been adopted  
in 2000 (Law No 2000-318).
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communities and their groupings may, within the respect of France's international 
obligations, conclude conventions with foreign local authorities in order to manage 
actions of cooperation or for development's aid”. Specific mechanisms for the State's 
information  and  for  the  involvement  of  the  State's  representative  within  each 
territorial  community  are  provided81.  Moreover,  Article  1115-4  recognises  and 
implements  the  creation  of  European  instruments  of  transfrontier/territorial 
cooperation and allows, therefore, the participation of territorial communities, within 
the limits of their competences and of the State's international obligations, to a body 
or legal person established under a foreign law. This participation is allowed only 
under the condition of the presence of, at least, another territorial authority belonging 
to  a  Member  State  of  the  European  Union  or  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The 
participation shall  be authorised by the State's representative within the territorial 
community concerned.  In  particular,  the General  Code authorises  specifically  the 
participation to European transfrontier structures such as the European District, the 
European  Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC)  and  the  Euroregional 
Cooperation  Grouping  (ECG).  As  it  has  already  been  mentioned  above,  some 
conditions are foreseen, namely: the respect of the competences attributed to each 
territorial community; the respect of the national foreign policy; the authorisation of 
the State's representative  in loco.  Furthermore, due the fact that also States can be 
potential members of an EGTC, the General Code introduces a specific provision in 
order  to  avoid  the  possibility  for  French  territorial  communities  to  adopt  any 
convention  with  foreign  States  except  in  the  case  of  an  EGTC.  The  quite  rapid 
integration  of  European  instruments  in  the  national  legislation  on  territorial 
communities demonstrates that, despite the traditional unitary state structure and the 
prudent approach towards decentralization, proper solutions for the development of 
sub-national foreign actions are feasible irrespective of the different national legal 
structures.  In  particular,  the  case  of  France  is  quite  peculiar.  Namely,  the 
acknowledgement of a sub-national foreign power, even if not corresponding to a 
traditional treaty-making power, has been accepted without excessive complications. 
The  result  is  a  linear  and  quite  simple  codification  of  the  power  to  conclude 
81 The  procedural  references  are  established  in  Articles L2131-1,  L2131-2,  L3131-1,  L3131-2, 
L4141-1, L4141-2. Moreover, Articles L1115-6 and L1115-7 introduce the constitution of a national 
commission of decentralized cooperation and the possibility for the Council of State to adopt decrees 
when necessary.
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conventions with other sub-national authorities. Concerning other relations that are 
not developed in the form of conventions, it seems that they are allowed as far as 
respecting the mentioned substantial limitations related to the attributed competences 
and the France's international obligations. 
Of  course,  the  basic  distinction  between  composed  and  unitary  countries 
resides in the fact that sub-national authorities of unitary states do not have any kind 
of international capacity to conclude treaties. And this is a quite banal observation. 
However,  as  far  as  also sub-national  authorities  within  composed countries  have 
developed alternative instruments for foreign relations, rarely recurring to treaties, 
the  progressive  acknowledgment  of  these  “special”  powers  presents  everywhere 
some common paradigms.
This brief presentation of the French system shows how foreign actions of 
sub-national authorities are intrinsic to each kind of constitutional order and do not 
necessarily depend on the structure of the State. In particular, once a phenomenon is 
well assessed in the praxis, the national legal orders need to find some solutions to 
cope with that phenomenon. In this regard, also other unitary States recognise the 
capacity  of  sub-national  authorities  to  deal  with  foreign  relations,  in  particular 
territorial cooperation. This trend is visible in the centralized countries of Eastern 
Europe, where the young democratic constitutional systems are developing important 
experiences  of  regionalism  and  decentralisation82.  For  example,  the  Hungarian 
Constitution states in Article 44/A that the local representatives bodies may, within 
their competences, cooperate with local authorities in other countries and affiliate 
themselves  with  international  organisations  of  local  bodies.  This  constitutional 
provision has some positive and negative elements. On the one hand, the explicit 
mention to a certain degree of local foreign power represents a constructive factor 
and is in line with the European approach; on the other hand this disposition seems to 
be too general and, therefore, not really encouraging local communities. However, 
within  this  scenery,  the  lack  of  a  well-established  praxis  of  sub-national  foreign 
relations and the recent changes of the constitutional structure have fostered a clear 
82 A huge literature is available about the local reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. See, among 
others, A. COULSON, A. CAMPBELL (eds.), Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe: the rebirth  
of local democracy, London-New York, 2008; A.M. BÍRÓ, P. KOVÁCS, Diversity in action: local public  
management of multi-ethnic communities in Central and Eastern Euorpe, New York, 2001.
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awareness about the importance of territorial cooperation and a rapid implementation 
of the European instruments within the ordinary legislation. 
The last example aims at demonstrating that non-controversial phenomena of 
sub-national foreign relations are possible even without clear explicit constitutional 
or legislative provisions. Namely, the Finnish Constitution, establishing the general 
principle  of  municipal  and  regional  right  to  self-government  doesn't  specify  any 
capacity of sub-national authorities to deal with foreign relations. Also the Finnish 
Local  Government  Act  nothing  says  about  this  argument.  However,  sub-national 
communities are involved in foreign relations83. In this case, it is possible to speak 
about  a  soft development  of  foreign  relations,  concerning  local  capabilities  and 
mainly dealing with  European regional  programmes84.  Thus,  foreign relations  are 
mostly based on informal grounds or, in any case, without the undertaken of specific 
obligations and, therefore, positively respected by the central authority within a non-
defined framework. Conversely, where the involvement in foreign activities is more 
structured, it seems to be mainly connected to EU or international instruments.  
2.3. Observations after the comparative analysis
It  can  be  considered  as  evident  that  foreign  activities  of  sub-national 
authorities are something different from traditional international relations between 
States  and  do  not,  in  principle,  hamper  national  foreign  policy.  Moreover,  it  is 
evident as well that transfrontier or territorial cooperation represents a part of sub-
national foreign relations in a correlation of species to genus, for the simple reason 
that the category of foreign relations comprehends a broader range of actions (it has 
already been mentioned the example of the regional representation in Brussels or the 
regional involvement within the Community legislative process). Thus, as a part of a 
broader  category,  territorial/transfrontier  cooperation  finds  its  national  legitimacy 
within the process about the development of sub-national foreign powers; a process 
83 Some examples are represented by the presence of sub-national authorities in different structures 
for transfrontier  cooperation such as the Euregio Karelia, the Bartents Regional Council, Kvarken 
Council,  etc.  Moreover,  Finnish sub-national authorities have a common representation's office in 
Brussels;  see  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  Study  on  the  Division  of  Powers  between the  Euroepan 
Union, the Member State, and Regional and Local Authorities, cit., p. 118.
84 In  particular,  several  relations  towards  the  Russian  border  are  managed  within  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the related funding resources. 
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that often differs from the written normative provisions. From the point of view of 
the  positive  rationalisation  within  the  different  national  legal  systems,  two  basic 
approaches can be observed. On the one hand, some systems provide for explicit 
dispositions about a treaty-making power (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland) or other 
forms of sub-national foreign powers, both in the Constitution (Italy, Hungary) or in 
ordinary legislative acts (France). On the other hand, some legal orders don't have 
explicit provisions with the consequence of a non-prohibition of these relations85. As 
a further general remark, it is possible to observe that almost every national system 
presents peculiar developments that  partially differ  from a strict adherence to the 
written provisions about the regional foreign power but, at the same time, fall within 
a  wider  conformity  to  the  general  principles  of  the  respective  legal  system (for 
example,  the  cases  of  Italy  and  France  before  the  adoption  of  written  texts  are 
emblematic).  In  this  regard,  sometimes  the  explicit  provisions  are  adopted  as  a 
consequence  of  a  long  process  of  acknowledgement  coming  from  jurisdictional 
authorities or from an administrative praxis. 
Although  submitted  to  different  national  procedures,  the  exercise  of  sub-
national  foreign  powers,  when  enacted  with  formal  actions  or  acts,  is  always 
conditioned by two main limitations: the respect of the international obligations of 
the State concerned and the conformity to the competences attributed to the sub-
national authorities. The supervision of the central authority is, then, determined by 
procedural  dispositions  and  effectively  implemented  throughout  the  degree  of 
cooperation  between  levels  of  government  as  far  as  partially  linked  to  political 
factors. 
Given this, it is patent that the basic legitimation concerning the exercise of 
sub-national  foreign powers and,  thus,  of transfrontier  activities  derives from the 
substantial  competences  conferred  to  sub-national  authorities  according  to  their 
respective national law. In particular, this mention of the “substantial competences” 
concerns the peculiar fields of subject-matters that these authorities can deal with in 
their respective interests. With other words, these competences are related to specific 
85 The  problem  regarding  the  consequences  of  non-explicit  provisions  concerns  the  possible 
contrasting interpretations about the “normative silence”. Namely a double outcome is possible: either 
a prohibition or a permission. However,  it seems quite misleading to interpret the lack of explicit 
provisions about sub-national foreign relations as a prohibition of those relations. In fact, the huge 
praxis and the progressive development of different foreign activities show that they are, at least, 
tolerated. 
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sectors like, for example, environment, culture, transports, etc., and do not depend 
from  a  specific  constitutional  or  legal  provision  about  transfrontier  cooperation. 
Namely, the eventual explicit entitlement to deal with transfrontier activities is not a 
real subject-matter, but an entitlement to exercise of substantial competences abroad.
The  fact  that  the  legitimation  for  sub-national  subjects  to  develop  transfrontier 
activities  doesn't  necessarily  depend  from  the  existence  of  an  explicit  regional 
foreign  power  is  also  visible  from  the  observation  of  the  local  actors.  Namely, 
differently from the regional subjects, local authorities are typically excluded from 
the treaty-making-power dispositions and they are hardly explicitly provided with 
general foreign powers. However, even from the analysis of the praxis, also local 
actors  are  involved  in  territorial  cooperation  for  what  concerns  their  field  of 
competences86.  This  kind  of  activities  at  local  level  has  been  mainly  developed 
through informal activities or through instruments of private law, like associations or 
cooperatives, without the implication of specific public-law-based provisions about 
transfrontier  relations87.  Thus,  this  brief  example  clarifies  additionally  that  the 
phenomenon of territorial cooperation is not univocally bound with the existence of 
written provisions about sub-national foreign powers, but that it is rather linked to 
the foreign development of inner substantial competences.
In this sense, the exercise of foreign competences is somehow a mirror image 
of the inner competences. Regarding to this, some authors have proposed the notion 
of  “implicit  competence”.  This  concept  aims  at  founding  a  sub-national  general 
competence in foreign relations which is not based in any explicit national provision, 
but which shall be considered as inherent to the existence of sub-national entities. In 
particular  the  concept  shall  be  true  for  the  species  of  territorial/transfrontier 
cooperation,  due  to  the  traditional  absence  of  national  explicit  disciplines88. 
According to our view after the previous comparative analysis, the notion of implicit 
competence  is  only  partially  valid.  Namely,  it  could  be  considered   correct  and 
innovative for the part  concerning the principle  that  the grounds for sub-national 
86 See,  for  instance,  the  activities  of  transfrontier  cooperation  between  the  cities  of  Strasbourg 
(France)  and  Kehl  (Germany)  and  the  creation  of  the  Eurodistrict  Strasbourg-Ortenau: 
http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org/affiche_terri.php?affiche=territoire/terri_doc_ag_sk.html.
87 See  R.  DICKMANN,  Il  Gruppo  Europeo  di  Cooperazione  Territoriale  (GECT),  in  Foro 
Amministrativo: Consiglio di Stato, n. 10, 2006, p. 2911.
88 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 248.
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foreign activities are entailed within the sub-national attributions. However, speaking 
about a “general implicit competence” could be quite misleading. In fact, it seems 
more reasonable to assert that the legitimacy of sub-national foreign relations and, 
thus, of territorial cooperation is justified on the basis of the inner competences and 
formally implemented trough specific procedures. The idea under this concept is that 
the  possibility  to  develop  foreign  relations  shall  not  be  considered  as  a  subject-
matter, rather as a procedure concerning the “modalities for the exterior exercise of 
some inner competences attributed to sub-national  authorities”89.  Furthermore,  the 
pretended implicit nature shall be negated for two reasons. Namely, the attribution of 
the  inner sub-national  competences  is  explicit.  Secondly,  their  exercise  abroad is 
limited,  at  least,  by  the  necessary  respect  of  national  foreign  policy.  Thus,  if  no 
positive provisions define sub-national foreign powers, they shall be determined  a 
contrario  through  their  limitations,  which  become  conditions  of  validity.  In  this 
terms,  it  is  possible  to  affirm,  that  a  legitimation to  deal  with  foreign actions  is 
granted to sub-national authorities as a form of valid exterior exercise of the inner 
competences.
3. Fundamental components of territorial cooperation
3.1. The source of the legitimation for territorial cooperation
According to the previous observations, it is possible to speak, in general and 
non-technical  terms,  about  a  foreign  competence  –  intended  as  capability –  of 
territorial communities. In this regard, the statement of N. Levrat has to be quoted: 
“La compétence est donc […] le fondement juridique de la validité des accords de  
coopération transfrontière.  C'est  en déterminant  la compétence – son origine,  sa 
nature et sa portée – que l'on pourra connaître la nature et la portée des normes  
contenues dans les accords de coopération transfrontière dont la validité découle de 
ladite compétence.”90
89 See  F. PALERMO,  Il potere estero delle regioni. Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un potere 
interno alla costituzione italiana, cit., p. 68.
90 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 235 et seq. develops and interesting consideration about the role of 
international law and the State in the legitimation of transfrontier cooperation. Namely, reasoning a-
contrario, it is possible to conclude that international law plays a kind of negative role denying the 
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The basic principle is that the national legal orders found the legitimacy for 
sub-national authorities to develop transfrontier cooperation. Of course, the issue of 
the external power of territorial actors is substantially concerned with the functional 
attribution of competences between the various tiers of government in each country; 
namely, where the constitution or the national law establish that certain matters are 
competence of the sub-national authorities, normally those authorities can exercise 
such powers even in a foreign context. In these terms, it is possible to wonder if there 
should be at least some positive national legal provisions conferring the right to sub-
national authorities to develop territorial cooperation or if this conferral is somehow 
superfluous. 
On the one hand, constitutions of unitary States, while delegating competences 
to  territorial  administrations,  do  not  traditionally  lay  down  specific  powers  for 
territorial  cooperation91.  On  the  other  hand,  federal  legal  orders  allow  a  treaty-
making power to the constituent units within the limit of their competences, while 
regional States do not always provide for such an attribution of powers92. As this 
attitude  of  the  States  assumes  quite  a  different  form  within  federal  or  regional 
systems93, a common feature regards the constant presence of limitations to this sub-
national power94 that sees the persistent attention of the State's supervision. But, as 
already  remembered,  such  a  treaty-making  power within  federal  countries  is 
recognition of transfrontier relations between sub-national communities within its sphere. Moreover, 
the States,  aware  of  the existence of  this  kind of  transfrontier  relations,  seemed to  have  at  least 
tolerated them and, consequently,  they lost  their right  to prevent the development of  transfrontier 
cooperation.
91 According to this view, however an important role of sub-national authorities has to be taken into 
consideration. Namely, considering the French unitary State, local and regional communities played a 
key-role within the transformation (but not the overtaking) of the traditional structure of the unitary 
central  State;  see  M. CALAMO SPECCHIA,  L' “action à l'étranger” degli enti territoriali  francesi tra  
interno e diritto europeo: alcune note di teoria e di metodo, cit., p. 666.
92 In this case the distinction between Italy and Spain is emblematic.
93 See F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of  
Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, in  Z.A. SKURBATY (eds.), Beyond a One-Dimensional  
State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 285  et seq. The authors highlight 
very clearly  the  differences  between federal  and  regional  systems.  While  constitutions  of  federal 
States (like Germany, Austria and Belgium) originally provide a partial treaty-making-power for the 
constituent units, which are bound to the limitation related to the own competences, regional States 
(like Italy and Spain) do not really lay down apposite provisions concerning the external relations of 
Regions.  Nevertheless,  regional  authorities  has  progressively  developed  external  relations,  whose 
legitimation is the result of a cooperation with the central State and the following approval of the 
constitutional courts.
94 Ibid. p. 288: “Also the controlling power of the central State is provided for both in the federal and 
the regional systems, in order to guarantee a consistent foreign policy of the whole state as well as its 
international liability”.
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normally connected to the frame of international law. And, since the existence of a 
further space for foreign relations has been underlined, such space is available for 
sub-national  authorities  without  being  basically  conditioned  by  the  unitary  or 
composite  structure of  the  State.  Namely,  as the validity  to develop transfrontier 
relations is connected to the competences assigned to the sub-state authorities, is not 
necessary to find the ground for an ad hoc transfrontier competence, but to look at 
the already existing competences. “Ainsi donc, l'étendue de la capacité serait bien  
définie  par  référence  aux  compétences  dont  disposent  les  CPIEs  [collectivités  
publiques  infra-étatiques]  en  droit  interne,  mais  dans  le  limites  qu'imposent  le  
respect  des  relations  juridiques  particulières  qu'entretiennent  les  CPIEs avec les  
individus d'une part,  et  avec leur Etat national d'autre part.”95 Thus, the internal 
relations between the State and the sub-national entities will define the range and the 
limits  of  the competences  and the  further  procedures,  but  it  will  not  prevent  the 
potential feasibility of territorial cooperation.
If transfrontier cooperation gets its legitimation from the internal attributions of  
sub-national  authorities,  it  is  possible  to  draw  a  kind  of  mirroring  between  the 
domestic and foreign powers of territorial communities. Moreover, the existence of 
limits is related to the internal constitutional structure of each State. In relation to this  
last  aspect,  then,  some  interpretative  obstacles  remain  within  the  definition  and 
distinction  of  each  matter  of  competence,  which  could  have  some undetermined 
dimension.  In this cases,  when the definition of the respective attributions of the 
State  and  of  other  sub-national  authorities  is  concerned,  a  concerted  solution  is 
recommendable  in  order  to  avoid  the  recourse  to  the  competent  jurisdictional 
authority. Namely,  soft mechanisms of coordination and cooperation among tiers of 
government,  especially  within composed States,  are  a fruitful  component  of sub-
national activities. Conversely, sometimes the legitimation of a sub-national foreign 
power has  been stigmatized by constitutional  courts  within litigation proceedings 
between central and sub-national authorities96. In this regard, an emblematic example 
95 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 254.
96 The Italian Corte Costituzionale has already drawn a differentiation among foreign affairs, which 
are a State's prerogative, and “merely international activities” and “promotional activities”, which are 
allowed within the field of regional competences and, therefore, legitimizing cross-border activities 
(see judgements n. 170/1975, 123/1980, 223/1984, 187/1985, 179/1987, 564/1988, 238/2004). 
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is represented by a quite recent statement97 of the Italian constitutional jurisprudence 
about the possibility for Italian sub-national authorities to put into practice cross-
border agreements in application of the EU legislation98, which is directly applicable 
without a previous consent of the central government. To be more precise, the Italian 
Constitutional Court confirmed that those kind of agreements among foreign sub-
national  authorities,  while  being a manifestation of international relations, do not 
have the quality of international treaties, since they are not legally binding for the 
State,  but  only  for  the  single  sub-national  entities99.  In  this  occasion,  in  fact,  an 
autonomous management of external power has been recognised to territorial entities 
by the EC law.
Since  this  kind  of  power  do  exist,  even  if  with  different  constitutional 
dynamics, both in unitary as in composite States, it can be generally identified with 
every form of connection or cooperation, either formal or not, between sub-national 
territorial entities, which creates a kind of legal relationship100. Namely, what denotes 
the  “legal  effects”  of  binding  two  foreign  territorial  communities  is  not  given 
necessarily  by  a  formal  structure;  rather  by  the  the  mandatory  nature  of  the 
agreement and the respective law applicable. In this regard, transfrontier activities 
have to be distinguished into legal and political and into formal or informal.
As general observation, the national legal orders in Europe delineate a multi-
faced and varied set of situations concerning the practice of territorial cooperation as 
a manifestation of foreign power101. But, of course, the recognition of the legitimacy 
for sub-national authorities to establish transfronier relations is only one part of the 
legal analysis, which also comprehends the legal nature of the agreements between 
these authorities, the law applicable and the legal consequences. Thus, the evaluation 
of the national competences has to be examined in the dynamic with other legal 
pluralistic and transnational elements.
97 Judgement n. 258/2004, with a comment of  R. DICKMANN,  La Corte costituzionale ed il “potere  
estero” delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome, in federalismi.it, n. 16/2004.
98 It deals about the application of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down 
general provisions on the Structural Funds and, in particular to the agreement within the context of the 
INTERREG III A program.
99 See  R. DICKMANN,  La Corte costituzionale ed il “potere estero” delle Regioni e delle Province  
Autonome, in federalismi.it, n. 16/2004, p. 8.
100 See  M. CALAMO SPECCHIA,  L' “action à l'étranger” degli enti territoriali francesi tra interno e  
diritto europeo: alcune note di teoria e di metodo, cit., p. 666.
101 See COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS,  La coopération transeuropéenne entre collectivités territoriales, cit., p. 
181.
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In these terms, a  partially  conclusive reflection could be done.  On the one 
hand, the feasibility of territorial cooperation mirrors the legal capacity recognised to 
territorial  authorities  by  each  respective  State  in  form  of  different  substancial 
competences;  on  the  other  hand,  territorial  cooperation  embodies  a  new type  of 
“experimental  law”102,  where  different  legal  orders  arrange  own mechanisms  and 
where the traditional constitutional conception of strict separation of competences 
should (preferably) leave the space for new forms of cooperation among levels of 
government. As a consequence, if normally the notion of autonomy appears like an 
absolute103 concept, it reveals its relativity with regard to the possible establishment 
of  concerted  strategies  of  cooperation  as  a  procedural  methodology to  deal  with 
complex powers. Such an approach seems to gain importance not only within the 
different  national  constitutional  orders,  but  also  in  the  the  EU  and  international 
perspectives. 
3.2.  The  legal  nature  and  the  law  applicable  to  the  agreements  of  territorial  
cooperation between sub-national territorial authorities
Cooperation of whatever kind is established through an agreement between 
the subjects involved. The agreements concerning territorial cooperation could have 
a very different nature and very different objectives. In the previous paragraphs the 
issue about the capability of sub-national authorities to enact territorial cooperation 
has been taken into consideration. Substantially speaking, the legal source of the sub-
national competence to deal with transfrontier relations is something different from 
the legal aspects concerning the agreements between foreign sub-national authorities 
in  order  to  establish and rule  their  relations  of  cooperation.  Namely,  as  the  first 
element founds the conditions of legitimacy for each sub-national actor within the 
respective national legal order to establish transnational foreign relations, the second 
element  concerns  the  legal  nature  and  mechanisms  about  the  agreement  of 
cooperation between foreign sub-national communities104. This is the interpretation 
102 This  expression  is  borrowed  from  F.  PALERMO,  J.  WOELK,  Cross-Border  Cooperation  as  an  
Indicator for Institutional Evolution of Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, cit., p. 288.
103 With reference to the word itself, autonomy (autòs nòmos) means “self-ruling”, “self-governing”, 
basically, independent of others.
104 See  N. LEVRAT,  Droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 259.
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proposed in this survey for the theoretical analysis of the legal aspects of territorial 
cooperation. However, other academic contributions identify basically three models 
in order to describe the mechanisms of territorial cooperation, namely: non-regulated 
cooperation; regulated cooperation, which is provided by an international covering 
agreement; cooperation regulated by Community legislation105.  This subdivision is 
certainly  correct,  but  is  not  really  clear  in  order  to  underline  the  different  legal 
components  of  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-national  authorities.  Namely, 
according to our opinion, the distinction between the law concerning the legitimation 
of the subjects involved in cooperation and the legal aspects concerning the relations 
between those subjects is fundamental in order to understand the complexity of the 
legal factors involved in territorial cooperation.
From a  general  point  of  view,  sub-national  cooperation  can  be  set  up  in 
different forms, namely trough informal praxis  or  formal agreements. Furthermore, 
formal agreements could have another declination in case they set  up a  common 
structure  with or  without  legal  personality/legal  capacity.  The  model  of  informal 
praxis doesn't imply a real legal concern about the nature of the agreement as far as it 
does not create legal obligations between the parties106. However, it is not the matter 
concerning the existence of a real covenant or not, rather, in the case of informal 
accords  there  are  no  legal  responsibilities  or  liabilities  and  the  agreement  is  not 
jurisdictionally  enforceable,  having  only  political  commitments.  In  this  sense, 
informal relations are basically taken out of a context of legal implications. About 
formal agreements, then, it is possible to observe that some of them generate legal 
obligations,  whereas  other  agreements  creates  only  political  implications,  in 
particular when the parties share only common general interests rather than concrete 
objectives.  The  further  analysis,  however,  concerns  agreements  with  legal 
connotation. In this regard, two legal aspects could be observed. On the one hand, a 
first  element  deals  with  the  legal  nature  of  the  agreement  between  sub-national 
authorities  which  founds  the  cooperation  and  anticipates  the  following  common 
activities;  in  particular,  the analysis  about  the legal nature wants to  highlight  the 
105 See  M.  PERTILE,  Il  GECT:  verso  un  organismo  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera?, in  Diritto del commercio internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto interno, 
cit., p. 120-122.
106 See M. AUDIT,  Les conventions transnationales entre personnes publiques, Paris, 2002, p. 49 et  
seq.
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private-law or public-law character of the agreement and its source, namely the legal 
instrument providing this kind of agreement. On the other hand, the second element 
concerns the legal regime and the normative provisions applicable to these peculiar 
relations. 
With reference to the legal nature of the agreement, it could be potentially 
based on private or public law. The praxis knows the use of both the two forms107. 
Given the fact that public international law is not relevant in this respect, the recourse 
to  one  or  the other  discipline  have  different  effects,  both  from a substantial  and 
jurisdictional point of view. The peculiarities of territorial cooperation between sub-
national  public  subjects  imply  that  the  recourse  to  private-law  agreements  (i.e. 
contracts) is, although practicable, quite limiting for mainly public purposes108. Of 
course,  the agreements concluded through private  contracts  are used in particular 
with regard to economic activities or for other typically private services and, more 
generally,  when  public  subjects  decide  to  act  as  private  subjects.  However,  the 
objects of territorial cooperation are typically broader and less defined than private 
objectives,  due  to  their  correspondence  to  the  public  (constitutional  or 
administrative) competences of sub-national entities109. In these terms, the scopes of 
territorial  cooperation  seem  to  be  better  satisfied  trough  public-law  agreements. 
Namely, although more recent than the parallel category in private law, the general 
notion of public-law agreement has been acknowledged in various national systems 
in  Europe  and  also  developed  at  Community  level110.  Thus,  agreements  or 
conventions for territorial cooperation should preferably be established through legal 
models based in public law. In particular, the existence of a convention or agreement 
between  public  bodies  doesn't  exclude  the  binding  legal  nature  of  the  act.  This 
possibility is also provided by the attachments to the Madrid Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities adopted 
107 See  L. CONDORELLI, F. SALERNO,  Le relazioni transfrontaliere tra comunità locali in Europa nel  
diritto internazionale ed europeo, in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico, 1986, p. 381 et seq.
108 See J. ROBERT, Public Relations at Borderlines, Grounau, 1998, p. 15.
109 See N. BASSI,  Gli accordi fra soggetti pubblici nel diritto europeo, Milano, 2004, p. 233 et seq.  
See also  N. FALCON,  Le convenzioni pubblicistiche. Ammissibilità e caratteri, Milano, 1984, p. 189: 
“the private contractual model, due to its compensative nature, is not wide enough in order to easily 
and comprehensively rule cases and relations that are tightly bound to public and also constitutional 
powers of the entities concerned” (translation is our). Other contributions concerning this subject are: 
G. GRECO, Accordi amministrativi tra provvedimento e contratto, Torino, 2003.
110 See N. BASSI,  Gli accordi fra soggetti pubblici nel diritto europeo, cit., p. 250 et seq. Regarding 
the national systems, the authors refers in particular to Italy, France, Germany and Spain.
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by the Council of Europe, which foresees a series of model-agreements available for 
different  objectives  of  cooperation.  Beside  private  contracts,  the  Convention 
introduces some examples that are identified as “public-law contracts”, which mainly 
deal  with  transports  and  communications,  energy-distribution,  natural  reserves, 
crafts, civil defence, trade fairs and marketplaces, social infrastructures and tourism. 
This  exemplification  demonstrates  how  the  matters  ruled  under  a  public-law 
agreement concern the competences of sub-national authorities and, therefore, are 
better  enshrined  within the  theoretical  categories  of  public  law,  which  has  not  a 
deterrent function towards the binding legal connotation of the agreement. Thus, in 
order to establish the legal obligation it is only necessary that the parties involved 
show their will of mutual commitment with regard to the established objectives. In 
particular, the public character of the agreement is really identified on the basis of 
these objectives, which are basically related to proper constitutional or administrative 
powers111. 
In case a formal agreement foresees the constitution of a structure with legal 
personality,  this body has typically its headquarters  within a determinate  national 
territory chosen with the consent of the actors involved in cooperation. Beside the 
fact that this entity could be a private-law or public-law legal person, its functions are 
regulated by the national law of the State where the headquarters is situated112.
The other important element for the legal analysis of territorial cooperation, 
which  has  already  been  mentioned  above,  concerns  the  legal  regime  and  the 
normative  provisions  applicable  to  the  established  transfronier  relations.  In 
particular, this legal regime could depend on different and variable factors, namely: 
the decisions taken within the agreement between the actors of cooperation about the 
111 Ibid., p. 308-318.
112 C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI,  L'aménagement  par  l'État  de  la  coopération 
transfrontalière des collectivités territoriales, in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-
TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État et la coopération transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13  
septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 20, identifies the minimum common elements of a structure of 
cooperation. These elements are typically enshrined in the statutes: a) name of the organisation, place 
of the headquarters, duration and the law governing the structure; b) geographic area covered by the 
structure;  c)  specific  objectives  and  scopes attributed  to  the  organism by  sub-national  authorities 
participating  as  members;  d)  composition  of  the  deliberative and  managing organs,  modalities  of 
representation of the sub-national members and rules about the designation of their representatives; 
the  legal  regime  concerning  the  relations  between  the  structure  and  the  sub-national  authorities 
involved; e) the functioning rules, in particular the legal regime about the management of staff; f) the 
budget and auditing rules; g) financing of the activities; h) the rules related to the modification of the 
original conditions, for the new memberships or withdraws as well as related to the dissolution of the 
structure. 
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law applicable to their relations, the international or Community legal rules about 
transfrontier  cooperation,  the  rules  derived  from  the  common  legal  disciplines 
regarding international relation (in particular in case of international  private law). 
Thus, the law applicable to each transfrontier relation shall be determined case by 
case, in relation to the instrument or to the kind of legal cooperation chosen113. In this 
sense, it seems that the regime about the law applicable is one of the most complex 
issues of territorial cooperation because it is bounded to several factors. For example, 
in the eventuality a common structure with legal personality under a certain national 
law is established, it is quite understandable that this national law will be applicable. 
However, the linkage to a certain national law rises some problems of coordination 
with the foreign sub-national authorities. In particular,  the necessity to have clear 
rules about the law applicable to transfrontier territorial relations has stimulated the 
development of common instruments for cooperation in order to find some coherent 
and attractive solutions114.
3.3. The different perspectives of the Council of Europe and of the European Union  
about sub-national authorities
In the previous paragraphs two important elements have been pointed out: the 
concept  of  sub-national  authorities  and their  legitimation  to  practice  transfrontier 
relation.  Those  aspects  are  both  fundamental  for  the  development  of  territorial 
cooperation and for a better legal awareness of this phenomenon. The dimension of 
national  legal  orders  and their  relationship with  territorial  communities  has  been 
highlighted. Now the perspectives of the “super”national institutions have to be taken 
into consideration in order to give a complete overview about the different contexts 
in which sub-national authorities play an increasing role and are influenced by. 
The  development  of  territorial/transfrontier  cooperation,  supported  by  the 
European Union and the Council of Europe, seems to be directly proportioned to the 
improving  relevance  of  sub-national  actors  within  these  two  frameworks. 
113 See  N. LEVRAT,  Droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 178.
114 See H. LABAYLE, L'Etat e la coopération transfrontalière. Éléments de synthèse, in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE 
DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI), L’État et la coopération transfrontalière:  
actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., 169 et seq.
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Furthermore, two aspects need to be highlighted: on the one hand the contribution of 
European institutions for the development of sub-national questions is undoubted; on 
the other hand, the different approach of the EU and of the CoE has to be kept in 
mind. In fact, the approach to territorial cooperation is conditioned by the different 
legal nature of the two systems. 
With regard to  the EU, its  supranational nature has brought to  a potential 
development of sub-national actors even in a sort of independent dynamic. In fact, 
although the well  known “legal  regional  blindness” of the European Community, 
regional and local authorities anyway attempt to become actors in their own right115. 
Conversely,  the  activities  of  the  CoE,  although  interested  in  the  development  of 
democracy and local government, are essentially distinguished by its international 
structure116. 
The  concrete  example  of  cooperation's  legal  instruments  is  emblematic  in 
order to comprehend the role of European institution towards the implementation of 
the  role  of  sub-national  institutions.  Namely,  the  Madrid  Outline  Convention  on 
Transfrontier  Cooperation  between Territorial  Communities  or  Authorities  and its 
Protocols, as the main CoE's legal tools regarding transfrontier relations, and the EC 
Regulation on the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, as the newest EU 
provision about the implementation of cooperation beyond the borders, represent the 
most  important  common  legal  frameworks  for  territorial  cooperation.  These  two 
instruments reveal each institution's legal nature and the consequent effect on sub-
national local actors. In fact, as we will better examine within the next chapters, the 
Madrid  Outline  Convention  is  an  international  agreement  between  States  as 
contracting  parties.  Thus,  before  the  setting  up  of  a  transfrontier  cooperation's 
arrangement,  the  Convention  provides  that  States  could  require  a  “covering” 
agreement,  previous  to  the  setting  up  of  the  cooperation  among  the  single  sub-
national communities117. As the Convention, in its quite undetermined set of rules, 
115 See  S. WEATHERILL,  The Challenge  of  the  Regional  Dimension in  the European Union,  in  S. 
WEATHERILL,  U.  BERNITZ,  The  Role  of  Regions  and  Sub-National  Actors  in  Europe,  Oxford  and 
Portland, 2005, p. 19.
116 See G. WINKLER, The Council of Europe. Monitoring Procedures and the Constitutional Autonomy  
of the Member States, Heidelberg, 2006, p. 347 et seq., and p. 461 et seq.
117 See D. FLORENZANO, Gli atti pattizi delle Regioni italiane nell'ambito delle attività di cooperazione  
transfrontaliera  alla  luce  del  rinnovato  quadro  costituzionale,  in  Diritto  pubblico  comparato  ed 
europeo,  2/2004, p. 680-681.  An appendix to the Madrid Outline Convention provides for several 
models with general clauses for inter-state agreements, which, anyway, do not have treaty value; see 
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strictly requires a conformity to the inner national  constitutional  orders,  it  leaves 
much  space  to  the  discretional  choices  of  States118.  On  the  contrary,  the  EC 
Regulation  on  EGTC  is  directly  applicable  within  the  territory  of  the  European 
Union, thus legitimizing the creation of transfrontier structures among sub-national 
authorities  according  to  the  discipline  of  the  Regulation  and  without  a  previous 
agreement among States. 
Since  a  digression  about  the  the  legal  peculiarities  and  the  distinctions 
between  an  international  and  a  supranational  legal  order  seems  to  be  quite 
unproductive if  conducted  in  theoretical  terms,  the  functional  effects  on the sub-
national  actors  and on the  regional  phenomenon are,  nevertheless,  significant.  In 
general, the academic literature tends to separate the analysis about the EU from the 
analysis concerning the CoE. Of course, the two systems are radically different and 
have  also  different  involvements  towards  sub-national  issues.  However  a 
comparative  reflection  on  their  impact  on  sub-national  subjects  and  territorial 
cooperation  could  be  interesting  in  the  perspective  of  this  research,  as  both  the 
institution give a huge emphasis to the increasing role of territorial communities119 in 
the field of transfrontier relations.
Starting from the CoE, it is quite clear that its first and general aim, besides 
the  major  objective  related  to  the  respect  of  human  rights,  is  to  achieve  better 
conditions  of  local  democracy,  dialogue,  reconciliation,  good  governance  and 
capacity  building  among  the  States  of  a  great Europe120.  In  this  regard,  a  clear 
example of the CoE's concern about regional and local democracy and related issue 
is represented by the adoption of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in 
the CoE official website at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/106-1.htm
118 Ibid.  p. 681  et seq., where Florenzano highlights the option of non-interference chosen by the 
Convention towards the contracting States; on this basis, the Italian ratification law (no. 948/1994) 
provides for a previous coverage agreement among Italy  and other  neighbouring State  before the 
setting up of any transfrontier agreement or arrangement. 
119 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Similarities  and  differences  of  
instrument and policies of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the field of Transfrontier  
Co-operation, Council of Europe, 2006, p. 7.
120 See  J.L. DE CASTRO,  The Other Dimension of Third-Level Politics in Europe: The Congress of  
Local  and  Regional  Powers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  in  F.  ALDECOA,  M.  KEATING (eds.), 
Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, London, 1999, p. 97, 
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE, Construire ensamble l'Europe du droit, Strasbourg, 2005, p. 5 et seq., and COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE,  STEERING COMMITTEE ON LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEMOCRACY (CDLR),  Administrative  and 
territorial reforms creating territorial communities or authorities at differennt levels, Strasbourg, 17 
December 2002, p. 7.
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1985, which symbolizes one of the most significant efforts of the Council for the 
development of genuine forms of democracy. Looking at the European Union, then, 
the  qualification  of  its  objectives  is  a  much  more  complex  matter.  From  an 
exclusively  economic  and  functional  perspective  to  a  value-oriented  semi-
autonomous system, the Union evolved as supranational system in a direction that 
brought  to  the  consideration  of  the  EU  as  a  constitutional  order121.  Within  this 
context,  the idea of the role  and participation of the Regions in the EU changed 
significantly throughout the process of European integration. If the CoE objectives 
aren't, of course, less important than the integration of the European Union, the ways 
and  methods  of  reaching  them  and  the  legal  means  utilized   are  substantially 
different. 
Regarding the general form of the CoE's acts, two ways are usually practised: 
international  agreements,  with binding legal effects  for the contracting parties,  or 
declarations/recommendations/resolutions, with a value of so-called soft law. Like in 
several  other  international  organisations,  the  intergovernmental  method  is  the 
procedure to adopt normative acts. And this is a quite linear modality (if not from a 
political point of view, at least from a legal perspective), if considered in regard to its 
legal effects. This modus operandi is clearly visible even with reference to the sub-
national collectivities, to their legal status and to the regulatory effectiveness within 
the CoE's Member States. Of course, a political recognition of local and regional 
authorities  has  been  developed  and  fostered  by  the  Council,  mainly  after  the 
establishment  of the Congress of  Local  and Regional  Authorities  (CLRAE)122.  In 
121 Summarizing the evolution of the EU and its constitutional dynamics is, of course, not possible. 
The academic literature on this topic is countless.  Ex multis, see J.H.H. WEILER,  The Constitution of  
Europe,  Cambridge, 1999;  J.C. PIRIS,  L’Union européenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il  
une?, in  Revue trimestrielle du droit européen, n.  4 , Oct.-Déc. 1999,  p. 599  et seq.; J.H.H. WEILER, 
Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 10/2000; G. 
DE BÚRCA,  J.  SCOTT,  Constitutional  Change in  the  EU,  Oxford,  2001;  D.  CURTIN,  I.  DEKKER,  The 
Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflection on Vertical Unity-in-Diversity, in P. 
BEAUMONT,  C.  LYONS,  N.  WALKER (eds.),  Convergence  and  divergence  in  European  Public  Law, 
Oxford, 2002, p. 59 et seq.;  A. PIZZORUSSO,  Il patrimonio costituzionale europeo,  Bologna, 2002;  G. 
ZAGREBELSKY (cur.),  Diritti  e  Costituzione  nell’Unione  europea,  Roma-Bari;  2003;  R.  TONIATTI,  F. 
PALERMO (cur.),  Il  processo  di  costituzionalizzazione  dell’Unione  europea.  Saggi  su  valori  e  
prescrittività dell’integrazione costituzionale sovranazionale, Trento, 2004;  F. PALERMO,  La forma di  
Stato dell’Unione europea. Per una teoria costituzionale dell’integrazione sovranazionale, Padova, 
2005. 
122 The  CLRAE  was  established  in  1957,  originally  as  the  Conference  of  Local  Authorities  in 
Europe. It became later Conference of Local and Regional Authorities and “[i]n 1994 the Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities succeeded the Conference as a Council of Europe consultative body. 
Being intended to genuinely represent both local and regional authorities, it comprises two chambers: 
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fact, this body has a consultative role123, which shows the increasing importance of 
the sub-state levels of government. However, although this important expression of 
consultative opinions, the legal acts are effective and binding only among States, as 
subjects of international law124.
Evaluating these last assertions about the CLRAE, its role seems, indeed, not 
so different from that of the Committee of the Regions of the EU. According to the 
TEC Treaty125, this entity has a consultative role, as well. But, even if regions and 
local authorities are not considered as direct interlocutors of the European institutions 
and primary actors within the European decision-making process, anyway their status 
is  progressively  abandoning  the  traditional  “international  legal  indifference”126 
towards territorial communities. Namely, since the idea of sub-national communities 
as real subjects of the EU system could be even refused, it is a fact that they can be 
direct recipients of the EC legal acts that are directly applicable or, in some cases, 
responsible for the implementation of directives. Anyway, whatever complicated and 
experimental, a regional active dimension within the EU represents a true reality127.
According to what has been said, it is clear that the CoE and the EU have 
different perspectives in the approach to sub-national authorities and, as it has been 
highlighted, differing legal effects. But, at the very end, not only legal impacts ex se 
are to be taken into consideration. Rather, the capacity of legal means to reach the 
objectives of the system involved, either international or supranational, is relevant in 
order to evaluate the system's efficacy itself.
the Chamber of Local Authorities and the Chamber of Regions”, see the CoE official website at http://
www.coe.int/t/congress/presentation/default_en.asp.
123 Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the CLRAE Statutory Resolution set down the nature and the function of the 
Congress. In particular, Art. 2 affirms that, in addiction to its consultative role, aims of the Congress, 
among others, are: to ensure the participation of local and regional authorities in the implementation 
of the ideal of European unity; to submit proposals to the Committee of Ministers in order to promote 
local and regional democracy; to promote co-operation between local and regional authorities; etc.
124 The major  CoE's legal  acts about local  government and democracy are,  in fact,  international 
conventions, like the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the Madrid Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Co-operation, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
125 See Art. 263 et seq.
126 See  M.  PLUTINO,  La  partecipazione  delle  regioni  alla  formazione  della  decisione  politica  
comunitaria, in L. CHIEFFI (cur.), Regioni e dinamiche di integrazione europea, Torino, 2003, p. 49 ss.
127 See F. PALERMO, A. SANTINI, From NUTS to Constitutional Regions: Addressing EU Regions in the  
EU Framework,  in  R.  TONIATTI,  F.  PALERMO,  M.  DANI (eds.),  An Ever More Complex  Union.  The 
Regional Variable as a Missing Link in the EU Constitution?, Bolzano, 2004, p. 3-26. See also  M. 
KEATING, Europeanism and Regionalism, in B. JONES AND M. KEATING (eds.), The European Union and 
the Regions, Oxford, 1995 p. 3-22.
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In this perspective, a compared analysis of territorial cooperation within the 
areas  of  the  EU  and  the  CoE  could  be  an  interesting  benchmark  to  see  the 
implementation  of  praxis  and  rules,  even  with  regard  to  the  fulfilment  of  the 
respective objectives. In these terms, it is possible to speak about the “prescriptive 
capacity” and the limitations of the two legal systems in relation to the other levels of 
government, such as the national and sub-national tiers128. 
3.4. Territorial cooperation “before” and “after” the adoption of EGTC Regulation
So  far,  a  general  reflection  on  some  essential  key-concepts  has  been 
presented.  What  has  clearly  emerged  is  that  territorial  cooperation  represents  a 
factual phenomenon first, and then a legal reality. In particular, the praxis and the 
instruments for territorial cooperation evolved progressively and the two main supra-
national legal tools – the CoE Outline Convention and the EC Regulation on the 
EGTC – are not the exclusive ways of founding transfrontier relations and activities 
between sub-national authorities.
However,  such  legal  instruments  seem  to  give  those  collectivities  two 
principal benefits: on the one hand, a set of rules that, even if not always optimal, 
draws a general framework of positive references; on the other hand, a sort of “own 
and proper” legitimacy for the exercise of (what has been called) foreign powers, 
which traditionally have created some friction with the belonging States.
For sure, the most relevant happening within the last few years in the field of 
territorial cooperation is the adoption of the EC Regulation on the EGTC. As far as 
the  main  characteristics  of  this  normative  act  will  be  widely  analysed  in  the 
forthcoming chapters, only a brief consideration will be developed in this paragraph.
The EGTC Regulation provides for a legal tool that is not exclusively thought 
for sub-national authorities. Namely, according to the Article 3, the membership of 
such  a  grouping  could  be  formed  by  Member  States,  regional  authorities,  local 
128 See  F.  PALERMO,  Premessa.  Verso  il  diritto  costituzionale  integrato  dell'incompletezza,  in R. 
TONIATTI, F. PALERMO (cur.), Il processo di costituzionalizzazione dell’Unione europea. Saggi su valori  
e prescrittività dell’integrazione costituzionale sovranazionale, Trento, 2004, p. 4-5. The scenario of a 
multi-level  system could  suggest  an  idea  of  a  hierarchical sovereignty and  normativism.  On the 
contrary, MacCormick suggests a conception that identifies “the legal order in the complex interaction 
of overlapping legalities, which  characterises contemporary European legal order” as a “plurality of 
interacting  systems,  'distinct,  but  interesting'”,  see  S.  DOUGLAS-SCOTT,  European  Union  Law:  A 
Constitution for Europe, Harlow, 2002, p. 279.
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authorities,  bodies  governed  by  public  law  and  associations  consisting  of  such 
bodies;  members  coming  from  at  least  two  Member  States129.  But,  as  several 
documents  coming  from different  sources  highlight,  this  instrument  is  peculiarly 
thought  for  facilitate  cross-border activities among regional  and local  authorities. 
Such an observation, then, is even more decisive if examined together with the main 
legal effect of regulation, i.e. the direct applicability. 
Thus,  although  the  EGTC  Regulation  provides  for  different  limitations 
(regarding the scope, the members and the competences of an EGTC), which are 
directly connected to the constitutional order of Member States, it is possible to make  
an hypothesis about a new impulse of this instrument towards territorial cooperation, 
first, and, also, on the external powers of sub-state authorities. In fact, despite some 
restrictions,  this  normative  act  lays  down  provisions  that  allow  sub-national 
authorities belonging to different Member States to create a cross-border legal entity 
without a previous agreement between those States.
In these terms, the adoption of the EGTC Regulation should be seen as a 
turning point  within the legal management  of territorial  cooperation.  As the legal 
instrument  has  been  set  up,  two  following  consequences  will  be  examined:  the 
technical-legal  functioning  and  application  of  its  rules,  and  the  political  will  to 
proceed to its implementation130.  While the Regulation itself  affirms that it  won't 
substitute the other existing instruments, it is quite clear that it has currently become 
the most interesting and controversial one. 
129 See http://www.interact-eu.net/the_egtc_regulation/68.
130 In this sense “the European Commission must report on the application of the Regulation by 
August  2011,  including  the  proposal  for  amendments  if  necessary”,  see  http://www.interact-
eu.net/the_egtc_regulation/68.
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THE EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL DIMENSION
1. European governance in a post-sovereignty constitutional context
1.1. The governance's perspective and the EU multilevel governance
Issues related to institutional governance are always complex as far as they 
are linked to the exercise of powers in a multi-dimensional system. In these terms, 
the governance's perspective is also linked to the European approach to the territorial 
dimension. The concept of governance within the European context is usually seen in 
connection with its most famous adjective, namely “multilevel” governance (MLG). 
These themes are normally and obviously collocated more within the frame of the 
European Union than in the area of the Council of Europe, because MLG is a typical 
phenomenon and a typical conception of the EU system1. Therefore, much space in 
this  chapter  is  going  to  be  dedicated to  the  multi-level  approach within  the  EU. 
However, despite this comprehensible observation, the concept and the vision of a 
multilevel approach to governance could be seen in a wider sense, thus embracing 
also other “levels” outside the European Union. This is the reason why the role of the 
Council  of  Europe  has  been  mentioned in  this  chapter.  Of  course,  as  mentioned 
several times, we are aware of its peculiar international nature. In any case, and in 
particular  with  regard  to  territorial  cooperation,  the  CoE has  a  fundamental  role 
concerning  the  development  of  governance's  mechanisms.  From another  point  of 
view, the analysis of MLG, as developed within the EU system, could be a positive 
model  in  order  to  suggest,  with  the  due  differentiations,  feasible  mechanisms  of 
institutional cooperation/coordination applicable in a wider context.
1 A broad approach to the general issue about the multilevel system of rights is given by P. BILANCIA, E 
DE MARCO (cur.),  La  tutela  multilivello  dei  diritti.  Punti  di  crisi,  problemi  aperti,  momenti  di  
stabilizzazione, Milano, 2004. 
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The  intention  to  open  this  chapter  with  some  observations  about  a 
governance's  perspective  founds  its  reasons  in  the  evolution  of  European 
constitutional  dynamics.  Moreover,  as  a  general  concept,  the  governance's 
perspective is conceived as a theoretical background for the analysis of the European 
territorial  approach and development  of an European territorial  dimension,  which 
saw a progressively wider importance. 
Generally speaking, the objects of such an approach, namely territories, have 
assumed a varying connotation in relation to the institutional interventions. Thus, the 
territories' passive attitude of being targets of European, national and sub-national 
actions has modified their configuration, together with the development of both the 
European  and  the  sub-national  dimensions.  According  to  the  aforementioned 
dynamic process, it is possible to see how rigid schemas and inflexible political or 
legal solutions are not to recommend as practicable formulas. And this statement is 
also  relevant  for  the  analysis  of  transfrontier  phenomena.  The  background  of  a 
compound, multi-layered and poly-centric legal order find his basis in the flexible 
conception of governance, indeed.
This study will not attempt to propose a theoretical definition of governance. 
Even if there are different approaches to it and even if diversified identifications of 
governance have been proposed, a general characteristic of this concept shows some 
peculiarities concerning the power exercise, which is non-exclusively-governmental 
and extremely versatile. In these terms the political  essence of governance is  the 
counterbalance of a non-necessarily-hierarchical system of public law2. 
According to such a view and with reference to the territorial approach, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union have disparate methods of governance. 
Namely,  while  the CoE fosters  a  process of good governance within its Member 
States  and  especially  tries  to  promote  the  democratic  development  of  local 
communities, the EU represents an integrated system of multilevel governance3. Of 
course,  the  MLG  does  not  embody  a  prescriptive  “ought  to  be”  of  the  EU 
supranational  order.  However,  it  demonstrates  a  sort  of  “way  of  being”  of  the 
European integration, with all its limits and obstacles as well.
2 See R. SCHOBBEN, ‘New governance’ in the European Union: a cross-disciplinary comparison, cit., p. 
41.
3 See  G.  MARKS,  Structural  Policy  in  the  European  Community,  in  A.M.  SBRAGIA,  Euro-politics.  
Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community, Washington D.C., 1992, p. 191 ss.
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This typical characteristic of the EU is concretely embodied in the territorial 
approach and the related aims are pursued trough the development of an institutional 
territorial  involvement.  Namely,  the  supra-national  institutional  dimension  has 
progressively changed from the idea of “structural spaces” to “functional territories” 
and,  more  recently,  to  a  so-called  “institutional  regionalism”.  In  these  terms,  the 
territorial and transfrontier matters have become a benchmark in the perspective of 
the  MLG's  method  and  of  the  subsidiarity  principle.  Moreover,  the  Community 
system suggests and concretely fosters one of the most important methods of the 
advanced federalist systems, which is, precisely, the implementation of cooperation 
between the different entities or levels of government. Although not every country 
can cope with federalist principles, however such method can also be imported in 
other systems of government, such as centralized or regional countries, as a form of 
institutional procedure. 
Hence,  referring  to  sub-national  authorities  within  the  Community  legal 
system, even if they do not represent constituent units of the EU4,  they could be 
somehow considered  as  subjects  of  governance  (even  if  within  different 
constitutional orders) in their respective Member States and, thus, as a “constituent” 
part of the whole European system of governance5. In these terms, the most relevant 
specificity of the EU is the capacity, or at least the tendency, to develop an integrated 
approach to various policies, both from the procedural and from the substantial point 
of  view.  Of  course,  this  is  neither  an  easy  nor  a  completed  process.  Obstacles 
concerning the  demand of a stronger legitimacy and the claim on a more relevant 
influence, both by sub-national entities or national authorities, are current issues. In 
particular,  sub-national  actors  still  need  to  increase  their  pressure  within  their 
respective States' procedures in order to influence the decision-making process and 
their role towards the European policies. Anyway, within this panorama, sub-national 
4 The analysis of F. MORATA, Come migliorare la governance democratica europea con le Regioni, in 
Le Istituzioni del Federalismo, 1, 2004, p. 24, about the role of the Regions within the EU's multilevel 
perspective is accurate. Namely, “ […] as far as the territory has become at the same time an object 
and an actor of European policies, the expansion of EC policies has developed with detriment to the 
constitutional  powers  conferred  to  Regions  with  the  consequence  that,  differently  form  central 
governments, they do not have at European level  institutional mechanisms in order  to develop an 
effective influence within the decision-making structure” (our translation).
5 Ibid., p. 25 et seq.
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authorities could find a role beyond the traditional conception of power, with creative 
solutions and a dynamic capacity of a constant renewal6. 
1.2 .  Sub-national  authorities  within  the  EU's  MLG  territorial  perspective:  is  
territorial  cooperation  fostering  a  “de  facto” solidarity  towards  a  constitutional  
approach?
As it has been said, territorial cooperation, outside the sphere of international 
relations  and  national  foreign  affairs,  is  principally  a  matter  that  involves  sub-
national authorities in first line. Some paradoxes may, however, be observed. While 
sub-national  authorities  seem  to  gain  importance  within  the  international  and 
supranational  arenas  and  also  within  the  constitutional  structure  of  States, 
nevertheless the arrangement of legal instruments tends not to recognise pure rights 
to sub-national transfrontier activities. 
Namely, on the one hand, as it will be better analysed further on, the existing 
legal  tools  dealing  with  transfrontier  cooperation  try  to  safeguard  the  national 
constitutional orders; on the other hand, sub-national authorities ask for their role 
even by putting into place foreign activities. Within this scenario, it is possible to 
develop  a  concrete  observation  about  the  relations  existing  between  political 
instances, legal rules, concrete phenomena and the way they influence each other. 
Namely, if normative documents aim to respect the national constitutional orders and 
the clear subdivision of competences and functions among the tiers of government, it 
is  also  remarkable  how this  allocation  is  rarely  well-defined  and  how territorial 
cooperation couldn't be, in fact, simply restricted to the allocation of competences, in 
particular when those competences are “shared” or just “mixed” between levels of 
government. Thus, the conception of multilevel governance within the EU seems to 
look for a kind of fruitful interaction of the above-mentioned trends. In this view, a 
peculiar observation could be done. In fact, the more a demand of legal certainties 
comes to the fore, the more an action of multiple actors seems to be better concerted 
with soft law or “meta legal” principles that become increasingly enshrined within 
the legislations and the constitutions. 
6 See  F.  MORATA,  Come  migliorare  la  governance  democratica  europea  con  le  Regioni,  in Le 
Istituzioni del Federalismo, cit., p. 39.
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An example about the EU will clarify the statement. Namely, the so called 
semi-permanent7 evolution  of  the  EC/EU  primary  law  progressively  gives 
importance  to  quasi-normative principles,  such  as  subsidiarity,  cooperation  and 
partnership, which become key factors of the new form of governance and, at the 
same  time,  functional  instruments  for  integration.  Within  this  frame,  territorial 
cooperation is one of the elements requiring and fostering the perspective of a new 
governance8.
Thus, territorial cooperation between sub-national authorities assumes a kind 
of  proactive  role  with  regard  to  the  progressive  transformation  of  institutional 
relations from a de facto solidarity towards a constitutional approach. Of course, a de 
facto  solidarity is the necessary precondition for sub-national communities to build 
territorial cooperation, but even a new constitutional approach should be proposed 
and  practised  also  by  central  authorities.  To  what  extend  these  elements  can  be 
combined  and  in  which  form  they  effectively  influence  the  development  of  the 
European integration will be a crawling key-point for the further analysis and the 
related conclusions.
1.3. The background of territorial cooperation. An ex post justification
Governance and subsidiarity are both indicative elements of what could be 
called a “post-sovereignty constitutional context”9. Within this perspective the role of 
multiple institutional actors is relevant and requires a shared responsibility for what 
concerns  the  sphere  of  substantial  political  choices.  Looking  at  the  different 
experiences of the Council of Europe and of the European Union it is quite clear that 
the States need to leave some space to other political and administrative subjects in 
order  to  implement  functional  policies  or  interventions.  Concerning  the  formal 
7 See B. DE WITTE, Il processo semi-permanente di revisione dei Trattati, in Quaderni costituzionali, 
2002, p. 499 et seq.
8 See  J.  GABBE,  Governance  and cross-border  co-operation,  Speech on the occasion  of  the RFO 
Annual Conference in Joensuu, North Karelia, Finland, March 2005, available at:
http://www.aebr.net/publikationen/pdfs/governancevortragjoensuu.gb.pdf, p. 2 et seq.
9 This  expression has  been borrowed from Prof.  R.  Toniatti,  who spoke about  “post-sovereignty 
constitutionalism” during the seminar “The Constitutional Transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From an 
imposed system to a sustainable multinational State?”, presentation of the book by J. Woelk, held on 
25 February 2009 at the School of International Studies, Trento.
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aspect, namely the procedures, the involvement of super-national and sub-national 
authorities is also required.
From a legal point of view, the traditional conception of constitutional law 
has clearly evolved into a system that can be hardly based on a strict and exclusive 
allocation of competences.  The territorial dimension is an emblematic example in 
this  regard.  In  the  same sense,  the principle  of  conferred competences and,  as  a 
consequence, the increasing development of meta-State policies should be based on 
procedural  principles  like  cooperation,  consultation  and  partnership.  Within  this 
scenery, the biggest question for a lawyer is to find the proper and suitable role of the 
law. Namely, analysing European territorial policies and the sub-national increasing 
functions, legal documents seem to have a secondary place in respect to non-binding 
acts. It seems, in practice, that political and soft-law assumptions, declarations and 
fragmented  concrete  interventions  prevail  on  juridical  instruments.  Since  this 
statement  is  true  and,  thus,  apparently  showing  a  subordinate  role  of  legal 
instruments,  nevertheless  a  broader  context  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 
Namely, as it has briefly mentioned during the previous paragraphs of this chapter, 
legal  tools  concerning  a  territorial  approach  do  effectively  exist  and  territorial 
cooperation, if not in every case, is covered by normative provisions. But hard law 
and soft law instruments have not necessarily to be seen as contrasting elements, 
rather, as complementary features. The post-sovereignty constitutional background is 
deeply connected to the use of powers and competences and to a related structure 
that depends from a balanced interdependence of legal and non legal tools, in other 
words a process of mandatory and voluntary aspects10. Principles like subsidiarity, 
cooperation  and  partnership  are  essential  factors  for  the  implementation  of  a 
multilevel  governance's  perspective  and  fundamental  keys  for  the  synergy  of 
different and compound legal orders.
In this perspective the previous paragraphs spent some words drawing the 
background of territorial cooperation as a relevant aspect and connotative mirror of 
transfrontier  phenomena  and  the  related  institutional  approaches  from  a  non 
exclusively legal perspective11. 
10 See SOCIETÀ GEOGRAFICA ITALIANA,  Europa. Un territorio per l'Unione, Villa Celimontana, 2006, p. 
25.
11 In this regard, see the contribution of  N. VEGGELAND,  Competitive Regions and European Neo-
Regionalism Cross-border Cooperation: A New Mode of Nation-Building?, in G. BUCKEN-KNAPP, M. 
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2. The evolution of territorial policies within the European context
2.1. Qualifying the territorial approach: a wide perspective on European institutions
The  progressive  importance  of  the  territorial  dimension  has  involved 
European institutions, considered in a wide sense, both the EU and the CoE levels12. 
In  this  paragraph the  broader  “European”  approach towards  the  territorial 
dimension will be taken into consideration, without making an individual distinction 
among the CoE, EU, national and sub-national perspectives. In fact, all these subjects  
present  different  interests,  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  draw  a  common  trend to 
territorial policies. Thus, no peculiar attention will be driven to one or another of the 
mentioned areas, but a generally comprehensive overlook about territorial policies 
will be presented. Namely, while such an analysis could seem vague or useless, it 
gives a wide focus and a systematic image of the argument.
At  a  first  glance  what  is  called “territorial  policy”  seems to  be a  distinct 
matter if compared to territorial/cross-border cooperation, being the latter a kind of 
stets of procedures and actions concerning different and numerous fields if compared 
to proper territorial matters. In fact, the concept of territorial policy reminds to the 
idea related to the interventions and programs about a determined physical space. 
But,  a territorial  approach comprehends,  besides the spatial/physical  dimension, a 
wider  range  of  components  and the  related fields  of  action  at  different  levels  of 
government. In this sense, an effort of abstraction from the common identification of 
territorial policy with the sole spatial  planning,  brings to the conclusion that also 
territorial cooperation is a  species  of the  genus  “territorial policy”. Or, better said, 
territorial cooperation is a modality to manage territorial policies. 
Intended  in  a  broader  meaning,  a  territorial  approach  implies  the 
manifestation  of  concern  towards  the  different  economical  and  social  situations 
across Europe and the consequent actions by political  actors.  For sure,  this is  an 
express deal of EU institutions, which have affirmed during the last few years, and 
constantly  reaffirm,  the  necessity  of  an  European unite  intervention for  fostering 
SCHACK (eds.), Borders Matter: Transboundary Regions in Contemporary Europe, Aabenraa, 2001, p. 
131 ss.
12 See L. GRAZI, Alle origini del GECT. L'evoulzione della cooperazione territoriale in Europa dalla  
Conferenza  europea  dei  poteri  locali  al  Comitato  delle  Regioni,  in  A.  PAPISCA (cur.),  Il  gruppo 
europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 121 et seq.
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territorial cohesion13. Actually, this kind of objectives for the Community was not 
originally  included within the Treaties and,  it  is  also possible  to argue,  territorial 
policies within the EU were not covered by specific attributed competences in this 
field until the amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty14. 
Without pointing out the attention only on the EU perspective, it is somehow 
visible that a territoriality-oriented approach is a sort of core issue both for the EU 
and the CoE, even if for the latter it is not a predominant sector of action. In these 
terms, even if not representing an exclusive field of competence at (both) European 
level(s),  the  territorial  approach  has  become  a  sort  of  functional  element  for 
developing  different  political  strategies.  And  transfrontier  cooperation  is  also  a 
functional  aspect  of  such  territorial  dimension,  denoting  an  even  more  complex 
outstanding interest in what is called “territorial cohesion”15. 
In this regard, some general and common aspects could be considered as a 
ground and as a distinctive feature within the “wider” the European reality. Namely, 
concepts like territorial cohesion, territorial cooperation, territorial development and 
territorial governance16 are essential elements related to the dialogue on European 
integration and development. These elements could be regarded both as descriptive 
terms and methods for the institutional interventions. In particular, they express the 
dynamic profile of a complex and specific reality in Europe, which is distinguished 
13 One of the first EC efforts to foster territorial cohesion has been evinced by the EC Commission in 
the Third  Report  on Economic  and  Social  Cohesion  of  February 2004: “Territorial  cohesion  has 
therefore been included in the draft Constitution (Article 3), to complement the Union objectives on 
economic and social cohesion. Its importance is also acknowledged in Article 16 (Principles) in the 
Treaty which recognises that citizens should have access to essential services, basic infrastructure and 
knowledge by highlighting the significance of services of general economic interest for promoting 
social  and  territorial  cohesion.  The  concept  of  territorial  cohesion  extends  beyond  the  notion  of 
economic and social cohesion by both adding to this and reinforcing it. In policy terms, the objective 
is to help achieve a more balanced development by reducing existing disparities, avoiding territorial 
imbalances and by making both sectoral policies which have a spatial impact and regional policy more 
coherent. The concern is also to improve territorial integration and encourage cooperation between 
regions”.
14 See Territorial Agenda of the EU, Towards a More Competitive and Sustainable Europe of Diverse 
Regions, Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and 
Territorial  Cohesion  in  Leipzig  on  24/25  May  2007,  and  A.  FALUDI,  Position  European  Spatial  
Plannig, in European Planning Studies, 10:7, 2002, p. 899.
15 As the  territorial  cohesion  concept  is  traditionally  connected  to  the  EU policies,  it  is  anyway 
necessary  to  underline  that  this  concept is  also known by the European Conference  of  Ministers 
responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT) at the CoE. Namely, the CEMAT highlighted in 
an own document a definition of “territorial cohesion” as  a multidimensional concept with, at least, 
three  different  characterising  components:   territorial  quality,  territorial  efficiency  and  territorial 
identity; see European Conference of Ministers responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT), 
Spatial Development Glossary, Strasbourg, 2007, p. 27-28.
16 See CEMAT,  Spatial Development Glossary, cit., p. 27-29.
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by a deep territorial cultural diversity and by a multiplicity of territorial identities17. 
These typical aspects of the European panorama are the tangible basis for EU and 
CoE policies that aim at intervening with respect to economic and social imbalances, 
cultural distances and administrative discrepancies18. In such a general perspective, 
territorial  cooperation becomes a key element for the simple reason that a super-
national  approach to territorial  issues needs to  find instruments,  which  consent  a 
systemic and broad vision, not only constrained by the political and legal limits of 
national frontiers. 
Thus,  a  European  territorial  approach  requires  necessarily  a  transfrontier 
approach, that makes Europe an experimental laboratory, integrating the research of 
proper  legal  instruments  and  de facto situations19.  According  to  such view,  three 
kinds  of territorial  interventions  with a  transfrontier  impact  can be developed by 
European institutions. Namely, on the one hand, interventions remaining only within 
political and administrative borders are previewed in order to cope with territorial 
imbalances across Europe; on the other hand, means for fostering cooperation among 
territories  belonging  to  different  States  are  mostly  provided  for  sub-national 
authorities; and finally, the concept of a “transfrontier space” as an individual subject 
and direct interlocutor with super-national institutions has acquired more relevance, 
thus creating a kind of functional space, which becomes a single identity in function 
of the fulfilment of European provisions or as an object provided by European legal 
instruments for transfrontier cooperation20.
17 See  R. CAMAGNI,  The rationale for territorial cohesion and the place of territorial development  
policies  in  the  European model  of  society,  paper  presented  at  the  Vienna  Seminar  on  Territorial 
cohesion and the European model of society, July 2005, p. 20.
18 C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2006, p. 19.
19 C. RICQ, Coopération transfrontaliére: laboratoire de l'Europe, in Temps européens, n. 2, 1997, p. 
115-121.
20 In this sense the first reference goes to the EGTC as an EC entity with legal capacity. However, 
although being the newest, the EGTC is not the only subject expressing an unique entity for territorial 
cooperation.  Namely,  the CoE has  elaborated a  third protocol  to  the Madrid Outline Convention, 
which will provide the creation of a similar legal subject, as mentioned by Ulrich Bohner, Secretary 
General of the CLRAE, in his speech held in the occasion of the CoE's interdisciplinary seminar on 
transfrontier cooperation, i Speyer, on 6 February 2009. Moreover, as the EGTC is the currently best 
legally defined subject for territorial cooperation, other instruments, both with a legal framework and 
even without,  have been put in place.  Here,  the allusion goes  to the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG),  to  the  European Cooperative Society (SCE) as subjects which are not  directly 
devoted to territorial cooperation, but also as operative tools for transfrontier activities; but it is also to 
remember the concept of Euroregion that, even without a well defined legal framework, represents an 
important unified interlocutor for cross-border activities.
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Until this point, some general features about an European territorial approach 
have been highlighted, without indicating the differences between the super-national 
actors.  While having different features in common, the EU and CoE have mostly 
divergent  attitudes  and  perspectives  of  actions  towards  policies  with  territorial 
impact.
2.2. The CoE territorial perspective: an invitation to States towards local democracy  
and constructive partnership 
In the last paragraph the existence of a CoE's territorial approach has been 
mentioned. This attitude has been mainly developed within two different fields: on 
one  hand  the  transfrontier  cooperation  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  CEMAT 
perspective on regional and spatial planning.
Transfrontier  cooperation  is  a  specific  sector  of  action  within  both  the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRAE) and the Department of Local 
and  Regional  Democracy  and  Good  Governance,  thus  being  an  instrument  for 
fostering the balanced development and democratic structure of government, in order 
to promote tolerance, good neighbouring and efficiency of public services21. From an 
international organisation's perspective, the main tasks are devoted to the respect of 
the inner constitutional structure of each single State, as well as to the improvement 
of local and regional democracies. In these terms, the assistance and the legal advise 
for the practice of transfrontier relations and the establishment of transfrontier bodies 
between local and regional authorities is a specific aim within the CoE policy, in 
particular  for  its  Committee  of  Experts  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation22.  Among 
others, a very clear and direct object of CoE's transfrontier strategy is to individuate 
and reduce national obstacles for developing transfrontier relation between local and 
regional authorities, thus fostering decentralized cooperation, partnership and good 
governance.  According  to  these  objectives,  besides  the  legal  framework  of  the 
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation, other instruments have 
21 See  the  CoE  Recommendation  Rec(2005)2  on  good  practices  in  and  reducing  obstacles  to 
transfrontier  and  interterritorial  cooperation  between  territorial  communities  or  authorities  of 4 
February 2009.
22 Information are available on the CoE web portal at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Areas_of_Work/Transfrontier_Cooperation/Aims/default_e
n.asp.
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been  provided  in  order  to  spread  out  and  encourage  transfronier  activities.   An 
example  is  offered  by  the  setting  up  of  the  online  database  MORE  (Matching 
Opportunities for Regions in Europe) on transfrontier cooperation as a service of the 
CLARE with the support of the Italian government, the Committee of the Regions of 
the EU and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions23.
The further CoE's territorial approach concerns the European Conference of 
Ministers Responsible for Regional/Spatial planning (CEMAT) as consultative body 
with  its  soft  law  activity.  Namely,  the  Conference  adopted  several  guideline 
documents about European spatial planning and related strategies. Some of the most 
important acts are the “Guiding principles for sustainable spatial development of the 
European Continent”24 and other documents, such as the Recommendation (2001)1 
of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE25 and the European Regional Planning 
Charter26. 
Having a broader approach to spatial development and territorial integration, 
these documents do not forget to stress the importance of transfrontier cooperation 
and  sub-national  authorities,  focusing  the  attention  on  European  cooperation  and 
towards a regionally balanced development of the continent. 
After  this  brief  outlook  of  the  CoE's  territorial  approach,  some  first 
conclusions could be presented. A well established fact is that the CoE do have a 
territorial  perspective.  However,  the  related  means  of  action  reveal  its 
intergovernmental structure and the lack of a very structured policy. In general terms, 
only a few and quite fragmented legal documents have been set down, while the most 
of  the  documents  contain  political  recommendation  to  States  without  developing 
concrete interventions that directly deals with sub-national authorities and without a 
direct impacts on them. Of course, the specific nature of an international organisation 
cannot  bring  to  a  coherently  binding  own  territorial  policy;  nevertheless  this 
23 See the official website access to the database at http://www.loreg.coe.int/more/.
24 This program document has been adopted on the 12th CEMAT session in Hannover in June 2000; 
see C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 25.
25 Recommendation Rec(2002)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the Guiding 
principles for sustainable spatial development of the European Continent, Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 30 January 2002 at the 781st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.
26 European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter, adopted in 1983 at the 6th Session of the CEMAT in 
Torremolinos,  was  incorporated  into  Recommendation  (84)  2  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to 
Member States on the European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter.
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institution has specific tasks and objectives that aim at increasing the cooperation 
among local and regional communities. 
Keeping  this  statement  in  mind,  one question  can better  define the  issues 
concerned.  Are  CoE's  legal  instruments  –  mainly  those  related  to  transfrontier 
cooperation – functional to the realization of its aims? Being aware of the fact that 
the  CoE represents  a  totally  different  kind  of  order  in  comparison  to  the  EU,  a 
parallel  level  of  analysis  can individuate  the  efficacy  of  the  legal  instruments  to 
pursue the respective objectives, both for the CoE and for the EU. 
In this regard, the CoE's territorial approach, while not representing a well 
structured  policy,  comprehends  tools  for  transfrontier  cooperation  and  spatial 
development as instruments for reaching the objectives of local democracy and good 
governance27.  Thus,  an analysis of CoE's territorial  legal instruments could verify 
their efficiency and effectiveness in relation to its objectives.
2.3. The EU territorial policy: the increasing role of cohesion as a political objective  
with legal references
The EU territorial approach is a really complex and wide subject, which takes 
its peculiarity from the specific nature of the EU political and legal system. As the 
EU has not had an explicit territorial policy since its origins, the territorial dimension 
has progressively evolved and has gained a primary importance as a political pillar 
and as an objective of the Union28. From the very beginning, the Community started 
its territorial concern in a fragmented manner and without a clear legal basis within 
the Treaties. What is quite evident, anyway, is the connection with the Community 
interest  to  the  European territorial  structure  in  connection  to  the  development  of 
regional and cohesion policies. 
Namely, the very first involvement has spread out with the creation of the DG 
Regional  Policy  of  the  European  Commission  in  1968  and,  later,  with  the 
establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. 
27 See CLRAE, Recommendation 265 (2009) on Good governance: a key factor for the sustainable 
economic development of regions and CLRAE, Resolution 283 (2009) on on Good governance: a key 
factor for the sustainable economic development of regions.
28 See  G.  MOFFA,  Coesione  europea  e  sviluppo  locale.  Le  politiche  comunitarie  di  promozione  
territoriale, Roma, 2005, p. 41.
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Subsequently, as the “territorial” aspect wasn't really mentioned within the 
EC Treaty29, several interventions have been based on Art. 158 TEC, Art. 2 and 3 
TEU, related to economic and social cohesion objective. Namely, while the issue of 
cohesion  is  not  necessarily  connected  only  with  the  economic  and  monetary 
integration, it  represents a kind of constitutional feature of the EU, pursuing at a 
balanced  and  equal  development  within  the  Union30.  Representing  one  of  the 
fundamental principles of the Union, which is grounded on its diversity (linguistic, 
cultural, political, social and territorial)31, the cohesion strategy has to be intended 
both as a dynamic process and a guiding firm principle for the overall EU policies32.
In these terms the policy of territorial cohesion is the result of a progressive 
and  dynamic  adaptation  of  political  aims  and  legal  provisions.  Namely,  a  deep 
incentive  both  from  the  intergovernmental  side  and  from  the  institutional  side 
brought  to  the  development  of  a  persisting  and  fruitful  debate.  Important 
acknowledgements such as the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESPD)33, 
the European Spatial Observatory Network (ESPON) and other documents like the 
Territorial  Agenda of the EU34 have to be mentioned. The executive strength has 
29 The only direct reference to the term “territorial cohesion” as a common value within the EU was 
entailed in Art. 16 TEC in relation to the general economic interest's services and, apparently, without 
a broader application.
30 See  L.  SIMONETTI,  Dal  riequilibrio  alla  coesione:  l’evoluzione  delle  politiche  territoriali  
dell’Unione Europea, in Rassegna Economica, n. 1, 2005, p. 203.
31 See, for instance, Art. 151 TEC, which explicitly mentions the EU national, regional and cultural 
diversities, as well as the common cultural heritage.
32 See the Council  decision of  6 October  2006 on Community strategic guidelines  on Cohesion, 
2006/702/EC, Official Journal L 291, 21.10.2006.
33 The  ESDP is  an  intergovernmental  political  document  adopted  by  the  Ministers  for  Spatial 
Planning at the Potsdam Council on 10 and 11 May 1999 and dealing with several aspects of the EU 
broader territorial approach. The online glossary of the EU website defines the ESDP with a very clear 
statement:  “Although  it  does  not  justify  further  Community  responsibilities  as  regards  spatial 
planning, the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is a framework for policy guidance 
to improve cooperation among Community sectoral policies which have a significant impact in spatial 
terms. It was drawn up because it was found that the work of the Member States complemented each 
other best if directed towards common objectives for spatial development. It is an intergovernmental 
document which is for guidance and not binding. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is 
applied  at  the  most  appropriate  level  and  as  desired  by  the  various  parties  engaged  in  spatial 
development.”
34 The political  debate leading to  the EU Territorial  Agenda saw the development of  a  dynamic 
discussion, which took place not only before  the main document, but also later. See The Territorial  
State and Perspectives of the European Union, Towards a Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in 
the  Light  of  Lisbon  and  Gothenburg  Ambitions,  Based  on  the  Scoping  Document  discussed  by 
Ministers at their Informal  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Luxembourg  in  May  2005,  A  Background 
Document for the  Territorial Agenda of the European Union; Territorial Agenda of the EU, Towards a 
More  Competitive  and  Sustainable  Europe  of  Diverse  Regions,  Agreed  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/25 
May  2007;  European  Parliament,  Follow-up  of  the  Territorial  Agenda  and  the  Leipzig  Charter:  
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come from the Commission's impulse, which has promoted increasing interventions 
according to the legal provisions of the primary and secondary legislation. Moreover, 
also  the  consultative  role  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  has  given  a  serious 
incentive, mainly by underlining the connections between the role of sub-national 
actors, power-sharing and territorial balance35. In this sense, as already mentioned, 
the EU territorial  policy has increased in parallel  with the EU regional approach. 
Namely, the first Community interventions with territorial impact tended to consider 
the sub-national actors as mere geographical areas and recipients of redistributive 
policies. But, progressively, this kind of “functional regionalism” evolved in a form 
of “institutional regionalism”, which qualifies the sub-national collectivities as active 
actors of the European system36.
Furthermore, as already said with reference to the regional policy, the ERDF 
and, generally, the Structural Funds put in practice a complex normative structure 
based on the objectives of the economic and social cohesion. But this approach has 
gradually shown the importance and the centrality of the territorial dimension inside 
the cohesion policy in the light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies37. 
Thus,  following the secondary legislation and the impulse of soft-law,  the 
concept of territorial cohesion seeks to find its normative place within the primary 
legislation,  once  within  the  Constitutional  Treaty38 and  now  within  the  Lisbon 
Treaty39. 
Apart from the formal “constitutional” recognition, the cohesion policy 2007-
2013  already  entails  an  objective  related  to  territorial  cohesion  and  cooperation, 
which founds in this way a sort of legitimation within the secondary legislation40. In 
this regard, it is possible to notice how the supranational territorial approach do not 
Towards an European Action Programme for Spatial Development and Territorial Cohesion, Brussels, 
2007.
35 See  Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 10 April  2003 on Territorial  Cohesion, CdR 
388/2002 fin.
36 See  D.  FLORENZANO,  L'autonomia  regionale  nella  dimensione  internazionale.  Dalle  Attività  
promozionali agli accordi ed alle intese, Padova, 2004, p. 110 et seq.
37 See the Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of 
Rome, Berlin, 25 March 2007.
38 Art. I-3, III-220 and III-221 make a direct and specific reference to territorial cohesion. 
39 The Treaty under ratification mentions territorial cohesion at Art. 2C as a shared competence of the 
Union and Member  States,  and will  replace  art.  158 TEC with the  words  “economic,  social  and 
territorial cohesion” as a matter of action of the EU institutions.
40 See  A.  DI STEFANO,  Coesione  e  diritto  nell'Unione  Europea.  La  nuova  disciplina  dei  fondi  
strutturali comunitari nel Regolamento 1083/2006, Catania, 2008, p. 27 et seq.
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show only political programs and strategies, but also a legal implication that involves 
two different aspect of the legal rules. Namely, what is provided within the Treaties, 
even if only concerning social and economic aspects, explains a sort of constitutional 
programmatic obligation to pursue the cohesion objectives, thus comprehending the 
territorial  aspect  as a part  of the Community  acquis.  In addition,  the Regulations 
dealing  with  the  cohesion  policy,  like  the  new  ERDF  Regulation  or  the  EGTC 
Regulation,  represent  a  directly  applicable  discipline  that  could  also  potentially 
legitimize legal actions. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that the EU does really have a “territorial acquis”, 
which is the result of a progressive and long-lasting compensation and development 
of legal provisions and soft interventions. In particular, during the last few years the 
issue of a  supranational  territorial  policy has demonstrated to  be necessary as an 
expression  of  shared  governance.  Within  this  trend,  the  European  Commission 
adopted  in  October  2008  the  Green  Paper  on  Territorial  Cohesion41,  aiming  at 
pointing out the attention on some key-topics and at encouraging the debate about 
them in order to have a clearer and more efficient approach to the matter42. 
A further  proof  of  the  widening  and  institutionally  inclusive  role  of  the 
territorial question is a document discussed by the Committee of the Regions within 
its CONST Commission43 on 27 February 2009, as a working document on “The 
process of drawing up the Committee of the Regions'  White Paper  on Multilevel 
Governance”44. This kind of own initiative intervention denotes some revolutionary 
aspects, since it is the first time that the Committee launches the proposal for a white 
paper on this subject. Besides the role of the Committee itself, the working document 
is particularly relevant for its content, mainly for its clarity about the focus of the 
current  EU  status  and  the  future  policy  actions.  The  Committee  stresses  the 
importance,  while  respecting  the  national  sovereignty  and  preserving  the  single 
41 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of 
the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion: 
Turning territorial diversity into strength, COM(2008) 616 final.
42 Ibid.,  p.  11.  In  particular,  a  deep attention seems to  be  drawn on the  delimitation  of  what  is 
intended for territorial cohesion and the scope and scale of intervention. Namely, this last issue shows 
several  sensitive aspects concerning the role  of public  actors,  thus the attribution and exercise  of 
competences by the European institutions, national or sub-national authorities.
43 Commission for Constitutional Affairs, European Governance and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice.
44 CdR 271/2008 rev.
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national  identities,  of  a  shared  responsibility  between supranational,  national  and 
sub-national  actors.  In  this  terms,  a  too  sectoral  territorial  approach  should  be 
replaced by an integrated and cooperative action of all levels of government, thus 
surpassing  the  traditional  conception  of  conferred  competences  and  applying 
effectively  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and partnership45.  And,  one  of  the  most 
interesting statement is the recognition of local and regional autonomy not only as a 
very relevant value, but as one of the fundamental rights of the Union. Currently, this 
is  a  quite  controversial  point.  In  fact  there  is  a  sort  of  dichotomy  in  the  EU 
conception of the sub-national actors. The so called regional blindness has already 
been mentioned46; moreover, according to the principle of multilevel governance and 
territorial approach and thanks to the CoR impulse, the local and regional authorities 
are considered as actors of European policies and subjects of a right to autonomy. 
However,  the  very  essence  of  such  a  right  seems,  until  now,  not  to  be  directly 
enforceable  but,  rather,  a  programmatic  principle  within  the  multidimensional 
European scene47 and not a legally mandatory rule. According to such a view, while 
the EU governance is, in some ways increasing, the Member States hold the so-called 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz of their national order and of the formal competences of the 
Union.
This last issue related to competences has to be taken into consideration from 
a  legal  point  of  view,  dealing  with  the  EU  territorial  policy.  Namely,  the 
supranational institutions do not have an exclusive competence regarding both the 
regional  issues  and  the  territorial  cohesion.  But  the  Community  initiatives  are 
adopted in an area of shared competences with the Member States and, if the case, 
with other sub-national authorities. In these terms, the EU territorial approach seems 
not  to  deepen  or  face  the  question  of  competences;  rather  it  apparently  avoids 
treating  the  argument.  The  issue  of  the  legitimate  exercise  of  powers  and 
competences  remains,  in  some  ways,  hidden  behind  the  management  and  the 
45 See  F. PALERMO,  The White Paper on EU Governance: the right tool for the wrong means,  in 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The Contributions to the 2008 Ateliers, February 2009, p. 4.
46 See also R. TONIATTI, S. ORTINO et al., European Governance, Bolzano/Bozen, 2002, p. 4.
47 See the study commissioned by the Committee of the Regions:  Strengthening regional and local  
democracy n the European Union, Vol. I, Bruxelles, 2004. See also the Preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: “The Union contributes to the preservation and to the 
development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of 
the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of 
their public authorities at national, regional and local levels [...]”.
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implementation of a shared governance, both in horizontal and vertical meaning48. In 
this  sense,  the  intentions  and the  proposals  of  European  institutions  seem to  go 
beyond a  strictly  positive  legal  conception  of  the  competence  exercise,  as  it  has 
happened during the past years of integration. It is also true that Member Sates have 
recently shown a considerable tendency to remark their individuality, which often 
mirrors the common sense of the population. The first negative result of the Irish 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is a clear example of that. But, even beyond the 
biggest  agreements  of  the  Treaties,  some other  instruments  and  practices  are  an 
everyday potential tool for apply integrative dynamics. The cohesion policy and, in 
particular,  the  EC  Regulation  establishing  the  European  Grouping  of  Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTC) are examples of such instruments that need to be observed as 
functions  and  benchmarks  of  the  European  process,  even  with  a  glance  to  the 
relationship  between  the  constitutional  structure  of  objectives  and  the  respective 
implementation. 
Within  this  scenery  every  public  actor  should  take  its  part  regarding  the 
decision-making  and  implementation  of  European  policies.  Thus,  what  the  EU 
institutions, mainly the Committee of the Regions, call as the fundamental right of 
autonomy of sub-national authorities becomes the right of those collectivities to be 
legal  subject  within  the  Community  order  and  their  mutual  relations  should  be 
considered as free within the “European common space” 49. According to this view 
and  in  the  trend  of  this  process,  the  EGTC  Regulations  represents  a  silent  and 
potential revolution, both for the EU territorial and regional policy.
48 See the CdR Working document on “The process of drawing up the Committee of the Regions' 
White Paper on Multilevel Governance”, cit., p. 3.
49 See  D.  FLORENZANO,  L'autonomia  regionale  nella  dimensione  internazionale.  Dalle  Attività  
promozionali agli accordi ed alle intese, cit., p. 132.
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CHAPTER IV
SPECIFIC INSTRUMENTS FOR TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
1. Introduction
Territorial cooperation involves several institutional actors as well as different 
“managing”  tools.  These  tools  could  be  intended  as  the  means  of  setting  up 
coordinated actions between sub-national authorities. So far the description of the 
general  context  has  been  already  examined.  In  this  chapter  the  peculiar  legal 
instruments, which have been developed during the years, are going to be taken into 
consideration. 
Since the first agreements on cross-border activities in the Fifties, different 
solutions  have  been  experienced up  to  now.  The  biggest  difference,  without  any 
univocal reference to historical evolutions, runs among cooperation with non-legal 
and with legal basis. The first form has been developed through informal agreements 
or  the  establishment  of  some  kind  of  informal  associations  or  conferences.  The 
second one have its basis  in different sources, which are mainly divided in three 
categories: national law, international law, EC law. As it will be demonstrated further 
on, although the exclusive role of the State is loosing certainty, the national law is 
constantly  present  within the regulation of transfrontier  phenomena.  In particular, 
this  happens in the case of the establishment of inter-institutional structures with 
legal capacity. In fact, as we will see, international and EC legal tools cannot avoid 
the recalling on domestic law in order to have a proper implementation.
As  different  fields  of  law are  concerned  and  several  solutions  have  been 
proposed, the struggle to find a kind of uniformity seems to be in a stalemate. This is 
principally due to the fact that the search of international or supranational formulas is 
always somehow bounded to the application national law and, therefore, differently 
107
CHAPTER IV
implemented1. Nonetheless, the need of uniform standards seems to be one of the 
most required devices. Such an approach represents a challenge for super-national 
institutions.
So far, a general overview of the broader phenomena related to regionalism 
and to the European dimension has been considered as the wider background for 
territorial cooperation. The next paragraphs will be devoted to the presentation and 
the analysis of the most important legal instruments for transfrontier relations among 
sub-national communities. To the most recent tools within the framework of the EU 
and the CoE, namely the EGTC Regulation and the CoE's Third Protocol  to  the 
Madrid  Outline  Convention  a  specific  and  peculiar  attention  has  been dedicated. 
Before  analysing  these  new instruments,  the  previous  establishment  of  particular 
solutions for territorial cooperation will be overlooked in order to give an overall 
idea about the various means adopted in this field.
2 . The  role  of  national  law:  the  premise  for  an  European  approach to  territorial 
cooperation
2.1. The delay of a national legal approach about territorial cooperation between  
sub-national authorities
The  most  relevant  academic  literature  about  the  legal  dimension  of 
transfrontier relations is devoted to the analysis of the main instruments provided by 
international  law  and  EC  law,  as  the  most  important  regulatory  framework  for 
territorial cooperation. But, before giving reference to the state of the play in this 
regard,  an  evaluation  about  national  law is  essential  in  order  to  comprehend the 
development  of  alternative instruments.  Looking at  the different  legal systems in 
Europe it is hard to find specific national normative provisions about territorial or 
transfrontier cooperation at sub-national level2.  However, the first legitimation for 
sub-national  authorities to deal with territorial  cooperation really comes from the 
1 See  H.  COMTE,  N.  LEVRAT,  Aux  coutures  de  l'Europe.  Defis  et  enjeux  del  la  coopération  
transfrontalière, Paris, 2006, p. 23.
2 If explicit provisions about territorial cooperation have been recently introduced within national 
legislations or constitutions, it is mainly due to the adoption of new instruments at international or 
Community level. 
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national systems. Moreover, with reference to these national systems, three elements 
have been mentioned in regard to the national legal approach towards the foreign 
action of sub-national subjects, namely: the possible national provision of a treaty-
making power, the progressive development of a general sub-national foreign power 
and the (more or less tolerated) practice of territorial cooperation. As far as these 
concepts could have something in common, both from a legal and from a practical 
perspective,  it  is  possible  to  argue that  they have basically  evolved according  to 
different legal perspectives. However, the progressive evolution of a sub-national (or, 
better,  regional)  foreign  power  follows  somehow  the  same  direction  of  the 
development  of  territorial  cooperation,  thus,  in  the  need  to  find  a  more  defined 
collocation within the national systems. 
As  it  has  been  mentioned  in  the  second  chapter,  the  existence  and  the 
acknowledgement of a sub-national foreign power have increasingly evolved within 
the national constitutional and legislative frameworks. In this regard it has been said 
that  territorial  cooperation  is  part  of  the  wider  category  of  sub-national  foreign 
relations. And this could, only apparently, solve the problem about legal framework 
for  territorial  cooperation  and  the  respective  traditional  lack  of  instruments  of 
national law for sub-national authorities. In fact, according to this view, the national 
provisions about sub-national relations and the related praxis, as illustrated in the 
second chapter,  seem to be the sole  national normative background for territorial 
cooperation  as  well  as  for  any  kind  of  sub-national  foreign  exercise  of  power. 
However,  this  statement  is  not  really  and  always  true.  Namely,  the  mentioned 
comparative references to the development of a sub-national foreign power within 
various national systems were dealing with the hypothesis concerning the legitimacy 
of  territorial  cooperation  as  a  form of  sub-national  foreign  power,  but  not  as  a 
condition  for  the  exercise  of  territorial  cooperation.  With  other  words,  the 
acknowledgement of a sub-national foreign power within national systems represents 
the legal legitimation for actions outside the national borders. The development of 
such a “legal category” cannot, as a consequence, impede the development of sub-
national territorial cooperation. Thus, the existence of a sub-national foreign power 
represents a sort of theoretical legitimation for territorial cooperation. But it doesn't 
mean  that  national  legislations  provide  for  useful  instruments  or  regulatory 
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frameworks  of  territorial  and  transfrontier  cooperation  as  such.  In  these  terms, 
territorial  cooperation  has  partially  followed autonomous  paths,  even  outside  the 
national  constitutional  or  legislative  dispositions  about  the  sub-national  foreign 
power.  Thus,  other  mechanisms,  in  the  absence  of  ad hoc  provisions,  have  been 
developed.  Some methods are  represented by the practice  of fair  cooperation (or 
mere tolerance) between level of governments in cases where the national interests 
are not considered hampered by the regional/local foreign activities; another example 
is given by the strict separation of competences from the central authorities, thus 
trying to divide as much as possible the potential overlap of affairs. Also cooperation 
with  foreign  subjects  through  informal  agreements,  exchange  of  informations, 
courtesy visits, etc., are considered as alternative ways to build foreign relation. 
All the mentioned examples highlight that the peculiar recourse to national 
constitutional (or legislative) provisions about “regional” foreign powers have been 
rarely useful in order to set up territorial cooperation. Emblematic in this sense is the 
diffusion of Euroregions without a well-defined legal framework, but mainly based 
on  informal  arrangements.  Another  example  in  this  sense  is  represented  by  the 
cooperation at  local  level,  which  is  typically  not  considered  in  the  constitutional 
provisions  about  the  sub-national  foreign powers  and has,  therefore,  found other 
methods to spread out. 
In any case, the practice demonstrates that solutions provided at national level 
in order to develop an effective transfronier cooperation are not enough3. As far as 
cooperation involves the presence of institutional subjects belonging, at least, to two 
different countries, a sort of reciprocal recognition and a method of bi-univocal legal 
connection are anyway required. However, national legislations are almost lacking in 
defining or providing apposite legal means for this kind of activities and national 
authorities seem to prefer the European level to deal with these issues. In particular, 
two aspects regarding national law need to be taken into consideration in order to 
understand  the  development  of  legal  instruments  of  territorial  cooperation:  the 
projection  of  national  law  in  the  international/supranational  field  and  the 
consequential development of national provisions.
3 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, Madrid, 
2008, p. 43.
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Furthermore, although it has been proven to be insufficient, it might be worth 
to  retrace  the  development  of  national  legal  approaches  towards  transfrontier 
cooperation. In general terms, looking at the different legal orders in Europe, it is 
hard to find original domestic disciplines in this respect. It is necessary, then, to make 
a kind of historical observation. As it has already been mentioned, the development 
of  cross-border  relations  between  territorial  communities  started  soon  after  the 
second  war  conflict  and  progressively  increased  even  without  ad  hoc  legal 
frameworks. Thus, the phenomenon has developed in a kind of spontaneous way. 
During the  years  and after  the proliferating amount of  transfrontier  decentralized 
relations,  the national legislations or constitutional provisions came with delay to 
discipline some aspects or some basic rules regarding the legitimization of cross-
border relations of the respective sub-national collectivities. In most of the cases the 
first  national  interventions  were  related  to  the  signature  of  inter-state  protocols, 
agreements  or  international  treaties  to  allow  transfrontier  cooperation  between 
territorial authorities4. In this regard, two types of relation have been established: on 
the one hand “neighbourhood relations” were undertaken5,  which were carried on 
principally by States with the participation of the sub-national subjects as a mere 
eventuality; on the other hand, the official relations of transfrontier cooperation had 
been put in place in different ways, but mostly through a covering international treaty 
signed by States6. Actually, keeping in mind the different constitutional dimensions 
of the European States and the peculiar treaty-making power of federal entities, the 
existence of a general possibility for federated units to conclude international treaties 
has represented a formally easiest formula to develop territorial cooperation. It is the 
case of Switzerland, where Article 56 of the Federal Constitution provides the right 
for  Cantons to  conclude  treaties  with  foreign countries  within the  scope  of  their 
4 See  J. GABBE, V.  VON MALKUS ET AL. , Cooperation between European border regions: review and 
perspectives, Baden-Baden, 2008, p. 42.
5 See  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI,  L'aménagement  par  l'État  de  la  coopération  
transfrontalière  des  collectivités  territoriales,  cit.,  p.  5.  The  author  speaks  about  “relations  de 
voisinage interétatique”, which mainly depend from the will of the State. Some examples about these 
relations  between  France  and  Spain  regard  the  utilization  of  frontier  water,  the  works  related  to 
frontier rivers, etc., and sometimes  ad hoc  commissions where created in order to deal with these 
issues, even with the participation of territorial communities. The ancient commission (Commission 
Internationale des Pyrénées) was created in 1875 and the participation of French local communities 
was  allowed  after  a  decision  of  the  préfet.  In  this  case,  a  decentralized,  but  still  governmental 
authority, had an authorizing power towards the local communities.  
6 Ibid., p. 5-17.
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powers7.  However,  the  recurs  to  international  agreements  between  the  federated 
entities of federal  countries  and foreign States hasn't  been really  much practised. 
Namely, in almost every European country the first example of legal solution for 
cooperation has been the existence of so-called “covering inter-state agreements” as 
a preliminary requirement and an exigence under national law8.
According  to  such  situation,  the  legal  activity  of  States  has  been  more 
concentrated on the international dimension,  rather than on an internal attempt to 
give  a  legal  clarification  and  a  defined  framework  to  cross-border/territorial 
cooperation,  thus,  determining  a  kind  of  commitment  to  the  international  level 
instead  of  providing  for  national  legal  approaches.  Nevertheless,  a  huge  praxis 
demonstrates  that  structured  territorial  cooperation  between  sub-national 
communities was  in  the need to  find a  legal  form in order  to  establish enduring 
organisations. In the absence of apposite disciplines, these structures borrowed the 
legal form according to the most suitable national law, thus becoming Portuguese or 
Spanish  consorcio,  French Groupements  d'intérêt  public (GIP)  and société  
d'économie mixte locale (SEML), or simple private associations. Only gradually, and 
mainly after a discrete evolution of the material phenomenon and the progression of 
the  debate  within  the  international/supranational  organizations,  some  national 
systems  have  implemented  specific  dispositions  about  transfrontier  cooperation. 
Generally speaking, according this kind of dispositions, local and regional territorial 
cooperation do represent a  species  within the bigger  genus  of sub-national foreign 
relations9.  In  this  regard,  it  the  development  of  French  legislation  is  particularly 
interesting. The process of decentralization allowed the exercise of foreign powers by 
territorial  communities  (collectivités  territoriales)  according to  the condition of a 
governmental authorisation10. Afterwards, the law of 6th February 1992 expanded the 
7 The article  follows:  “These treaties  may not  be contrary  to  the  law nor to  the interests  of  the 
Confederation nor to the laws of other Cantons. Before concluding a treaty, the Cantons must inform 
the Confederation. The Cantons may deal directly with lower ranking foreign authorities; in other 
cases, the relations of the Cantonsi with foreign countries shall be conducted by the Confederation on 
their behalf”. See  C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 48.
8 Ibid., p. 17.
9 D. FLORENZANO, L'autonomia regionale nella dimensione internazionale. Dalle Attività promozionali  
agli accordi ed alle intese, Padova, 2004, p. 65.
10 In particular, Art. 65, par. 3, law of 2 March 1982, affirmed that “[w]ith the authorisation of the 
government, the Regional Council can decide to organise, with a view to concerted action and in the 
framework  of  transfrontier  cooperation,  regular  contacts  with  decentralised  foreign  communities 
possessing a common frontier with the region.”  See also, P. LAYE, La coopération décentralisée des  
collectivités territoriales, Voiron, 2008.
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previous provisions, covering all forms of decentralized cooperation without a prior 
authorisation of the State. As an exception, the authorisation from the Prefect was 
only needed if French territorial  communities which wanted to join a cooperation 
body  governed  by  foreign  law11.  Moreover,  the  General  Code  of  Territorial 
Communities12, adopted in 1996 and currently into force, foresees the possibility to 
stipulate conventions with foreign territorial communities, within the limits of their 
competences and respecting the international obligation of France13. Also the Italian 
Constitution  after  its  last  revision  has  reformulated  in  Article  117,  par.  9,  the 
capability  for  Regions  to  establish,  within  their  competences,  agreements  with 
foreign States and arrangements with territorial entities that belong to a foreign State, 
in the cases and forms provided for by state law14. These examples do not represent 
an original national attitude towards sub-national foreign power, but demonstrate a 
clear  development  towards  the  management  of  sub-national  transfrontier 
cooperation.
These  kind  of  national  provisions,  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional 
structure of each State, are progressively increasing in Europe, even in the south-
eastern countries, which are traditionally connoted with a centralistic attitude15. Of 
course, each country establishes some forms of national control over sub-national 
transfrontier relations, but the creation of explicit provisions in this regard seems to 
leave a more open space for mutual cooperation between levels of government16. 
Since the first contemporary examples of territorial cooperation started almost fifty 
11 See C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 47.
12 Art. L 1112-1, Code général des collectivités territoriales, Loi n°96-142 du 21 février 1996 relative 
à la partie Législative du code général des collectivités territoriales.
13 The provisions of the General Code were anticipated by Art. 131, Loi d'orientation n. 92-125 of 6th 
February 1992 related to the territorial administration of the (French) Republic. The article affirmed: 
“Ces conventions entrent en vigueur dès leur transmission au représentant de l'Etat dans les conditions 
fixées aux I et II de l'article 2 de la loi no 82-213 du 2 mars 1982 précitée. Les dispositions de l'article 
3 de la même loi sont applicables à ces conventions.”. See also Loi d'orientation n. 95-115.
14 This  provision  was  part  of  the  constitutional  review of  the  V Title,  adopted  with  the  Legge 
costituzionale n. 3/2001.
15 See, as an example, the case of Croatia.  Although the country is still characterized by a strong 
centralistic aptitude, the Law on Local Self-Government adopted in April 2001 provides, at Art. 14 et  
seq.,  for  the  possibility  of  sub-national  units  to  join  correspondent  foreign  authorities  of  other 
countries in order to pursue cooperation, in compliance with the law and under the supervision of 
central government.
16 Y. LEJEUNE, La surveillance des relations internationales conventionelles des collectivités fédérées, 
in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État  et  la  
coopération transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 
105-129, analyses in particular the cases of Belgium and Switzerland.  
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years ago, it is now quite useless to remark the late national concern towards this 
issue. Looking at the historical evolution of territorial cooperation, the prevalent state 
concern seemed, and still seems, to be related to the respect of the internal attribution 
of competences and the exclusive control on the matter foreign affairs/international 
relations.  That  is  maybe  the  reason  of  a  progressive  attempt  to  find  a  coherent 
approach within other institutional centres, in primis, the Council of Europe, and also 
with  the  contribution  of  regional  associations  like  the  Association  of  European 
Border Regions (AEBR), devoted to such issues since years. The ratification of the 
first European legal instrument for transfrontier cooperation, the so-called Madrid 
Outline Convention,  within the national systems has certainly given an important 
impulse about the necessary awareness and development of the phenomenon and, in 
particular,  about  the  sub-national  demand of  clearer  rules.  However,  the  national 
legal implementation continued to be lacking and the Madrid Convention has shown 
all its legal weakness as international instrument. In this sense, the state approach 
shows a “negative” involvement in territorial/transfrontier cooperation, instead of a 
proactive  role  in  order  to  set  down  positive  rules  for  cross-border  relations  of 
regional and local authorities17.
2.2. The constant presence of the State
Until  this  point,  two  factors  concerning  the  development  of  territorial 
cooperation in Europe have been highlighted: the expansion of transfrontier relations 
between sub-national authorities as a material phenomenon and the delay regarding 
the adoption of specific national regulatory measures for these phenomena. However, 
within  this  context,  sub-national  authorities  aspiring  to  develop  territorial 
cooperation are required to observe specific legal principles in order to be formally 
legitimized in their actions, namely: the filed of their competences, the national law 
and the international obligations of the State18. Of course, as far as different solutions 
17 V.  COCUCCI,  Nuove forme  di  cooperazione  territoriale  transfrontaliera:  il  Gruppo Europeo  di  
Cooperazione Territoriale, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 2008, p. 895, affirms 
that national governments traditionally had difficulties in accepting forms of transfrontier cooperation, 
even if they were aware of their opportunity. In particular, it seems that States in some ways had fear 
of the involvement of sub-national communities in foreign activities.
18 C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, L'aménagement par l'État de la coopération transfrontalière 
des collectivités territoriales, cit. p. 16.
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are available, the necessary involvement of national legal details generates different 
forms of cooperation in each single case, but, in general, the above-mentioned three 
elements remain a kind of constant and stable presence. This is valid both for the past 
activities as well as for the most current forms of territorial cooperation19. 
As far as the respect of sub-national competences and national international 
obligations are, at least from a formal point of view, quite linear to be individuated, 
the  necessity  to  respect  the  national  law  seems  a  more  fluctuant  concept.  In 
particular, since the lack of a well determined legal framework within the national 
systems is almost constant, the national ratification of international treaties or the 
implementation of Community law represent the basic device for the establishment 
of specific references for territorial cooperation. But,  within this scenery, also the 
entire national legal systems need to be taken into consideration as legal obligation to 
build up territorial cooperation. In this sense, the dynamics with the single domestic 
legal orders could be really complex and reaching legal uniformity in this field is a 
difficult  (if  not  impossible)  challenge  due  to  such  a  tight  link  with  the  national 
legislations20. The application of national legislations, in particular, is involved when 
transfrontier cooperation is managed through structures with own legal personality 
and  legal  capacity.  In  this  regard,  it  is  possible  to  speak  about  a  necessary 
“conformity with the national legal order” concerned, which has to be observed by 
the  public  entities  involved  in  transfrontier  activities  or,  more  precisely,  in 
transfrontier structures with other foreign entities.
In order to open a point of discussion, it is possible to wonder whether such 
conformity could be considered as a sort of  “explicit consent of central authorities”21 
or  whether the concepts of “conformity” and “consent” are somehow different in 
nature. Namely, the term “consent”, or consensus, reminds to the idea of an explicit 
authorization that shall come from a certain central governmental authority in order 
to allow sub-national entities to carry on territorial cooperation. Instead, the concept 
19 It is maybe superfluous to remark that we are dealing with official forms of territorial cooperation, 
because the development of informal or unofficial activities do not require, intrinsically, specific legal 
frameworks.
20 See J.M. PÈREZ MEDINA, El Estado y la cooperación transfronteriza, in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES 
TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI), L’État et la coopération transfrontalière: actes de la  
journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 46.
21 Ibid., p. 31. The author affirms: “La coopération transfrontalière des collectivités territoriales n'est 
possible  qu'avec  le  consentement  de  l'Etat;  consentement  manifesté  par  établissement  de  règles 
spécifiques de Droit International et de Droit national. 
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of “conformity” with the legal order represents an implicit  requisite or condition, 
which doesn't need a positive or discretional approval, but generally complies with 
the  system  of  the  national  legislation  in  general  terms  without  creating  legal 
conflicts. Apart from being an interesting theoretical digression, the mentioned issue 
has some practical repercussions in relation to the practice of territorial cooperation. 
In  fact,  it  is  radically  different  for  local  and  regional  authorities  to  wait  for  a 
governmental  authorization  or  to  act  somehow  autonomously,  according  to  the 
respective national legal order and within the framework of the constitutional system. 
In  regard  to  this,  a  relevant  distinction  occurs  between  international  law  and 
Community law. Namely, whereas the first implies for sure the active role of the 
States, the second could have direct legal effects, mainly in the case of Regulations. 
The Italian Constitutional Court has clearly explained this difference in its judgement 
No  258/2004,  affirming  that  the  legal  source  legitimizing  the  creation  of  a 
transfrontier  structure – namely the EC Regulations related to the ERDF – were 
sufficient in order not to violate the competences of the State22. Within this scenery, 
an agreement between foreign territorial communities was justified on the basis of 
Community law, thus, not bounded to the national law23 which ratified the Madrid 
Outline  Convention  on  transfrontier  cooperation  and  which  required  a  previous 
governmental consensus.
As a partial conclusion,  it  is  now possible to affirm that the setting up of 
territorial cooperation knows the existence of both the above mentioned concepts – 
the  state  consensus  and  the  conformity  with  the  legal  order  –  but  they  do  not 
necessarily coexist, although they can cohabit. Namely, the conformity with the legal 
order, quite banally, is a constant requisite for sub-national authorities to observe, as 
it happens for every legal subject within a legal system in order to act validly. The 
consent or approval of the State is a more complex matter. It deals both with a form 
of  express  authorization  to  create  transfrontier  relations  among  sub-national 
communities or with a non-explicit or tacit form of permission as a kind of approval 
22 For a better explanation of the issue, see  L. SOVERINO,  I servizi pubblici nell'Euroregione: nuove  
prospettive  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  transfrontaliera,  tra Consiglio  d'Europa e  
potere estero delle Regioni (a proposito del Regolamento CE 1082/2006), in Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
Pubblico Comunitario, 2009, p. 56-59.
23 In particular, Art. 5, law 19 November 1985, n. 948 that foresees a necessary previous agreement 
between the Government and the sub-national authorities in order to set up transfrontier cooperation 
with correspondent foreign entities.
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in relation to the specific norms of the case24.  At the very end,  the two concepts 
intend to reach the same objective, which is the guarantee of the national legal order 
and the national sovereignty. However,  it  seems that there could be a subtle,  but 
substantial difference. In fact, the formal and explicit approval is an act of the central 
government  in  order  to  allow  sub-national  authorities  to  develop  territorial 
cooperation. This act is directed to safeguard the prerogative of the State, considered 
from the point of view of the central authority. The tacit consent is, on the contrary, a 
form of supervision, which is related to the conformity with the legal order and tends 
to guarantee the coherence of the national legal system in its complexity. Namely, it 
tends to safeguard the existence of a certain degree of pluralism, even with regard to 
the territorial composition of the State concerned. In particular, the existence of an 
“implied” consent from the State represents a peculiar form of tolerance towards sub-
national transfrontier activities that are not considered as dangerous from the point of 
view of the general national interest. And maybe this kind of tolerance has been in 
the  past  one  of  the  main  factors  contributing  to  the  development  of  territorial 
cooperation in the absence of specific national measures.
3. The development of Euroregions
3.1. The “non-legal” definition
Due  to  the  original  lack  of  general  legal  frameworks  about  territorial 
cooperation, the need to establish regional or local relations between foreign partners 
brought  to  the  expansion  of  the  so-called  “Euroregions”.  The  most  important 
common characteristic  of  these forms of  cooperation  is  not  the  procedure  or  the 
modalities for cooperation, but the cooperation itself. In a very simple and banal way, 
the Euroregion identifies a region, a portion of European territory, which is extended 
24 In order to give an example, Art. 4, par. 3 of the EGTC Regulation affirms: “[...] the Member State 
concerned shall, taking into account its constitutional structure,  approve the prospective member's 
participation in the EGTC, unless it considers that such participation is not in conformity with this 
Regulation  or  national  law,  including  the  prospective  member's  powers  and  duties,  or  that  such 
participation is not justified for reasons of public interest or of public policy of such Member State. In 
such a case, the Member State shall give a statement of its reasons for withholding approval.” In this 
provision, the consent of the State seems to be a little different from an authorization, being it not 
conditioned by a degree of discretion. Namely, the control of conformity with the applicable rules 
implies, in our opinion, an objective evaluation and, in a positive case, a subsequent obliged approval.
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across  national  borders.  The  “Euroregion” or  “Euregio” cannot  be qualified as  a 
classified or codified instrument for territorial/transfrontier cooperation between sub-
national authorities. With other words, the Euroregion does not represent a standard 
model  or  a  defined  procedure  as  such.  So,  why  to  take  this  experience  into 
consideration in this chapter, which is dealing with the instruments of transfrontier 
cooperation? 
The answers to this question are not univocal, but the main reason handles 
with the collective perception of the Euroregions as peculiar means for territorial 
cooperation. Namely, as far as these entities do not refer to a determinate model, it is 
well  recognised  that  they  represent  useful  means  for  developing  transfrontier 
cooperation at sub-national level.
The terminology used to distinguish the existence of a transfrontier space is 
rather variegated. The concept of Euroregion is not substantially different from that 
of a working community25. Sometimes they are treated as different structures, but 
there is not a strict criteria of legal identification. Normally, working communities 
cover a broader geographical area and deal with wider tasks26. The same observation 
could  be  proposed  for  the  comparison  between  Euroregions  and  the  so-called 
Eurodistricts27, which usually have a more economic connotation.
As we will observe, the number of Euroregions that have been created on the 
European territory, from the West to the East and from the North to the South, is 
25 According to M. MASCIA, Dalle comunità di lavoro interregionali al GECT: il caso Alpe Adria, in 
A. PAPISCA (cur.), Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 150, the establishment of Euroregions has chronologically anticipated the constitution 
of  working communities.  As far  as  both the two structures  have  no uniform identifications,  it  is 
possible to say that there is not a substantial difference between the two concepts. However, in this 
regard, some peculiar observations highlight that while the Euroregions typically can be constituted 
with  or  without  legal  personality,  working  communities  are  usually  organisations  without  legal 
personality.
26 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The Status quo of Transeuropean Co-operation between Territorial  
Authorities and the Future Steps that contribute to realise a New Model of European Governance, cit. 
p. 78.
27 See C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 30-31. As the notion of Eurodistricts 
does  not  really  have  a  legal  definition and  could  be  compared  to  some extent  to  the  public-law 
Euroregions, a further concept defines the so-called European districts  which have been established 
according  to  the  French  Law  on  Local  freedoms  and  responsibilities  of  13  August  2005.  These 
structures are constituted “in the form of a 'mixed open syndicate' able to associate different types of 
territorial communities including intermunicipal consortia or any type of public institution set up for 
intermunicipal cooperation, and at the same time public-law entities such as chambers of commerce”. 
The peculiarity of this instrument resides in the fact that the headquarters shall necessary be based in 
France and that the majority of its members shall be French.
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huge28. Their adventure started at the end of the 50s and is lasting nowadays with the 
creation of the Euroregions of so-called second generation. 
So far, no common or shared definition has been given to the Euroregions. 
Namely, they are set up with different structures, through different agreements and 
according  with  different  laws  or  procedures.  The  non-existence  of  a  general 
framework  or  model  for  the  Euroregions  is  also  related  to  the  legal  aspects 
concerning this issue. In fact, since no unique general description has been accepted, 
all the more no certain legal definition is available for the term “Euroregion”. Thus, 
Euroregions cannot be considered as standard-entities based on defined legal criteria.
Despite  the  lack  of  legal  or  general  meaning,  some  common  aspects  or 
features of the Euroregions have been inductively listed. The technique at the basis of 
such a categorization is necessarily the inference from the analysis of the concrete 
praxis and reality of the existing Euroregions, since a general category doesn't exist. 
The most common features have been identified, thanks to the studies conducted by 
the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), as follows: their formation is 
permanent, i.e. the Euroregions are not established for a limited period of time; their 
identity is distinct from the identity of the members29; they have own administrative, 
technical and financial resources; they follow an internal decision-making process30.
Due to the fact that, in any case, some common aspects exist, the Council of 
Europe proposes the definition of a Euroregion as “an organisation for transfrontier 
or interterritorial cooperation between territorial communities or authorities […] with 
general  responsibility  for  promoting,  supporting  and  developing  neighbourly 
relations between its members in their common area of responsibility [...]”31. Being 
extremely vague and at the same time restrictive, this definition doesn't provide any 
clarification to the concept. In order to avoid confusions and to highlight some basic 
28 Some examples of Euroregions are the following: (between Germany and the Netherlands) Euregio 
(1958),  Regio Rhein-Waal (1969), Regio Ems-Dollart (1978); (between Germany, Switzerland and 
France) Regio Basiliensis (1963); (between Germany and Czech Republic) Euroregio Egrensis (1991), 
Euroregio  Elba  (1992),  Euroregio  Erzgebirge-Krusne  Hory  (1992),  Euroregio  Bayerischer 
Wald/Sumava (1993);  (between  Germany and Poland) Euroregione Pomerania  (1991),   Euroregio 
Spree-Neisse-Bober (1992), Euroregio Pro Europa Viadrina (1993).
29 The term “identity” seems not to have a legal connotation. As we will see, the Euroregions have 
different structures and they do not necessarily have the legal personality. Thus, the distinct identity of 
the Euroregions with respect to their members gives the idea of a general connotation of the structure, 
as subjects with an own individuality.
30 See  J. GABBE, V.  VON MALKUS, K. MAHNKOPF, H. MARTINOS,  Institutional aspects of Cross-border  
Cooperation, Gronau 1999, p. 9.
31 LR-CT (2004)15, p. 20.
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concepts, the AEBR and the European Commission completed the already mentioned 
list of features by the individuation of the potential characteristics that delineates an 
Euroregion, from three different points of view, namely32: organisation33, method of 
working34 and  content  of  cross-border  cooperation35.  In  this  regard,  Euroregions 
develop  transfrontier  activities  according  to  different  structures  and  working-
procedures.
From a strictly legal point of view, thus, a Euroregion can be set up according 
to  the  most  various  forms  that  have  been  developed  for  creating  transfrontier 
activities and/or  structures between sub-national  authorities.  Namely,  they can be 
established without legal personality in form, for instance, of working communities, 
or with legal  personality according to private or public law. The use of the term 
“Euroregion” confer to the organisation an explicit transfrontier connotation and a 
positive unifying idea.  Therefore,  Euroregions  are  just  the result  of  the praxis of 
transfrontier  cooperation in its various modalities.  As transfrontier  actors are also 
various, Euroregions are not necessarily composed by territorial communities, but 
also  by  European  organisations,  associations,  chambers  of  commerce  and 
32 The chart was developed by the AEBR and the DG Regio. See  ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER 
REGIONS AND EUROPEAN COMMISSION (ed.), Practical Guide to Cross-border Co-operation, 3rd edition 
by J. GABBE, V. VON MALKUS, K. MAHNKOPF, H. MARTINOS, Gronau, 2000.
33 Amalgamation of regional and local authorities from both sides of the national border, sometimes 
with a parliamentary assembly; cross-border organisations with a permanent secretariat and experts 
and administrative staff; according to private law based on national associations or foundations from 
both sides of the border according to the respective public law; according to public law based on 
international treaties which also regulate the membership of regional authorities. 
34 Development and strategic-oriented co-operation, no measures based on individual cases; always 
cross-border-oriented, not as national border region, no new administrative level; hub for cross-border 
relations; citizens, politicians, institutions, economy, social partners, organisers of cultural events etc.; 
balancing between different structures and powers on both sides of the border and with regard to 
psychological issues, partnership co-operation, vertically (European, governmental, regional, local) as 
well as horizontally beyond the border; implementation of cross-border decisions at national level and 
according  to  procedures  applicable  on  both  sides  of  the  border  (avoidance  of  competence  and 
structural power conflicts), cross-border participation of citizens, institutions and social partners in 
programmes, projects and decision-making processes, direct initiatives and the use of own resources 
as preconditions for help and support of third parties.
35 Definition of fields of action according to joint interests (e.g. infrastructure, economy, culture); co-
operation in all areas of life: living, work, leisure time, culture etc.; equal emphasis on social-cultural 
co-operation as on economic-infrastructural co-operation; implementation of treaties and agreements 
and  concluded  at  European  level  between  countries  to  achieve  cross-border  practice;  advice, 
assistance  and  co-ordination  of  cross-border  co-operation,  particularly  in  the  following  fields: 
Economic  development;  Tourism  and  leisure;  Transport  and  traffic  Agricultural  development; 
Regional development; Innovation and technology transfer; Environmental protection; Schools and 
education and nature conservation; Culture and sports Social co-operation; Health affairs Emergency 
services and disaster prevention; Energy; Waste disposal; Communications and Public security.
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enterprises36. In this sense, as it has been said at the beginning of the paragraph, they 
are not instruments, rather the result of transfrontier cooperation.
3.2. The normative quality of Euroregions
The  historical  analysis  of  the  Euroregions  measures  the  developments  of 
cross-border  cooperation,  both  from  the  normative  and  from  the  practical 
perspective.  The first experience has been identified in the EUREGIO, created in 
1958 across the German-Dutch border, involving almost 100 municipalities. As it has 
already been mentioned above, transfrontier cooperation between local and regional 
authorities has been established through different legal and non-legal forms, so that it 
is not possible to define a single model of Euroregion. In these terms, the evaluation 
of  the  normative  quality  of  transfrontier  regions  shows all  the  legal  implications 
concerning the establishment of sub-national  cross-border relations and highlights 
the legal issues dealing with the Euroregions. And the main conclusion in this regard 
reveals  the necessity to accept  a  third dimension between law and non-law37.  An 
explanation of the statement is the following.
The  historical  development  of  Euroregions  shows  that  different  structures 
have been created. The first agreements have been concluded as forms of partnership 
and aimed at the establishment of a mere coordination and consultation. The system 
of the so-called working communities that have been developed since the 70s, such 
as  the  Arbeitsgemeinschaft  Alpenländer  (ARGE  ALP),  the  Arbeitsgemeinschaft  
Alpen-Adria,  the  Communauté de Travail  des Alpes Occidentales (COTRAO),  the 
Communidad de Trabajo de los Pirineos, has been a reality without a particular legal 
framework. Moreover, these organisations were not entitled with legal personality. 
The main functions of these working communities were related to the possibility to 
create coordination in order to find some common solutions to strictly transfrontier 
issues, as disaster prevention, transports, protection of the natural resources, etc. In 
36 B.  WASSENBERG,  Vers une eurorégion? La coopeération  transfrontalière franco-germano-suisse  
dans l'espace rhénan de 1974 à 2000, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 453. See also J. LANGER (ed.), Euroregions:  
the Alps-Adriatic context. Symposium on cross-border cooperation in the territory between the Alps  
and the Adratic Sea,  Framkfurt a/M, 2007;  K. BÖTTGER,  Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit  in  
Europa: Erfolge und Misserfolge der Kooperation am Beispiel der EUREGIO (Rhein-Ems-Ijssel), der 
Euregio Maas-Rhein und der Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa, Tübingen, 2006.
37 W. LANG, Die normative Qualität grenzüberschreitender Regionen zum Begriff der “soft insitition”, 
in Archiv des Völkerrechts, Band 27, Nr. 3, 1989, p. 280.
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general, it is possible to say that there is no substantial legal difference between the 
organisations established as “Euroregion” and the other working communities that 
are not identified with the same term. In fact, the organisational structure is, more or 
less, the same and it is generally composed of an assembly of the members, thematic 
commissions, working groups and a turning presidency38. 
The  subsequent  historical  evolution  of  the  Euroregions  was more  dealing 
with  the  issues  concerned  to  their  legal  configuration,  such  as  the  role  of 
international law, the (eventual) necessity of a covering inter-state agreement and the 
provisions  established  by  the  international  and  supranational  organisations,  both 
Council of Europe and the European Community. The concrete development of these 
transfrontier  structures  grew the  attention  on  the  legal  instruments  available  for 
cross-border cooperation and to the competences of sub-national authorities to create 
ad hoc structures. 
Of  course,  what  can  be  considered  the  “hardest”  form  of  transfrontier 
cooperation is the establishment of a transfrontier entity with legal personality and 
legal capacity. This step implies a complex evaluation on different kind of rules and 
on  their  interaction:  namely,  the  law  applicable  to  the  agreement  and  the  rules 
governing the everyday-functioning of the structure.
From  the  working  partnership  to  the  establishment  of  a  legal  entity,  the 
difference is of substantial relevance with reference to the legal implications. In fact, 
whereas an agreement on the exclusive ground of partnership is situated in the space 
of  the  non-law,  a  binding  agreement  –  an  inter-state  agreement  as  well  as  an 
agreement  between  sub-national  authorities  –  is  legally  enforceable.  However, 
despite the evolutions about their legal quality and about the legitimacy of territorial 
communities to get involved, Euroregions maintain the role of “soft institutions”39. 
Whichever normative quality they have and whichever law legitimates their action, 
their role is collocated in a kind of limbo between the law and the non-law, namely 
the institutional soft-law. 
38 See W. FERRARA, Le Euroregioni, in Progetti transfrontalieri per città gemelle e per città mondiali, 
Anno VII, N. 3-4,  Dicembre 1998, p. 1, available at  http://www.isig.it;  see also the paper by  J.L. 
ARNAUD,  Cross-border  and  transnational  cooperation:  the  new  Europe  is  inventing  itself  in  its  
margins, Paris, 2002.
39 Ibid., p, 284-285.
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4. International instruments
4.1. Public international instruments before the 1980
As already remembered, the Council of Europe adopted the European Outline 
Convention  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation  between  Territorial  Communities  or 
Authorities in Madrid on the 21st May 1980. Before the agreement on this document, 
which represents the first attempt to find a legal homogeneous tool for transfrontier 
cooperation in Europe, traditional international law has been used in the form of 
treaties  between  States  in  order  to  regulate  single  cases  of  cooperation  across  a 
common frontier. This kind of legal instruments, however, seemed not to satisfy the 
challenges drawn by the transfrontier matters concerned. In this regard, the analysis 
proposed by C. Ricq is particularly clear and it is worth to be quoted. 
Namely, “States accordingly undertake by an international agreement – i.e. 
between States – to recognise that, under their domestic legal system, their frontier 
communities  are  empowered to  conduct relations directly,  but  always under  their 
auspices,  and  conclude  legal  transactions,  with  their  approval,  with  frontier 
communities located on the territory of another signatory State. The agreements in 
question  thus  seek  to  promote  a  redistribution  of  powers  in  public  international 
relations between central government and transfrontier communities, rather than to 
develop new mechanisms of inter-state cooperation. This objective does not yet seem 
to have been achieved by existing agreements”40.
A peculiar characteristic of this kind of international treaties is the variability 
and flexibility, depending on the frontier involved and on the matters concerned. As 
the use of international law in the form of treaties or intergovernmental commissions 
represents a still current instrument, existing in parallel with other developing tools 
of  cooperation,  it  shows the  inadequacy of  the  state  diplomacy to  answer to  the 
aspirations and challenges of the transfrontier territories41.
40 C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 49. By the way, the Author lists a series 
of  transfrintier  structures  created  before  1980  with  international  agreements,  namely:  Oresund 
Council, Sarlorlux, North-Calotte Council, Euregio (the precursor of AEBR), Maas-Rhine Euregio, 
Ems-Dollart Region, Rhine-Waal Euregio, Regio Basiliensis, Comité régional franco-genevois, Arge-
Alp, Alpe-Adria, Cotrao.
41 See  N.  WISMER,  Les modalités  d'intervention de l'Etat  dans la coopération  transfrontalière,  in 
RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État et la coopération 
transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 88.
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4.2. The system of the Madrid Outline Convention (MOC) 
As  already  said,  the  European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier 
Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, commonly known as 
Madrid Outline Convention (MOC)42, was adopted in 1980 and entered into force on 
the 22nd December 1981. Out of 47 Member States of the CoE, the Convention has 
been ratified by and has entered into force in 36 countries43. The MOC is composed 
by 12 articles and its main aims are  specified in Article  1,  which recites:  “Each 
Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and foster transfronier cooperation between 
territorial  communities  or  authorities  within  its  jurisdiction  and  territorial 
communities  or  authorities within the  jurisdiction of  other  Contracting Parties.  It 
shall endeavour to promote the conclusion of any agreements and arrangements that 
may prove necessary for this purpose with due regard to the different constitutional 
provisions of each Party”44.  As it is quite clear,  the intention of this international 
document  is  that  of  promoting  and  trying  to  support  transfrontier  cooperation 
according to the national constitutional structures45, rather than to create any kind of 
right for sub-national territorial communities or authorities. However, it is worth to 
remember that the text of the Convention was approved after a debate that lasted 
several years within the CoE, as the Explanatory Report to the Convention clearly 
points out46. An interesting aspect within such a debate was the feel of the necessity 
42 CETS No. 106.
43 At the time of writing, Iceland and Malta have signed the Convention, but have not ratified it yet. 
Andorra,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Greece,  Montenegro,  San  Marino,  Serbia,  the  FYROM  and  United 
Kingdom have not signed  the Convention. Data available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.aspNT=106&CM=7&DF=5/29/2009&CL=EN
G.
44 Italic is ours. The official version regarding the aims of the adoption of the MOC affirms that “[t]he 
Convention is intended to encourage and facilitate the conclusion of cross-border agreements between 
local and regional authorities within the scope of their respective powers. Such agreements may cover 
regional development, environmental protection, the improvement of public services, etc., and may 
include  the  setting up  of  transfrontier  associations  or  consortia  of  local  authorities.  To allow for 
variations  in  the  legal  and  constitutional  systems in  the  Council  of  Europe's  member  States,  the 
Convention sets out a range of model agreements to enable both local and regional authorities as well 
as  States  to  place  transfrontier  co-operation  in  the  context  best  suited  to  their  needs.  Under  the 
Convention, Parties undertake to seek ways of eliminating obstacles to transfrontier co-operation and 
to grant to authorities engaging in international co-operation the facilities they would enjoy in a purely 
national context.”, see at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/106.htm.
45 The Explanatory Report suggests to consider this provision as a tantamount to a “federal clause”.
46The Explanatory Report to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities is published at the webpage:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/106.htm.  Some  important  documents  that 
anticipated  the  intention  and  the  need  to  adopt  a  legal  framework  for  transfrontier  cooperation 
between sub-national territorial subjects are: Recommendation 470(1966) on European co-operation 
between local authorities, Resolution 8(1974) on co-operation between local communities in frontier 
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to  introduce  some changes within the  national  legislations  “as were necessary to 
remove any obstacles to transfrontier cooperation between local authorities” and to 
“provide  local  authorities  with  the  instruments  appropriate  for  transfrontier 
cooperation”47. With regard to the adoption of this document, it is important to note 
that its signature and subsequent entry into force happened some years before the 
adoption of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, adopted in 1985, which 
also provides at Article 10, paragraph 3 the right for local authorities to association 
with  foreign  counterparts.  However,  the  political  and  legal  involvement  of  the 
Charter about the necessary recognition and implementation of the principle of local 
self-government  seems  to  skip  with  regard  to  the  development  of  transfrontier 
cooperation, thus, leaving the issue to the previous Madrid Convention.
It  is  well  known  and  recognized  that  the  MOC  doesn't  introduce  a  new 
experience within the panorama of transfrontier relations, but tries to legitimate and 
institutionalize a consolidated phenomenon48. As many academic contributions and 
public  debates  demonstrate,  the  above-mentioned  aims  have  been  only  partially 
satisfied  with  the  adoption  of  the  MOC.  If  the  existence  of  a  common  legal 
instrument for transfrontier cooperation between sub-national entities appeared to be 
a first and new goal, the legal outcome and the content of the Convention are weak. 
According to N. Levrat,  what he calls a “relative faiblesse juridique”  is a typical 
attitude of the CoE's international legal instruments49. Namely, the text of the MOC 
clearly shows the possibility for States to add some reserves or statements in relation 
areas,  Recommendations  784  (1976)  and  802  (1977),  Resolution  90  (1977).  Another  interesting 
remark in the Explanatory Report is the attention to the Opinion No. 96 (1979) on the draft European 
Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities. In 
this document, which enthusiastically anticipated the adoption of the MOC, it  is affirmed that the 
Convention itself “might afford a basis for a new doctrine of international law governing neighbourly 
relations across frontiers and the division of responsibilities among local authorities”. See also  E. 
DECAUX, La Convention-cadre européenne sur la coopération transfrontalière des collectivités ou des  
autotités locales, in Revue générale de droit international public, 88/3, 1984, p. 538-620.
47  See Resolution 8(1974).
48 See  D.  FLORENZANO,  L'autonomia  regionale  nella  dimensione  internazionale.  Dalle  Attività  
promozionali  agli  accordi  ed  alle  intese,  cit.,  p.  67  et  seq.  and  G.  VEDOVATO,  Les  relations  
transfrontalières  dans  la  nouvelle  Europe  intégrée  des  régions,  in  Rivista  di  studi  politici  
internazionali, LXI, 4, ottobre-dicembre 1994, p. 580 et seq.
49 See N. LEVRAT, L'émergence des instrument juridiques del la coopération transfrontière du Conseil  
de l'Europe, in  La cooération transfrontalière,  Numéro thématique de  Annales de droit de Louvain, 
2004,  vol.  64  n.  3,  p.  367.  The  Author  explains  that  “[c]ette  relative  'faiblesse  juridique'  des 
instruments  du  Conseil  de  l'Europe  se  révèle  dans  des  domaines  nouveau,  dont  le  potentialités 
évolutives et les conséquences juridiques ne sont pas encore clairement identifiées par les Etats, être 
un  atout  autorisant  les  autorités  nationales  à  envisager  des  solutions  novatrices  dont  les  risques 
juridiques leur paraissent limités en raison précisément de la souplesse de l'engagement”.
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to the adaptation of the Convention to each single legal order. The related effect is 
that  transfrontier cooperation between sub-national territories is  quantitatively  and 
qualitatively under the choice of the States parties50. In fact, the signatory States have 
the discretional power to indicate which sub-national entities are entitled to put into 
practice transfrontier cooperation and also the eventual extension from the border of 
the territory concerned. 
Article 2 of the Convention defines the concept of transfrontier cooperation as 
“any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between 
territorial  communities  or  authorities  within  the  jurisdiction  of  two  or  more 
Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement or arrangement necessary 
for this purpose, according to the powers conferred to such authorities by domestic 
law”. First of all, such a provision highlights the presence of a so-called “protection 
clause” for the domestic legal orders of the Member States, as far as the respect of 
the internal attribution of competences to the sub-national authorities is necessarily 
required51. Moreover, the content of Art. 2, mainly with regard to the qualification of 
the  actions  and  acts  of  the  sub-national  authorities,  has  no  clear  legal  frame  or 
outcome.  In  general  terms,  the  Convention  individuates  two  different  forms  of 
cooperation  that  do  not  really  represent  something  new  with  regard  to  the  past 
experiences.  Namely,  the  “neighbourly relations”  remind to  a  non-legally  framed 
cooperation  in  form  of  consultations  or  exchanges  of  informations,  while  the 
“agreement or arrangement” seem to deal with the establishment of specific legal 
relations52. Actually, also the specification related to the two terms – agreement or 
arrangement – seems to be extremely vague and without a precise qualification of the 
legal  nature  concerning  those  instruments53,  which  obtain  a  diverse  connotation 
within each national act of ratification. Furthermore, it's not easy to comprehend if 
50 A clear example of this kind of discretion is set down in Art. 2, par. 3, where each Contracting 
Party is entitled, at the time of signing the Convention or afterwards, to indicate the “communities, 
authorities or bodies, subjects and forms to which it intends to confine the scope of the Convention or 
which  it  intends  to  exclude  from  its  scope”;  a  list  of  such  declarations  is  available  at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.aspNT=106&CM=7&DF=6/3/2009&CL
=ENG&VL=1. 
51 See  A. FODELLA,  M. PERTILE,  G. AVOLIO,  Studio sulla creazione di nuove forme di cooperazione 
transfrontaliera a livello sub-statale per lo sviluppo sostenibile del territorio, in AA.VV.,  Strumenti  
giuridici della cooperazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile di un’area montana transfrontaliera. Atti del  
Convegno FAO, Roma 1 giugno 2005 , Bolzano, 2005, p. 79.
52 See the Explanatory Report, points 21-23.
53 See D. FLORENZANO, Gli atti pattizi delle Regioni italiane nell'ambito delle attività di cooperazione  
transfrontaliera alla luce del rinnovato quadro costituzionale, cit., p. 681.
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these  agreements  and  arrangements  shall  be  signed  between  States  or  between 
territorial communities, although the official interpretation given in the Explanatory 
Report  considers  the  agreements  as  matter  of  States  and  the  arrangements  as 
instruments for sub-national communities. Namely, according to Article 3, paragraph 
1,  “the  Contracting  Parties  shall  […]  encourage  any  initiative  by  territorial 
communities and authorities inspired by the outline arrangements between territorial 
communities  and  authorities  drawn  up  in  the  Council  of  Europe.  If  they  judge 
necessary they may take into consideration the bilateral  or multilateral  inter-state 
model agreements drawn up in the Council of Europe and designed to facilitate co-
operation between territorial communities or authorities.” Following this statement, 
paragraph 3 of the same Article clarifies that “[i]f the Contracting Parties deem it 
necessary  to  conclude  inter-state  agreements,  these  may  inter  alia  establish  the 
context,  forms  and  limits  within  which  territorial  communities  or  authorities 
concerned with transfrontier cooperation may act. Each agreement may also stipulate 
the authorities or bodies to which it applies”. 
Although apparently redundant,  such a literal  transcription of some salient 
extracts  of  the  MOC  is  quite  useful  in  order  to  have  a  clear  and  visible 
acknowledgement of the style and standard of the Convention.
Advancing some general comments about the Convention, one of the most 
relevant provisions, which discovers the weak legal nature of the Convention in the 
perspective of sub-national authorities, concerns the possibility for States to define 
the frame of cooperation with inter-state agreements covering the content of future 
actions and relations between local and regional communities. Such a discretional 
power is able to eliminate  a priori the creation of a peculiar right for sub-national 
entities to engage in cooperation with some degree of autonomy. 
Furthermore,  although the  Convention  itself  doesn't  directly  deal  with  the 
legal aspects at national level, it provides, without having a binding value, for some 
models of inter-state agreements on transfrontier cooperation at local and regional 
level and outline agreements, statutes and contracts as optional and potential basis for 
transfrontier cooperation between territorial authorities or communities54. 
54 The  Explanatory  Report,  at  point  12,  underlines  that  “[t]he  graduated  system of  models  and 
outlines appended to the Convention (out not forming an integral part thereof) is designed to provide 
states on the one hand, and territorial communities on the other, with a choice of forms of co-operation 
best suited to their problems. Accordingly, the Convention does not preclude either the use of different 
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As a general  observation about  the  MOC,  it  is  possible  to  affirm that  its 
clearest  and  most  definite  legal  outcome  regards  the  intention  to  safeguard  the 
national  constitutional  structures  of  the  States  Parties  and  their  unconditioned 
sovereignty,  being  the  transfrontier  cooperation  between  sub-national  authorities 
mainly subject to national law55.
As already remembered, the Convention does not substitute other available 
legal instruments or solutions for transfrontier cooperation, but represents an optional 
and eventual tool for sub-national authorities. However, since its legal value could be 
considered as quite weak, some important results have, been achieved. Namely, the 
MOC has had, and still has, the political value to have approached for the first time 
the phenomenon of transfrontier  cooperation between sub-national  entities from a 
unitary  legal  point  of  view.  Despite  all  its  vagueness  and  legal  weakness,  the 
Convention  pretends  anyway  to  represent  a  common  juridical  system.  The 
consequent  effect  is  a  legal  document  with  less  juridical  power,  but  with  some 
political involvements which are mainly focused in two directions. On the one hand, 
it  explicitly treats the phenomenon of transfrontier cooperation as a single unique 
matter for the first time, instead of considering isolated specific experiences as it was 
before. On the other hand, the MOC underlines that such a phenomenon needs a 
general legal approach and a standard model. Between the words, this was a kind of 
tacit admissions that the national approaches were not adequate as such, but were in 
the need of some new and innovative shared solutions56.
More in general, the Convention inaugurates what could be conceived as a 
“system”  for  a  general  legal  approach  to  transfrontier  cooperation.  Namely,  the 
attempt to settle this phenomenon according to juridical parameters is faced through 
forms of agreements or the adaptation of the appended models to each specific case of transfrontier 
co-operation. Moreover, as may be seen from Article 3, paragraph 1, and Article 8, further model and 
arrangements between territorial communities or authorities may be drawn up within the Council of 
Europe.” 
55 See P. GAUTIER, La nature juridique des conventions de coopération transfrontalière entre autorités  
régionales  ou  locales  relevants  d'Etats  différentes,  in  La  coopération  transfrontalière,  Numéro 
thématique de Annales de droit de Louvain, 2004, vol. 64 n. 3, p. 408.
56 N. LEVRAT, L'émergence des instrument juridiques del la coopération transfrontière du Conseil de  
l'Europe,  cit.,  p.  371,  explains  that  “[...]  l'existence  de  cette  Convention  va  permettre  un 
'normalisation'  du  phénomène,  qui  sortira  de  la  marginalité  pour  afficher  d'apparentes  réalisation 
institutionnelles […]. Ces réalisations institutionnelles montrent une acceptation politique, notamment 
par les ministères des Affaires étrangères des Etats concernés, de la réalité du phénomène des relations 
transfrontalières;  mais  les  structures  mises  sur  pieds  voient  leur  capacité  d'action  très  fortement 
limitée, en raison de l'absence de cadre juridique préalablement défini dans lequel elles pourraient 
s'inscrire.”
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a  (more  or  less)  complex  and  necessary  interaction  between  international  and 
national law.
4.3.  The  implementation  of  the  Madrid  Outline  Convention  in  the  national 
perspectives: a failed attempt to find uniformity?
Article 4 of the MOC encourages the States Parties to adapt their national 
legislations  in  order  to  facilitate  territorial  communities  or  authorities  to  set  up 
transfrontier relations57. 
More than this, the principal aim of the MOC was that of creating a standard 
legal  framework  for  these  sub-national  relations.  The  consequent  and  successive 
challenge was the intention to pursue a certain degree of legal uniformity within the 
States' legislative provisions in this field. But, despite the appreciable attempt, the 
plans didn't reach the expected results in this sense. Namely the Convention, trying 
to protect as much as possible the principle of national sovereignty, leaves to the 
Contracting Parties a really wide space for the free interpretation of some crucial 
provisions entailed in the document and allows a high level of discretion about the 
subsequent normative implementation in the national contexts as well. In this regard, 
insofar as one of the main problems was the definition of suitable legal instruments 
for  sub-national  institutional  subjects,  the  1980's  document  didn't  create  fruitful 
conditions for the establishment of transfrontier structures under public law58. In fact, 
national authorities generated some difficulties for territorial communities aiming to 
take part in cross-border permanent structures and were more open to the possibility 
concerning the conclusion of temporary projects.
Moreover, confirming the discretional approach of the national Contracting 
Parties,  several  examples  demonstrate  how  States,  in  the  very  first  phase  of 
application of the Convention, preferred to keep control over the acts of territorial 
57 Art. 4 recites: “Each Contracting Parties shall endeavour to resolve any legal, administrative or 
technical  difficulties  liable  to  hamper  the  development  and  smooth  running  of  transfrontier 
cooperation and shall consult with the other Contracting Party or Parties to the extent required”.
58 See J. GABBE,  Legal status of cross-border co-operation structures – past, present and prospects, 
Gronau, 2006, p. 4: “The main reason is that the Madrid Outline Convention leaves the states much 
room for  interpretation while  implementing the Convention through bilateral/trilateral  agreements, 
e.g. as regards the respective provisions on the location, majority situation, management and the tasks. 
This,  in  turn,  clearly  indicates  that  the  Madrid  Outline  Convention  can’t  create  uniform  legal 
conditions for the regional / local partners of a state or on both sides of the border”.
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communities.  Namely,  among  others,  Spain59,  France60,  Italy61 and  Belgium62, 
required a covering inter-state agreement as a preliminary condition before setting up 
transfrontier cooperation between sub-national communities or authorities, according 
to the provisions of MOC. However, this kind of reserve has not been embraced by 
all the States parties to the Convention. In particular, it is interesting to notice how 
sometimes the state approaches changed during the years. In fact, in some cases, like 
for Belgium and France63, the reserve about the previous inter-state agreement has 
been withdrawn and the application of the MOC continued without reserves. Thus, it 
is possible to formulate the following considerations. 
The  easiest  way  to  comprehend  the  imperative  state  predominance  in 
implementing  the  content  of  the  MOC  is  precisely  the  provision  concerning  an 
express reserve about the possibility to condition the establishment of cooperation to 
a previous inter-state agreement. But this is not the only element. Namely, as it has 
been mentioned, not every Contracting Party proposed this kind of reserve and, in 
other cases, the reserve has been abandoned. Thus, the MOC is often applied without 
reserve of the inter-state agreement64. However, even in such cases the discretion of 
State Parties are preserved by the international nature of the Convention and by its 
soft legal content. In fact, although not specified trough international agreements, the 
implementation  of  transfrontier  cooperation  between  sub-national  authorities  is 
strictly shaped by national legal orders and the respective national procedures. To 
mention an example,  Austria  ratified the MOC without  the reserve of a previous 
agreement between States65. Moreover, the Austrian Constitution allows the Länder,  
59 Spain ratified the Madrid Outline Convention with the law of 16 October 1990. In two occasions 
Spain made some reserves to the application of the Convention, the first about the subordination to 
previous  inter-state  agreements  and  the  second  about  the  necessary  express  approval  of  the 
government.
60 France ratified the MOC with the L. n. 83-1131 of 23 December 1983. 
61 Italy ratified the MOC with the law of 19 November 1994, no. 948. The Italian Government, 
referring to paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Convention, declared that its application shall be subject to 
the conclusion of inter-state agreements. See:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.aspNT=106&CM=7&DF=6/5/2009&CL
=ENG&VL=1.
62 Belgium ratified the  MOC on 6 april  1987 with the  express  reserve  of  a  previous  inter-state 
agreement; the reserve has been removed since 11 December 2002. 
63 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on  the  current  state  of  the  
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe, Council of Europe, 2006, 
p. 65. 
64 Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and other countries didn't provide for 
specific reserves or declarations.
65 The Austrian ratification of the MOC is dated 18 October 1982.
130
SPECIFIC INSTRUMENTS FOR TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
within the  limits  of  their  respective competences,  to  conclude treaties  with other 
States  or  sub-national  entities66.  However,  the  national  law  requires,  for  any 
agreement  including  of  transfrontier  cooperation,  an  approval  form  the  Federal 
Government67. 
In this sense, the implementation of the MOC remains concretely bounded to 
the national procedures concerning the exercise of sub-national foreign power and no 
radical  differences  are  perceivable  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  the 
Convention in composed or non-composed countries. Moreover, two types of State 
control are potentially practicable: an  ex ante-control and an  ex post-control68. The 
first one usually takes the form of a governmental supervision on the correct exercise 
of the attributed competences of sub-national entities or, in other cases, it consists in 
the  explicit  reserve  of  authorisation  concerning  the  opportunity/legitimacy  of 
transfrontier relations as undertaken by regional or local authorities. The  ex post-
control,  which  doesn't  necessarily  presume  a  previous  explicit  authorisation,  is, 
potentially, determined to cease with a judiciary check of legitimacy69.  Again, the 
dichotomy between the State-approval  and the conformity with the national  legal 
66 See Art. 15, 16 and 116 of the Austrian Constitution.
67 “In  particular,  the  Federal  Government  must  be  informed  before  negotiations  begin,  and  the 
authorisation must be signed by the President of the Republic, following a recommendation from the 
Land Government, and counter-signed by the Landeshauptmann (president of the Land). Apprval may 
also be tacit. Any treaty concluded under this procedure must be revoked if the Fedreal Government 
so requests. The Länder feel that such a complicated procedure somewhat limits their ability to enter 
into transfrontier cooperation agreements.” Moreover, it is quite peculiar to observe how this kind of 
internal proceeding has detracted Austrian regional authorities from using it for transfrontier relations' 
scopes. Namely, “[t]he Austrian Länder have not yet concluded one agreement on the basis of Art. 16 
of the Federal Constitution. The Austrian  Länder  normally conclude 'agreements' which are legally 
not binding with neighbouring regions. Transfrontier  cooperation of the Austrian  Länder normally 
falls under Art. 17 of the Federal Constitution (competences of the Länder as holders of civil rights).” 
See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on  the  current  state  of  the 
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe, cit., p. 33. 
68 See  L. MALO,  Le contrôle administratif de la coopération transfrontalière, in  RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES 
NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État  et  la  coopération transfrontalière:  
actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 131-156, and  M. AUDIT,  Le 
contrôle  juridictionnel  de  la  coopération  transfrontalière,  in  RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES 
TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI), L’État et la coopération transfrontalière: actes de la  
journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., p. 157-166.
69 With regard to the jurisdictional control, it is worth to remember that it should not concern issues 
related  to  the  States'  prerogatives  about  the  international  affairs.  Namely,  as  it  has  already  been 
underlined, the foreign relations of sub-national authorities related to cross-border cooperation do not 
refer to the international relations of States. Rather, this kind of jurisdictional control deals with the 
respect of the matters in which the sub-national authorities have an attributed competence that can be 
also projected in the transfrontier field. See M. AUDIT,  Le contrôle juridictionnel de la coopération 
transfrontalière, in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI), L’État  
et la coopération transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., p. 162.
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order seems to mark the difference between the first  and the second modality of 
supervision.  In  these  terms,  the  control  about  the  competence/legitimacy  of  sub-
national authorities about the establishment of transfrontier relations for cooperation 
is not a matter of international law, rather a mere internal question70. Namely, it is 
about  the  external/foreign  projection  of  an  internal/national  competence  and  the 
related control should be limited to the verification of such a compatibility.
4.4. The Additional Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention
The content of the MOC revealed quite soon its incompleteness and its scarce 
contribution  in  regard  to  the  operative  development  of  effective  transfrontier 
relations between sub-national entities. In particular, these authorities didn't obtain an 
enforceable  recognition  of  competence  by  their  respective  States  to  set  up 
transfrontier  cooperation's  agreements  and,  additionally,  the  structures  of 
transfrontier nature didn't find a clear legal framework71.
The Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier 
Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities72 (hereinafter referred 
to as the “Additional Protocol”) was signed on the 9th of November 1995 and entered 
into force in December 199873. This document considers the necessity to adapt and 
supplement the MOC, as it is clearly affirmed in the Preamble. Namely, it has been 
patently noticed that the local and regional authorities hadn't find in the Convention a 
legal  opportunity  in  their  respective  States74,  even  if  some States signed bilateral 
agreements in order to put transfrontier cooperation into practice or implemented the 
MOC  within  the  national  legal  system.  But,  as  the  Explanatory  Report  to  the 
Additional Protocol affirms, “[i]t [was] nevertheless useful to add to the Convention 
70 Ibid., p. 163.
71 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on the  current  state  of  the  
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe, cit., p. 9. See also the 
study undertaken by the Select Committee of Experts on Transfrontier Co-operation LR-R-CT (91)2.
72 CETS No. 159.
73 The Additional Protocol has not been signed by the following States: Andorra, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Lichtenstein,  Malta, 
Montenegro, Norway, Poland, San Marino, Serbia, Spain, FYROM, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
Following States signed it, but haven't ratified it yet: Belgium, Georgia, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and 
Romania.
74 See  Standing  Conference  of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities  of  Europe  (CLRAE),  Resolution 
227(1991).
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a  protocol  describing  legal  instruments  proven  by  experience,  unifying  the 
fundamental principles of transfrontier cooperation among territorial communities or 
authorities and suggesting appropriate solutions to the Contracting Parties.”75 
In order to face the mentioned problems, the Additional Protocol introduced a 
supplementary framework aiming at creating a common reference for transfrontier 
cooperation bodies established by sub-national authorities. Namely, the Additional 
Protocol recognises “under certain conditions, the right of territorial communities to 
conclude transfrontier cooperation agreements, the validity in domestic law of the 
acts and decisions made in the framework of a transfrontier cooperation agreement, 
and the legal corporate capacity (“legal personality”) of any cooperation body set up 
under such an agreement.”76 According to this general aim, Article 1 recognises to 
the territorial communities or authorities, within the limits of their competences, an 
individual  right  to  develop  cross-border  relation  in  the  form  of  transfrontier 
cooperation's  agreements77.  In these  terms, sub-national  authorities  could on their 
own initiative  and responsibility  develop cross-border  actions78,  even through the 
creation of structures with legal capacity, both of private or public law. The legal 
capacity is defined according to the national law where the transfrontier structure 
will  have  its  headquarters79.  With  other  words,  the  Additional  Protocol  aims  at 
defining the legal effects of acts performed within the framework of transfrontier 
cooperation  and  of  the  legal  status  of  any  cooperation  bodies  to  be  set  up  by 
transfrontier cooperation agreements. 
75 See the Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/159.htm. Among other issues, this Report underlines 
the lack of legal details from the MOC to the States' national laws in order to resolve problems, which 
were peculiar  to  the transfrontier  cooperation,  such  as:  the putting into effect  of  transfrontier  co-
operation between territorial  communities or  authorities within a public  law framework; the legal 
force  in  the  national  law of  each  State  of  the  measures  taken in  the context  of  transfrontier  co-
operation by territorial  communities or authorities; the legal personality and public or private law 
status granted to any transfrontier co-operation bodies which may be set up by territorial communities 
or authorities.
76 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/159.htm.
77 Art. 3 is also to keep in mind: “A transfrontier co-operation agreement concluded by territorial 
communities or authorities may set up a transfrontier co-operation body, which may or may not have 
legal personality. The agreement shall specify whether the body, with regard to the responsibilities 
assigned to it and to the provisions of national law, is to be considered a public or private law entity 
within the national legal systems to which the territorial communities or authorities concluding the 
agreement belong”.
78 See N. LEVRAT, L'émergence des instrument juridiques de la coopération transfrontière du Conseil  
de l'Europe, cit., p. 375.
79 Art. 4.
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Since  the  Additional  Protocol  establishes  some  pragmatic  solutions  with 
reference  to  the  possibility  to  build  transfrontier  cooperation  structures  at  sub-
national level, the concrete application of these dispositions doesn't eliminate several 
complexities  regarding  the  law  applicable  to  such  structures  and  the  following 
consequences. In fact, according to the analysis of N. Levrat, this Protocol creates a 
kind of dualistic effect, when providing that “[d]ecisions taken under a transfrontier 
cooperation agreement shall be implemented by territorial communities or authorities 
within their national legal system, in conformity with their national law” (Art. 2). 
Thus, territorial communities have to transpose the acts of a transfrontier body into 
the national system in order to give them a legal value. In these terms, however, it is 
possible to wonder about the nature of such an obligation80.
Undoubtedly, the Additional Protocol shows a new perspective for territorial 
communities. Despite that, its practicability has found several obstacles, mainly due 
to the different praxis already established in transfrontier relations and, probably, due 
to its scarce attractiveness.  Namely, the idea of creating a common framework is 
practically denied by the necessary connection to the transposition in the national 
legal systems of acts potentially adopted under a foreign law81, thus generating an 
excessive complexity of legal solutions82.
4.5. The Second Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention 
The Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-
operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning Inter-territorial 
co-operation83 (hereinafter referred to as the “Second Protocol”), signed on the 5th of 
May 1998 and entered into force in February 200184, has a different aim. While the 
80 See N. LEVRAT, L'émergence des instrument juridiques de la coopération transfrontière du Conseil  
de l'Europe, cit., p. 376.
81 Namely, this reference is to the national law of the State in which the transfrontier body has its 
headquarters.
82 See  H.  COMTE,  N.  LEVRAT,  Aux  coutures  de  l'Europe.  Defis  et  enjeux  del  la  coopération  
transfrontalière, cit.,  p. 19-20. In particular, “[...]  les solutions juridiques offertes par ce Protocole 
additionel, si elles semblent opérationnelles et rationnelles – bien qu'en peu complexes – d'un point de 
vue strictement juridique, n'attirent guère les décideurs, notamment dans la mesure où elles rompent 
l'égalité  juridique  entre  les  parties,  contraignant  l'une  ou  certaines  d'entre  elles  à  agir  dans  un 
environnent juridique étranger, qui se trouve être celui du co-contractant”.
83 CETS No. 169.
84 The Second Protocol has been signed by following States: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia  and Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  France,  Germany,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Moldova,  Monaco, 
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Additional Protocol deals with the strengthening of the territorial communities to set 
up transfrontier agreements and with the legal nature of the respective structures, the 
Second Protocol intends to expand the geographical context defined by the MOC. 
Since  the  Convention  refers  to  transfrontier  cooperation  as  a  relation  between 
adjacent  neighbouring  communities,  the  Second  Protocol  extends  this  sphere  of 
application.  Namely,  the  meaning  of  “inter-territorial  cooperation”  refers  to 
authorities, which do not necessarily share a common border, as a more advanced 
form  of  transfrontier  cooperation85.  According  to  this  new  shape  of  territorial 
relations,  the  principles,  dispositions  and  limits  entailed  in  the  MOC and in  the 
Additional Protocol on transfrontier cooperation shall apply, mutatis mutandis86, even 
in the frame of inter-territorial cooperation, namely between non-adjacent territorial 
communities87. As the substantial legal guidelines remain unchanged with respect to 
the  MOC  and  the  Additional  Protocol,  the  new  approach  to  inter-territorial 
cooperation  enlarges  the  spectrum of  the  official  recognition  of  another  form of 
cross-border cooperation,  which actually has specific peculiarities.  From a formal 
point of view, the Second Protocol doesn't expand the range of powers for territorial 
communities or authorities, nor it confers a clearer legal framework. Thus, the core 
of the legal framework established by the MOC remains the same88. However, the 
Second Protocol contributes to broaden and to legitimize, even conceptually, the field  
Netherlands, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. Following States signed 
it, but haven't ratified it yet: Belgium, Georgia, Iceland, Portugal and Romania.
85 In this regard a fundamental document inspiring the Second Protocol was the Vienna Declaration 
of 1993 of the heads of State and government of the member States of the Council of Europe, adopted 
on the 9th October 1993.
86 In  particular,  Art.  1  reminds  that  signatory  States  shall  recognise  territorial  communities  or 
authorities the right “to engage in discussions and to draw up, within common fields of responsibility, 
interterritorial co-operation agreements, in accordance with the procedures laid down in their statutes, 
in conformity with national law and insofar as such agreements are in keeping with the Contracting 
Party's  international  commitments.  An interterritorial  co-operation  agreement shall  entail  only the 
responsibilities of the territorial communities or authorities which have concluded it.”
87 See Art. 1-5 of the Second Protocol. As the Explanatory Report to the Second Protocol (points 7 
and 8) points out that “[r]elations between territorial communities across national borders have been 
so dynamic that  agreements  have emerged between geographically remote authorities.  Such inter-
regional agreements have been drawn up, for instance, between Spain, France, Italy and Belgium in 
connection with high-tech economic development poles. Many twinning agreements between towns or 
regions are in fact advanced co-operation agreements covering fields which have traditionally been 
excluded from conventional twinning arrangements. Such contacts between territorial communities 
are bound to undergo considerable expansion in the future. Therefore, the question is whether such 
schemes should remain without a legal framework at the international level or whether they should be 
placed from the outset into a well-known, tried and tested framework.”
88 See N. LEVRAT, L'émergence des instrument juridiques de la coopération transfrontière du Conseil  
de l'Europe, cit., p. 378. See also,  U. BEYERLIN,  Rechtsprobleme des lokales Grenzüberschreitenden 
Zusammenarbeit, Berlin, 1988, p. 118 et seq.
135
CHAPTER IV
and  the  definition  of  cross-border  relations  with  reference  to  a  given  territory. 
Namely, if the traditional perception of territorial cooperation was mainly rooted in 
the  classification  of  relations  between  adjacent  territorial  communities,  the 
international  recognition  of  inter-territorial  cooperation  opens  new  options  for 
cooperation and for a new dynamic conception of territories that is not only focused 
on  a  contiguous  space.  In  fact,  transfrontier  cooperation  and  inter-territorial 
cooperation entail  some basic  practical  differences.  While  the  first  one is  mainly 
based  in  the  achievement  of  shared  solutions  to  common  questions,  which  do 
postulate the existence of a common border, the second one strives to give value to 
the activities concerned as such and to the intention of creating cooperation, rather 
than  to  consider  it  as  a  sort  of  due  action  because  of  the  adjacency  of  the 
communities involved.
After this brief overview of the system of the Madrid Outline Convention, it 
is necessary to remind,  as a general  remark and as a kind of oxymoron, both its 
pioneering  role  and  its  legal  vagueness.  Of  course,  the  Council  of  Europe  is 
particularly proud of this legal framework. A measure to evaluate its effectiveness 
could be, in fact, the number of ratifications of the Convention and its Protocols. 
More complex is the evaluation of the effective implementation of the ratification-
rules, even after  almost thirty years from the adoption of the MOC. Namely,  the 
system of the Convention is still facing several problematic issues within Member 
States, such as the nature of the agreement between territorial communities or the 
law applicable to the activities of a cross-border structure89 and, in some cases, the 
eventual compliance with the national rules concerning the exercise of sub-national 
foreign  powers.  Another  possible  factor  revealing the  efficacy of  the  instruments 
under analysis could be the investigation about the number of transfrontier structures 
that have been created90.
89 These issues have been pointed out by Auke van der Groot, (at that time) Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands and Chair of the Committee of Experts on Transfrontier 
Co-operation  of  the Council  of  Europe,  during the International  Seminar,  Legal  Status  of  Cross-
Border  Cooperation  (CBC)  Structures,  Towards  a  new  European  Convention  on  Groupings  of  
Territorial Co-operation, Vilnius, 4-6 December 2006; the report of the speech is available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1375217&Site=COE. 
90 Ibid.: “The enquiries done at the Council of Europe showed that while the legal framework was 
slowly put into practice – with legislation being amended or adopted with a view to making cross-
border and interterritorial co-operation 'legal' – the other 'accompanying' measures take more time to 
be adopted. These may include the provision of technical assistance by a central state apparatus, the 
access to funds especially targeted to cross-border co-operation projects, the adoption of interstate 
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Anyway, while doubting about its nature of hard law or soft law document91, 
it is worth to underline that “the most relevant consequence of the Convention is that 
it brings transfrontier cooperation into the domestic legal system of the contracting 
States thereby transforming it from an activity at best ‘tolerated’ into an explicitly 
mentioned ‘legal’ activity, which the contracting States have agreed to promote.”92
4.6. International treaties on the basis of the MOC
The  adoption  of  the  Madrid  Outline  Convention  has  conditioned  the 
subsequent  conclusion  of  several  treaties  between  States  concerning  transfrontier 
cooperation among sub-national communities in order to fix the context, the extent 
and  the  limits  of  cooperation  between  these  territorial  entities.  The  treaties  are 
usually bilateral, but also a few multilateral agreements have been adopted. The most 
significant  and  most  mentioned  treaties  are  the  following93:  the  BENELUX 
Convention (September  1986);  the  Isselburg-Anholt  Agreement between Germany 
and the Netherlands (May 1991); the Bern Agreement between Italy and Switzerland 
(February 1993); the Rome Agreement between France and Italy (November 1993); 
the  Vienna  Agreement between  Italy  and  Austria  (January  1993);  the  Bayonne 
Agreement between France and Spain  (February  1995);  the  Karlsruhe  Agreement 
between France, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland (January 1996); the Mainz 
Agreement between  Germany  and  Belgium (June  1996);  the  Brussels  Agreement 
between France and Belgium (September 2002); the Valencia Agreement between 
Spain and Portugal (October 2002).
agreements or an effective co-ordination between interstate committees,  where they exist, and the 
initiatives taken at local level. One useful indicator of effectiveness may therefore be the number of 
cross-border co-operation bodies established by the territorial authorities of member states, not only 
by those that have ratified the Madrid Convention. Studies recently published on the 'Euroregions' 
created in such countries as Lithuania (and its neighbours), Slovakia (and its neighbours) and South 
Eastern Europe in general, show how 'Euroregions' have become popular in a relatively short period 
of  time.  There  are approximately 90 Euroregions in  Europe  today  – at  least,  Euroregions  whose 
existence is known to the Council of Europe or to the Association of European Border Regions – and 
probably more if one takes into account those whose creation is not officially communicated to the 
Council of Europe – even if this communication has no legal consequences.”
91 See  R.  SEERDEN,  Publiekrechtelijke  grensoverschrijdende  samenwerking  tussen  decentrale 
overheden, Maastricht, 1993, p. 45 et seq.
92 See F. PALERMO, J. WOELK, Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution of  
Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol, in  Z.A. SKURBATY (eds.), Beyond a One-Dimensional  
State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?, cit., p. 283.
93 See C. RICQ, Handbook of Transfrontier Co-operation, cit., p. 85-86.
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Generally speaking, after the adoption of the MOC within the context of the 
Council of Europe, transfrontier cooperation between local and regional authorities 
tended to develop in the form of international treaties along that path, even if not 
legally well defined, in order to set down the rules to strength or to fix the basic 
principles  for  such  kind  of  relations.  Despite  the  existence  of  the  MOC  legal 
frameworks, some other “merely” inter-state agreements continued to be signed in 
order to foster cross-border relation without creating a new legal framework or an 
apposite field of action for territorial  communities94, rather to reinforce friendship 
and  understandings  between  neighbouring  countries95,  to  approach  common 
problems in specific fields96, to create cross-border commissions to discuss frontier 
problems97 or to develop regional planning98. 
Leaving apart these lastly mentioned inter-state agreements and returning to 
the treaties concerning local and regional authorities, it is worth to focus the attention 
on  some  peculiarities.  In  particular,  the  Vienna Agreement99,  the  Bayonne 
Agreement100,  the  Karlsruhe  Agreement101,  the  Brussels  Agreement102 and  the 
94 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on  the  current  state  of  the  
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe, cit., p. 13-15.
95 Treaties between: Hungary and Romania (1996); Hungary and Slovak Republic (1995); Hungary 
and Slovenia (1992); Hungary and Ukraine (1991).
96 Agreements between: Slovenia and Austria concerning the prevention and mutual assistance in 
disasters and serious accidents (1996); Slovenia and Croatia on water management (1996); Austria 
and Hungary concerning employment in transfrontier areas (1997) and tourism (1989); Norway and 
Sweden on public health care (1993); Finland and Sweden about nuclear plants and nuclear events 
(1987).
97 Consultative commission between France and Switzerland related to problems of neighbourhood 
between the Canton of Geneva and the départements of Ain and the Haute-Savoie (1973). About the 
establishment  of  inter-state  commissions  see  also  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANI, 
L'aménagement par l'État de la coopération transfrontalière des collectivités territoriales, in RÉSEAU 
D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État  et  la  coopération  
transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., p. 5-8.
98 Most recent commissions for the development of regional planning within a determined frontier 
zone have been set up between Italy and Switzerland (1993); France and Spain (1994); Germany and 
Switzerland concerning the Upper-Rhine area (1996). See also the CoE's publication: Managing old 
and new frontier  of  Europe:  transfrontier  co-operation in  regional/spatial  planning,  local  border  
traffic and impact assessment, Transfrontier Cooperation Study Series, No. 7, 1998.
99 “Accordo  quadro  tra  la  Repubblica  Italiana  e  la  Repubblica  d'Austria  sulla  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera delle collettività territoriali”, adopted in Vienna on 27 January 1993.
100 “Traité  entre  la  République  française  et  le  Royaume  d'Espagne  relatif  à  la  coopération  
transfrontalière entre collectivités territoriales”, adopted in Bayonne on 10 March 1995.
101 “Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française, le Gouvernement de la République  
fédérale d'Allemagne, le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et le Conseil fédérale Suisse  
agissant au nom de Cantons de Soleure, de Bâle-Ville, de Bâle-Campagne, d'Argovie e du Jura sur la  
coopération transfrontalière entre les collectivités territoriales et organismes publics locaux”, adopted 
in Karlsruhe on 23 January 1996.
102 “Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française, d'une part, et le Gouvernement du  
Royaume de Belgique, le Gouvernement de la Communauté française, le Gouvernement de la Région  
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Valencia Agreement103 will  be taken into consideration as paradigmatic examples. 
Their objective is, as well as for the other mentioned international agreements on the 
basis  of  the  MOC, to  facilitate  and  foster  transfrontier  cooperation between sub-
national authorities, according to the domestic legal orders104. 
In these  terms, the local  and regional  authorities  are  explicitly  allowed to 
develop transfrontier activities, but, at the same time, no nationally generalized right 
to  conclude  cross-border  agreements  is  established  in  favour  of  sub-national 
communities, thus denoting a clear regime of “juridical subordination” to the central 
authorities105. 
Some of the mentioned international agreements – in particular the cases of 
Germany, Spain, France, Switzerland, Portugal and Italy – refer specifically to the 
establishment of transfrontier  cooperation between sub-national authorities,  which 
are  located  along  a  common  border.  However,  the  requisite  of  proximity  is  not 
always foreseen – with reference to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – as 
a necessary criterion106. Nevertheless, only determined and listed regional and local 
authorities are allowed to get involved in transfrontier activities. In this sense, the 
international treaties do not apply on the whole territory of the States parties, but 
only to  precise and identified areas (bordering or not-bordering to  the respective 
foreign party), which means that other areas within the same country are excluded 
from the scope of these treaties107. Therefore, such treaties do not introduce a general 
wallonne  et  le  Gouvernement  flamand,  d'autre  part,  sur  la  coopération  transfrontalière entre  les  
collectivités territoriales et organismes publics locaux”, adopted in Bruxelles on16 septembre 2002. 
This treaty is quite peculiar respect to the others. Namely, parties to the accord are not only States, but 
also some Belgian Communities and Regions. Such a peculiarity is well entailed in the expression 
“Traité mixte”, which indicates, according to Belgian law, the presence of the federal entities as well 
as  the  federal  central  authority.  See  Y.  LEJEUNE,  Vers  un  droit  européen  de  la  coopération  
transfrontalière, in  La  cooération  transfrontalière,  Numéro  thématique  de  Annales  de  droit  de  
Louvain, 2004, vol. 64 n. 3, p. 356. 
103 “Tratado  entre  el  Reino  de  España  y  la  República  Portuguesa  sobre  la  cooperación 
transfronteriza  entre entidades e instancias territoriales”, adopted in Valencia on 3 October 2002. 
104 See  P.  GAUTIER,  La  nature  juridique  des  conventions  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  
autorités  régionales  ou  locales  relevants  d'Etats  différentes,  in  La  coopération  transfrontalière,  
Numéro thématique de Annales de droit de Louvain, cit., p. 397-418. 
105 See  Y.  LEJEUNE,  Vers  un droit  européen de  la  coopération  transfrontalière, in  La cooération 
transfrontalière, Numéro thématique de Annales de droit de Louvain, p. 355.
106 P.  D'ARGENT,  La  nature  juridique  des  partenaires  à  la  coopération  transfrontalière,  in  La 
cooération transfrontalière, Numéro thématique de Annales de droit de Louvain, cit., p. 428.
107 See Art. 2 of the Vienna Agreement, which indicates the Italian territorial communities allowed 
for  cross-border  cooperation  (Regions  of  Friuli  Venezia-Giulia,  Veneto,  Trentino-Alto  Adige  and 
Veneto;  Autonomous  Provinces  of  Bolzano  and  Trento;  Provinces,  Municipalities,  Mountain 
Communities, Provincial or Muncipal Consortia located, even partially, within an area of 25 Km from 
the border with Austria) and, as well, the Austrian territorial communities (Länder, Municipalities and 
139
CHAPTER IV
and  common  national  framework  for  transfrontier  cooperation.  Moreover,  each 
agreement remembers, as an indispensable requirement, the necessity for local and 
regional authorities to respect their competences according to the national  law as 
well as the internal legal system and the international obligations of the respective 
State; in particular, it is also foreseen the subsequent establishment of obligations and 
responsibilities only for sub-national entities and involved in cooperation and not for 
Associations of Municipalities). Art. 2 of the Bayonne Agreement indicates the following territorial 
communities: (for France) Regions of Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Languedoc-Rousillion, as well as the 
Departments,  Municipalities  and  respective  association  that  are  located  in  the  territory  of  the 
mentioned  regions;  (for  Spain)  the  Autonomous  Communities  of  Pays  Basque,  Navarre,  Aragon, 
Catalogne, as well as the historic Territories, Provinces and Municipalities belonging to the mentioned 
Autonomous  Communities.  Art.  2  of  the  Karlsruhe  Agreement  indicates  the  following  territorial 
communities: (for Germany) a) in the Land of Bade-Wurtemberg, the Municipalities and Landkreise,  
b)  in  the Land  of Rhénanie-Palatinat,  the  Municipalities,  Verbandsgemeinden,  Landkreise,  and 
Bezirksverband Pfalz, c) in Sarre, the Municipalities, Landkreise and the Stadtverband Saarbrücken; 
(for  France)  the  Regions  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  Municipalities,  Departments  and  the  respective 
associations located on the mentioned regions, as well as their public institutions insofar as territorial 
communities do take part to this transfrontier cooperation; (for Luxembourg) Municipalities, Unions 
of Municipalities and public institutions put under municipal control, as well as natural parks insofar 
as territorial public entities; (for Switzerland) a) in the Canton of Soleure, Municipalities and Districts,  
b) in the Canton of Bâle-Ville, Municipalities, c) in the Canton of Bâle-Campagne, Municipalities,  d) 
in the Canton of Argovie, Municipalities, e) in the Canton of Jura, Municipalities and Districts, as well 
as their associations and their public institutions legally autonomous (our translation). Art. 2 of the 
Brussels  Agreement,  which  lists  the  single  territorial  communities  allowed  for  transfrontier 
cooperation,  doesn't  consider  the  Belgian Communities  as  territorial  authorities  and,  furthermore, 
doesn't include in the meaning of “transfrontier cooperation” the relations between the contracting 
parties, i.e. between a French entity and a Belgian Region. The article recites, at par. 1 and 2: “Le 
présent Accord est applicable aux collectivités territoriales et organismes publics locaux suivants: 1. 
Dans  le  Royaume de Belgique :  a)   Sur  le  territoire  de la  Région flamande:  aux provinces;  aux 
communes; aux structures de coopération intercommunale; aux régies provinciales et communales 
autonomes; aux centres publics d'aide sociale; aux associations fondées par un centre public d'aide 
sociale; aux polders et aux wateringues; b) Sur le territoire de la Région wallonne: aux provinces; aux 
communes;  aux intercommunales;  aux régies  provinciales  et  communales autonomes;  aux  centres 
publics d'aide sociale; aux associations fondées par un centre public d'aide sociale; c) Sur l'ensemble 
du territoire belge: aux structures publiques de coopération intercommunale qui excèdent les limites 
territoriales des Régions. 2. En République française, à la région Champagne-Ardenne, à la région 
Lorraine, à la région Nord - Pas-de-Calais et à la région Picardie, aux communes, aux départements, et  
à leurs groupements compris sur le territoire desdites régions, ainsi qu'à leurs établissements publics 
dans la mesure où des collectivités territoriales participent à cette coopération transfrontalière.” At par. 
4 and 5: “Sont considérées comme collectivités territoriales ou organismes publics locaux au sens du 
présent  Accord,  les  organismes  mentionnés  aux  paragraphes  1  et  2.  Dans  le  présent  Accord, 
l'expression   'coopération  transfrontalière'  désigne  la  coopération  transfrontalière  des  collectivités 
territoriales et  organismes publics  locaux à l'exception de la  coopération  transfrontalière entre  les 
Parties,  qui  n'est  pas  régie par  le présent  Accord.”  Art.  3 of  the Valencia Agreement recites:  “El 
presente Tratado se aplicará: en España: A las Comunidades Autónomas de Galicia, Castilla y León, 
Extremadura y Andalucía;  a  las provincias de Pontevedra,  Ourense,  Zamora,  Salamanca, Cáceres, 
Badajoz y Huelva; a los municipios pertenecientes a las provincias indicadas. Asimismo y siempre 
que incluyan municipios de los anteriores, se aplicará a las comarcas u otras entidades que agrupen 
varios  municipios  instituidas  por  las  Comunidades  Autónomas  expresadas  y  a  las  Áreas 
Metropolitanas y Mancomunidades de Municipios creadas con arreglo a la legislación de Régimen 
Local. En Portugal: A las Comisiones de Coordinación de las Regiones Norte, Centro, Alentejo y 
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the States parties108. In any case, while the agreements have some basic principles in 
common, the provisions about the modalities and forms of cooperation differ. For 
example, the Vienna agreement is very general, allowing agreements of transfrontier 
cooperation  without  specifying the  nature of  such  agreements,  the  eventual  legal 
nature of transfrontier structures and the related applicable law. In these terms, the 
Vienna  Agreement  could  be  considered  as  a  “minimum  standard”  model  for 
transfrontier sub-national activities109. The other treaties considered are much more 
complex. 
First of all, the Bayonne, Karlsruhe, Brussels and Valencia Agreements make 
reference to the so-called conventions of  cooperation,  which are  identified as the 
basic instruments to settle the cooperation between the territorial authorities110 and to 
create structures with or without legal capacity. These conventions shall be approved 
by  each  single  sub-national  entity  according  to  the  respective  national  law 
procedures. The reference to the conventions is particularly relevant, because they 
will  be a  constant  element  for  almost  every European instrument  of transfrontier 
cooperation. 
Two main factors influence the nature of a convention: on the one hand, the 
intentions of the sub-national entities to take part to a common undertaking; on the 
other  hand,  the  definition  of  a  common  field  of  action.  The  last  element,  quite 
obviously, should necessarily correspond to a common domain of competence of all 
the  territorial  subjects  involved.  Thus,  as  a  general  consequence,  according  to  P. 
D'Argente, it is possible to observe that the national law of one entity is potentially 
able to limit the transfrontier cooperation capacity of another one, and vice-versa. 
Inevitably, the result and the concrete projection of such a common involvement has 
Algarve;  a  las  Asociaciones  de  Municipios  y  otras  estructuras  que  intregren  municipios  con 
intervención en el área geográfica de las NUTS III, definida por el Derecho interno portugués, Minho-
Lima, Cávado, Alto Trás-os-Montes, Douro, Beira Interior Norte, Beira Interior Sul, Alto Alentejo, 
Alentejo Central, Baixo Alentejo y Algarve, y a los municipios situados en las mencionadas NUTS 
III.”
108 As an additional condition, the Bayonne Agreement requires for a “common interest” between the 
sub-national entities involved (Art. 3).
109 A peculiarity  of  the  Vienna  Agreement  is  to  list,  after  recalling  the  necessity  of  respect  the 
assigned competences, some matters that can be object of transfrontier cooperation. Since this kind of 
specification could represent an attempt to clarify the fields of cooperation, however it could lead to 
some  interpretative  misunderstanding;  let's  think,  for  instance,  at  the  revision  of  the  Italian 
Constitution, in  particular  at  the Art.  117, which provides  for the list  of competences  exclusively 
attributed to the State and existence of residual competences of the Regions.
110 See Art. 3 of Bayonne Agreement, Art. 3 of Karlsruhe Agreement,  Art. 3 of Brussels Agreement 
and Art. 4 of the Valencia Agreement.
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to be identified with the “lowest common denominator” of the competence of each 
single  territorial  subject  within  the  respective  national  legal  order,  as  a 
interdependent  linkage  of  national  public  law.  With other  words  “la  coopération 
transfrontalière  impose par  nature  une  manière  de  croisement  des  droits  publics  
internes,  d'application  cumulative  et  de  réduction  par  fusion  de  leurs  éléments  
communs permettant de déterminer le domaine de validité matériel des conventions  
de coopération conclues. Le partenaire à la coopération ne se présente donc pas à 
celle-ci en tant qu'il est lui même: il se présente seulement avec ce qu'il a de commun  
avec son alter-ego transfrontalier”111. 
Usually, the conventions contain the reference to the law applicable to the 
transfrontier  structures,  and  the  relative  procedures  and controls,  which  normally 
refer  to  the  legislation  of  the  country  where  the  transfrontier  structure  has  its 
headquarters. As well, in case of dispute or litigation, the competent jurisdiction is 
individuated  according  to  the  law  of  the  chosen  country.  Furthermore,  as  the 
conventions  make references  to  the  objects  of the common proposals  and to  the 
competences attributed to the common structure, they usually specify explicitly that 
they cannot assign to the common entity new competences or competences related to 
police/security powers or other attributions that are an expression of the central state 
power112.
Generally the agreements provide for the option for sub-national authorities 
to  create,  as  already  said,  common  organism  with  or  without  legal  capacity. 
Regarding the last case, the main objective is to establish common structures in order 
to face issues of common relevance, encouraging a common debate and proposing 
questions and solutions for the territorial communities without creating any sort of 
obligations for the authorities involved113. As the organisms without legal capacity do 
111 See  P. D'ARGENT,  La nature juridique des partenaires à la coopération transfrontalière, cit., p. 
430.
112 See Art. 3-4 of the Bayonne Agreement, Art. 3-4 of the Karlsruhe Agreement, Art. 3-4 of the 
Brussels Agreement and Art. 5-6 of the Valencia Agreement.
113 See Art.  7  of  the Bayonne Agreement,  Art.  9 of  the Karlsruhe Agreement  and Art.  9 of  the 
Brussels Agreement. The latter reproduces exactly the content of the Karlsruhe Agreement, which 
recites:  “(1)  Les  collectivités  territoriales  ou organismes publics  locaux peuvent,  conformément  à 
l'Article 3, créer des organismes communs sans personnalité juridique ni autonomie budgétaire, tels 
que des conférences, des groupes de travail intercommunaux, des groupes d'étude et de réflexion, des 
comités de coordination pour étudier des questions d'intérêt commun, formuler des propositions de 
coopération, échanger des informations ou encourager  l'adoption par  les organismes concernés de 
mesures nécessaires pour mettre en oeuvre les objectifs définis. (2) Un organisme sans personnalité 
juridique ne peut adopter de décisions engageant ses membres ou des tiers.  (3) La convention de 
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not require a typical legal framework covered with positive rules, procedures and 
working rules are not of a strict and formal character.
Moreover,  as  far  as  bodies  with  legal  capacities  are  concerned,  different 
solutions  are  proposed  by  the  treaties,  depending  on  the  national  legal  system 
involved. From a general point of view the treaties provide for the possibility for the 
sub-national  authorities  to  create  common  bodies  with  legal  capacity  or  to  join 
already existing bodies. In general, the subjects with legal capacities are determined 
by the national law applicable, namely that of the country chosen as the place for the 
headquarters. 
In this sense the Bayonne Agreement explicitly provides for the possibility to 
identify  the  new transfrontier  structure  with  a  “groupment  d'interêt  public”  or  a 
“societé  d'économie  mixte  locale”  according  to  the  French  law,  or  to  create  a 
“consorcio” according to the Spanish law114. Actually, such a provision doesn't seem 
to introduce a list of typical solutions for bodies with legal capacity, since the treaty 
enables a general possibility to constitute “organisms of cooperation, endowed or not 
with legal capacity”115.  According to this agreement, for the organisms with legal 
capacity  is  necessary  to  adopt  a  statute,  which  shall  constitute  the  basic  rule  of 
functioning of the transfrontier structure116.
The Valencia Agreement, at  Art 10, explicitly indicates the legal form that 
structures  with  legal  capacity  shall  have.  Namely,  in  case the body will  base  its 
headquarters  in  Portugal,  the  transfrontier  entity  is  constituted as  “associação de 
direito público” or as “empresa intermunicipal”. In case it will be based in Spain, the 
form shall  be that of “consorcio”.  Furthermore, the transfrontier  entities could be 
created for the following objectives: the realization of public works, management of 
coopération qui prévoit la création d'organismes sans personnalité juridique contient des dispositions 
sur:  a)  les  domaines  devant  faire  l'objet  des  activités  de  l'organisme,  b)  la  mise  en  place  et  les 
modalités de travail de l'organisme, c) la durée pour laquelle il est constitué. (4) L'organisme sans 
personnalité juridique est soumis au droit défini par la convention de coopération.” Art. 9 and 10 of 
the Valencia agreement provide for a clear-defined and strict discipline. Namely, structures without 
legal capacity could be “Comunidades de Trabajo” or  “Grupos de Trabajo” (Art. 9). In particular, 
these dtructures will be devoted to the analysis of issues of common interest, to make proposals of 
cooperation between the various sub-national authorities, to prepare studies or projects in order to 
develop common transfrontier activities, etc. 
114 Art. 5 of the Bayonne Agreement. In particular,  the Article reaffirms that  “[l]es décisions des 
collectivités  territoriales  espagnoles  sur  leur  participation  aux  organismes  français   susvisés  sont 
soumises au droit espagnol. Les décisions des collectivités territoriales françaises sur leur participation 
aux organismes espagnols susvisés sont soumises au droit français.”
115 Art. 3.
116 Art. 6.
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common equipments or public services and the development of actions devoted to 
the adjudication of the Program Spain-Portugal of the EC initiative Interreg III A or 
of the instruments, accepted by the contracting parties, that will substitute it. This last 
objective  permits  to  focus  on  a  typical  peculiarity  of  the  Valencia  Agreement, 
consisting in the explicit reference to Community legislation. In fact, the agreement 
is the only one,  among those taken into consideration, that  mentions Community 
aspects117. By the way, it is quite singular for an international agreement to set the 
requirement  of conformity,  besides the national  and international law, to  EC law. 
Furthermore, referring to the scope of application, the Valencia Agreement mentions 
both  the  traditional  sub-national  authorities  and,  for  the  Portuguese  side,  also 
structures corresponding to the geographical area of NUTS III118. In these terms it is 
possible to wonder about the effects of the implementation of the EGTC Regulation 
in Spain and Portugal and the potential relation with this international agreement.
The Karlsruhe Agreement and the Brussels Agreement entail, more or less, 
similar aspects. On the one hand, they provide for the general possibility to create or 
join an organism with legal capacity119. On the other hand, they introduce the term of 
117 In particular, Art. 2 mentions the EC law in regard to the object of the Agreement: “1. El presente 
Tratado  tiene  por  objeto  promover  y  regular  jurídicamente  la  cooperación  transfronteriza  entre 
instancias  territoriales  portuguesas  y  entidades  territoriales  españolas  en  el  ámbito  de  sus 
competencias respectivas, la cual se llevará a cabo respetando el Derecho interno de las Partes, el 
Derecho comunitario europeo y los compromisos internacionales por éstas asumidos. 2. El régimen 
jurídico previsto en el presente Tratado se aplicará a las formas de cooperación regidas por el Derecho 
público, sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de recurrir a modalidades de cooperación sujetas al Derecho 
privado, siempre que las mismas resulten conformes al Derecho interno de las Partes, al Derecho 
comunitario europeo y a los compromisos internacionales por éstas asumidos.”
118 See  M.  SOBRIDO PRIETO,  El  tratado  hispano-portugés  sobre  la  cooperación  transfronteriza 
territorial, in  Revista Electrónica des Estudios Internacionales,  n. 4, 2008,  www.reei.org, p. 11  et  
seq.,  see  also  M.G.  MERCÁN PUENTES,  El  tratado  bilateral  hispano-portugués  sobre  cooperacion  
transfronteriza de 2002, in Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Ano 7, Num. 15, Mayo-Agosto 
2003, p. 728-729, who defines as “honest” the intent of the Agreement to mention the role and the 
interconnections with the EC framework.
119 While the Karlsruhe Agreement entail only a general provision (Art. 10), the Brussels Agreement 
indicates the categories  of  organisms that,  according to  the respective national  legal  systems, are 
enabled to include foreign sub-national authorities. Namely, Art. 10, par. 2 recites:  “Les catégories 
d'organismes publics locaux visés au paragraphe 1er ci-dessus sont les suivantes: 1.Dans le Royaume 
de Belgique: a) sur le territoire de la Région flamande: les structures de coopération intercommunale 
(décret flamand du 6 juillet 2001), les associations fondées par un centre public d'aide sociale; b) sur 
le territoire de la Région wallonne: les intercommunales (décret wallon du 5 décembre 1996), les 
associations fondées par un centre public d'aide sociale; c) sur le territoire de la Région flamande et de 
la  Région wallonne: les associations  sans  but  lucratif  et  les  fondations  (loi  du 27 juin 1921),  les 
associations internationales (loi du 25 octobre 1919), les intercommunales dont le ressort dépasse le 
territoire d'une Région (loi du 22 décembre 1986), les groupements européens d'intérêt économique 
(GEIE). 2. En République française: les groupements d'intérêt public de coopération transfrontalière et 
les groupements d'intérêt public chargés de la mise en oeuvre de politiques de développement social 
urbain,  les  sociétés  d'économie  mixte  locales,  y  compris  ceux  déjà  existant  constitués  par  des 
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a local grouping of transfrontier cooperation (LGTC)120. Such a legal entity could be 
established in order to realize undertakings or services, which embody an interest for 
each  of  the  territorial  communities  involved.  Moreover,  this  local  grouping  of 
transfrontier  cooperation  is  subject  to  the  domestic  law  applicable  to  the  public 
institutions  of  inter-municipal  cooperation  of  the  State  party  where  it  has  its 
headquarters.  The grouping is  considered as  a  legal  entity  of public  law and the 
related legal personality is conferred from the date of its establishment. It has legal 
capacity and budgetary autonomy. 
4.7. The local grouping of transfrontier cooperation (LGTC)
This instrument, endowed with legal capacity, has been firstly introduced by 
the  Karlsruhe  Agreement  in  1996  and  subsequently  reproduced  by  the  Brussels 
Agreement. As already said, the LGTC is a public law body with legal capacity and 
budgetary autonomy. The specific digression on this figure is justified by the fact that 
it  somewhat resembles the newest European instruments of territorial/transfrontier 
cooperation – namely the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation of the EU 
and the Euroregional Cooperation Grouping of the CoE– in their essential elements, 
thus constituting a sort of anticipation with regard to the progressive developments in 
this field. 
Articles  from  11  to  15  of  the  Karlsruhe  Agreement  set  down  a  quite 
exhaustive discipline about the LGTC. Namely, Article 11 introduces the model of 
this  new  structure  and  its  general  aim.  Territorial  communities  and  local  public 
organisms could create a LGTC by respecting the internal legislation of the State 
where the legal seat has been settled. In these terms, the LGTC is a kind of new tool, 
which shall, anyway, correspond to and respect the national provisions about public 
law bodies. More precisely, Article 11 says that an LGTC should be submitted to the 
national  law applicable  to  the  public  institutions  of  inter-communal  cooperation. 
Other articles concern the essential elements of the LGTC, namely the statute (Art. 
collectivités territoriales françaises”.
120 Art. 11 of the Karlsruhe Agreement and Art. 11 of the Brussels Agreement.
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12)121,  the  bodies  of  the  structure  (Art.  13)122,  the  financing  (Art.  14)  and  the 
procedure of dissolution (Art. 15)123. In particular, regarding the statute it is relevant 
to notice fundamental the elements prescribed by Article 12: the indication of the 
territorial  communities  or  the  local  public  organisms  composing  the  LGTC;  the 
objects,  tasks  and  relations  with  its  Members,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the 
liability;  the  denomination,  legal  seat,  and  the  concerned  geographic  area;  the 
competences  of  its  bodies,  the  procedures  and  the  number  of  the  Members' 
representatives within the bodies; the procedure of convocation of the Members; the 
quorum; the modalities and majorities related to the deliberations; the modalities of 
functioning, in particular concerning the staff-administration; the criteria according 
to  which  the  Members  have  a  duty  of  contribution  to  the  financial  needs,  the 
budgetary  and  accounting  rules;  the  condition  of  modification  of  the  Statute,  in 
particular with regard to the accession and withdraw of Members; the duration and 
the  conditions  concerning  the  dissolution;  the  condition  of  liquidation  after  the 
dissolution124.
121 In particular, Art. 12, par. 3 sets the rules regarding the modification to the Statute and the relative 
majorities: “Les statuts du groupement local de coopération transfrontalière prévoient les conditions 
dans lesquelles les modifications de statuts sont adoptées. Celles-ci sont adoptées à une majorité qui 
n'est pas inférieure aux deux tiers du nombre statutaire de représentants des collectivités territoriales 
ou organismes publics locaux au sein de l'assemblée du groupement. Les statuts peuvent prévoir des 
dispositions  supplémentaires.  Dans  le  cas  d'un  groupement  local  de  coopération  transfrontalière 
associant des collectivités territoriales ou organismes publics locaux de trois des quatre Parties, cette 
majorité ne pourra pas être inférieure aux trois quarts.”
122 Main bodies are: the assembly, the president and the vice-president. According to the statute, it is 
possible to provide for supplementary bodies. The designation of the representatives of the territorial 
communities has to be done in conformity to the national legislation of each Member.
123 Dissolution of the LGTC is prescribed in case of the expiration of the predetermined date, in case 
of  the  the  accomplishment  of  the  foreseen  objectives  and  in  case  of  unanimity  decision  of  the 
members.
124 Also the Valencia Agreement provides for the specification  of the essential elements of the statute 
of the entities with legal capacity (Art. 11, par. 7), namely: “la identificación de los miembros; la 
denominación, la sede, la zona geográfica en que desarrolle su actividad, la duración y la forma legal 
adoptada,  haciendo  referencia  a  la  legislación  que  le  reconozca  personalidad  jurídica;  el  objeto 
concreto de su actividad, las tareas que le hayan sido encomendadas por las instancias y entidades 
territoriales que lo constituyan y las condiciones y medios de que disponga para su realización; las 
relaciones que establezca con los miembros, con terceros y con autoridades superiores o de control; el 
régimen de contratación; el patrimonio y el régimen de financiación o formación del capital social; el 
ámbito y los límites de la responsabilidad de los miembros; la previsión de los órganos sociales, sus 
competencias, el procedimiento de toma de decisiones y el sistema de nombramiento o cese de sus 
titulares;  el  régimen del  presupuesto,  de los  balances  y de  la  fiscalización de cuentas;  las  reglas 
relativas al estatuto y a la gestión del personal; las lenguas adoptadas, debiendo redactarse en todo 
caso las decisiones de los órganos sociales en las lenguas oficiales de las Partes; las reglas relativas a 
la modificación de los estatutos, a la adhesión o la retirada de miembros, a la disolución del organismo 
y a las condiciones de liquidación después de su disolución; las formas de solución de controversias”.
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A general overview of the mentioned provisions could be summarized trough 
the pinpoint of some basic elements that represent the three fundamental components 
of a complete legal status for a LGTC: the framework agreement in the form of a 
convention; the statute, edited according to the convention's requirements; a national 
discipline/legislation of reference regarding the local inter-municipal associations of 
the State where the headquarters is settled125.
The  LGTC,  as  delineated  by  the  Karlsruhe  Agreement,  represents  a  first 
effective  attempt  to  draw  the  basic  legal  framework  for  a  specific  structure  of 
transfrontier cooperation between sub-national authorities126. Namely, as it has a kind 
of  “dynamic  factor”  referring  to  the  national  legislations  about  the  local  inter-
communal association, it has its own and proper elements, which are different from 
the typical associative or cooperative legal bodies already existing within each State 
party. A conclusive quite negative observation is necessary in order not to forget that 
such  a  legal  instrument  is  not  foreseen  as  a  generally  suitable  structure  for 
cooperation, but it could be created only by territorial communities (or other public 
entities) designated by the State parties to the covering inter-state agreement.
4.8.  Brief  observations  about  the  system of  the  MOC and the  related  inter-state  
agreements
With regard to the creation within the CoE of a regulatory system concerning 
transfrontier cooperation, some negative aspects have to be stressed. Namely, on the 
one hand,  the vague legal  effectiveness  of  the Convention and its  value of  mere 
“programmatic instrument” has already been highlighted by various contributions; on 
the  other  hand,  the  extreme  non-homogeneous  context  for  cross-border  activities 
125 See  A. FODELLA, M. PERTILE, G. AVOLIO,  Studio sulla creazione di nuove forme di cooperazione  
transfrontaliera a livello sub-statale per lo sviluppo sostenibile del territorio, in AA.VV., Strumenti  
giuridici della cooperazione per lo sviluppo sostenibile di un’area montana transfrontaliera,  cit., p. 
87.
126 The LGTC could be considered as an element of the past, thus having a peculiar meaning in the 
process of the development of legal instruments of territorial cooperation. For sure, the study and the 
analysis of most current tools, like the EGTC, is nowadays more appropriate. However, the creation of 
new European common instruments doesn't substitute or amend the previous one. In the case of the 
LGTC, for instance, the evaluation of opting for this kind of possibility is still taken in consideration 
by  the  transfrontier  structure  of  the  Espace  Mont  Blanc,  which  is  still  in  search  of  an  adequate 
juridical support. Namely, the use of the EGTC could not be taken into consideration, as Switzerland 
is a part and a member of the transfrontier area. 
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created  by  the  inter-state  agreements  has  pointed  out  the  weakness  of  the  MOC 
system  in  respect  to  the  development  of  effective  tools  for  cooperation  at  sub-
national  level.  Moreover,  one  simple  instance,  which  clearly  explains  how  sub-
national  authorities after  the adoption of  the  MOC didn't  really  saw an  effective 
progress towards the acknowledgement of their right to put into practice cross-border 
relations,  is  represented  by  the  discretional  power  of  the  the  respective  States, 
according to that system, to indicate the designated authorities for the participation to 
transfrontier activities.
As a partial  observation,  despite  the pivotal  experience of the MOC, it  is 
possible to say that no radical legal progress have been made, from a strictly legal 
point of view, to improve the generalized rights of territorial communities to develop 
cross-border cooperation, both with regard to adjacent and non-adjacent areas: the 
prerogatives on transfrontier cooperation remain, practically, under state-control. 
Without paradoxes, despite these negative notes, relevant improvements have, 
however, been made in the field of transfrontier cooperation thanks to the Madrid 
Convention.  Namely,  the  system of  the  MOC,  included the  successive  inter-state 
agreements,  represents  a  first  serious  attempt  to  define  a  legal  framework  for 
transfrontier cooperation and to give to this matter an official recognition. In fact, as 
it  has  been  already  mentioned,  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-national 
authorities have progressively emerged from a de facto condition to a progressively 
legitimated  reality.  Moreover,  since  the  MOC  has  introduced  a  weak  legal 
contribution,  the  various  inter-state  agreements,  although  quite  differently,  have 
established  a  rather  clear  and  useful  legal  discipline  for  the  specific  experiences 
concerned. The aforementioned agreements are, obviously, limited, because they do 
not  deal  with  an  overall  national  approach  to  the  phenomenon  of  transfrontier 
cooperation  and  cover  only  geographically  limited  territories  and  communities. 
Anyway, some of the legal solutions proposed by the MOC system are still practised. 
In  particular,  the  normative  aspects  regarding  the  conventions  of  cooperation 
between  sub-national  entities  and  the  statutes  of  common transfrontier  structures 
with legal personality remain substantially unchanged. Although such norms do not 
introduce  a  revolutionary  element  regarding  legal  persons,  however  they  have 
introduced,  without  the  possibility  to  crate  uniform  legal  standards,  explicit 
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provisions concerning some basic element that represent still nowadays the constant 
“ingredients” for transfrontier legal persons established by territorial communities. 
Also  the  designation  of  the  law  applicable  to  the  transfronier  structures,  their 
procedures and acts is another important factor to take into consideration, as well as 
the liability of the parties signatories to the conventions of the cooperation. 
In  particular,  the  system of  the  Madrid  Convention,  its  Protocols  and  the 
subsequent inter-state agreements disclose and reveal openly a legal dimension that 
needs  a  dynamic  interaction  between  different  sources  of  the  law,  in  particular 
between national law and international law. In this respect, it has been quite clearly 
demonstrated  how these  two  legal  spheres  cannot  discipline  the  phenomenon  of 
territorial  cooperation  independently,  but  they  need  to  be  mutually  integrated. 
Furthermore, from the sub-national perspective another double dynamism has been 
demonstrated, namely the one that concerns the relations between territorial entities, 
which  participate  to  the  double  synergy  of  their  domestic  law  and  the  foreign 
national law127. In this sense, the legal nature of transfrontier cooperation has some 
own peculiarities that are somehow different, but also dependant from the legal rules 
they derive from.
4.9. The Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention: preliminary observations
The document under analysis has been opened for signature on 16 November 
2009  in  Utrecht,  in  the  occasion  of  the  16th  session  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
Conference of Ministers  responsible  for local and regional  government128. By the 
127 It is worth to quote again  P. D'ARGENT,  La nature juridique des partenaires à la coopération  
transfrontalière,  in  La  cooération  transfrontalière,  Numéro  thématique  de  Annales  de  droit  de  
Louvain, cit., p. 430-432: “On pourrait dire, abstraitement, que chaque partenaire à la coopération a 
deux natures juridiques. Une nature purement interne et complète lorsque ses activités ne présentent 
aucune élément transfrontalier. Une nature externe, incomplète et dépendante de l'étranger lorsque ses 
activités sont engagées transfrontalièrement. On pourrait dire aussi que la coopération transfrontalière 
transforme  des  entités  internes  dissemblables  en  entités  internes  comparables,  à  défaut  d'être 
communes. Et que, dans l'exercice, chaque droit public interne se soumit humblement à son semblable 
étranger pour la détermination des compétences transfrontalières des entités qu'il constitue. La vision 
quelque peu pessimiste du 'plus petit commun dénominateur' peut s'embellir de l'espoir de voir les 
droit  publics  internes  se  rapprocher  –  voir  s'unifier  ?  –  dans  la  détermination  des  pouvoirs  et 
compétences  des  entités  locales,  l'argument  de  la  nécessaire  coopération  transfrontalière  pouvant 
amener des législateurs nationaux à accroitre les prérogatives des collectivités afin de leur permettre 
de jouer jeu égal avec des partenaires étrangers.”
128 The updated list of signatures and ratifications is available at:
 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.aspNT=206&CM=8&DF=04/12/2009&CL=E
NG.
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way, the elaboration of the Third Protocol has been quite long and the various draft 
versions have been changed significantly from the original version129. For reasons of 
logic and completeness the presentation of this document is proposed at this point of 
the study, in order to give the general idea of the evolution of the CoE's instruments 
on transfrontier cooperation. Anyway, it  is necessary to remark that a comparison 
with the Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 on the European Grouping of Territorial 
Cooperation  (EGTC)  is  essential  in  order  to  have  a  realistic  and  more  complex 
comprehension  of  the  European  legal  framework  devoted  to  develop  territorial 
cooperation  between  sub-national  authorities.  This  comparison,  will  be  handled 
further on, with the analysis of the EGTC Regulation. For the moment, the main 
aspects of the CoE's Third Protocol are going to be taken into consideration.
The third legal document added to the MOC is called Protocol No. 3 to the  
European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation  between  Territorial  
Communities  or  Authorities  concerning  Euroregional  Cooperation  Groupings 
(hereinafter mentioned as the “Third Protocol”)130. The preliminary draft, which has 
been given assent to by the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy 
(CDLR), has been approved by the Committee of Ministers in order to become a 
draft ready for the final adoption. The following consensus from the CoE's Member 
States opened the document to the signature and to the following ratification within 
the respective Member States. 
The project, discussion and elaboration of the Third Protocol has been carried 
on within the Committee of Experts on Local and Regional Government Institutions 
and Co-operation (LR-IC). In the evident lack of a wide academical analysis on the 
argument, some basic informations can be found within the memoranda prepared for 
the institutional meetings at the CoE. “The work on a draft third protocol started in 
2004 in the Committee of Experts on Transfrontier Cooperation (LR-CT) under the 
authority of the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR). 
129 This paragraph is enriched by some personal notes and impressions matured during a study-visit 
at the CLRAE (March-May 2009). 
130 This part of the research as been written during the drafting phase of the Third Protocol and 
subsequently adapted after its official adoption. The last draft versions available were those of April 
and  May  2009,  presented  by  the  European  Committee  on  Local  and  Regional  Democracy 
CDLR(2009)9. The document reproduces the last draft version of the Third Protocol to be submitted 
to the Committee of Ministers. As the document reports, “[...] the changes made in the text reflect the 
discussions and agreements reached at the meeting of the LR-IC Committee held on 23 March 2009 
(LR-IC (2009)7).” 
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The initial objective was the drawing up of a convention containing a “uniform law” 
on the legal status of transfrontier and inter-territorial cooperation bodies. After the 
European Communities started working on a regulation on the legal status of cross-
border  cooperation  bodies  (Commission  Proposal  of  14  July  2004,  to  become 
Regulation  (EC)  No.  1082/2006  […]  on  a  European  Grouping  of  Territorial 
Cooperation  (EGTC)),  the  work  was  reoriented  towards  the  drafting  of  a  third 
protocol to the Madrid Convention, that would provide the core provisions for the 
establishment and functioning of transfrontier and interterritorial cooperation bodies 
while  at  the  same  time  being  fully  compatible  with  the  EC Regulation.”131 This 
motivation is particularly interesting and clarifies the necessity of compare the two 
instruments.
With regard to the elaboration of the Third Protocol in particular, it aims at 
introducing the possibility to set  up a new transfrontier  structure,  namely the so-
called Euroregional Cooperation Grouping (ECG). The set of rules proposed should 
have  the  function  of  simplifying  the  procedures  enabling  the  establishment  of 
transfrontier bodies and of harmonising as much as possible the respective governing 
rules. In these terms, the choice of drafting a new additional protocol to the MOC 
recognizes  the  difficulties  to  establish  effective  forms  of  cooperation  under  the 
Convention  and  its  first  two  protocols132 and  embodies  the  necessity  of 
supplementing the existing legal framework with a more actual instrument. 
The Protocol consists of 22 Articles. From the Preamble it is possible to draw 
out  some basic  acknowledgements,  namely the  still  existing differing legislations 
within the Member States, the necessity to design some common legal frameworks 
and the necessity to find some adaptations with the EU Regulation on the EGTC. In 
fact,  for  many reasons,  these  two instruments  seem to be  in  mutual  competition 
131 See the Explanatory Report  contained in the Preliminary Draft  of the  Protocol No. 3 to the 
European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation  between  Territorial  Communities  or 
Authorities concerning Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, Secretariat Memorandum prepared by 
the Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs – Directorate of Democratic Institutions, 
Strasbourg, 7 April 2009.
132 “If the Madrid Convention and its Additional Protocols have cleared the way to the establishment 
of fruitful forms of dialogue and cooperation between territorial communities or authorities across two 
or more borders, the structured cooperation between the same territorial entities is faced with huge 
difficulties.  Cross-border  cooperation  between  member  states  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  be  it  at 
interstate level or at the level of territorial communities or authorities, is still hampered by a number of 
factors  related  to  the  differences  in  the  political  systems,  functions  and  powers  of  territorial 
communities or authorities, legal traditions, languages, etc.”, Draft Explanatory Report contained in 
the Preliminary Draft of the  Protocol No. 3, p. 5.
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regarding  their  role  to  develop  transfrontier  cooperation  between  sub-national 
authorities in Europe. However,  what  comes out from the intentions of the Third 
Protocol and from the related documents is an aspiration to create the conditions of a 
possible complementarity between the two instruments. One clear example in this 
regard is  the geographical  scope of the legal  tools concerned.  Namely,  while  the 
EGTC Regulation covers the smaller area of the EU, the Third Protocol focuses on 
the so-called Greater Europe and could, potentially, be available for more numerous 
territorial communities. We will see, anyway, that both of the new legal tools contain 
some provisions aiming at encompassing subjects that do not belong to the Member 
States  of  the  respective  institutional  geographical  area,  thus  considering  the 
hypothesis of openness to third countries. In this sense, it is possible to find out a 
double dynamic of complementarity/competitiveness between the EGTC Regulation 
and  the  Third  Protocol.  Another  observation  that  has  been  made133 regards  the 
potential  multiplication  of  similar  legal  instruments134.  The  contextual 
implementation of the EGTC and of the ECG could be seen as problematic for some 
countries. However, what has emerged from the board of the LR-IC Committee is the 
attention  drawn  on  the  optionality  of  all  these  instrument  for  transfrontier 
cooperation. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities had also the occasion 
to stress that the instruments are fully compatible.
Moreover, the Third Protocol has been recently the object of an opinion135 of 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. The Congress recognises the current 
status of cross-border cooperation in Europe, where a huge number of transfrontier 
multilateral structures has been created, often under the general and non-legally well 
defined  form of  Euroregions.  In  this  regard,  the  Congress  has  been  increasingly 
concerned with the aim of promoting the formation of a uniform and practicable 
legal  basis  for  transfrontier  cooperation136.  Thus,  the  Congress  encourages  the 
133 The following comments have been noted down during the LR-IC meeting of 23 March 2009.
134 The main perplexities came from the Italian and from the German representations. Namely, being 
also part of the EU, these countries showed some doubts about the implementation of provisions, like 
that of the EGC and of the EGTC, that seems somehow similar. Namely, since the process of the 
implementation of the EGTC Regulation is still ongoing, Italy and Germany underlined how the EGC 
could represent a sort of duplication.
135 Opinion  30(2009)  of  10  June  2009  on  the  Draft  Protocol  No.  3  to  the  European  Outline 
Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning 
Euroregional Cooperation Groupings.
136 See the Study Report “European legal instruments of interregional co-operation” CPR/GT/CIR 
(14) 3.
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adoption  of  the  Third  Protocol  underlying  some  possible  future  implications. 
Namely, the use of this new legal tool and the setting up of Euroregional Cooperation 
Groupings could represent the natural evolution of the previous forms of Euroregions 
and underlines how the CoE's instrument does not compete with the EU Regulation 
on EGTC, rather the two instruments are somehow complementary. Trying to give a 
general evaluation of this opinion, it is possible to highlight two main aspects. One is 
related to the positive acceptance of the evolution of transfrontier cooperation and 
the related necessity for sub-national authorities to have a framework legal reference 
about  the  rules  for  the  establishment  of  an  effective  cooperation.  The  second 
observation concerns the weak emphasis put on the technical-legal features of the 
Protocol. Namely, apart from the consideration regarding the necessity to find some 
compatibilities with the EU instrument,  the Congress'  opinion contains only very 
general political comments without taking a clear position on the legal features and 
effects of the establishment of Euroregional Cooperation Groupings. However, to be 
precise,  the real  function of such kind of opinion doesn't  concern the analysis  of 
technical  aspects,  but  the  eventual  support  towards  the  political  feasibility  of the 
matter concerned. In this regard, the indention under a political opinion is that of 
strengthening  the  will  to  adopt  the  document:  in  fact  the  political  choice  is  a 
preliminary and essential condition for the legal rules to become effective137.
Resuming  the  content  of  the  Third  Protocol  on  the  whole,  its  provisions 
contain the basic common rules that frame the constitution of an ECG. The Protocol, 
actually,  doesn't  concern  the  capacity  of  sub-national  authorities  to  set  up  a 
transfrontier  structure.  As  already  mentioned  in  the  introductory  paragraphs,  the 
legitimacy to constitute a transfrontier body for sub-national entities comes from the 
competences conferred at national level. Rather, the Third Protocol aims at creating 
some  references  and  a  common  legal  standard  which  shall  directly  regard  the 
transfrontier  structure.  In  these  terms,  the  legal  capacity  of  each  member  is  an 
essential requirement that doesn't concern the content of this international agreement.
137 As it has been also observed during the LR-IC Committee meeting of 23 March 2009, the legal 
provisions  regarding  transfrontier  cooperation  need  firstly  to  encounter  the  political  intention  of 
Member States in order to be translated into a legal instrument.
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4.10. The Third Protocol: analysis of the main legal provisions
Article 1 recites: “1) Territorial communities or authorities and other bodies 
referred to under Article 3, paragraph 1 may set  up a 'Euroregional  Co-operation 
Grouping' (ECG) on the territory of the member States of the Council of Europe, 
Parties to this Protocol, under the conditions provided by it. 2) The objective of the 
EGC  shall  be  to  promote,  support  and  develop,  for  the  benefit  of  populations, 
transfrontier and inter-territorial co-operation between its members in their common 
areas of competences  and in keeping with the competences established under the 
national law of the States concerned”. This provision contains already some of the 
most relevant aspects of the new legal instrument. Firstly, as it has been mentioned 
several  times during the preparatory meetings, the Protocol aims to create a very 
flexible instrument for territorial cooperation. But together with the versatility, some 
basic  limitations  need  to  be  respected.  In  particular,  the  compliance  with  the 
competences of sub-national authorities, as defined at national level, is an essential 
element, which covers the whole mechanism of the Protocol: it will be often repeated 
that neither the Protocol itself, nor the establishment of an EGC is going to confer 
new competences or expand the already attributed competences of the sub-national 
authorities members to the ECG. Although such a provision is not formally requested 
as necessary138, both from a substantial and formal point of view, it seems to be one 
of  the  most  relevant  issues  of  the  Protocol.  Apart  from  the  question  of  the 
competences of the territorial communities, the Explanatory Report, i.e. the official 
commentary to the single articles of the Protocol, underlines that also any agreement-
making powers aren't conferred to sub-national authorities. In this regard, if the sub-
national  authorities maintain their  own competences and the respective projection 
outside the national borders, the powers to join or create a trans-boundary body are 
not going to be expanded by the provisions of the Third Protocol. Thus, the new 
international instrument gives the references of some common rules, which actually 
should be seen as complementary to the national constitutional legal orders, without 
introducing any substantial  change in  respect  to  the first  approach of the Madrid 
138 The constant repetition about the non-modification of the competences of territorial communities 
or authorities seems not to be necessary from a strictly legal point of view; rather it shows a kind of a 
need  coming  from the  States,  which  want  to  reaffirm the  unquestionable  source  of  legitimation 
coming from the national legal order. In fact, as such a condition is an implicit element for the sub-
national legal capacity, it doesn't need to be constantly confirmed and represents an unchanging factor 
for territorial communities in order to act legally. 
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Outline Convention. What is radically new is the direct provision, coming from an 
international legal document, of the possibility to create a transfrontier entity with 
legal capacity. The establishment of such an entity is not new  per se, having been 
already  foreseen  by  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  or  by  specific  agreements 
between  territorial  authorities139.  However,  the  bilateral  or  multilateral  structures 
were only common to those members parties to the peculiar agreements, while the 
Third Protocol introduces basic common rules that are shared by a wider range of 
subjects.  The  reason  for  creating  a  conventional  model  for  transfrontier  bodies 
reveals the necessity to give some guidelines to sub-national authorities in order to 
develop cross-border cooperation. 
Regarding the geographical scope of the Protocol, as the first article affirms, 
both transfrontier and inter-territorial cooperation are considered: this means that a 
cross-border structure could be potentially created between non contiguous territorial 
communities.  This  aspect,  for  the  moment  remaining  only  a  matter  of  abstract 
analysis, could be very interesting, maybe, if we think about the possibility to create 
a structure between territorial communities belonging to EU countries and other non-
contiguous communities belonging to non-EU countries. 
About the name “Euroregional Cooperation Grouping”, it has been pointed 
out that the denomination seems, at first glance, to include only the regional actors 
and not the local authorities140, thus generating some confusions. In reality, the term 
has only a general and non-technical aim of comprehending both regional and local 
authorities. Speaking about an ECG, then, conventionally indicates a transfrontier (or 
inter-territorial) legal entity, without the intention to focus on (or to exclude) any 
institutional or administrative level in particular141: the exact term of reference is still 
the Madrid Outline Convention, which applies to transfrontier cooperation between 
territorial communities or authorities (of course, as identified by each State Party)142.
139 As  an  example,  we  already  spoke  about  the  the  local  grouping  of  transfrontier  cooperation 
(LGTC) introduced in 1996 by the Karlsruhe Agreement. 
140 The  term  “Euroregional”,  referred  to  the  new  structure,  is  the  result  of  several  years  of 
terminological hypothesis within the LR-IC Committee and the previous Committees dealing with 
transfrontier cooperation, if we think that the project of the Third Protocol started in 2004. 
141 During the LR-IC meeting of 23 March 2009, Mr. A. Zardi, Head of the Department of Local and 
Regional  Democracy  and  Good Governance,  explained  that  the  term has  a  general  meaning  and 
doesn't imply any legal consequence.
142 The  Explanatory  Report  to  Art.  1  reports:  “The  name  'Euroregional  Co-operation  Grouping' 
(ECG) tries to reflect the fact that local and regional communities and authorities established on a 
territorial basis and other public or private law entities as specified in more detail under Article 3 that 
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Furthermore, it  is important to highlight that the ECG remains an optional 
instrument  for  the  establishment  of  transfrontier  relations  between  territorial 
communities or authorities.
Since some aspects of the Third Protocol are really peculiar and relevant from 
a legal point of view, even for the further comparison with the EGTC, the analysis 
will be divided into smaller paragraph, which will take into consideration the most 
important elements of the ECG143.
a) Optionality
The legal standards introduced by the Third Protocol are optional. This means 
that  all  the  other  existing  forms  of  transfrontier  and  interterritorial  cooperation 
remain untouched and still practicable. In these terms, the ECG aims to become a 
widespread  instrument  of  cross-border  and  territorial  cooperation,  but  is  not 
necessarily going to substitute the previous or concurrent ones.
In particular, with regard to the obligations undertaken by the future signatory 
States,  Article  15  clearly  affirms  that  the  applicability  of  other  treaties  existing 
between the parties in matters of transfrontier or inter-territorial cooperation or the 
ability of the party to conclude new treaties on the subject are not affected by the 
Third Protocol. Besides the provision about the States parties, also the other forms of 
cooperation  between  sub-national  authorities,  which  aren't  established  through 
treaties, will not be affected as well. Namely, after the ratification within a State, the 
Third Protocol is not going to be the sole instrument allowing sub-national entities to 
develop  transfrontier  relations.  An  appendix  to  the  Protocol  will  contain  other 
optional  but  detailed  rules  regarding  the  possibilities  of  implementation  of  the 
Protocol within the contracting parties.
b) Territorial scope
As referred to in Article 1, an EGC must be set up on the territory of the 
Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe  parties  to  the  Third  Protocol144.  This 
participate in transfrontier and interregional co-operation intend to create sustainable networks and not 
new territorial entities.”
143 The order of the analysis will not necessarily follow the order of the articles.
144 The original version of the preliminary draft referred to “territorial communities or authorities of 
two or more Council of Europe member States”. 
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provision  is  quite  easy  and seems non-problematic.  Namely,  it  is  referred to  the 
headquarters of the EGC, which shall be inevitably based on the territory of a State, 
party  to  the  Protocol145.  As  a  consequence,  a  sub-national  authority,  which  is 
determined to have the seat of the EGC on its territory, needs the previous ratification 
of the Third Protocol by the respective State.
However, the territory where the headquarters is based doesn't represent the 
sole territory on which the constitution and the activities of an EGC can have legal 
effects. To be more precise, it is not the territory per se which is relevant, rather the 
national law connected to that territory. In fact, as we will see further on, the EGC is 
not only related to the national law of its headquarters, but, for different reasons, to 
the national law of its members, to the law of the territory where it acts as a legal 
persons  and  to  the  law  of  the  territory  where  third  parties/people  get  legal 
consequences from the EGC's actions146. Thus, the legal framework provided by the 
Third Protocol puts the basis for a common and simplified general standard, which 
necessarily needs to be integrated within a more complex legal panorama. 
c) Membership
The issue of the membership has been one of the most  debated questions 
during the drafting of the Third Protocol. The related provision has been changed 
significantly from the first to the subsequent draftings. 
For sub-national authorities the possibility to become members of an EGC is 
firstly  conditioned to  the  signature  and  ratification  of  the  Third  Protocol  by  the 
respective  States  member  of  the  CoE,  as  required  under  Article  3,  paragraph  1. 
Members  of  an  EGC  are  territorial  communities  or  authorities  belonging  to  the 
States, signatories to the Protocol. Only in these national territories the EGC can 
have its headquarters. With regard to participation in the EGC, the condition of the 
legitimate membership of each sub-national authority is submitted to the provisions 
of each national system and to the respective attribution of competences to territorial 
145 It seems quite obvious that a State party to the Protocol is a Member State of the Council of 
Europe.
146 As examples, see: Art. 7, par. 1, 2 and 4 about the necessity for sub-national authorities to respect 
their competences under the respective national system; Art. 9, par. 2 and 3 about the liability of the 
ECG; Art. 10, par. 2 about the dispute settlement with third parties; Art. 11 about the administrative 
and judicial review; Art. 12, par. 2 about the financial audit.
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communities.  As  the  Third  Protocol  strongly  affirms,  no  new  competences  are 
transferred to the sub-national entities member to an EGC.
Besides the participation of sub-national authorities, also the States can be 
potential members of the EGC themselves. Namely, the first sentence of Article 3, 
paragraph  1  mentions  the  possible  presence  of  States.  The  explanatory  report 
specifies further the condition for this special membership, affirming that States may 
become members only if “one or more of their territorial communities or authorities 
are  members”.  This means that  States,  even if  parties  to  the  Protocol,  cannot be 
member of an EGC without  the engagement of at  least  one of their  sub-national 
authorities  as  a  requirement.  Thus,  the  membership  of  territorial  communities  or 
authorities is the condition for the validity of the state-membership within an ECG. 
An observation about the potential presence of States as members of an EGC could 
be made with reference to the competences of territorial communities or authorities. 
As  far  as  the  system of  the  Madrid  Convention  and  its  Protocols  is  thought  as 
instrument to foster transfrontier cooperation between sub-national authorities, it is 
important to remember that these sub-national entities are also (more or less) limited 
in their competences and, consequently, in their legal capacity. If the presence of the 
respective States within an EGC could be interpreted as a controlling intent or as a 
restrictive supervision, nevertheless it can be fundamental in order to exercise those 
powers or to put into practice those activities that  sub-national authorities cannot 
exercise  or  put  into  practice.  Namely,  the  provision  regarding  the  central  state-
authorities  should  be  considered  in  this  sense.  In  fact,  a  supervisory  or  limiting 
function could be played by the States without being members of an EGC, but just 
with  the  administrative  or  judiciary  internal  supervision  about  the  respect  of  the 
competences by sub-national subjects. 
Article 3, paragraph 2 also affirms that “territorial communities or authorities 
of a State non-Party to this Protocol, which shares a border with a Party which is or 
will become the State in which the ECG has its headquarters, may take part in the 
establishment  of,  or  join,  this  ECG if  an agreement  between these two States so 
allows,  without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  this  Protocol.”  According  to  the 
Explanatory Report, this statement should be considered as an “opening clause”147, 
147 About this “opening clause” the Explanatory Report remembers that “[t]erritorial communities or 
authorities from non-member states of the Council of Europe can only become members of an EGC if 
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potentially enabling the participation of sub-national authorities,  whose respective 
State didn't sign and ratified the Protocol. Such a provision is the result of a long and 
complex debate about the opportunity to include members non parties to the Third 
Protocol148.  More  than  a  legal  issue,  this  theme implies  political  evaluations.  Of 
course, it is possible to underline a kind of “double binary” for the legal conditions of  
membership: one for the territorial  authorities that  belong to States parties to the 
Third Protocol and the other for territorial authorities belonging to States non parties 
to  it.  Anyway  such  a  distinction  doesn't  have  practical  consequences  on  the 
establishment of an EGC between these two types of sub-national communities and 
on  the  subsequent  rules  of  procedure,  rather  it  constitutes  a  prerequisite  for  its 
legitimate  establishment.  The  legal  differentiation  seems  to  have  a  political 
justification in order to permit a better and more flexible expansion of the EGC.
About the question of the membership, the establishment of an EGC is likely 
much broader than that of other EU instruments. In this regard, the attention of the 
LR-IC  Committee  has  been  highly  addressed  towards  the  necessities  and 
expectations of non-EU countries in order to strengthen the future perspectives of 
cross-border cooperation in that  territories.  Namely, also the cooperation between 
communities belonging to EU countries and that belonging to non-EU countries has 
been  taken  into  consideration.  But,  as  also  the  EU Regulation  about  the  EGTC 
provides for the possibility to include the so-called third countries, interesting spaces 
of comparison are going to be opened. 
According to Art. 1, par. 1 and Art. 3, par. 2 an EGC should be composed of 
two territorial authorities, at least one of which shall belong to a State party to the 
Third Protocol149. Moreover, the EGC shall be necessarily established on the territory 
of a State party, i.e. its headquarters. As a further condition, Article 3, paragraph 3 
underlines that sub-national authorities belonging to the States parties to the Third 
Protocol shall have the majority of voting rights in the EGC. This provision has been, 
the legal provisions applicable to them, in their respective constitutional system, so enable or by virtue 
of a treaty between their state and a Party to this Protocol”.
148 During the meetings of the LR-IC Committee, notably that of 23 March 2009, the issue about the 
necessity of the ratification of the Third Protocol or the possibility to become member without the 
ratification was at the centre of the discussion. Namely, the concern was about the possibility to be 
members of an EGC without having signed and ratified the Madrid Outline Convention. 
149 This interpretation seems to be supported by Prof. J. Marko, who attended the meetings of the 
LR-IC Committee as consulting expert.
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probably, introduced in order to re-establish some balance in favour of the parties 
that decided to ratify the Protocol.
Besides  territorial  communities,  Article  3,  paragraph  1  considers  other 
potential members. Namely, “all legal persons established for the specific purpose of 
meeting  needs  in  the  general  interest,  not  having  an  industrial  or  commercial 
character  may  be  members”.  In  particular,  these  legal  persons  shall  meet 
alternatively, according to the same article, the following conditions: 1) their activity 
shall be financed mainly by the state, a territorial community or authority or similar 
body or 2) their management shall be subject to the control of these entities or 3) half 
the members of their administrative, managerial or supervisory organs are appointed 
by  the  state,  a  territorial  community  or  authority  or  similar  body150.  Thus,  the 
Protocol is open to the participation of subjects, which are not directly representing a 
territorial  community.  However,  the  lack of  “territoriality”  as  a  condition for  the 
membership to an EGC is replaced by the purposes and by the public involvement. 
The  first  drafting of  the  Protocol  provided explicitly the possible  membership of 
private law entities when dealing with the development of public goals or not-for-
profit activities. As far as this element has been eliminated from the final version, the 
general  aim has  been maintained  as  far  as  only mere  private  and profit-oriented 
entities,  i.e.  commercial  enterprises,  seem  to  be  radically  excluded  from  the 
participation to an EGC. In this sense, the ambition of the Protocol grants a wider 
involvement of subjects, thus establishing the broadest and most flexible membership 
as  possible151.  In  this  sense,  the  participation  of  private-law legal  persons  is  not 
excluded insofar as it meets the conditions established under Article 3. We will see 
that the EGTC doesn't permit the participation of private law entities and provides for 
a determined category of public subjects that are allowed to be members; however 
150 This provision has been subject to several modifications. In particular, the final version is the 
most suitable to the compatibility with the EC Regulation on EGTC.
151 The first draft of the commentary to this article affirmed that could be considered as potential 
members: “[...] functional, legal entities such as chamber of commerce or trade unions which might 
also be established at regional level. Representatives social partners such as chambers of commerce or 
trade unions  - which are established in several member states either as private law entities in the form 
of associations or as public law entities – may therefore become members from the very beginning. If 
a state's national law does not allow private law entities to participate in an ECG, this does not exclude 
the participation of private law entities from other state. With regard to the distinction between 'not-
for-profit' private law entities and profit-oriented entities with public interest goals it is made clear that  
commercial enterprises may not participate for private gain per se. However, public or private law 
entities which make gains in pursuing goals of public interest are authorised to become members”.
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the purposes of the EU Regulation are not really different, aiming at the membership 
of bodies which are mainly concerned with the public interest. The provisions of the 
Third Protocol, besides its flexibility, can be considered far-seeing as it allows the 
membership of “functional subjects”, i.e. non-territorial entities. Such an option can 
permit  a  potential  implementation  of  the  principle  of  horizontal  subsidiarity, 
considering the participation of a multiple subjects.
With  regard  to  the  membership  of  non-territorial  subjects,  the  already 
mentioned provision of Article 3, paragraph 3 is also applicable. As the explanatory 
report  recalls,  “[...]  Council  of  Europe  legal  instruments  foresee  territorial  and 
functional cooperation by territorial communities or authorities as their main purpose 
since they carry out tasks in the general interests of their populations. However, other 
legal persons pursuing goals of general interests may be members. In order to avoid 
the risk of these special interests organisations overruling territorial communities or 
authorities  in  the  policy  development  and  decision-making  processes  of  their 
respective EGC, paragraph 3 makes it clear that territorial communities or authorities 
of the Parties must retain the majority of the voting rights in an EGC and therefore its  
control.”
d) The assent of the national central authority
The argument of this sub-paragraph wouldn't probably be treated as a separate 
section during an ordinary presentation of the main aspects of the Third Protocol to 
the  Madrid  Convention.  However,  according  to  our  opinion,  it  reveals  some 
interesting and peculiar aspects of the new international instrument that should be 
treated in an apposite section. 
Article 4, paragraph 4 affirms: “Before concluding an agreement to found the 
EGC or before joining the EGC, the territorial communities or authorities shall, as  
appropriate, inform, notify or obtain authorisation from their national authorities  
regarding  this  intention”152.  This  provision  strengthens,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
international  character  of  the  Protocol,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  reaffirms  the 
requirement  for  sub-national  authorities  to  compel  to  the  national  legal  system. 
Regarding the obligation of conformity to the respective national law, the Protocol 
152 Italic is our.
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recalls  several  times the observance of the competences attributed under  national 
law. This kind of provision seems to be sufficient in order to safeguard the central 
state  from  the  potential  misuse  (or  expansion)  of  the  sub-national  attributions. 
Namely, a violation of the internal allocation of competences during the constitution 
or the joining of an ECG can be managed by the central  authorities through the 
ordinary administrative or judicial procedures provided by each national system. In 
this  regard,  the  domestic  mechanisms  of  state  supervision  shall  fall  within  the 
physiological  handling  of  national  disputes  between  tiers  of  government.  The 
provision of Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Third Protocol could be simply considered 
as a mean of transparency or better coordination between central and sub-national 
authorities.  And this  should be,  maybe,  the  best  and easiest  way to  consider  the 
words of the Protocol  without  malice153.  However,  the request  of an information, 
notification  or  authorisation  reveals,  according  to  our  opinion,  the  intention  to 
reinforce the supervision towards sub-national communities or authorities, remarking 
the sovereignty of the central authorities by intensifying the national procedures of 
control.  According  to  the  same  intentions,  the  provisions  of  Article  4  have  been 
enriched in the final version of the Protocol, which comprehends some additional 
paragraphs if compared with the previous draft versions. A fast reading of the article 
suggests that these integrations have been made in order to make the Protocol more 
compatible with the EGTC Regulation. Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 4 recites that the 
national authorisation to sub-national authorities “may be refused if membership to 
the  ECG would violate  this  Protocol  or provisions of national  law,  including the 
powers or responsibilities of prospective members, or if membership is not justified 
for reasons of public interest or of public policy of the Party concerned. In such case, 
the  Party  shall  give  a  statement  of  its  reasons  for  withholding  approval”.  This 
wording  is  identical  to  the  analogue  disposition  contained  in  the  Community 
Regulation.  However,  the  different  nature  of  these  instruments  suggest  the 
conclusion that, in particular in the case of the Third Protocol, due to its international 
nature, such provision is not really useful.
153 The Explanatory Report remembers that on the basis of the communication from the sub-national 
subjects, “the central authorities can have recourse to their national supervisory legal instruments in 
order to control the legality or the constitutionality of the draft agreement.” In this regard it is worth to 
specify that the state supervision doesn't directly concern the legitimacy of the agreement establishing 
the EGC per se, rather it concerns the the legitimacy of the respective sub-national authorities to take 
part to that agreement according to the national legal system. 
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Moreover,  this  provision  is  completed  by  Article  16,  paragraph  1,  which 
considers the possibility for each State to designate, at the moment of the ratification 
or approval of the Protocol, the categories of territorial communities or authorities 
and the other legal  entities admitted which it  it  excludes  from the scopes  of  the 
Protocol154. As it is quite clear that such a potential exclusion should be based on the 
national  law and not  on a  discretional  choice  of the State,  the  reiteration of this 
eventuality  within  the  text  of  the  Protocol  seems  to  be  superfluous  and  quite 
redundant. In fact, following the words of the Explanatory Report to Art. 4, the most 
part of the countries prescribes in their national constitutional system that regional or 
local authorities have to seek prior consent for such activities. Article 4, paragraph 5 
completes the content of paragraph 2 of the same Article, specifying that each State 
may waive the requirement of information, notification or authorisation referred to in 
par. 2, in general or for specific categories of territorial communities or authorities.
As a conclusion on this question, what emerges from the Third Protocol is the 
strong interest of States to highlight and emphasize their overwhelming supervision 
on transfrontier cooperation between territorial  communities or authorities even if 
such emphasis doesn't always have a legal justification155. As it has been said the 
guarantee against sub-national non-legitimized actions in transfrontier cooperation is 
(implicitly or explicitly) foreseen by each national legal system.
e) Applicable law
The law applicable is considered as the law related to the operative phase of 
the ECG. As premise, an observation has to be made in this regard. This is about the 
distinction of the law founding the validity of an EGC and the proper law applicable, 
namely the rules of its functioning. As already mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
such a difference is fundamental in order to individuate the legal source which is 
relevant to the different legal relations and condition of legitimacy. In fact, the proper 
capacity to act of each single member of the EGC, i.e. territorial authorities and other 
legal subjects, is determined by the respective national law, which confers to the sub-
154 See also Art. 2, par. 2 of the Madrid Outline Convention.
155 Although the provisions under analysis can be considered as superfluous, it  is patent that the 
Third Protocol doesn't aim to list the conditions of participation to an EGC for its potential members; 
conditions, which are left to the national system of member states. As an example, it has to be kept in 
mind that, mainly with regard to “composite” States, some of them do not require a specific pre-
authorization (Belgium and Switzerland). 
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national authorities some specific competences. The same is true for non-territorial 
entities,  whose  capacity  to  act  is  also  defined  by  the  national  law  where  the 
concerned legal entity is established156. In this sense, the respective national law of 
the  members  of  an  EGC is  legitimating  the  participation  of  each  subject  to  the 
common  transfrontier  structure,  but  it  doesn't  necessarily  affect  the  working 
procedures of the EGC.
Conversely,  the  law  applicable  to  the  EGC's  operational  activities  is  the 
national law where the structure has its headquarters157. The seat of the headquarters 
and,  consequently,  the  applicable  law  are  chosen  by  the  members  during  the 
constituent phase. Thus, there is a necessary and binding relation between the State 
of the headquarters and the law applicable to the EGC. Moreover, as the EGC has the 
legal capacity, this is accorded by the same national law158. Article 2, paragraph 1 
affirms that “[t]he EGC shall be a legal person, governed by the law of the Party, 
Council of Europe member State, in which it has its headquarters”. In this case the 
Protocol doesn't introduce a new legal figure, i.e. a new type of legal person. Namely, 
this is established and chosen according to the national legal system in which the 
EGC has its seat. In fact, it is the state of the headquarters that determines the law 
applicable and the nature of the legal person. 
What has to be considered the applicable law is strictly concerned with the 
rules governing the ordinary working procedures of the EGC as legal subject, while 
it  is  possible  that  some (administrative  or  jurisdictional)  disputes  may be settled 
according to the national law of other parties concerned. Moreover, it is patent that 
156 Art.  1,  par.  2  refers  to  the national  law of  the states  concerned, thus  recalling the fact  that, 
according to the commentary of the Article, “[n]ational law covers the entire constitutional and legal 
system of the respective Council of Europe member state, i.e. including not only the law created by 
the  national,  regional  or  local  authorities  (and  the  subsequent  executive  provisions:  regulations, 
decrees, etc.),  but also Community law if the state in question is a member state of the European 
Union.”
157 The provision of the Third Protocol is quite incomplete in comparison to the respective provision 
of  the  EC  Regulation  1082/2006.  In  fact,  the  latter  displays  a  hierarchic  ruling  about  the  law 
applicable (Art. 2 of the EGTC Regulation). Namely, the first rules applicable are the provisions of the 
Regulation itself; secondly, the EGTC is governed by its statutes, when the Regulation so authorizes; 
only when the Regulation is lacking in governing some matters the applicable law is that of the state 
where  the  EGTC  has  its  registered  office.  See  COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report  on  European  legal  
instruments  of  interregional  cooperation,  drawn  up  at  the  request  of  the  Congress  of  Local  an 
Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 4.
158 During the LR-IC Committee meeting of 23 March 2009 Prof. J. Marko explicitly highlighted the 
substantial difference between the participation to an EGC, which shall be conform to the national 
law, and the ratification of the Third Protocol, which may legitimate a state to have the headquarters 
on an EGC on its territory.
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the national law of a sub-national subject member to an EGC, which belong to a 
State non-party to the Protocol in any case cannot be considered as applicable law.
f) Establishment of an EGC: Agreement and Statutes
The first  founding act  of the  EGC is  necessarily represented by a written 
agreement  between  its  members159.  According  to  Article  4,  paragraph  3  some 
mandatory  characteristics  have  to  be  specified,  namely:  the  list  of  members,  the 
name, the headquarters, the duration, the objects and tasks of the EGC, as well as its 
geographical scope160. As it has already been mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
the signatory members shall respect their respective national law with regard to the 
competences and to the compliance with the eventual requirement of information, 
notification or authorisation. In order to complete the procedure, Article 4, paragraph 
7 requires the publication or registration of the agreement in the State where the EGC 
has its headquarters, as well as in all States to which each member belongs161.
The conclusion of the agreement confirms the purpose and the determination 
of  the  members  to  set  up  a  legal  subject  –  the  EGC  –  especially  dedicated  to 
transfrontier and inter-territorial cooperation. In other words, the member of an EGC 
are  mutually  obliged,  through  this  agreement,  to  respect  and  put  in  practice  the 
provisions established,  in particular  the scopes and tasks of the EGC. Bearing in 
mind that such agreement is not part of international law, it is possible to wonder 
about its legal nature162. In fact, with regard to the implementation of this agreement, 
it  is  binding for  the signatories  parties which jointly  accepted the content  of  the 
accord and the commitment to found an ECG. But, according to which law are they 
mutually obliged? The law applicable to the functioning of the EGC is the national 
159 The last paragraph of Art. 4 affirms that the agreement should be written in the language of the 
state where the ECG has its headquarters as well as in the language of each members, all languages 
being equally authentic. 
160 As it has been already said, the agreement between the members of an EGC, being they sub-
national  authorities,  States or other “public-oriented” legal  subjects, doesn't  have the nature of an 
international treaty.
161 For reasons of transparency and legal certainty the publication or registration are required in 
every state of the ECG's members. With reference to the different legal status an EGC can have, i.e.  
according  to  public  or  private  law,  each  national  law  has  its  form of  publicity,  which  shall  be 
respected. 
162 The relationship between the international law and the legal nature of the agreement establishing 
an EGC is quite peculiar in this case. Of course, the Third Protocol is part of the international law and 
it is binding between the signatories States. The agreement establishing an EGC is foreseen by the 
Third Protocol, but doesn't  have a legal international  character because it  doesn't  directly obligate 
international subjects, i.e. States.
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law of its headquarters. And also the agreement seems to be submitted to the same 
national law for what concerns the relations between the members of the EGC163. In 
this view, a sub-national authority is submitted to the law of a foreign State, namely 
that of the ECG's headquarters164. 
The second constituent act is the statute, which is an essential and integral 
part of the agreement165. The content of the statute is not entirely specified by the 
Protocol.  Article  5,  paragraph  3  underlines  that  “[i]n  addition  to  the  mandatory 
provisions  of  the  agreement,  the  statutes  shall  contain  rules  on  membership, 
withdrawal and dissolution of the ECG, including the legal consequences as well as 
on  operations,  organs  and  their  tasks,  staffing,  budgets  and  financing,  liability, 
accountability and transparency of the EGC without prejudice of the provisions of 
this Protocol and in conformity with the applicable law”. As the Explanatory Report 
remembers, “[t]he list of the contents of the statutes is non-exhaustive and lays down 
the minimum requirements.  The law applicable to all issues to be included in the 
statutes  may  not  always  be  the  law  of  the  state  in  which  the  ECG  has  its 
headquarters, as was already outlined in the comment under Article 2.” 
In  conclusion,  the  constituent  elements  of  an  ECG  are  the  unanimous 
agreement  between  its  founding  members  and  the  statutes,  which  contains  and 
specifies the detailed structure and operational system of the ECG. Therefore, Article 
6 provides that any amendment to the agreement and any substantial amendment166 of 
the statutes shall follow the same procedures and forms provided by the respective 
articles. Unlike the EU Regulation on the EGTC, the Third Protocol doesn't prescribe 
that the ECG should have determinate organs (like an assembly or an advisory body). 
The internal structure of an ECG is shaped according to the legal model provided by 
163  N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques  intra-étatiques,  cit.,  p.  259  et  seq.,  proposes  a  detailed  analysis  about  the  potential 
applicable law to the transnational agreements between sub-national communities or authorities. In the 
case of the Madrid Outline Convention and its Protocols the sub-national authorities are explicitly 
authorized to conclude a transnational agreement with other foreign sub-national subjects in force of 
the  international  treaty,  which  represents  a  kind  of  covering  act  for  the  subsequent  agreements 
establishing the ECGs.
164 The commentary to Article 2 in the Explanatory Report affirms explicitly that the law applicable 
to the agreement (and to the actions of the EGC) shall be the law of the state in which the ECG has its 
headquarters, although there are several instances where the law of other states is also applicable.
165 As well as for the agreement, the statute shall be written in the language(s) of the State where the 
ECG  has  its  headquarters  and  in  the  languages  of  the  other  members.  Each  version  is  equally 
authentic.
166 Substantial amendments to the statutes  are considered those containing an amendment to the 
agreement.
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the national legal order in which the headquarters has its base. Thus, the Protocol 
doesn't prescribe any hierarchy between its provisions and the national legislations, 
rather it lays down genera standards which find their legal reason within the national 
laws.
Unfortunately,  the  model  provided by  the  Third  Protocol  remains,  for  the 
moment,  only theoretical.  Of course,  the binomial  of an agreement between sub-
national  authorities  and  the  following  statutes  has  already  been in  use  to  create 
common  transfrontier  structures,  like  the  Adriatic  Euroregion  or  the  Black  Sea 
Euroregion, but the concrete functioning of an ECG will, hopefully, only be analysed 
in the future.
The duration of the ECG is considered in Article 8, which establishes that an 
ECG can be set  up for a limited or unlimited period of time, as specified in the 
agreement and in the statute. Moreover, an EGC shall be wound up ipso facto when 
the period for which it was established has expired or if the territorial communities or 
authorities case to control the majority of the voting rights or after an unanimous 
decision  of  its  members167.  An ECG may  be  also  be  wound up by a  unanimous 
decision of its members.
g) Legal capacity
As legal person governed by the national law of the State where the ECG has 
its headquarters, the ECG shall have the most extensive legal capacity accorded to 
legal persons under the State's national law168. The Third Protocol, strengthening the 
provisions of the Additional Protocol169, considers the legal personality and the legal 
capacity of the ECG as mandatory. If the legal capacity of the transfrontier structure 
should, logically, follow the national law of the headquarters,  the meaning of the 
words “most extensive” legal capacity is not very clear. The commentary to Article 2 
of the Explanatory Report doesn't specify this meaning as well. Therefore it is not 
167 According  to  the  Report  of  Prof.  Lejeune  (COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report  on  European  legal  
instruments  of  interregional  cooperation,  drawn  up  at  the  request  of  the  Congress  of  Local  an 
Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 9) “this dissolution, either brought forward or when 
the period agreed expires, must not be confused with dissolution ordered as punishment by a court or 
another supervisory authority” as referred to under Art. 11.
168 See Art. 2, par. 2 . According to the same article, the legal consequences of the legal capacity 
imply that the ECG shall have the right of its own budget, to enter into contract, hire staff, acquire 
movable and immovable property and bring legal proceedings. This list is non exhaustive.
169 The Additional Protocol establishes that the legal capacity of a transfrontier body is optional.
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necessary to complicate the possible interpretations of this provision and it seems the 
better interpretation just to think that the ECG can have, according to the national 
law applicable, the freedom to choose the most suitable legal form available in that 
legal  system.  In  this  regard,  the  commentary  explains  that  both  private  law and 
public law are free to be chosen at the moment of the constitution of the ECG. Thus, 
the new legal entity is fully connected with one national law, which confers the legal 
characters of it subjectivity. The Protocol doesn't provide for a list of the possible 
legal figures, since it is a free and shared choice of the members of the ECG to find 
the best solution available in conformity with the national law applicable170. A deep 
analysis  of  the  possible  legal  forms  available  within  each  national  law  as 
headquarters of an ECG is not necessarily useful to have a better comprehension of 
the Third Protocol and goes beyond the scope of this survey. 
As the legal capacity of the ECG is ruled under the national law of the party 
in which it has its headquarters, also the budget implementation and the financial 
audit  are  managed  according  to  the  same  national  law.  Therefore,  according  to 
Article 12, paragraph 2 “[t]his State shall inform the other States whose territorial 
communities or authorities are members of the ECG without delay of the results of 
the audit and of the measures taken concerning the ECG”. Thus, not only the State of 
the headquarters is involved, but also the States where the ECG is operative. A duty 
of mutual information is also foreseen.
h) Tasks and scope of action
The Third Protocol doesn't list the tasks of an ECG, in order to leave to the 
members the maximum of flexibility as possible. Thus, the members can agree on a 
vast range of material scopes. The limits related to the tasks and scope of action are, 
170 The Explanatory Report to Art. 2 considers the three general possibilities that an ECG can assume 
as legal  subject in connection to the membership: a) public law ECGs with only either  territorial 
territorial  or  other  so-called  public  bodies  as  members;  b)  public  law ECSs,  with both  territorial 
authorities and public bodies as members, the latter participating in the performance of public tasks if 
this  is  allowed  under  the  respective  national  law;  c)  private  law  ECGs,  which  might  again  be 
composed of  both territorial  authorties and  other  public  entities,  the latter  acting,  however under 
private  law,  as  this  is  the case,  for  instance,  under  Article  17 of  the  Austrian  Constitution when 
territorial authorities may, like other non-state actors, have recourse to private law legal instruments 
such  as  contracts.  Private  law ECGs are  already  possible  under  the  Additional  Protocol,  so  that 
existing forms of cooperation need not to be changed. Moreover, the members of the ECG are not 
granted by any additional competences that they do not already possess under their respective national 
law.
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obviously, connected to the competences of each member. According to Article 7, 
paragraph 1 “these tasks shall be in accordance with the competences of the members 
under their respective national law and shall be listed in the agreement and in the 
statutes”171. Insofar as the attributions and competences of each member of the ECG 
can  be  very  different  in  nature  and  rank,  the  concept  of  the  “lowest  common 
denominator” comes again to the fore. As it as already been mentioned in the second 
chapter, transfrontier structures composed by sub-national authorities belonging to 
different States should respect each national system and, therefore, comply with the 
respective attribution of competences. Thus, an ECG entrusted with tasks exceeding 
the competences of the “lowest powerful” of its members cannot act legitimately. For 
this reason, the Protocol introduces a mechanism in order to avoid this limitation. 
Article 3 permits the participation of a State of the Council of Europe in the case that 
one  of  its  sub-national  authorities  takes  part  to  an  ECG.  Such  a  provision  is 
specifically thought for adapting the gaps of competences between the different sub-
national subjects.  In fact,  the State can fulfil  the lack of competences of its sub-
national communities and, in this way, it can widen the “rule” of the common lowest 
denominator. Thus, the contextual membership of central and sub-national authorities  
is oriented towards a better coordination and towards an easiest implementation of 
the ECG's tasks. In these terms and according to the most logical interpretation of the 
Protocol,  the  State  should  not  be  seen  as  a  competitor  with  regard  to  territorial 
communities. At least the State is not in competition with sub-national authorities 
when it is a member of the ECG. Namely, it  can exercise its supervisory activity 
through  other  mechanisms,  i.e.  the  internal  attribution  of  competences  and  the 
eventual requirement of authorisation. Of course, this interpretation remains still a 
theoretical one, as far as the Protocol has not entered into force yet. Only with the 
ratification of the Protocol and its subsequent implementation it will be possible to 
evaluate the concrete function of its provisions.
Article 7, paragraph 2 is about the implementation of the tasks: “[t]he ECG 
shall adopt decisions and ensure their implementation, in respect and for the benefit 
of individual persons or legal entities subject to the jurisdiction of the States to which 
171 Art. 7, par. 4 specifies that “[t]he ECG may not exercise competences that territorial communities 
or authorities exercise as agents of the state to which they belong, except where duly authorised. It 
may exercise competences that states members of the ECG confer upon it.” 
169
CHAPTER IV
its members belong. Members shall adopt or facilitate all necessary measures falling 
within  their  competences  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  ECG's  decisions  are 
implemented172”.  This  is  the  only  provision,  which  concerns  the  tasks  from  a 
proactive point of view, whereas the other dispositions of Article 7 concern the tasks 
from  a  “negative”  point  of  view,  i.e.  from  the  perspective  of  their  limitations. 
However,  the  mentioned  positive  disposition  seems to  represent  a  programmatic 
purpose without imposing clear instructions or obligations about the implementation 
of the ECG's tasks. But, as far as the members are concerned, sub-national authorities 
should  always  follow  and  give  incentives  to  the  ECG's  activities.  As  further 
highlighted  by Art.  7,  par.  3,  the ECG may not exercise  regulatory powers,  take 
measures affecting the rights and freedoms of individuals or impose levies of a fiscal 
nature. Of course, the central authority can delegate specific competences to the sub-
national authorities.
As far as the Protocol doesn't provide for a restricted list of tasks, the ECG 
could  deal with multiple  issues and implement  several  tasks,  because of  its  high 
degree of flexibility. The limits of this flexibility are entailed in each national legal 
system.  In  these  terms,  the  setting  up  of  an  ECG  requires  a  certain  degree  of 
coordination and cooperation between the difference sub-national authorities in order 
to find and to settle the maximum degree of compatibility between the respective 
legal order. 
Moreover, an ECG can potentially implement programmes and projects co-
financed by the European Union in the field of cross-border cooperation, i.e. in the 
case of Structural Funds and Pre-accession Instrument. This is quite an interesting 
perspective, as it opens the way to a possible competition with the EU Regulation on 
the EGTC. In fact, the constitution of an ECG could be potentially preferred in order 
to  manage  EU  programmes  and  funds,  maybe  if  we  consider  the  possible 
participation of non-EU members. In this regard, a comparison between the tasks of 
an  ECG  and  of  an  EGTC  is  essential  in  order  to  understand  the  possible 
implementation and the range of activities that these two cross-border structure can 
develop.
172 The second sentence of par. 2 is considered, according to the commentary, as an application of the 
principle  of  subsidiarity.  When ECG,  as  a  legal  subject,  lacks  the  necessary  executive  power  or 
effective  legal  mechanisms to  enforce its  decisions,  the members should facilitate  and propel  the 
ECG's actions.
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Approaching the next sub-paragraph, an aspect can be anticipated with regard 
to the tasks of an ECG. In fact, in case an ECG is acting outside its tasks as defined 
in the founding documents, Article 11, paragraph 5 provides for the following rule in 
addiction to the specific provisions about the dissolution of an ECG. Thus, when 
requested by a competent authority with a legitimate interest, “a competent court or 
the competent authority of a party where the ECG has its headquarters may order the 
ECG to be wound up if it finds that the ECG is acting outside the tasks entrusted to 
it”173.  Although  such  a  provisions  is  quite  clear  from an  abstract  point  of  view, 
according to our opinion some difficulties of interpretation can emerge if the tasks 
entrusted  to  the  ECG are  enumerated in  a  too  general  way.  In  these  cases,  it  is 
desirable some coordination and mutual trust between the different subjects involved 
in order to avoid pretentious judicial processes. 
i) The pathological phase
Several issues are focused in this sub-paragraph, namely the liabilities, the 
dispute  settlement  and  the  administrative  and  judicial  review with  regard  to  the 
actions  of  an  ECG.  These  elements,  even  if  different,  comprehend  the  overall 
dispositions  about  the  responsibilities  and  the  consequences  of  possible 
infringements committed by the ECG and its organs and members during the activity 
of the ECG.
Article 9 of the Protocol establishes some general rules about the liabilities. 
The first three paragraphs of Article 9 are about the liabilities of the ECG, whereas 
the lasts to paragraphs display some provisions about the liabilities of the members. 
Paragraph 1 states that “[t]he ECG – or if its assets are not sufficient, its members 
jointly174 – shall be liable with regard to third parties for its acts, including debts of 
whatever nature, even if those acts do not follow within its tasks”. This provisions 
affirms the principle of a general liability of the ECG for its actions that violates the 
rights  of  third  parties.  In  this  case,  the  determination  of  the  tasks  through  the 
agreement and the statutes is not sufficient in order to prevent some attributions of 
173 Moreover, always according to the same paragraph, the competent court or authority may allow 
the ECG time to rectify the situation. If the ECG fails to do so within the time allowed, it may be 
declared wound up.
174 The commentary to the article speaks, also in this occasion, of the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Namely, the states intervene only in case the ECG doesn't have sufficient assets.
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responsibility to the ECG. Namely, even acting outside the limits of its tasks, the 
ECG can be liable with regard to third parties as a general principle of responsibility. 
Furthermore, paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be read together. On the one hand, the ECG is 
liable to its members for any breach of the law to which it may be subject and175, on 
the other hand, the organs of the ECG are liable with regard to the ECG for any 
breach of the law they have committed in their exercise of their functions. According 
to  these  provisions,  there  is  a  possible  multiple  and  mutual  liability  between 
members, the ECG and its organs. As the law concerned is not always the law which 
is generally applicable to the actions of the ECG, other national legal orders can be 
involved and not only the law of the state where the ECG has its headquarters.
As  far  as  the  ECG  has  the  most  extensive  legal  capacity  under  the  law 
applicable and has, therefore, a general liability for its acts towards third parties, it is 
possible  that  the  members  have  a  limited  liability,  according  to  their  respective 
national legal status. In such case, according to Art. 4, par. 3, the name of the ECG at 
the time of the constitution shall include the word “limited”176. In the eventuality that 
a member of the ECG has a limited liability in accordance with its national law, Art. 
9, par. 4 provides the possibility for the other members to also limit their liability in 
the statutes. Moreover, according to par. 5, a State, on the territory of which it is 
intended to set up the headquarters, may prohibit the registration or publication of the  
ECG if one or more of its prospective members have limited liability.
This brief presentation of the provisions about the system of the liabilities 
within an ECG, makes clear that the attempt of harmonisation proposed by the Third 
Protocol is far from resolving the complexities arising from the existence of different 
legal systems, their national law and the legal dimension of sub-national authorities. 
About the role of national central authorities, it is obvious that where they are not 
members of an ECG no liabilities can be ascribed to them. Thus, with regard to the 
activities of an ECG the State, in general, has the quality of third party177.
175 The commentary makes the following example:  if  a  member  acts on behalf  of an ECG (for 
instance as under Art. 7, par. 2) and violates the respective law so that the ECG is held responsible by 
a third party according to Art. 9, par. 1, then the ECG has the rights to seek regress against the member 
in accordance to Art. 10, par. 2.
176 The national law of the other ECG members will determine whether they can limit their liability 
as well.
177 See  COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report  on  European legal  instruments  of  interregional  cooperation, 
drawn up at the request of the Congress of Local an Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 9.
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Article 10 considers the cases of dispute settlement. The general rule states 
that in case of disputes between the ECG and its members, the competent courts shall 
be those of the state in which the ECG has its headquarters178. Alternatively, in case 
of a dispute between the ECG and a third party, the competent court shall be those of 
the State in which the third party effectively resides or, with regard to a legal person, 
the State in which its seat or headquarters is  located,  as long as these States are 
member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe179.  In  this  regard,  the  applicable  law is 
connected to the competence of the court. As an exceptional option and if the parties 
agree in advance, the disputes with third parties may be settled through an arbitration 
agreement.  However,  if  the  residence,  seat  or  headquarters  is  not  located  in  a 
members State of the Council of Europe the ECG is obliged, according to Art. 10, 
par. 3, to conclude an arbitration agreement for all the activities with this party. In 
these situations, the main concern is related to avoid the application of the law of a 
State  which  is  not  member  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  The  necessary  respect  of 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law are  considered  as  an  achievement  for  the  CoE's 
member States180. At least, the monitoring activity and the institutional relevance of 
the Council play a fundamental role which is not guaranteed in non-member States.
Article 11 concerns, in general, the control over the legality of the acts of an 
ECG. Following the rule of the general law applicable, “[d]ecisions and acts of the 
ECG shall be subject to the same supervision and administrative and judicial review 
of the legality of acts of territorial communities or authorities as those required in the 
State in which the ECG has its headquarters.” In order to facilitate the relations with 
the  institutions  involved,  the  ECG  shall  comply  with  requests  of  informations 
coming  from  the  authorities  of  States  to  which  the  territorial  communities  or 
authorities belong. But, besides the acts of the ECG itself, the Third Protocol takes 
into consideration also the actions of the members. Namely, according to Article 11, 
paragraph 3,  decisions  and acts  of  the  members  of  an  ECG – both  sub-national 
subjects  and  the  other  “public-based”  entities  –  are  subject  to  the  supervision, 
178 Art. 10, par. 1.
179 Ibid., par. 2.
180 According to these principles, Art. 10, par. 4 and 5, specifies the general rights of third parties. 
“Third parties shall retain, vis-à-vis territorial communities or authorities in behalf of which the ECG 
performs certain tasks, all the rights they would enjoy if those tasks were not performed by the ECG. 
In any case, the rights of individuals and legal persons shall include the right to appeal before all 
competent organs and courts, including the rights of access to services in their own language and the 
right to access information”.
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administrative and judicial  control under their respective national law181. This last 
remark seems to be a  sort  of reassurances  for the States signatories to the Third 
Protocol. Indeed, several  provisions of the Protocol aim to confirm the control of 
national  central  authorities  on the legality  of the activities of the  respective sub-
national entities. 
In this regard, Art. 11, par. 4 considers the eventuality that an ECG violates 
with  its  activities  some of  fundamental  interests  of  States  to  which its  members 
belong,  such as  public  policy,  public  security,  public  health  and public  morality. 
Besides this principles of public order, also the violation of the public interest of a 
State is mentioned. In case of such contravention, a competent authority of the State 
concerned “may prohibit that activity on its territory or require those members that 
fall  under  its  jurisdiction to  withdraw from the  ECG unless  the  latter  ceases  the 
activity in question”. This is a general safeguard clause against possible activities of 
the ECG against the state-interests. On the one hand, it is comprehensible that the 
Protocol includes such a disposition in order prevent from an abuse of activities but, 
on the other hand, this provision can lead to an excessive discretionary control of 
States on the respective sub-national authorities and, also, on foreign sub-national 
subjects182.  For this  reason,  paragraph 4 continues  as  follows.  “Such prohibitions 
shall  not  constitute  a  means  of  arbitrary  or  disguised  restriction  on  cooperation 
between the members. Review of the competent authority's or body's decision by a 
judicial authority shall be possible”. The text of the paragraph seems to contain the 
conditions for a balanced supervisory activity coming from the States. However, as 
the national fundamental interests, and mainly the concept of “violation of the public 
interest”, are of difficult and (generally) evolving interpretation, there is always the 
risk  to  submit  the  parameters  of  legitimacy  to  a  mere  political  and  arbitrary 
evaluation. 
181 The commentary remembers that  this provision remarks Art. 3,  par. 4 of the Madrid Outline 
Convention which states that “agreements and arrangements shall be concluded with due respect with 
due regard to the jurisdiction provided by the internal law of each Contracting Party in respect of 
international relations and general policy and to any rules of control or supervision to which territorial 
communities or authorities may be subject.”
182 The fact that a state can prohibit the activity of the ECG has its consequences on each member of 
the ECG and, therefore, also on subjects that do not belong to the state concerned.
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4.11. An overall evaluation about the Third Protocol: simplification vs. legitimization
The  main  aim  of  the  Third  Protocol  is  to  foster  transfrontier  and 
interterritorial cooperation and to provide for a harmonized and substantive set of 
rules in order to facilitate the establishment of cooperation. The added value of the 
Third Protocol with regard to the Madrid Outline Convention has to be seen in the 
provision of common legal standards related to the establishment of a transfrontier 
body with legal capacity. The very first idea of constituting the unique and foremost 
legal instrument for the development of the future transfrontier structures had to be 
set  aside  after  the  adoption of  the  EU Regulation on the EGTC. The process  of 
drafting  the  document,  therefore,  has  needed  to  look  for  possible  forms  of 
compatibility with the EU provisions183. However, the ECG still aims to provide one 
of the best optional model to implement territorial cooperation between sub-national 
communities or authorities184. 
As  it  has  been  remarked  by  the  Committee  of  Experts  on  Transfrontier 
Cooperation,  the  three  main  problems,  which  remained  unresolved  after  the 
implementation of the MOC are: 1) the absence of an almost generalized explicit 
recognition of sub-national  authorities'  legal competence to  conclude transfrontier 
cooperation agreements; 2) the legal nature of transfrontier cooperation bodies and 3) 
the  legal  force  of  the  acts  accomplished  by  these  bodies185.  If  such  questions 
represent the main difficulties for sub-national subjects to put in force transfrontier 
activities,  it  is  possible  to  affirm  that  the  Third  Protocol  sorts  out  these  issues? 
Obviously, an answer can be only partial for two reasons. Firstly, because the process 
for the ratification and effective implementation of the Third Protocol is currently 
183 The attempt to find the best ways of compatibility of the Third Protocol with the EU Regulation 
have not remained only words. Namely, an accurate comparison between the two legal instrument has 
been the object of a Report commissioned by the CLRAE in order to give a significant contribution 
and a clear legal advise for the drafting of the Third Protocol. The document in question is COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, Report on European legal instruments of interregional cooperation, drawn up at the request of 
the Congress of Local an Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, July 2007, CPR/GT/CIR(14)3.
184 See  COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report  on  European legal  instruments  of  interregional  cooperation, 
drawn up at the request of the Congress of Local an Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 2 
and p. 16: “In drawing up Protocol No. 3 and its appendix, the committee of experts on transfrontier 
cooperation (LR-CT) is pursuing a precise objective, which is to provide the Contractiong Parties with 
a  set  of  legal  rules  that  make  it  possible  to  supplement,  modify  or  replace  national  legislation 
governing  cooperation  bodies  set  up  between  territorial  authorities  or  groupings  of  territorial 
authorities in different countries. The need for such rules is mainly felt within states that have no 
practical experience of trasfrontier cooperation or legislative tradition in this area.”
185 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on the  current  state  of  the  
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe, cit. p. 9.
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still ongoing and, therefore, its final dimension is not yet defined; secondly, because 
the Protocol is an optional instrument and, as such, it cannot cope with all aspects 
and forms of transfrontier cooperation. In fact, as far as States will sign and ratify the 
document, other approaches to transfrontier cooperation remain still practicable. 
Starting to answer from the second and the third mentioned apects, the legal 
nature of transfrontier cooperation bodies is defined by the creation of the new figure 
of the Euroregional Cooperation Grouping and by the mandatory attribution of the 
legal  personality  and  the  legal  capacity.  The  status,  conditions  and  procedures 
concerning this legal subject are demanded, as already explained, to the national law 
of the State where the ECG has its headquarters. The legal force of the acts of an 
ECG follows the tasks conferred to the new body. It is described, in general, through 
its limitations with regard to the possible conflicts with the various national central 
authorities'  competences and with regard to the potential breaches of the national 
fundamental interests.
The  first  question  is  about  the  recognition  of  a  sub-national  general 
competence to  conclude transfrontier  cooperation agreements.  The Third Protocol 
entails  some  dispositions  about  the  creation  of  an  ECG  as  a  transfrontier 
cooperation's body, which is created by an agreement between, as major members, 
territorial communities or authorities. Does it mean that sub-national authorities have 
a generalized right to territorial cooperation? 
The ratification of the Third Protocol by the States members of the CoE will 
allow territorial  communities  or  authorities  to  set  up  an  ECG through  a  written 
agreement and in conformity to the conditions provided in the Protocol. As far as the 
MOC considers the possibility of a previous inter-state agreement, this eventuality 
seems (but  it's  still  not  definitely  sure)  to  be  abandoned  by  the  Third  Protocol. 
Namely, States entitle sub-national authorities to conclude an agreement constituting 
an ECG through the Protocol  itself,  which already represents  a  kind of  covering 
inter-state agreement. Some dispositions of the MOC remain, however, the same and 
are  confirmed in  the  Third Protocol,  such as  the faculty  for  the States parties to 
designate the categories of territorial communities or authorities or other public or 
private entities, which they exclude from the scope of the Protocol.186 Thus, the new 
186 See Art. 16, par. 1. 
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instrument  of the Council  of Europe doesn't  introduce an overall  competence for 
territorial  communities  or  authorities  to  engage  in  transfrontier  cooperation.  The 
reference to the compatibility and conformity with the national legal orders and the 
respective systems of competences'  attributions remain the core legal issue of the 
Third Protocol. 
Rather  than  facing  the  question  of  the  legitimization  of  sub-national 
authorities  toward  transfrontier  cooperation,  the  Third Protocol  seeks  to  improve 
legal certainty and legal simplification in a matter which is characterized by a high 
degree of variability.
During the works for the adoption of the CLRAE's opinion on the (previous 
Draft)  Third  Protocol,  the  lack of  knowledge about  the  concrete  development  of 
transfrontier  cooperation  was  highlighted  by  several  sub-national  subjects.  In 
particular, territorial communities belonging to the east-countries of the Council of 
Europe raised the question187.  Moreover,  the differences among the national  legal 
systems and the multiplication of the models for the development of cross-border 
cooperation  required  the  implementation  of  clearer  solutions.  Thus,  the  Third 
Protocol intends to overcome the obstacles deriving from the differences between 
national legal systems and from the multiplicity of the different forms of territorial 
cooperation which have spread out across Europe188. 
The analysis of single aspects of the ECG demonstrates that the Protocol is 
far  from supplying  to  the  complexities  emerging  from the  existence  of  different 
national legal and administrative systems. Rather, the Protocol needs a cohabitation 
with the national  rules,  without  whose it  is  legally not self-sufficient.  Within the 
panorama of transfrontier cooperation the interaction of different national systems 
cannot be neglected, being a typical legal character of the greater Europe. Therefore, 
also in order to face the pressure of the member States of the CoE, the Third Protocol 
should try to cope with legal complexities and not to refuse them189. 
187 This aspect  emerged in several  meetings  held with the CLRAE's officials  with regard to the 
drafting of the adopted CLRAE, Opinion 30(2009) of 10 June 2009 on the Draft Protocol No. 3 to the 
European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier  Cooperation  between  Territorial  Communities  or 
Authorities concerning Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, during my study visit at the Congress. 
188 See A. ENGL, Future Perspectives on Territorial Cooperation in Europe: The EC Regulation on a  
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation and the Planned Council of Europe Third Protocol to  
the  Madrid  Outline  Convention  concerning  Euroregional  Co-operation  Groupings,  European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers 03/2007, Bolzano, 2007, http://eurac.edu/edap, p. 25.
189 “The revised draft protocol and its appendix will thus constitute a much more diversified legal 
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In this regard, the intention to reach a simplification and a systematization of 
the matter, seems to be achieved by the provision of some general and necessarily 
flexible  legal  standards190.  From  the  point  of  view  of  sub-national  subjects,  the 
situation  with  regard  to  the  role  of  central  authorities  remains  substantially 
unchanged except for the new option to build up a recognised transfrontier structure 
such the ECG. Namely, the knowledge of the existence of an apposite body with 
legal  capacity  will  hopefully  foster  the  development  and  the  implementation  of 
transfrontier initiatives191.
5. Community instruments 
5.1. General remarks
From a general point of view, the EU/EC approach to territorial cooperation is 
rather  different  from that  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  Both  of  the two institutions 
certainly present various similarities, mainly concerning the most general ideas and 
principles of territorial/transfronier cooperation192. In this regard, some remarks about 
the approach of the European Community and of the Council of Europe's territorial 
dimension have already been made. As far as territorial cooperation represents for the 
Council of Europe a sector of interest and intervention, for the EU it consists of a 
part of its policies within the Member States. Actually, such an observation doesn't 
want to be rude or to diminish the pioneering role the CoE has had and still has with 
regard  to  the  development  of  transfrontier  cooperation  between  sub-national 
instrument than the European Regulation. Their flexibility will, in particular, enable states to adhere 
more easily to their traditional legal principles.”, see  COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report on European legal  
instruments  of  interregional  cooperation,  drawn  up  at  the  request  of  the  Congress  of  Local  an 
Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 17.
190 Ibid., p. 16, where Prof. Lejeune speaks about “legal standardisation”.
191 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Report  on the current  state  of  the 
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier co-operation in Europe,  cit. p. 23  et seq.  The 
difficulties derived from the existence of different legal frameworks can be faced only via complex 
and coordinated actions, which do not always coincide with interventions on legal rules. If there is a 
responsibility of the states with regard to the legal framework for sub-national authorities in order to 
develop cross-border cooperation, some obstacles can be overcome by other means.  For instance, 
neighbourly collaboration between states or regional and local authorities, mutual consultations and 
provision of financial support are essential key-factors to develop a effective cooperation besides the 
difficulties of the legal orders.
192 See  COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION,  Similarities  and  differences  of  
instrument and policies of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the field of Transfrontier  
Co-operation, cit., p. 34.
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authorities. The approach of these two institution is, however, different due to the 
“physiological” fact  of their distinct legal and political nature. Moreover, also the 
geographical dimension is different. In fact, it is possible to affirm that the CoE's 
instruments for transfrontier cooperation do not have, as such, geographical purposes 
and consequences: they apply uniformly in each country that ratifies the instruments. 
Conversely, the EC/EU territorial policy affects differently the various zones of the 
Community through its various instruments and funds193.
With reference to  the  development  of  territorial  cooperation between sub-
national communities supported by the EC/EU, it is possible to say that it did not 
begin as an explicit objective or as an urgent need to find legal instruments to foster 
this  kind  of  activities194.  In  particular,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  the  original 
Treaties  do  not  provide  an  explicit  competence  for  the  Community  to  deal  with 
territorial cooperation.
For this reason, the first Community approach to sub-national issues has been 
deeply  connected  to  the  necessity  of  finding  an  economical  balance  among  the 
various  European  regions  and,  in  particular,  to  the  cohesion  policy  according  to 
Articles  158, 159 and 160 TEC195.  In  this  sense,  transfrontier  and inter-territorial 
cooperation  are,  at  the  origins  of  the  Community  territorial  approach,  a  kind  of 
indirect  consequence  of  the  Community  interventions196 within  the  cohesion  and 
regional policies. In particular, the concept of “cohesion”, which has been introduced 
with the Single European Act197, represents the aim of a redistributive policy aiming 
193 Ibid., p. 37.
194 Ibid., p. 36. It is interesting to note that, on the one hand the Council of Europe has been firstly 
concerned with the exigence to elaborate a legal framework for transfrontier cooperation and, on the 
other hand, it finances almost exclusively “soft” projects aiming to establish contacts and cooperation 
between regional  and local communities.  Conversely,  the European Community has not originally 
involved  in  the  provision  of  legal  instruments  for  he  development  of  cross-border  cooperation, 
nonetheless it has implemented “hard” projects.
195 See  P. LÉGER,  Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE, Bruxelles, 2000, p. 1280-
1289.
196 In regard to the EU territorial cohesion policy, according to A. Faludi, it is not possible to speak 
about  an  explicit  territorial  approach  before  the  2000s.  Nevertheless,  implicitly,  such  a  territorial 
concern has been part of the EU institutional activities and known also under other terms like regional 
policy  or  regional  planning  and  spatial  planning  or  spatial  development  policy.  See  A.  FALUDI, 
Territorial Cohesion under the Looking Glass. Synthesis Paper about the history of the concept and  
policy background to territorial cohesion, 2009, available at the EU Commission official website:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/index_en.htm, p. 6.
197 More than the concept of cohesion, the SEA introduced in the Treaties also an explicit provision 
regarding the ERDF (originally created with the Regulation EEC no. 724/75), entailed in Art. 160 
TEC.
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at  promoting  the  development  of  disadvantaged  regions  and  local  communities 
within the European market, as well as at reducing social and economic inequalities 
across Europe198. As far as such an approach could be intended quite easily as mainly 
of economic nature, it is relevant to underline that the policies related to cohesion, 
convergence  and  regionalism  do  have  an  intrinsic  political  nature,  being  deeply 
connected to the “constitutional” objectives of an harmonious development of the 
whole Community,  capable  of  granting an equitable  social  protection  and a  high 
standard of life-quality,  as enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 TEC. However, it  is not 
possible to forget the functional/economical aspect of the development of territorial 
policies within the  EU. In this  scenery the issue of  cross-border  cooperation has 
developed, quite paradoxically, both as an essential element for generating a deeper 
integration  and  as  a  collateral  effect  of  policies  that  are  not,  at  a  first  instance, 
directly  addressed  to  such  an  issue.  Thus,  the  very  first  existence  of  a  common 
concept  of  a  “transfrontier  territory”  was  linked  to  the  possibility  to  obtain  a 
Community financial contribution199.
Within  this  context,  the  slow development  of  an  official  territorial  policy 
brought to a delayed awareness of the political necessity of a legal instrument for 
territorial cooperation which found its culmination with the adoption of the EGTC 
Regulation in 2006.
Even if  the adoption of a proper  legal  tool  for territorial  cooperation is  a 
recent  happening,  previous  years  have  seen  the  development  of  an  important 
experience in the field of the so-called “trans-european” cooperation. Namely, the 
creation  of  the  INTERREG  programme  in  1989  launched  a  huge  and  relevant 
Community  initiative  devoted  to  foster  trans-frontier,  trans-national  and  inter-
198 See  I.  BACHE,  Europeanization and Multilevel Governance: Cohesion Policy in the European 
Union and Britain, London, 2007, p. 3. See also I. BEGG, N. DE MICHELIS, R. ESPOSTI, Cohesion in the  
EU, in CESifo Forum, 2008, v. 9, n. 1, p. 3-34. If the concept of “cohesion has been introduced with 
the Single European Act, the idea of reducing the development gaps between different regions and the 
delay of the less favourites have been one of the first concerns of the Member States, even according 
to the Preamble of the Rome Treaty. Namely, this explains the creation of the ERDF in 1975, some 
years  before  the  SEA.  Main  objectives  of  the  cohesion/regional  policy  are:  the  promotion  of 
development  and the structural  adjustment  of  region with development-delay, the reconversion  of 
regions  with  industrial  decline,  the  struggle  against  unemployment,  the  adaptation  of  workers  in 
regard to the industrial mutations and the rural development. For the programming period 2000-2006 
these objectives have been reduced to three main priorities. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that 
the creation of a specific Cohesion Fund dates back to 1994.
199 A. EMBID IRUJO, C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ, Las agrupaciones europeas de cooperación  
territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, Madrid, 2008, p. 47.
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regional cooperation200. As far as this kind of initiative does not represent a proper 
solution  and  a  true  legal  instrument  for  the  establishment  of  sub-national 
cooperation, the creation and the subsequent spreading out of Community planning 
and financial tools have deeply marked the evolution of the EU approach towards 
territorial cooperation.
In this regard, the EU showed, as a first involvement in the field of territorial 
cooperation,  the  intention  to  develop  a  promotional  role  rather  than  a  legal 
systematization of the subject. 
 
5.2. The experience of INTERREG
The development of INTERREG programmes is a peculiar aspect related to 
the Community cohesion policy and structural funds. It started in the Nineties and 
lasted, with significant modifications, until 2006, namely until the adoption of the 
new cohesion policy 2007-2013, when the objective of territorial cohesion has been 
explicitly introduced as an autonomous part of the general policy. INTERREG knew 
three phases of programming, respectively 1990-1993 (INTERREG I), 1994-1999 
(INTERREG II) and 2000-2006 (INTERREG III)201. Generally speaking it is known 
as an economic-promotional tool of the Community to foster projects or programmes 
related  to  the  development  of  cross-border,  transnational  and  interregional 
cooperation,  thus promoting a better European integration directly on the field of 
localized interests. 
Before deepening the analysis of the background, a clarification has to be 
made. Speaking from a legal point of view, the context of INTERREG does not have 
a  peculiar  value  with  regard  to  the  creation  of  juridical  tools  for  cross-border 
cooperation between sub-national authorities. Actually, the idea crawling under the 
200 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds 
and  their  effectiveness  and  on  coordination  of  their  activities  between  themselves  and  with  the 
operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments.
201 INTERREG I supported 31 cross-border programmes. INTERREG II financed 79 programmes 
and  introduced  three  types  of  approach,  namely  related  to  cross-border  cooperation  (strand  A), 
completion of energy and networks (strand B, only available in this second phase) and regional and 
spatial  planning  (strand  C,  introduced  in  1996).  INTERREG  III,  strong  of  an  almost  10-years 
experience, developed 72 programmes for a total amount of EUR 4.875 and was divided into three 
strands: cross-border cooperation (strand A), transnational cooperation (strand B) and interregional 
cooperation  (strand  C).  See  INTERACT,  A Study  of  the  Mid  Term  Evaluations  of  INTERREG 
Programmes for the programming period 2000 until 2006, Vienna, 2005, p. 17-21.
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design of INTERREG is that the presence of national borders should not be a barrier 
for a balanced development and integration of the European territory202. Therefore, 
part of the Structural Funds, in particular the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), have been designated for this scope. In this sense, the main interest for the 
Commission  has  not  been  that  of  finding  a  legal  framework  for  territorial 
cooperation,  rather  to  foster  the  substantial  efficacy  of  promotional  initiatives 
devoted  to  the  real  development  and  integration  of  areas,  spaces  and  territories 
divided by a national border, but in the need (and in the will) of shared projects. 
Thus, although it is not possible to consider the INTERREG as a legal instrument or 
as a legal framework for cross-border relations between sub-national authorities, it is 
worth,  and  necessary,  to  retrace  briefly  its  story  and  to  consider,  anyway,  its 
contribution  in  the  perspective  of  the  development  of  territorial  cooperation  in 
Europe. 
The  presentation  and  the  subsequent  comprehension  of  the  INTERREG 
system implies a high degree of complexity,  a detailed analysis  and a quite good 
practical experience concerning its concrete planning. Therefore, the following pages 
will only attempt to give a general overview of this instrument and will draw some 
general conclusions and observations with regard to the role of INTERREG in the 
development  of  the  legal  instruments  for  cooperation  between  foreign  territorial 
communities.
After an experience of almost 10 years, the last phase of INTERREG (2000-
2006)203 saw the  conclusive  definition of  the  three areas of  intervention,  namely, 
strand A, B and C, which influenced the conceptual subdivision of the terminology 
related to trans-European cooperation.  According to  the Commission's  guidelines, 
cross-border cooperation (strand A) concerns neighbouring authorities, adjacent to a 
common border,  and  it  is  intended  to  develop  cross-border  economic  and social 
centres  through  joint  strategies  for  sustainable  territorial  development204; 
202 See Communication from the Commission to the Member States of 28 April 2000 laying down 
guidelines for a Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage 
harmonious and balanced development of the European territory - Interreg III, OJ C 143, 23.5.2000, p.  
6–29.
203 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds.
204 Priority is given to the following objectives: promotion of cross-border urban, rural and coastal 
development; development of entrepreneurial spirit and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
tourism, local development and employment initiatives (LDEI); creating an integrated labour market 
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transnational cooperation (strand B) concerns national, regional and local authorities 
and aims to promote a higher degree of territorial integration across large groupings 
of European regions, with a view to achieving sustainable, harmonious and balanced 
development in the Community and better territorial integration with candidate and 
other neighbouring countries205; interregional cooperation (strand C), concerning the 
whole Community territory, is intended to improve the effectiveness of policies and 
instruments for regional development and cohesion through networking, particularly 
for  regions  whose  development  is  lagging  behind  and  those  undergoing 
conversion206. With regard to this tripartite terminological background it is worth to 
propose a brief observation. The intention to divide the INTERREG programming 
arrangement is connected to the structural target of the Community policy, but has 
nothing to do with a clear theoretical classification of territorial cooperation per se, 
nor  it  has  some  consequences  for  the  legal  distinction  of  different  forms  of 
cooperation.  In  particular,  while  this  tri-partition  has  become  a  traditional  and 
familiar classification within the cohesion policy, it creates some confusions from a 
strictly legal-terminological point of view.
About the procedures of implementation of INTERREG and with regard to 
the actors of the different programmes, a differentiation has to be made. On the one 
hand, the issue of so-called eligibility concerns the individuation of the territories 
admitted  for  the  funding;  on  the  other  hand  the  actors  of  cooperation  could  be 
available  among  institutional  territorial  authorities  (national,  regional  or  local) 
without forgetting the possible participation of other subjects like economic or social 
partners207. In this perspective, it is important to spend a few words about the eligible 
and  promoting  social  inclusion;  cooperation  on  research,  technological  development,  education, 
culture, communications, health and civil protection; environmental protection, energy efficiency and 
renewable  energies;  basic  infrastructure  of  cross-border  importance;  cooperation  in  the  legal  and 
administrative fields; cooperation between citizens and institutions; and technical assistance.
205 Main objectives are: territorial development strategies; development of efficient and sustainable 
transport systems and improved access to the information society; promotion of the environment and 
sound  management  of  cultural  heritage  and  natural  resources,  in  particular  water  resources;  and 
technical assistance for the establishment of transnational partnerships.
206 See  Communication from the Commission to the Member States of 28 April 2000 laying down 
guidelines for a Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage 
harmonious and balanced development of the European territory - Interreg III, 2000/C 143/08, p. 3-5. 
The objectives of strand C are settled in a specific document (Commission Communication to the 
Member  States  of  7  May  2001  -  "Interregional  cooperation"  -  Strand  C  of  the  INTERREG  III 
Community initiative, C(2001) 1188 final - Official Journal of 15.5.2001)
207 Non-governmental  organisations  and  the  academic  world  are,  according  to  the  Commission, 
examples of non-institutional partners.
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territories.  For  cross-border  cooperation  (strand  A)  the  eligible  areas  are  all  the 
NUTS III208 level along internal or external Community borders209. For transnational 
cooperation (strand B) the eligible areas are made up among groups of regions and 
for interregional cooperation (strand C) the whole of the Community is eligible. As 
far as the three kinds of cooperation could be conceptually quite different in relation 
to  the  territories  concerned and in  relation  to  the  types  of  relations  between the 
authorities involved, from a strictly legal point of view the related instruments and 
procedures  do  not  really  basically  change,  being  the  Member  States  always 
concerned in the phase of the programming. 
Another  relevant  aspect  concerns  the  individuation  of  the  institutional 
authorities responsible for the programming. The Commission's guidelines provides 
for the following allocation: the regional or local authorities in partnership with the 
national authorities (Strand A); the national authorities in close cooperation with the 
regional  or  local  authorities  located  in  the  geographical  area  where  transnational 
cooperation is  to  take place (Strand B); and only the national  authorities (Strand 
C)210.
Generally speaking,  the INTERREG III,  as  last  and most  complete phase, 
individuates some common aspects and principles as guidelines for the development 
of the three strands of programmes. The principle of  coherence  with the domestic 
policies of Member States and the principle  of  complementarity with the general 
provisions  of  the  Structural  Funds  permit  a  balanced  Community  action.  The 
208 According to the Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of  a common classification of territorial  units  for  statistics 
(NUTS), the level of NUTS III corresponds to the following existing administrative units: for Belgium 
"arrondissementen/arrondissements", for Denmark "Amtskommuner", for Germany "Kreise/kreisfreie 
Städte", for Greece "nomoi", for Spain "provincias", for France "départements", for Ireland "regional 
authority regions", for Italy "province", for Sweden "län" and for Finland "maakunnat/landskapen". 
Furthermore, as a clarification the Regulation affirms, at art. 3, that if for a given level of NUTS no 
administrative units of a suitable scale exist in a Member State, in accordance with the criteria referred  
to in paragraph 2,  this NUTS level shall  be constituted by aggregating an appropriate  number of 
existing smaller contiguous administrative units. This aggregation shall take into consideration such 
relevant criteria as geographical, socio-economic, historical, cultural or environmental circumstances. 
Regarding the employment of the concept of NUTS in relation to the eligible territories for cross-
border cooperation, while a positive aspect could be referred to the homogeneity and balance between 
the areas interested for the various programmes, a negative aspect concerns the potential difficulty to 
overlap the territorial division with the correspondent and suitable institutional subject. 
209 In particular, according to the Commission's guidelines, all the internal and external areas along 
the borders and certain maritime areas are eligible. See Annex I to the Commission's Communication 
2000/C 143/08.
210 See at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24204_en.htm.
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principle  of  programming  invites  regions  or  other  territories  involved  in  the 
cooperation to present the Commission a so-called Community Initiative Programme 
(CIP) “defining their joint development strategy and demonstrating the cross-border 
value added by the operations planned”211, whereas the principle of partnership calls 
for a bottom-up approach to develop shared actions among national, regional and 
local authorities and the other economic and social partners. These two principles 
have, then, to be considered together with the fact that every programme needs to be 
carried on by a single managing authority, which shall be the referent for the entire 
the programme. Moreover, the development of these kind of Community initiatives 
has the important merit to spread the methodology of agreements and coordination 
between public subjects212.
According  to  these  general  references,  it  is  possible  to  observe  how 
INTERREG, in particular the third and more advanced phase, is something more 
than a system of funding and an economical resource. As far as it is true that the local  
and regional communities don't find a new instrument for developing autonomous 
actions and initiatives, it is also true that INTERREG could be considered as as a 
benchmark for the elaboration of specific relations between territorial communities 
within a Community initiative213. As some doctrinal contributions notice, a negative 
character  of  INTERREG  could  be  individuated  in  the  excessive  involvement  of 
central national powers with regard to the establishment of the different forms of 
cooperation. In this sense, the strict supervision of the State could represent a kind of 
obstacle for an autonomous development of sub-national cooperation and decision-
making214. As far as such an observation is concerned, one reason could be found in 
211 See at:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24204_en.htm.
212 See N. BASSI, Gli accordi fra soggetti pubblici nel diritto europeo, cit., p. 59-60.
213 With regard to the possibility of managing determinate objectives within regional policy and the 
structural funds, the Commission proposed the legal instrument of the so-called “tripartite contracts” 
as a more advanced form for territorial policies between European Community, Member States and 
the  respective  local  and  regional  authorities.  See  the  Communication  from  the  Commission,  A 
framework for target-based tripartite contracts and agreements between the Community, the States and 
regional and local authorities, COM (2002) 709 final.
214 See J. GABBE, V. VON MALKUS ET AL., Cooperation between European border regions: review and 
perspectives, Baden-Baden, 2008, p. 49: “As the implementation of INTERREG-programmes […] is 
still often heavily influenced by the national level, the flexibility needed to meet the special priorities 
of different border regions is often lacking. The lack of regionalisation in these programmes is clearly 
noticeable. In recent years, it has been possible to achieve gradual improvements in these areas. By 
means of the principles of partnership and solidarity, several border regions were increasingly brought 
into the decision-making process […]”.
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the technical-economic content of the structural policy that has not necessarily to do 
with  the  pressing  or  innovative  aspects  of  cooperation  among regional  and  local 
communities215.
So far, a kind of double role of INTERREG has been pointed out. On the one 
hand,  this  Community initiative  has  widely contributed  to  the  establishment  of  a 
quite  long  experience  of  trans-European  cooperation,  even  in  partnership  and 
partially on behalf of territorial communities; on the other hand, the possibilities for 
sub-national authorities to take part and drawing up operational programmes vary. In 
this sense, this specificity of INTERREG brought, as a consequence, to deficiencies 
or delays in the legal treatment of inter-regional cooperation216. 
An indicative and more general symptom of this question is the lack or the 
delay of an explicit provision in the primary and secondary Community legislation 
regarding  the  role  and  legitimacy  of  regional  and  local  authorities  within  the 
Community  legal  system.  Such  a  situation  is  also  related  to  the  INTERREG 
programming and it  is,  however,  clearly in line and coherent with the provisions 
contained in Article 159 TEC, where the implementation of the cohesion objectives 
entailed in Article 158 and the related responsibility of the economic choice and of 
the  allocation  of  financing  resources  are  charged  to  the  conjunct  actions  of  the 
Member  States  and  the  Community217.  In  this  perspective  it  is  quite  easy  to 
comprehend  why  the  role  of  the  sub-national  authorities  in  the  INTERREG 
programmes is concentrated more in the concrete realization of projects rather than 
in  the  preliminary  decision-making  phase  and  in  the  adoption  of  proper  legal 
acknowledgments for territorial communities.
Although the INTERREG programmes hasn't developed a significant legal 
systematization in the field of trans-European cooperation, however they represent a 
set  of  financial  and  economic  resources  that  have  to  be  seen  as  a  parallel  and 
complementary instruments with regard to the legal ones218.
215 See K. SODUPE, The Euroepan Union and Inter-regional Co-operation, in F. ALDECOA, M. KEATING 
(eds.), Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, cit., p. 74. See 
also M. JOUEN, La cohésion territoriale, de la théorie à la pratique, Paris, 2009, p. 29.
216 Ibid., p. 74-78.
217 See  P. LÉGER, Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE, cit., p. 1286.
218 In this regard, the economic contribution and the financial means should not be considered as to 
the detriment of proper legal solutions. Namely, the funding resources are as much important as the 
legal certainty. With a metaphor, the legal instruments represent the essential skeleton of the body-
structure of cross-border cooperation, while the economic resources represent its nutrition.
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Moreover, the INTERREG experience lead, progressively and unconsciously, 
to the new conception of territorial cooperation219. Namely, considering the territory 
of the Union as a common space within the purposes of cohesion, the main attention 
is  not addressed towards the frontier,  but to the territory itself.  In this sense, the 
frontiers  cease  to  be  the  prominent  element  related  to  the  field  of  cooperation, 
whereas the territories become the principal factors. Territorial cooperation has seen 
a slow development in the sense of integration. Also from the legal point of view, the 
adoption, after the long INTERREG phase, of the EGTC Regulation symbolizes a 
real change in the form of epilogue for transfrontier cooperation as a legal taboo-
matter, with the subsequent designation of territorial cooperation.
5.3. Community instruments for external cross-border cooperation 
The European programmes fostering cohesion and, consequently, territorial 
cooperation,  take also into consideration  the  issue  of  the  external  borders  of  the 
Community.  Namely,  if  the  achievement  of  a  more  equilibrate  and  cohesive 
European territory is one of the most relevant concerns for the European institutions, 
even the development of relations with third countries or entities belonging to other 
countries plays a significant and strategic role for the European Union. As for the 
establishment of the programming phase of INTERREG, cross-border cooperation 
toward the external borders of the Community, in particular to the Eastern borders, 
has been developed throughout specific programmes and projects. 
Neither the internal, nor the external cross-border cooperation has originally 
made  use  of  proper  legal  instruments;  rather  the  EU  programming  phase  has 
strengthened institutional and administrative structures that encouraged cooperation 
and  that  opened  the  way  for  the  further  development.  The  reason  for  this  brief 
mention of the EU external programmes resides in the relevance that this kind of 
relations play also with regard to the new instrument of the European Grouping of 
Territorial  Cooperation (EGTC). In fact,  the possibility to include in cross-border 
cooperation territorial communities or authorities belonging to third countries, seems 
to  have  its  precursor  in  the  various  programmes  and  projects  that  have  been 
219 See  INTERACT, Study on organisational aspects of cross-border INTERREG programmes - Legal 
aspects and partnerships, 2006, p. 30 et seq.
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developed before the last phase of cohesion policy 2007-2013. This last phase have 
recently systematized and substituted the previous instruments. 
The mostly known experiences of Phare CBC220, Tacis CBC221, Cards222 and 
Meda223 started a cooperation along the European borders that is now comprehended 
within the territorial objectives of the new cohesion policy224. More in general, these 
former experiences opened the way to the inclusion of subjects belonging to third 
countries  in cross-border cooperation.  Such an issue is  particularly sensitive with 
regard  to  the  legal  basis  for  the  participation  of  “external”  local  and  regional 
authorities to the territorial instruments of the EU. Namely, as it has been pointed out 
about the CoE's Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention and as it will be 
discovered about the EC Regulation on the EGTC, the participation of sub-national 
authorities of third countries represents a challenging and debated argument.
As  it  has  been  already  concluded  for  the  INTERREG,  the  mentioned 
instruments for cross-border cooperation have an economic/promotional nature and 
do not  represent  suitable  legal  instruments  for  sub-national  authorities.  However, 
these instruments have created the basis for building up mutual trust and a potential 
political good attitude towards regional and local cross-border activities225. And this 
is a kind of prerequisite for the effective implementation of legal means.
220 The  programme  Phare  cross-border  cooperation  has  been  established  in  1994  and  aimed  to 
develop  cooperation  with  the  Eastern  Europe  candidate  countries  in  order  to  reduce  the 
marginalisation of the border areas and the respective territorial  communities. Main projects have 
been financed in the field of infrastructures and economic development. The programmes have been 
renewed in correspondence to the Interreg phasing and lasted until 2006. From the year 2000 all the 
frontier regions between the EU and the European Eastern countries have been covered.
221 Tacis CBC, set up in 1996, finances activities related to the European borders of the Russian 
Federation,  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Moldova.  It  dealt  mainly  with  infrastructures,  environment  and 
transfrontier  cooperation  at  local  level.  This  programme has  not  been coordinated with the  other 
cohesion programmes.
222 Crads has been adopted in 2000 and deals with cross-border, transnational  and trans-regional 
cooperation in the frontier zones of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, etc.).
223 Meda provides for measures of financing and technical instruments concerning Mediterranean 
third countires.
224 See  COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS,  La  coopération  transeuropéenne  entre  collectivités  territoriales, 
Bruxelles,  2001, p.  62-65; see also  ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS,  LACE PHARE CBC 
Practical Manual, Gronau, 2000.
225 “Despite difficulties and in some cases also reservations in the candidate countries, cross-border 
cooperation gradually became a routine, even in areas that were particularly affected as a result of 
historical developments”, see J. GABBE, V. VON MALKUS ET AL., Cooperation between European border  
regions: review and perspectives, cit., p. 33.
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5.4. Other Community legal instruments for cooperation's purposes
As long as the EU/EC didn't provide for a suitable ad hoc instrument for the 
development of transfrontier relations under the framework of the Community legal 
order, other existing tools have been utilized in order to develop cooperation across 
the  borders.  The  references  go  in  this  case  to  the  European  Economic  Interest 
Grouping  (EEIG)  and  to  the  European  Cooperative  Society  (SCE).  These  legal 
models  developed  under  Community  law  have  been  used  for  cross-border 
cooperation mainly in order to manage specific cross-border projects. 
The legal subjects concerned have been created both through a Community 
Regulation and,  therefore,  they aim to overcome the already mentioned obstacles 
deriving from the different national legal systems. Although they are more suitable 
for the activities of SMEs, regional and local communities have made use of the legal  
instruments provided by Community law because of the lack of national uniform and 
proper  legal  models  for  cross-border  cooperation226.  However,  several  aspects 
suggest  that  they  are  not  really  suitable  for  transfrontier  cooperation  between 
territorial  communities,  even  if  they  have  for  sure  some  important  and  positive 
implications. Namely, some basic discrepancies between these legal instruments and 
the  eventual  membership  of  public  law  entities  dissuaded  from  their  massive 
utilization. On the one hand, these instrument have the aim to encourage and promote 
the  constitution  of  transfrontier  structures  and  to  develop  transfrontier  relations 
between legal entities belonging to different States. On the other hand, their major 
economic attitudes are not really appropriate or satisfactory for achieving the main 
targets  of cross-border  cooperation,  which has mainly the scope to pursue public 
interests.  A brief  presentation  of  the  mentioned  instruments  will  permit  a  better 
comprehension of the argument.
a) The European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)
The  EEIG  has  been  established  by  the  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No. 
2137/85227 and aims to facilitate and develop the economic activities of its members 
by fostering an effective cooperation across frontiers228.
226 See COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS,  La coopération transeuropéenne entre collectivités territoriales, cit., p. 
56.
227 OJ L 199 of 31 July 1985. The Regulation entered effectively into force in 1989.
228 See Art. 3 of the Regulation on the EEIG.
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Different subjects can utilize such instrument and can become members in 
order  to  develop  the  concerning  activities:  as  it  has  been mainly  created  for  the 
cooperation  between  enterprises,  it  is  also  open  for  the  participation  of  public 
subjects mainly with regard to the provision of services. For these purposes, also 
territorial communities are potentially allowed to participate in such structures. In 
this regard,  public  territorial  authorities act  more as private  actors than as public 
representative bodies.  As such, the EEIG is a not-for-profit structure,  but aims at 
fostering the economic activities of its members at transnational level. Anyway, the 
EEIG displays some inconvenients concerning the implementation of transfrontier 
cooperation and concerning the involvement of sub-national territorial authorities229. 
Namely, its scope of action is principally devoted to economic objectives. In 
this regard, the EEIG is mostly linked to private law and is barely connected with the 
interests of public institutions such as regional and local authorities230. In particular, 
legal relations with third parties remain submitted to private law and the economic 
functions present some limits in order to manage resources such as the INTERREG 
funds231. 
Rather than a general legitimation to take part in a trans-national structure, the 
limitations for sub-national territorial authorities to get involved in an EEIG resides 
in  the mere  private/economic scope.  Public  authorities cannot,  in  general,  confer 
their competences, functions and responsibilities to a legal entity of this kind. 
229 In this regard, the EC Regulation No. 1082/2006 on the EGTC explicitly affirms, at paragraph 4 
of the preamble,  the inadequacy of  the Community law to grant  the possibility  to create suitable 
structures  for  territorial  cooperation:  “The  existing  instruments,  such  as  the  European  economic 
interest  grouping,  have proven ill-adapted to  organising structured cooperation under INTERREG 
initiative during the 2000-2006 programming period”. 
230 “Un deuxième élément qui restreint leur usage pour la coopération transfrontalière est la relation 
juridique particulière qu'ils entretiennent avec le tiers et les organismes de droit public, qui ne peuvent 
être  soumis  qu'à  une  législation  nationale  spécifique  et  non  être  contrôles  par  le  membres  du 
groupement. Cependant, lorsque tels organismes sont engagés  dans des relations gouvernées par le 
droit privé, la règle du contrôle direct par la loi nationale ne s'applique plus. Dans ce cas, la relation 
juridique relève en premier lieu du contrat instituant le groupement et ensuite de la réglementation 
communautaire, le droit national n'intervenant que lorsque ces deux options on été épuisées. N'étant 
pas  possibles  en droit  national,  les relations  entre  tiers  nécessiteraient  de  la  création d'un nouvel 
organe représentatif. Il s'agit là d'un handicap majeur pour l'utilisation des GEIE dans la cadre de la 
coopération  transfrontalière,  car  ils  ne  pourront,  à  moins  d'en  passer  par  la  création  d'une  autre 
structure,  assumer  la  gestion  d'un  grand  programme  de  coopération,  laquelle  impliquerait  très 
probablement  des  contacts  avec  des  tierces  parties  de  droit  public.” , see  COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS,  La 
coopération transeuropéenne entre collectivités territoriales, cit., p. 57. 
231 The  same  conclusion  comes  from the  European  Court  of  Auditors,  see:  Cour  des  comptes 
européenne,  Special Report n°4/2004 on the programming of the Community Initiative concerning  
trans-European co-operation –Interreg III, Doc. 14728/04 FIN 521 FSTR 41.
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Moreover, although it may be entrusted with legal capacity232, it doesn't have 
a legal personality and cannot access to the Community funding programmes, so that 
the restrictions to transfrontier cooperation seem to be quite numerous if compared to 
the benefits233.  Despite the mentioned difficulties, some successful examples have 
been carried out, such as:  La Thuile – La Rosière “Sud Mont-Blanc” EEIG for the 
management of ski resorts; The cross-border agency for the Bayonne- San Sebastian 
Eurocity  EEIG;  the Euroregion EEIG,  which associates Brussels,  Flanders,  Kent, 
Wallonia and Nord-Pas de Calais Region; the TRIURBIR EEIG, which associates the 
towns of Castelo Branco (Portugal), Caceres and Palasencia (Spain)234. 
Thus, if the EEIG represents sometimes a kind of flexible instrument for the 
development  of  certain  cross-border  activities,  which  are  mostly  concerned  with 
economic  activities  and  projects235,  it  is  less  appropriate  in  order  to  constitute  a 
general, permanent and overall legal instrument for the establishment of long-lasting 
transfrontier bodies concerned with public interests involved in strictly cross-border 
or territorial cooperation236.
b) The European Cooperative Society (SEC)
The  European Cooperative  Society  (SEC),  established  with  the  Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003237, is another instrument created by Community law 
and aimed at developing transfrontier relations. Of course, the provisions concerning 
232 See  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Terrotorial Cooperation – EGTC –, 
Study carried out by GEPE under the supervision of. Prof: N. Levrat, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 39. One of 
the biggest difficulties which is linked to the establishment of a cross-border structure for cooperation 
is the lack of clear rules on the legal personality of a joint cooperation body. 
233 See the  Communication from the Commission - Participation of European Economic Interest 
Groupings  (EEIGs)  in  public  contracts  and  programmes  financed by public  funds,  COM/97/0434 
final.  The  Commission  has  found  that  the  best  involvement  in  an  EEIG  is  not  devoted  to  the 
conclusion of public contracts or programmes financed by public funds.
234 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Terrotorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., 
p. 40.
235 Other experiences of EEIG with the participation of territorial administrations are: Usse EEIG 
(Union  des  sylviculteurs  du  Sud de  l'Europe);  Ernac  EEIG (Résau  de  régions  européennes  pour 
l'utilisation des technologies de la communication) Eurocorp EEIG; Euro-Institut EEIG (Institut pour 
la  coopeération  régionale  et  l'administration  européenne);  Ecom  EEIG  (European  Chamber  of 
commerce). See COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS, La coopération transeuropéenne entre collectivités territoriales, 
cit., p. 211.
236 See  J. GABBE, V.  VON MALKUS, K. MAHNKOPF, H. MARTINOS,  Institutional aspects of Cross-border  
Cooperation, Gronau 1999, p. 4.
237 OJ L 207 of the 18 August 2003. The Regulation has been supplemented by the Council Directive 
2003/72/EC of  22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute  for  a  European Cooperative  Society with 
regard to the involvement of employees.
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such a structure derive as a consequence of the difficulties encountered in developing 
cross-border activities among cooperatives belonging to different States. 
The existence of different national legislations generates several obstacles for 
business and social activities within the internal market238. Thus, the objectives of the 
SEC Regulation  pursue,  in  particular,  the  conclusion  of  agreements  between  the 
members in order to supply goods or services, or to execute works of the kind that 
the cooperatives normally carry out, or to constitute joint commissions. A SCE may 
also aim at the satisfaction of its members' needs by promoting, in the manner that 
has been mentioned above, their participation in economic activities, in one or more 
SCEs and/or national  cooperatives.  An SCE may conduct  its  activities  through a 
subsidiary.239 With regard to the members, the European cooperative may be formed 
by natural  persons resident in  the Member States,  by private or public law legal 
persons subject to the national law of the Member States, by the merger of already 
existing cooperatives or by the conversion of a cooperative formed under the national  
law  of  a  Member  State  and  if  it  has  had  an  establishment  in  another  Member 
States240. 
As far as this structure is somehow thought for facilitating a certain kind of 
activities and economic relations, it  is quite patent that  it  is not really suitable as 
permanent instrument for the establishment of a transfrontier cooperation's structure 
between  territorial  communities  or  authorities.  In  any  case,  the  development  of 
alternative  and  more  suitable  instrument  for  cooperation  between  territorial 
communities has taken a relevant advantage form the fruitful experiences represented 
by the SEC and by the EEIG, notably with regard to the formulation of common 
legal dispositions, principles and standards for transfrontier activities.
238 See paragraph 10 of the Preamble. Moreover, paragraph 11 affirms: “Cross-border cooperation 
between cooperatives in the Community is currently hampered by legal and administrative difficulties 
which should be eliminated in a market without frontiers”.
239 Article 1, paragraph 3.
240 For the detailed provision, see Art. 2.
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THE EUROPEAN GROUPING OF TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
1. The Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 and the European Cohesion Policy
1.1. Introduction
The  European  Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC)  is  a  legal 
instrument, which enables territorial authorities belonging to different States to create  
a body with legal personality. This legal subject shall be specifically set up for scopes  
of territorial cooperation. From a strictly technical point of view, it would be helpful 
to mention briefly the principal structural element of an EGTC in order to have a first 
idea of this instrument. At a first glance, the new instrument is not radically different 
from the other transfrontier structures that have already been developed. However, 
the EGTC presents undoubtedly some peculiarities that derive mainly from its nature 
of  Community  instrument.  Thus,  the  main  characteristics  of  an  EGTC  are  the 
following. 
An EGTC could be set  up by different  potential  members  such as States, 
regional or local authorities. The possibility to include other subjects is foreseen. An 
EGTC  is  established  by  a  convention  agreed  by  all  the  members.  The  EGTC's 
functions, tasks, organs and internal procedures are governed by a statute drafted and 
subscribed  by  the  members.  An EGTC has  legal  personality,  governed either  by 
public or private law. The legal capacity is accorded under the national law where the 
EGTC has its registered office. The headquarters is located on the territory of an EU 
Member  State.  The  tasks  of  an  EGTC  should  be  conform  to  the  objectives  of 
economic and social cohesion and its competences should comply with the members' 
attributions under the respective national laws. The law applicable to the EGTC, if no  
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or only partial provisions are established by the Regulation, is the national law of the 
Member State where the EGTC has its registered office.
This new tool has been introduced with the Regulation (EC) No 1082/20061 
and  represents  an  innovation  in  the  field  of  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-
national authorities. The EGTC Regulation is part of the package of the EU cohesion 
policy 2007-2013 and has been adopted in the same context of the other instruments 
such as the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the 
Cohesion Fund and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance2. For the first time, 
the Community action within the social and economic cohesion policy provides for a 
directly applicable normative model on territorial cooperation instead of the simple 
allocation  of  funds3.  In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  EGTC 
Regulation is not part of the Structural Funds and, even if it has been approved at the 
same time, it has a different nature. In fact, a first observation concerns the fact that 
the other instruments have a temporary character, while the EGTC Regulation has a 
permanent nature4. However, even if the EGTC is not part of the Structural Funds, it 
is one of the newest and most peculiar  instruments within the cohesion policy in 
order to develop territorial cooperation and regional integration5. As an introductory 
observation, it would be relevant to spend some words remembering the context of 
Community cohesion policy and, in particular, of the territorial cooperation objective 
in order to describe and individuate the background of the EGTC6. 
1 Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on a 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), published in OJEU L210/19, 31.7.2006.
2 See, Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 
on  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  1783/1999, 
Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
European Social Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999, Council Regulation of 14 July 
2004 (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC)  No  1164/94  and  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1085/2006  of  17  July  2006  establishing  an 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).
3 See  M.  PERTILE,  Il  GECT:  verso  un  organismo  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera?,  in  Diritto del commercio internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto interno, 
2005, p. 119.
4 To be precise, as far as an EGTC, as legal, person can have a permanent nature, the Regulation, 
according to Article 17, could be subject to amendments by the 1 August 2011. In any case, by the 
same date the Commission shall forward to the European Parliament and the Council a report on its 
application.
5 General information about EU Cohesion Policy are available at the official website of the European 
Commission, DG Regional Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm.
6 See F. GAETA, La nouvelle politique régionale européenne: mécanismes, acteures et objectifs d'une  
réforme complexe, in Revue française d'administration publique, n. 111, 2004, p. 447-459.
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As already mentioned in the previous chapters, the adoption of the EGTC 
Regulation represents a kind of silent revolution concerning the legal framework of 
territorial cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Community Regulation is the first 
legal  act  that  fixes the living reality of transfrontier  relations in  legal  terms.  The 
genesis of this new tool has to be analysed and evaluated within a larger panorama. 
As  far  as  the  EGTC's  implementation  has  to  be  evaluated  and  analysed  in  its 
individuality, also the general approach of the European policies towards territorial 
cooperation has to be taken into consideration. In fact, the progressive development 
of the EC territorial policy brought to a renewed approach to territorial cooperation 
and to the creation of the new legal instrument. Thus, it is of great importance to give 
some references with regard to the cohesion policy as a wider context, and to the 
related  effects  on  national  and  sub-national  tiers  of  government.  The  following 
paragraphs will not attempt to develop a well-structured and complete analysis of 
cohesion policy or structural  funds, rather they are going to select  some relevant 
issues  in  order  to  describe  some  basic  grounds  of  the  legal  aspects  concerning 
territorial  cooperation  and  to  the  implementation  of  European  integration.  In 
particular,  the  analysis  of  the  territorial  cooperation objective and of  the  broader 
framework of cohesion policy have a fundamental role not only as background of the 
EGTC,  but  also  for  its  effective  implementation.  In  fact,  as  it  will  be  explained 
further on in this chapter, territorial cooperation represents the field of action of an 
EGTC. Thus, the definition and exemplification of this concept is applied to draw the 
limits of the EGTC's action within its tasks.
1.2. The territorial objective of European Cohesion Policy 2007-2013: Community  
“constitutional” implications
a) Before the Lisbon Treaty
Referring to the adoption of the EGTC Regulation, the emerging question 
regards the position of this new instrument  within the context of the Community 
cohesion policy7 and, more in general, within the objectives of the European Union. 
7 L.  ANTONIOLLI,  G.  BENNACCHIO,  F.  LAJOLO DI COSSANO,  Lineamenti  di  diritto  dell’Unione europea, 
Padova, 2005, p. 214 et seq.
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First of all, it is important to focus on the option to consider territorial cohesion and 
territorial cooperation as competences of the European institutions in order to set and 
define some legal standards for cooperation between regional and local communities. 
As it  has  been  remarked  in  the  first  part  of  this  work,  the  concept  of  territorial 
cohesion has been explicitly introduced within the Community primary legal sources 
only  with  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  However,  as  it  has  already  been  remembered,  the 
Community  involvement  in  cross-border  cooperation  is  not  new and it  has  been 
approached through the concept of economic and social cohesion8. In this sense, the 
Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 establishing the EGTC is still linked to the evolution 
of  territorial  cooperation  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  The 
concept of cohesion as a Community objective was not introduced by the original 
TEC  and  its  legal  ground  was  created  only  with  the  SEA,  as  an  object  of  a 
Community policy to be implemented by the European institutions together with the 
Member  States.  The  consolidated  version  of  the  TEC  included  the  concept  of 
economic  and  social  cohesion  within  the  general  principles  of  the  Community. 
Among the Community’s tasks, Article 2 TEU and Article 2 TEC mention explicitly 
the  economic  and social  cohesion,  while  Article  3  TCE, in  order  to  achieve  the 
purposes of the previous article, lists the necessary Community’s activities which 
shall even include the development of economic and social cohesion9.
In regard to this,  it  is  possible to  see a kind of constitutional  prescriptive 
within the Community legal order to achieve a deeper political  integration, rather 
than a mere economic or functional perspective. The concept of cohesion should be 
considered something more than an economic way of eliminating disparities. It shall 
be intended as a method for dealing with the pluralistic nature of the EU. Without 
8 See ESPON Atlas, Mapping the structure of the European territory, Bonn, 2006, p. 9 ss. The European 
territory is various not only from a strictly geographical point of view, but mainly from economical, 
demographical, cultural, functional and regional aspects. See also  G. VIESTI, F. PROTA,  Le politiche 
regionali dell’Unione Europea,  Bologna, 2007, p. 15 ss.  Since the 70s the European Commission 
provided  for  an  increasingly  amount  of  financial  support  and  financial  assistance  for  developing 
regional policy. EC interventions within regional development became stronger and in 1972, during 
the  Paris  summit,  the  political  will  to  create  an  European  Regional  Development  Fund (ERDF) 
emerged for the first time. Based on the promotion of convergence between different regions,  the 
ERDF was set up in 1975 on the legal base of art. 235 ECT (now art. 308). The original budget was 
quite  limited,  but  progressively  increased  with  the  subsequent  EC  enlargements  and  with  the 
consequent augment of regional disparities. With the SEA the Structural Funds found their legal base 
within the new Title V “Economic and Social Cohesion”, further strengthened with the Maastricht 
Treaty.
9 See art. 3, k) TEC.
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representing a  legal  – enforceable  – principle10,  the objective of cohesion can be 
interpreted as a guiding/inspiring principle or as a value, a peculiar character of the 
EU constitutional  phenomenology11 and  a  distinctive  aspect  of  the  supranational 
integration. As far as cohesion constitutes an objective of the Treaties, the question 
that emerges is whether cohesion can be considered only a political objective, which 
doesn’t  necessarily  imply  a  prescriptive  nature,  or  whether  it  has  some  legal 
implications as well. In this regard, it  seems plausible to differentiate among two 
main issues dealing with cohesion policy. 
Firstly,  there  are  some general  provisions,  such  as  the  already  mentioned 
Treaty dispositions, which state the main objectives of the Community interventions. 
This kind of provisions about the necessity to realize the goals of cohesion, while 
they do not represent a binding obligation, play, nevertheless, a kind of constitutional 
role by representing a sort of value-parameter for Community activity. An objection 
to this approach can be easily foreseen in the fact that such principles – as territorial 
integration – cannot be considered in a strictly legal conception, being not-binding 
and  not  jurisdictionally  enforceable  in  their  essence.  However,  a  constitutional 
objective12 doesn’t  really  require  to  be  necessarily  enforceable  while  being  a 
10 M.L. FERNANDEZ ESTEBAN,  Constitutional Values and Principles in the Community Legal Order, in 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1995, 2, 2, p. 131, gives a clear explanation 
of the legal distinction of ‘principles’ and ‘values’: “Values and principles differ in that the essence of 
principles expresses an ‘ought to be’ proposition, while values express ‘what is good’”. According to 
this statement the concept of cohesion is to be intended more as a principle than as a value, in the 
sense that it does not represent an obligation, but an element of exclusive positive worth, which can 
also embody an objective to achieve. 
11 See R. BIN, P. CARETTI, Profili costituzionali dell’Unione europea, Bologna, 2005, p. 145.
12 Speaking about constitutional issues within the EU could require to introduce a digression about 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  constitutional  order  of  the  EU.  Given  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
constitutional nature of the EU legal order, both by scholars and by the European Court of Justice, it 
seems to be acceptable to justify the use of such a concept. Being aware that there are even dissenting 
views, relevant literature give a theoretically grounded validation of the “constitutionality” of the EU 
system.  See J.H.H.  WEILER,  The  Constitution  of  Europe,  Cambridge,  1999,  J.C.  PIRIS,  L’Union 
européenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il une?, in Revue trimestrielle du droit européen, n. 
4, Oct.-Déc. 1999, p. 599 ss., G. DE BÚRCA, J. SCOTT, Constitutional Change in the EU, Oxford, 2001, 
G . ZAGREBELSKY (cur.),  Diritti e Costituzione nell’Unione europea, Roma-Bari, 2003,  R. TONIATTI, F. 
PALERMO, M. DANI (eds.), An Ever More Complex Union. The Regional Variable as a Missing Link in  
the  EU  Constitution?,  Bolzano,  2004,  R.  TONIATTI,  F.  PALERMO (cur.) ,  Il  processo  di  
costituzionalizzazione  dell’Unione  europea.  Saggi  su  valori  e  prescrittività  dell’integrazione 
costituzionale sovranazionale, Trento, 2004, F. PALERMO, La forma di Stato dell’Unione europea. Per 
una  teoria  costituzionale  dell’integrazione  sovranazionale,  Padova,  2005.  About  the  ECJ 
jurisprudence,  it’s  worth  to  mention the well  known judgement  of  23 April  1986  “Les  Verts” v.  
European Parliament,  C-294/83, in  Racc.,  p.  I-1339,  where the Court  defines  the EC Treaties as 
“European constitutional charter”.
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programmatic  value  and a  hierarchic  parameter  for  other  normative  settings13.  In 
regard to  this,  the EU objectives, as embodied within the Treaties14,  represent  an 
element of constitutional phenomenology and make the EU legal order an entity with 
a tendency to achieve general purposes15.
Secondly, cohesion policy is equipped with a specific legal framework, which 
directly provides methods and procedures to allocate financial resources such as the 
Structural  Funds.  Furthermore,  even actions that are not comprehended under the 
Structural  Funds  can  be  undertaken.  Economic  resources  coming  from  the 
Community  level,  since  they  do  not  really  touch  the  constitutional  structure  of 
Member States, nevertheless introduce Community interventions directly within the 
sub-national  level.  Consequently,  territorial  issues  don’t  necessarily  depend  on 
national resources.
The legal base of cohesion policy has been firstly set down in Articles 158-
162 TEC16, which explicitly allow specific actions of the European institutions in this 
sense. The objectives of cohesion policy are foreseen in order to promote the overall 
harmonious development of the Community and to reduce disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions17. Originally these norms didn't provide 
for  an  explicit  or  direct  mention  of  the  territorial  dimension  of  cohesion. 
Nevertheless the territorial aspect has been one of the most relevant concerns with 
reference to the regional integration. At this step of the analysis, an observation is 
necessary. The Community territorial dimension and the peculiar field of territorial 
cooperation between local and regional authorities is now a consolidated reality. But, 
in  the  past,  Community  interventions  have  been  limited  to  a  kind of  soft  action 
without a defined legal  reference.  However, the objective of economic and social 
13 “Perhaps some form of constitutional background must emerge, not in the sense of a constitution of 
a  European  mega-state,  but  in  the sense of  a  constitution acknowledging the different  spheres  of 
individuals, regions and states.”, see R. SCHOBBEN, ‘New governance’ in the European Union: a cross-
disciplinary comparison, cit., p. 53.
14 See Art. 2 and Art. 3 TEC. 
15 According to that, cohesion policy has to be considered as a clear example of the spill over of the 
mere economic conception of EU integration. See M.L. FERNANDEZ ESTEBAN, Constitutional Values and 
Principles in the Community Legal Order, cit., p. 129 ss.
16 Title XVII, Economic and Social Cohesion.
17 General objectives and purposes of Economic and Social Cohesion are set in art. 158 TEC, which 
states as follows: “In order to promote its overall harmonious development,  the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In 
particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas”.
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cohesion has been interpreted in the sense of including also a territorial dimension, 
thus, giving the ground for a territorial approach. The reasons of this phenomenon 
are  multiple  and  complex.  In  particular,  even  if  the  Community  “constitutional” 
system somehow justifies the development of interventions in the field of territorial 
cooperation, the institutional approach has demonstrated to be prudent. Namely, the 
territorial cooperation has spread out without an explicit legal recognition within the 
Treaties through soft measures, such as the funding initiatives18. The adoption of the 
EGTC  Regulation  represents,  thus,  an  innovative  approach,  which  is  essentially 
based in the principle of subsidiarity.
As the regional and local component are linked to the national constitutional 
orders of Member States, Community policies,  which directly deal with sub-state 
entities, are quite a sensitive issue. In these terms, although the Community does not 
have direct  competences in relation to interventions on regional and local  levels, 
Community policies do have a high influence on sub-national territories as objects of 
the  concrete  involvement  within  the  cohesion  policy  and,  consequently,  these 
policies  have  an  indirect  impact  on  the  domestic  system  of  Member  States19. 
Actually, such an issue has strong connections with the exercise of the principle of 
subsidiarity,  as  already  said20.  Namely,  if  Member  States  are  often  detractors  of 
supranational implications within sub-national affairs, it is possible to argue that a 
policy of cohesion – be it economic, social or territorial – is better achievable if faced  
from  the  Community  level21.  In  fact,  the  aim  to  achieve  a  balanced  level  of 
development  within  Europe  requires  a  wider  approach  if  compared  to  Member 
States’ exclusive and isolated actions22.
18 The  construction  of  the  European  constitutionalism has  evolved through both  'soft'  and  'hard' 
regulatory mechanisms. In particular, the almost recent concept of multilevel governance deals with 
these  factors.  See  S.  VELLUTI,  Experimental  Forms  of  'New'  Governance  and  the  Paradoxes  of  
European Legal Integration,  in  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The Contributions to the 2008 Ateliers, 
February 2009, p. 158.
19 This reflection emerged from the contribution of M. Magrassi about the role of sub-state entities 
within the context of  EU territorial  cohesion policy  during the International  Workshop on Cross-
Border Cooperation in Europe, Faculty of Law, University of Trento, 3-4 November 2008.
20 “Reflections on the future of cohesion policy”, D. Hübner’s speech at the Conference on the future 
of cohesion policy organised by Slovenian Presidency of the EU, Maribor, 7 April 2008.
21 See G. SORRENTE, La politica di coesione dell’Unione europea per il periodo 2007-2013: Lo stato  
dei  lavori,  in  Le Istituzioni  del  Federalismo,  6.2002, p.  1095. See also  P.  GARCIA,  D.  HUET,  Vers 
l'Europe des Eurorégions? L'objectif de “cohesion territoriale”, in Revue du Marché commun et de  
l'Union européenne, 2005, n. 249, septembre, p. 499-502.
22 See  the  Preamble  of  Regulation  1083/2006,  par.  25:  “Since  the  Convergence,  Regional 
competitiveness  and  employment,  and  European  territorial  cooperation  objectives  cannot  be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States by reason of the extent of the disparities and the limit o 
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As mentioned above, the tasks related to territorial cooperation within the EU 
are part of the more general context of the European cohesion policy, in which the 
traditional role is represented by economic and social cohesion. Thus, current EU 
territorial policies have to be read within the perspective of the cohesion policy 2007-
201323 and the respective financing tools such as the Structural Funds (ERDF and 
ESF) and the Cohesion Fund24.  General  provisions about objectives and financial 
contributions of cohesion policy are laid down by the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1083/200625, also known as General Regulation, which represents a very complex 
and composite legal basis for financial instruments in order to give effectiveness to 
political purposes. 
Economic, social and territorial factors are directly connected to each other, 
all  representing  one  side  of  the  general  objective  of  welfare,  stability  and 
development  in  Europe.  According  to  this  view,  the  issue  of  cohesion26 among 
the financial resources of the Member States and regions eligible under the Convergence objective and 
can therefore be better achieved at Community level through the multiannual guarantee of Community 
finance  which  allows  cohesion  policy  to  be  concentrated  on  the  Community’s  priorities,  the 
Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 
5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article,  this 
Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.”
23 Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 presents relevant elements of simplification in respect to the previous 
period 2000-2006. As the main aim of CP is that of reducing disparities, the re-launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy  brought  to  a  necessary  rationalisation  of  the  objectives  and  instruments  for  reaching 
cohesion.  Namely,  objectives  and  financial  instruments  are  reduced  and  clarified.  CP 2007-2013 
comprehends 3 objectives to be achieved within the time period, which can be financed by other 3 
kind  of  instruments:  Convergence  (financed  by  ERDF,  ESF  and  Cohesion  Fund),  Regional 
competitiveness and employment (financed by ERDF and ESF) and European territorial cooperation 
(financed  by ERDF).  See  Communication from the  Commission to  the European  Parliament,  the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Member 
State and Regions delivering the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs through EU cohesion policy, 
2007-20013, COM(2007) 798 final.
24 ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) and ESF (Social Fund) are part of the so called 
Structural  Funds  together  with  other  financing  instruments  (such  as  the  European  Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), which are not 
part of Cohesion Policy. The Cohesion Fund is not part of Structural Funds and is set under the terms 
of Article 130d of the EC Treaty to provide financial help for projects in the fields of environment and 
transport infrastructure. Finance from the Fund goes only to the four poorer Community countries, the 
aim being to reduce the disparities between the EU members’ economies, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/glossary/glossary_en.htm.
25 Council Regulation (EC) No  1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European  Regional  Development  Fund,  the  European  Social  Fund  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, published in OJEU L 210/51 31.7.2006.
26 It is relevant to stress the difference between the concept of cohesion, which is associated with the 
political dimension, and the concept of convergence, which is dealing with the economic dimension; 
see A. BRUZZO, Le politiche strutturali della Comunità Europea per la coesione economica e sociale,  
Padova 2000, p. 35 ss.
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territories  is  another  way  to  speak  about  equality,  non-discrimination  and 
integration27. 
Territorial cooperation28, as an explicit policy objective, has been introduced 
for the first time within the agenda 2007-201329 and has been raised to the level of an 
autonomous objective with greater visibility and clearer legal basis covering 2,5% of 
the whole financial  resources allocated for the entire cohesion policy30.  The main 
interest of the European institutions is still coherent with the initiative of the previous 
INTERREG programmes. Namely,  the major  concern aims to  avoid that national 
frontiers hinder the balanced development and the integration within the European 
territory.  The  objective  of  territorial  cooperation  is  divided  into  three  different 
aspects,  which  refer  to  the  traditional  distinctions  of  cooperation  across  national 
borders. Namely, territorial cooperation is composed by cross-border, transnational 
and  interregional  cooperation31.  Although  the  management  of  finance  resources 
assigned to territorial cooperation is handled, according to the additionality principle, 
by the Commission and the Member States, also the regional authorities have some 
role with regard to the designation of territorial priorities32, thus seeking to create an 
effective system of multilevel governance33.
A major commitment of the cohesion policy is represented by the necessity to 
reduce  social  and  economic  disproportions  between  different  regions  or  groups 
27 See  G.  MOFFA,  Coesione  europea  e  sviluppo  locale.  Le  politiche  comunitarie  di  promozione  
territoriale, Roma, 2005, p. 21.
28 For  the  official  EC  text  “[t]he  European  territorial  cooperation  objective  aims  to  reinforce 
cooperation at cross-border, transnational and interregional level. It acts as a complement to the two 
other objectives […]. It aims to promote common solutions for the authorities of different countries in 
the domain of  urban,  rural  and  coastal  development,  the  development  of  economic  relations  and 
setting up of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMSs). The cooperation is centred on research, 
development, the knowledge-based society, risk prevention and integrated water management”, see 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Cohesion  policy 2007-20013, Commentaries and official texts,  Luxembourg, 
January 2007, p. 20-24.
29 European territorial  cooperation substitutes the previous initiatives  of  Interreg III,  URBAN II, 
EQUAL and Leader+.
30 Total available resources for Cohesion Policy 2007-20013 amount to EUR 347.410 billion.
31 See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Cohesion  policy 2007-20013, Commentaries and official texts, cit., p. 
20. Every type of cooperation concerns a different level of territorial tier (corresponding to NUTS 1, 3 
and 3) eligible for cooperation objectives. 
32 See G. SORRENTE, La politica di coesione dell’Unione europea per il periodo 2007-2013: Lo stato  
dei lavori, cit., p. 1099.
33 “[…] Member States are required to draw up a medium-term strategy for the use of the resources, 
to co-finance European aid form national resources, to work in partnership at national, regional and 
local level, and to respect EU laws and policies. These conditions have resulted in the development of 
a shared management system, between the European, national, regional and local level: in short, a 
system of multi-level governance”, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Growing Regions, growing Europe – Fourth 
report on economic and social cohesion, Luxembourg, 2007, p. XIV.
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within the EU34. Thus, given that EU territories are different in nature, the European 
territorial development requires to find the best decisional process and the optimal 
regulatory power in order to draw a “territorial justice”35. As far as the key challenge 
aims  to  ensure  a  balanced  and  sustainable  territorial  development  of  the  EU as 
whole36, the notion of territorial cohesion is necessarily linked with the objective of 
an equilibrate and sustainable development within the Union. 
Although  territorial  cohesion  has  been  developed  as  a  form of  European 
policy, nevertheless its definition remains problematic for several reasons. Namely it 
flows from the focus on eliminating disparities to a stronger attempt of integration of 
regional  and  local  levels37.  One  of  the  most  evident  features,  however,  is  the 
comprehension  of  territorial  cohesion  as  a  process  of  governance,  dealing  with 
multiple actors of government38. As far as public responsibilities and competences 
are allocated between different tiers of government, the participation of sub-national 
subjects within the policy-definition is necessary. In regard to this issue, public actors 
– at supranational, national or sub-national level – are respectively, albeit differently, 
involved in the definition of European territorial policies, hence implying the choice 
of methods and procedures in order to develop a functional organisational structure, 
which can be apt to deal with the tasks of territorial cooperation39. 
Within the concept of multilevel governance40, the legal analysis could find a 
proper role by achieving and establishing effective tools and instruments, procedures 
34 See the glossary of the EU official website at:
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/economic_social_cohesion_en.htm
35 ASSEMBLEA DELLE REGIONI D’EUROPA,  Regioni  e  Territori  in  Europa.  Gli  effetti  territoriali  delle  
politiche europee visti dalle regioni, Strasbourg, 1995, p. 20 ss.
36 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Green Paper  on  Territorial  Cohesion:  Turning  territorial  diversity  into  
strength, COM(2008) 616 final, p. 6.
37 See R. CAMAGNI, The rationale for territorial cohesion: issues and possible policy strategies, in L. 
PEDRAZZINI (ed.), The process of territorial cohesion in Europe, Milano, 2006, p. 53.
38 See ESPON Atlas, Mapping the structure of the European territory, cit., p. 60-61. About an European 
spatial development the concept of governance is often seen as an element of territorial cohesion. As 
spatial planning has always been connected to the power of governments and the exercise of public 
authority, governance represents a different method of doing government. Namely, formal authorities 
are  increasingly  supplemented  by  new  forms  of  participation  and  coordination  within  different 
political fields, as well as on and between different spatial levels.
39 “In this view the EU is a multi-level (supranational, national and sub-national) and multi-actor 
(private and public) system of governance containing highly complex networks for producing policy 
outcomes.”,  see  R.  SCHOBBEN,  ‘New  governance’ in  the  European  Union:  a  cross-disciplinary 
comparison, cit., p. 51.
40 Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil, au Comité Economique et 
Social Européen et au Comité des Régions sur le résultats des négociations concernant les stratégies et 
programmes  relatifs  à  la  politique  de  cohésion  pur  le  période  de  programmation  2007-2013, 
COM(2008) 301, p. 13.
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and structures to enact territorial cooperation. In this sense, Community objectives 
and tasks could be more achievable. Since neither the States' centralistic attitudes can 
give a response to complex issues nor the supranational system has the strength to 
empower their objectives, a “vertically integrated regime” seems to grant the most 
feasible and optimal solutions. 
b) After the Lisbon Treaty
At the conclusion of a problematic process, the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty is going to bring some changes with reference to the EU territorial dimension. 
Namely, the consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union and of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union includes now explicit and clearer 
references  regarding  territorial  cohesion,  introducing  a  new  legal  dimension  for 
territorial cooperation. 
Namely, the new version of the Treaty on the European Union, as amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty,  affirms in Article 341 that “the Union shall  promote economic, 
social  and territorial  cohesion,  and solidarity  among Member States”.  Within the 
framework of such a general principle, the Treaty on the Functioning of the UE, at 
Article  4,  deals  with the  distribution of competences  between the Union and the 
Member States, considering economic social and territorial cohesion as a matter of 
shared competence. In particular, the Title XVIII of the Treaty regards economic, 
social and territorial cohesion (Articles 174-17842). 
As a first observation, it  is possible to say that apparently limited changes 
have  been  brought  to  the  previous  version  of  the  Title  on  economic  and  social 
cohesion43.  What has  to  be pointed out,  however,  is  the introduction of  the  term 
“territorial” within a field of Community action that already new the approach to this 
dimension. In this regard, the inclusion of territorial cohesion within the Treaties is 
not  a  later  justification  in  order  to  legitimize  Community  actions.  Rather,  the 
recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  territorial  dimension  related  to  the  European 
41 Ex Article 2 TEU.
42 Ex Articles 158-162 TEC.
43 Article 174 (ex Art. 158) recognises that a “particular attention shall be be paid to rural areas, areas 
affected  by  industrial  transition,  and  regions  which  suffer  from severe  and  permanent  natural  or 
demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, 
cross-border and mountain regions”.
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cohesion policy represents the importance of the matter as autonomous concept and 
the impossibility to ignore the issues concerned. 
As  far  as  territorial  cohesion  is  now  representing  a  matter  of  shared 
competence  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States,  mechanisms  of  fair 
implementation  about  the  EU  interventions  need  to  be  followed.  Recalling  the 
provisions of the previous versions of the Treaties, the new Article 4 TEU affirms: 
“Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the  Treaties.  The  Member  States  shall  take  any  appropriate  measure,  general  or 
particular,  to  ensure  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  arising  out  of  the  Treaties  or 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.  The Member States shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives”. 
Far from considering this words as vague principles, territorial cooperation 
represents a concrete field where to put such words into practice for the future. In 
particular,  as  it  will  emerge during the analysis  of  the  Regulation on EGTC, the 
principle of sincere cooperation has a fundamental role in order to permit an effective  
implementation of EU interventions in the Member States. Besides the principle of 
sincere  cooperation,  another  element  has  to  be  kept  in  mind.  Namely,  Article  4, 
paragraph 2 of the new TEU's version states that the Union shall respect the equality 
of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in 
their fundamental  structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and 
local self-government. In these terms, the Treaties, explicitly mentioning the internal 
structure of Member States, reaffirm the necessary restraint from the intrusion within 
the  national  constitutional  systems'  identity,  but,  at  the  same  time,  identify  sub-
national subjects as relevant entities within the EU system. Territorial cooperation 
represents a sensitive issue in this regard. 
The introduction of the territorial dimension within the Treaties is surely a 
positive aspect. However it is too early to propose an interpretation about the effects 
on the concrete development of territorial cooperation after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty.
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1.3. General legal framework
As already mentioned above, overall provisions about the current cohesion 
policy are defined in the General Regulation 1083/2006. This normative document 
sets out general rules about the financial instruments related to the three cohesion 
policy  objectives.  These  three  objectives  of  cohesion  (Convergence;  Regional 
competitiveness and employment; European territorial cooperation) are financed by 
different  tools,  namely European Regional  Development Fund (ERDF),  European 
Social  Fund  (ESF)  and  Cohesion  Fund.  Funds  are  provided  by  the  European 
Commission through Member States and managed by competent authorities. Other 
specific Regulations deal individually with each kind of fund: Regulation (EC) No 
1080/2006 on the ERDF, Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 on the ESF and Regulation 
No 1084/2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund.
As  an  overall  consideration,  several  academic  studies  show  that  the 
implementing procedures of cohesion policy draw a typical paradigm of multilevel 
governance  and  an  integrated  policy  system  dealing  with  a  vertical  and 
intergovernmental  range  of  institutional  actors44.  This  paragraph  will  take  into 
consideration  the  General  Regulation  with  regard  to  the  objective  of  territorial 
cooperation, as it specifically concerns transfrontier activities45, and some relevant 
aspects of the Regulation on ERDF concerning territorial cooperation in particular. 
Namely,  the  general  objective  of  territorial  cooperation  is  financed  only  by  the 
ERDF46 with the aim of supporting different projects and programmes. Within this 
objective,  the adoption of the EGTC Regulation is  quite  peculiar, as  it  has to be 
collocated outside the funds and the respective implementation doesn't necessarily 
depend from Community funding. 
The procedure for setting and financing cohesion objectives is complex and 
detailed. The General Regulation consists of 108 articles comprehending both overall 
scopes and technical provisions. Regarding the ERDF, a primary procedural issue is 
44 See  A. BENZ AND B. EBERLEIN,  The Europeanization of  regional policies: patterns of  multilevel  
governance, in Journal of European Public Policy, 6:2, 1999, p. 335.
45 See the Preamble of Reg. 1083/2006, par. 4: “The increase in the number of the Community’s land 
and  sea  borders  and  the  extension  of  its  territory  mean  that  the  value  added  of  cross-border, 
transnational and interregional cooperation in the Community should be increased”; and par. 19: “A 
European territorial cooperation objective is to cover regions having land or sea frontiers, the areas of 
transnational  cooperation  being  defined  with  regard  to  actions  promoting  integrated  territorial 
development and support for interregional cooperation and exchange of experience”.
46 Reg. 1083/2006, Art. 4, par. 1, c).
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related to the so called “geographical eligibility”, which is directly connected to the 
destination  of  economical  resource  to  operational  programmes  linked  with  a 
determined geographical area. For every single objective the geographical reference 
is  that  of  NUTS47 levels.  With  reference  to  the  objective  of  European  territorial 
cooperation  the  level  of  NUTS  involved  varies  form  the  type  of  territorial 
cooperation concerned: namely, it  is related to level 3-Regions for the purpose of 
cross-border cooperation48, whereas for transnational cooperation a list submitted by 
the  Commission  should  individuate  the  eligible  regions,  and  for  interregional 
cooperation the entire territory of the Community shall be eligible49.
The  mentioned  geographical  criteria  established  for  the  definition  of 
programmes and the allocation of financial resources leads to a reflection about the 
institutional and administrative systems of the Member States. Namely, the NUTS 
system is based on the internal institutional subdivision of Member States. But, as 
national  systems  differ  in  the  hierarchical  structure  of  sub-national  entities,  the 
European nomenclature tries to find a  standard system for targeting regional  and 
local  tiers  as  areas  which  benefit  from  the  funds.  In  these  terms,  a  common 
delimitation of territorial  units  is  useful  in  order to  reach homogeneous scopes50. 
However,  such  a  territorial  standard  does  not  always  coincide  with  the  proper 
administrative  system  of  a  country,  thus  creating  a  gap  between  the  level  of 
Community interventions and the sub-national administrative authorities. But, more 
than  having  a  legal  significance,  such  a  supranational  involvement  within  sub-
national level seems to develop more a soft principle of cooperation and support, 
without  conferring  to  sub-national  entities  supplementary  powers  and  space  of 
autonomous action.
47 Nomenclature d’Unité  Territoriale  Statistique  indicates  the common classification of  territorial 
units  for  statistical  purposes and find its  legal  framework in  the Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003. 
NUTS  subdivides  Member  States  hierarchically  into  three  levels  (1,  2  and  3)  on  the  basis  of 
population threshold. “Territorial units are defined in terms of the existing administrative units in the 
Member States. An 'administrative unit' marks out a geographical area for which an administrative 
authority  has  power  to  take  administrative  or  policy  decisions  in  accordance  with  the  legal  and 
institutional framework of the Member State.”, see http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/g24218.htm.
48 More specifically Reg. 1083/2006, Art. 7, par. 1, states that “[f]or the purposes of cross-border 
cooperation, the NUTS level 3 regions of the Community along all internal and certain external land 
borders  and all  NUTS 3 level  regions of  the  Community along maritime borders separated,  as  a 
general  rule,  by a maximum of 150 kilometres shall be eligible for financing taking into account 
potential adjustments needed to ensure the coherence and continuity of the cooperation action”. 
49 Reg. 1083/2006, Art. 7.
50 See R.H. WILLIAMS, European Union Spatial Policy and Planning, London, 1996, p. 118.
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Without  giving  advise  of  the  whole  General  Regulation’s  content,  some 
aspects are particularly relevant vis-à-vis the connection among different authorities 
and the respective tasks and responsibilities. One of the main principles about the 
ruling  of  the  funds  is  complementarity,  which  means  that  they  shall  provide 
assistance complementing national actions, including actions at the regional and local  
level, integrating them into the priorities of the Community51. This kind of multi-
dimensional approach shows the particular attitude of such a Community tool, which 
cannot  be  implemented  without  the  coordination  and  cooperation  of  different 
institutional  actors.  The  principle  of  partnership,  intended  as  close  cooperation 
between the Commission and each Member State, is also foreseen as indispensable in 
order to pursue the objectives of the funds52. About the requisite of partnership, also 
sub-state entities and other authorities or bodies should be involved, as competent 
regional,  local,  and urban authorities,  economic  and social  partners,  or  any other 
appropriate  body  representing  civil  society,  environmental  partners,  non-
governmental organisations 53. 
Obviously,  the  principal  and  leading  subjects  together  with  the  European 
Commission are the Member States. The responsibility of designating the competent 
entity  for  managing  the  operational  programmes  is  devolved  to  them54.  Namely, 
Member  States  have  the  duty  of  supervising  the  implementation  of  operational 
programmes  and  shall  provide  all  the  necessary  resources  and  information  for 
granting the functioning of the monitoring system in concert with the Commission55. 
51 Reg. 1083/2006, Art. 9, par. 1. The following paragraphs of the same article set out other important 
principles such as “consistency”, “coordination” and “compliance”. All these factors are single aspects 
of the more general principle of assistance, which is provided as main argument of this group of 
norms. 
52 Ibid., Art. 11, par. 1.
53 Ibid., Art. 11, par. 1.
54 This procedure is composed by a three-phase strategy, which is divided among the main levels of 
implementation  of  the  Funds.  Namely,  according  to  Art.  25-33  of  the  General  Regulation,  the 
Community shall establish strategic guidelines on cohesion, which have to in line with other relevant 
EC policies. Subsequently, Member States shall present their national strategic reference framework, 
which  should  be  consistent  with  Community  priorities.  Thus,  Community  strategy  contains 
determinate policy-choices that limit the discretionarily action of the Member States. It is also relevant 
to mention the fact that, according to Art. 28, the  national strategic reference framework has to be 
taken as prepared after the consultation of relevant actors as referred to in Art. 11. The third phase is 
dedicated to the specific adoption of operational programmes, which should be drawn up by Member 
States  or  competent  authorities  designed  by  Member  States  and  submitted  to  the  European 
Commission  for  approval  (Art.  32).  For  every  single  objective  of  the  Cohesion  Policy  specific 
dispositions are provided. Concerning the European territorial cooperation, Art. 38 states that specific 
rules are laid down in the Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006.
55 Reg. 1083/2006, Art. 47, 48 and 49.
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At  the  same  time  Member  States  have  to  designate  specific  authorities  for  the 
carrying on of the programmes: a managing authority, a certifying authority and an 
audit authority56. These bodies can be selected among national, regional, local public 
authorities or other private bodies in order to create systems of managements and 
controls which operate independently. 
While the primary role and responsibilities are carried out by Member States, 
however,  other  sub-national  entities  are  necessary  for  the  implementation  of  the 
operational programmes. In other words, the objectives of the cohesion policy are 
part of the general scopes of Community policies and the respective procedures are 
laid  down by Community  rules;  these  objectives  pass  through the  strategies  and 
norms of every single Member States for being, at the very end, implemented at a 
sub-state level. Thus, the final target of sub-state levels represents a  condicio sine 
qua non  for the realization and execution of the operational programmes and this 
target shall be considered the living-factor and real scope of the cohesion policy. In 
these terms, territorial cooperation seems to have neither a top-down approach nor a 
bottom up, rather a merge of both of them. 
Since  the  General  Regulation  sets  down the  main  criteria  and  procedures 
related to the funds for cohesion policy, it seems indispensable to spend few words 
about  the  already  mentioned  Regulation  (EC)  No  1080/2006  on  ERDF57 which 
constitutes  the  main  financial  resource  for  the  European  territorial  cooperation 
objective.
The ERDF Regulation lays down general priorities for territorial cooperation, 
rules  related  to  eligibility  of  expenditure  and  specific  provisions  on  operational 
programmes. Beyond the already mentioned main issues of transfrontier nature, like 
tourism, culture, environment and public services, the ERDF may also contribute to 
the  promotion  of  legal  and  administrative  cooperation  across  borders58.  Member 
States are directly and substantially responsible for the overall management of the 
56 Ibid., Art. 59-62.
57 Published in OJEU L 210/1 31.7.2006. “The role of ERDF is to promote investments and correct 
the  main  regional  imbalances  of  the  European  Union.  Priority  financing  is  aimed  at  research, 
innovation, environmental questions and risk prevention, whilst infrastructural investment continues 
to play an important role, notably in the least developed areas. The whole of the general regulation 
being applied to the ERDF, the following regulation only covers the points which differ from the 
general  provisions”,  see  EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Cohesion  policy  2007-20013,  Commentaries  and 
official texts, cit., p. 96.
58 Reg. 1080/2006, Art. 6, pt. 2. 
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programmes and they should designate the competent authorities for administering 
and supervising the programmes. However, Member States cannot be considered as 
the very last beneficiaries of the contributions coming from the ERDF. In fact, the 
development of the regional and local dimension is the main aim of the cohesion 
policy. The target of the Community financial allocations is concerned with a non-
centralized  system  of  integration,  which  implies  a  decentralized  and  collective 
implementation and development of programmes59. Namely, the ERDF has a clear 
intent  of  targeting  specific  territories  that  are  typically  characterized  by 
disadvantages. In this perspective, Community policies are not primarily concerned 
with  the  adoption  of  a  legal  instrument  for  territorial  cooperation  between  sub-
national authorities. The constitutional and administrative national systems have not 
been  touched  in  their  substance  by  the  cohesion  policy,  since  the  Community 
strategies have revealed a kind of objective intention to compensate territorial gaps 
of welfare. Thus, being even criticized for the heavy implication of bureaucracy, the 
funds  assigned  to  cohesion's  objectives  have  certainly  introduced  a  multi-level 
instrument  of  governance60.  Programmes  dealing  with  the  territorial  cooperation 
objective  –  at  cross-border,  transnational  or  interregional  level  –  have  open  a 
dynamic way of regulatory instruments, which developed from supranational to local 
tiers  and vice versa.  Namely,  while  policies  and financial  tools  are  set  down by 
Community  norms,  the  practical  effects  take  action  differently  within  specific 
territories and, through the filter of Member States supervision, go back to EU level 
for a consistency and conformity test.
59 See I. TUROK, J. BACHTLER, Introduction, in J. BACHTLER, I. TUROK, Coherence of Eu Regional Policy:  
Contrasting Perspectives on the Structural Funds, Oxford, 2002, p. 5-6. According to the authors EU 
cohesion  policy  and  respective  Funds  have  a  specific  local  “reach”,  which  is  directed  to  the 
achievement of an horizontal interaction between local and regional levels. In this view the effectively 
of partnership  creates a new concept of governance “based on trust and dialogue rather than central 
control and direction.”
60 J.  BUKOWSKI,  S. PIATTONI,  M. SMYRL,  Introduction,  in  J.  BUKOWSKI,  S. PIATTONI,  M. SMYRL (eds.), 
Between Europeanization and Local Societies:  The Space  for  Territorial  Governance,  New York, 
2003, p. 5, argue that “[…] as a system of European governance evolves around the EU institutions 
and growing body of legislation, member-states political systems are necessarily transformed as they 
are forced to adapt to the impact of European policy making, not only in strictly economic policy 
domains such as the Single Market, but also in other areas such as environmental or social policy. […] 
But there is also growing evidence that all states are increasingly constraints in their decision-making 
ability, as they are forced to comply with EU laws and practices”.
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1.4.  Territorial  cooperation  according  to  Article  6  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1080/2006
The Regulation on ERDF deals with the territorial cooperation objective in 
Article 6. In particular, this article refers to the priorities related to the ERDF, which 
are divided into three basic groups corresponding to the subdivision of territorial 
cooperation, namely cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation. Thus, 
the priorities are the following: 1) the development of cross-border economic, social 
and  environmental  activities  through  joint  strategies  for  sustainable  territorial 
development61; 2) the establishment and development of transnational cooperation, 
including bilateral cooperation between maritime regions not covered under point 1, 
through the financing of networks and of actions conducive to integrated territorial 
development62; 3) reinforcement of the effectiveness of regional policy63. For each 
61 Te list of correspondent activities: a) encouraging entrepreneurship, in particular the development 
of SMEs, tourism, culture, and cross-border trade; b) encouraging and improving the joint protection 
and  management  of  natural  and  cultural  resources,  as  well  as  the  prevention  of  natural  and 
technological risks; c) by supporting links between urban and rural areas; d) by reducing isolation 
through improved access to transport, information and communication networks and services,  and 
cross-border water, waste and energy systems and facilities; e) by developing collaboration, capacity 
and joint use of infrastructures, in particular in sectors such as health, culture, tourism and education. 
In  addition,  the  ERDF  may  contribute  to  promoting  legal  and  administrative  cooperation,  the 
integration of cross-border labour markets, local employment initiatives, gender equality and equal 
opportunities, training and social inclusion, and sharing of human resources and facilities for R&TD.
62 Related activities are: (a) innovation: the creation and development of scientific and technological 
networks, and the enhancement of regional R&TD and innovation capacities, where these make a 
direct contribution to the balanced economic development of transnational areas. Actions may include:  
the establishment of networks between appropriate tertiary education and research institutions and 
SMEs;  links  to  improve  access  to  scientific  knowledge  and  technology  transfer  between  R&TD 
facilities and international centres of RTD excellence; twinning of technology transfer institutions; and 
development of joint financial engineering instruments directed at supporting R&TD in SMEs; (b) 
environment:  water  management,  energy  efficiency,  risk  prevention  and  environmental  protection 
activities with a clear transnational dimension. Actions may include: protection and management of 
river basins, coastal zones, marine resources, water services and wetlands; fire, drought and flood 
prevention; the promotion of maritime security and protection against natural and technological risks; 
and protection and enhancement of the natural heritage in support of socio-economic development and 
sustainable tourism; (c)  accessibility:  activities  to  improve  access  to  and quality  of  transport  and 
telecommunications services where these have a clear transnational dimension. Actions may include: 
investments in cross-border sections of trans-European networks; improved local and regional access 
to national and transnational networks; enhanced interoperability of national and regional systems; 
and  promotion  of  advanced  information  and  communication  technologies;  (d)  sustainable  urban 
development: strengthening polycentric development at transnational, national and regional level, with 
a clear transnational impact. Actions may include: the creation and improvement of urban networks 
and urban-rural links; strategies to tackle common urban-rural issues; preservation and promotion of 
the cultural heritage, and the strategic integration of development zones on a transnational basis.
63 Sector  of  intervention:  a) interregional  cooperation focusing on innovation and the knowledge 
economy and environment and risk prevention in the sense of Article 5(1) and (2); b) exchanges of 
experience  concerning  the  identification,  transfer  and  dissemination of  best  practice  including  on 
sustainable urban development as referred to in Article 8; c) actions involving studies, data collection, 
and the observation and analysis of development trends in the Community.
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filed,  a  list  of  suitable  activities  is  provided  in  order  to  individuate  the  most 
pertaining interventions.  This provision is  useful in order to understand the areas 
where  the  ERDF aims  to  operate  in  order  to  achieve  the  objective  of  territorial 
cooperation.  But,  the  contrary  is  not  true.  Thus,  territorial  cooperation  is  not 
necessarily defined through the priorities of the ERDF. This doesn't necessarily mean 
that the sectors related to territorial cooperation are wider, but it means that territorial 
cooperation could be also something different and could be achieved also through 
other means. Although linked to the ERDF, the focus on these priorities and related 
sectors  of  intervention  or  activities  have  been  interpreted  in  the  sense  that  it 
constitutes a list of the activities concerning the framework of territorial cooperation 
in general. In fact, without a strict legal definition of the sectors covered by territorial 
cooperation it is sometimes difficult to individuate the related sphere of actions in 
order to foresee legitimate fields of intervention. However, Article 6 doesn't provide 
for a catalogue  of enumerated activities allowed in order to  implement  territorial 
cooperation. The mentioned priorities and the related activities are broad. However, 
they do not indicate a comprehensive declination of what territorial cooperation is. 
Establishing the priorities under the ERDF's territorial objective, it represents more 
an indicative framework for the rest of territorial cooperation rather than an obliged 
path to follow. 
The intention of this short digression doesn't aim to persuade that Article 6 is 
useless or misleading, but it  is important to notice that it  is strictly linked to the 
implementation of the ERDF, which is only a part of the territorial cooperation, as it 
will be explained further on with the analysis of the EGTC Regulation.
1.5.  Sub-national  entities  within  the  context  of  EU  Territorial  Cooperation 
Objective: transfrontier legal implications
The European territorial cooperation objective has inherited the experience of 
several years of INTERREG activities. Actually, INTERREG (A, B and C) projects 
and  programmes  have  created  a  flourishing  ground for  transfrontier  cooperation, 
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being at cross-border64, transnational65 and interregional66 level, thus implementing 
the EU policies at sub-national level67. Within the territorial cooperation objective 
nearly seventy, between projects and programmes, have been set up in transfrontier 
areas and with the involvement of sub-national institutions68. However, it has already 
been noticed that, as far as regional and local priorities have been fostered among 
European policies, there is not a real empowerment of transfrontier structures, which 
should  be  properly  and  only  committed  to  transfrontier  issues.  Cross-border, 
transnational  and  interregional  programmes  have  surely  intensified  convergence, 
partnership and territorial  cooperation's  aims,  as  effects  of  these  policies.  In  this 
view,  sub-national  entities  are  directly  involved,  for  example,  as  managing 
authorities or as parties of operational programmes. EU cohesion policy and related 
funds aimed explicitly to involve sub-national actors69. But, Member States remain 
primary subjects of policy-negotiations and policy-making70.
64 An example of cross-border program is Alps-ALCOTRA, located along the French-Italian border; 
Regione Piemonte is the Managing Authority. “The general purpose of the programme is to improve 
the  quality  of  life  of  the  people  living  in  the  area  concerned  and  to  promote  the  sustainable 
development  of  cross-border  economic  and  territorial  systems  through  cooperation  in  the  social, 
economic, environmental and cultural fields”, see
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/italia/crossborder/it03_en.htm.
65 As  further  example  the  Alpine  Space  Programme  is  a  transnational  cooperation  programme 
between Germany,  France,  Italy,  Austria  and  Slovenia  (with participation  from Liechtenstein  and 
Switzerland), which aims at increasing the competitiveness and attractiveness of the alpine space and, 
at the same time, at developing accessibility, connectivity and environment in a sustainable way; see 
www.alpine-space.eu. A complete list of operational programmes, also comprehending third countries 
is available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/transnational/index_en.htm.
66 The  Interreg  IVC  programme,  representing  the  major  element  of  interregional  cooperation, 
enables  EU  regions  to  work  together  and  is  structured  around  two  priorities,  which  address: 
innovation and the knowledge economy, and environment and risk prevention; for more information 
see: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/interregional/index_en.htm.
67 See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  Region as partners. The European Territorial Cooperation Objective, 
Inforegio, No 24, December 2007, p. 7-10.
68 Projects  and  programmes  follow  the  three  different  components  of  Territorial  cooperation 
objective. With regard to cross-border cooperation 52 projects have been launched along internal EU 
borders, while 13 transnational co-operation programmes cover larger areas of co-operation such as 
the Baltic Sea, Alpine and Mediterranean regions; moreover, interregional cooperation programme is 
composed by Interreg IVC and 3 other networking programmes, such as Urbact II, Interact II and 
ESPON,  covering  all  Member  States  of  the  EU.  Detailed  information  and  interactive  maps  are 
available  at:  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/index_en.htm.  A  complete  list  of 
operational programmes, also comprehending third countries is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/search.cfmgv_pay=ALL&gv_reg=ALL&gv_obj=1
1&gv_the=ALL&lan=EN&gv_per=2.
69 See  I.  BACHE,  Europeanization  and Multilevel  Governance:  Cohesion  Policy  in  the  European  
Union  and  Britain,  London,  2007,  p.  49-50  and  I.  BACHE,  Europeanization  and  Multilevel  
Governance: Empirical findings and conceptual challenges,  ARENA Working Papers, No. 16, July 
2008;  C. ROCHE,  Les collectivités territoriales et l'Union européenne,  in  AJDA hebdo: L’Actualité  
juridique. Droit Administratif, 2005, année 61, n. 24 27 juin, p. 1325-1333.
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In these terms, the analysis related to the INTERREG initiative is applicable 
also to the new general objective of territorial cooperation as developed through the 
funds. It has been already mentioned that operational programmes do not create new 
legal structures for cooperation, and do not enlarge sub-national powers in relation to 
territorial objectives. With the provision of a territorial objective within the Structural 
Funds, the Community has continued to support the development of a substantive 
phenomenon,  without  the imposition of particular  legal standards.  With regard to 
this, neither EU policies interfere with the internal constitutional system of Member 
States,  nor  they  produce  changes  within  the  national  allocation  of  powers. 
Consequently,  also  territorial  cooperation  within  cohesion  policy  cannot  literally 
represent  a  proper  legal  instrument  for  sub-national  authorities  to  manage 
autonomous transfrontier/territorial activities. Nevertheless, operational programmes 
created with EU co-financing are an useful administrative instrument for regional 
and local communities in order to increase the number and the experience of cross-
border  activities,  while  administrative  systems  of  public  authorities  belonging  to 
different  countries  remain  unaltered.  Thus,  EU territorial  cooperation  integrate  a 
common  package  of  distinct  operative  programmes,  which  do  not  necessarily 
correspond to a new legal structure of implementation. Indeed, the enactment of the 
territorial objective, as for the previous INTERREG initiative71,  can be developed 
through  the  creation  of  apposite  structures,  but  also  without  them,  just  being 
managed by already existing national administrative authorities. 
Moreover,  while  EU territorial  policy insists  on reducing  the  gaps  among 
disadvantaged regions, cohesion policy doesn't point out through its programming 
initiative an explicit intent to focus the attention on territorial relations between sub-
national  subjects  as  a  peculiar  and  specific  object  of  supranational  legal 
interventions72.  In  this  view,  cross-border  territories  become  part  of  cohesion 
objectives as long as their features do coincide with that of less developed regions 
and not with institutional subjects in the need of more autonomy to manage territorial 
70 See  J. GABBE,  Governance and cross-border co-operation,  Speech on the occasion of the RFO 
Annual  Conference  in  Joensuu,  North  Karelia,  Finland,  March  2005,  p.  3,  available  at: 
http://www.aebr.net/publikationen/pdfs/governancevortragjoensuu.gb.pdf.
71 See  J. GABBE, V.VON MALCHUS, K. MAHNKOPF, H. MARTINOS ET AL. , Institutional aspects of Cross-
border Cooperation,  Gronau, 1999, p. 6-7.
72 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The Status quo of Transeuropean Co-operation between Territorial  
Authorities and the Future Steps that contribute to realise a New Model of European Governance, 
study developed by J. Gabbe, Th. Stumm, Gronau, 2001.
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relations73. However, a very relevant issue is represented by the fact that cross-border 
activities at  regional  or local level are not a priority for Member States with the 
consequence that the intervention at supranational level is fundamental74.
Conclusively, since the EU territorial objective within the ordinary principles 
of  cohesion policy  doesn’t  really  introduce  a  new general  approach to  territorial 
cooperation between sub-national  authorities,  however  it  increases  good practices 
and incentives different administrative and legal systems to collaborate despite the 
differences of political and legal structures75. While different levels of government 
and respective competences are involved, it seems, up to now, that cooperation and 
partnership among different actors can avoid conflicts of competences in order to 
achieve a satisfactory level of integration.
2. The EGTC and its legal framework
2.1. Introduction
The  long  development  of  territorial  cooperation  within  the  EU  policies 
culminates  with  the  adoption  of  a  Community  legislative  act  on  territorial 
cooperation76.  This  is  the  first  legal  document  at  Community  level  concerning 
territorial cooperation as a direct and unique object and, in this perspective, its legal 
peculiarities and the following effects are quite interesting. 
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, set up by the Regulation 
(EC) No 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 200677, 
has  been  adopted  in  order  to  create  a  stable  legal  framework  for  territorial 
73 See  ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS,  Comments  on  the  proposal  of  the  European 
Commission for  a Council  Regulation laying down general  provisions on the European Regional  
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, Gronau, 2004, p. 9-12, where 
an intention to increase the attention on the peculiar aspects of border-regions is firmly expressed. 
Namely, the comments of AEBR are concentrated on the lack of  consideration of problems related to 
border-regions  within  the  EU Cohesion  Policy,  being  the  whole  Territorial  cooperation  objective 
concentrated more on less developed territories. 
74 See J. GABBE, Governance and cross-border co-operation, cit., p. 3.
75 “This in turn requires a co-ordinated and concerted action of all levels, as otherwise conflicts with 
regard to competences are unavoidable”, see  J. GABBE,  Governance and cross-border co-operation, 
cit., p. 4.
76 More than three years have passed after the adoption of the Regulation on EGTC. However, there 
is not a great production of legal studies about the Regulation and its implementation. 
77 See OJEU L 210/19, 31.7.2006.
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cooperation within the EU. In particular, the Regulation aims at creating a standard 
setting in this field. One of the most popular definition of the EGTC describes it as 
an innovative tool for local and regional authorities, States and other public entities 
to build up a specific structure pertaining to issues extended “across frontiers”78. A 
relevant characteristic of an EGTC is the attribution of the legal personality. Namely, 
an established EGTC can act as a legal entity as such79.
Differently  from  the  other  Regulations  adopted  within  the  framework  of 
cohesion policy, the EGTC Regulation came into force on 1 August 2006 and should 
have been applied by 1 August 2007. Within this term, Member States had the duty 
to approve national provisions in order to make the Regulation effectively applicable. 
However, the process of implementation within the single Member States has been 
quite difficult and, at the time of writing, the process is not yet completed. 
In general, EU institutions, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in first line, 
highlight the importance and the potential positive role of this new tool. In particular, 
the adoption of a legal instrument for territorial cooperation under Community law 
has some peculiar prerogatives and relevant differences with regard to the previous 
instruments. As an example, for sub-national actors an inter-state covering agreement 
is not necessary in order to set up cooperative actions across the borders of different 
States because of the direct applicability of the Regulation80. 
In  any  case,  it  is  important  to  note  the  complex  and  necessary  relation 
between  the  EGTC  Regulation  and  the  national  legal  systems.  Although  this 
Regulation  is  a  product  of  Community  law,  nevertheless  its  implementation  is 
conditioned by national laws, which first  have to create the legal grounds for the 
78 Useful and practical information about the EGTC is available on the European Commission-DG 
Regional  Policy  website  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/gect/index_en.htm.  The  EU web 
glossary gives a short description of an EGTC: “In the light of the difficulties encountered by Member 
States  in  the  field  of  cross-border  cooperation,  this  Regulation  introduces  a  new  cooperation 
instrument at Community level as part of the reform of regional policy for the period 2007-2013. 
European groupings of territorial cooperation (EGTCs) will be legal entities and will be set up from 1 
January 2007. […]The objective of EGTCs is to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational and 
interregional  cooperation between its members. An EGTC is made up of Member States,  regional 
authorities,  local  authorities  and/or  bodies  governed  by  public  law,  as  the  case  may  be.”,  see 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/g24235.htm.
79 See  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Cohesion  policy 2007-20013, Commentaries and official texts, cit., p. 
126.
80 See  the  official  website  of  the  European  Commission  on  territorial  cooperation  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/gect/index_en.htm.
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Regulation to be effectively applicable81. From this point view the EGTC Regulation 
seems, at first glance, to show the nature of a directive rather than of a regulation 
according to the definition of the EU legal acts82. 
A first  attempt to describe and define the EGTC has been given by some 
unofficial statements from the European institutions, mainly by the CoR, according 
to  which  “the  European  Grouping  of  Territorial  Cooperation  is  a  new European 
instrument enabling regional and local authorities from different Member States to 
set  up cooperation structures with legal  personality.  It  can facilitate  and promote 
cross-border, trans-national and interregional cooperation with a new approach for 
multilevel  governance”83.  Such  an  explanation  highlights  the  major  peculiarities 
introduced  by  the  Regulation  1082/2006,  e.g.  the  target  of  regional  and  local 
communities, the legal capacity and the uniqueness of the legal instrument for the 
whole territory of the EU. However, it is also important to remark that the EGTC 
includes the possibility for States to be members. In this regard, Regulation (EC) No 
1082/2006  is  the  first  legal  instrument  providing  the  option  for  States  and  sub-
national  authorities  to  be  in  a  kind  of  contextual  position  within  the  same 
transfrontier structure. In fact, remembering the previous instruments developed for 
territorial cooperation, in particular the international bi-or multilateral treaties, States 
had the power to legitimize cross-border activities of sub-national  authorities,  but 
they were not an active part of cross-border cooperation. The implementation of the 
EGTC Regulation has needed, and still needs, a double approach, which combines a 
non-technical political encouragement and a legal-technical awareness.
On the one hand, the concrete application and the effective utilization of the 
new legal instrument represent a real challenge for Community institutions and for 
sub-national  authorities,  while  Member  States  show various  attitudes  towards  its 
81 See N. LEVRAT, Fact Finding on the EGTC and Territorial Pacts, in COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The 
Contributions to the 2008 Ateliers, February 2009, p. 179-180: “The Regulation on EGTC refers too 
largely to national legislation, which sometimes renders its use delicate in terms of political choices 
(among others, the choice of which legal order to embed the EGTC in - which may prove particularly 
tricky when several States become members of an EGTC; would a State accept participation in a legal 
structure which will be placed under the legal and even administrative control of a foreign power...) 
and of legal certainty (specific or appropriate legal frameworks are not sufficiently developed and 
tested)”.
82 See art. 249 TEC.
83 See  also  the  online  CoR definition  in  French:  “Le GECT est  un  nouvel  instrument  juridique 
européen qui permet aux collectivités territoriales de différents États membres de mettre en place des 
groupes  de  coopération  dotés  de  la  personnalité  juridique”,  available  on  the  website: 
http://cor.ip.lu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx.
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implementation84.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  EU  institutions  and  regional 
associations like the AEBR strengthen with particular enthusiasm the forthcoming 
actualization  of  the  EGTC  Regulation,  which  is  probably  made  more  attractive 
through  a  supporting  promotional  activity  and  trough  the  elaboration  of  basic 
explicative reports85. The idea is, namely, to foster an easy comprehension of this 
new instrument in order to develop its further application. According to this point of 
view,  definitions  or  explanations  on  the  EGTC are  not  necessarily  dealing  with 
peculiar  legal  aspects.  Rather,  the  first  approaches  to  the  EGTC  Regulation 
enthusiastically  highlight  its  originality  in  the  hope  of  its  future  widespread 
application. 
On the other hand, a clear and aware comprehension about the legal nature of 
the  EGTC  is,  in  any  case,  indispensable.  In  this  respect  the  establishment  of 
European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation is considered as a legal solution in 
order  to  overcome  the  obstacles  of  transfrontier  relations  between  sub-national 
communities  and  in  order  to  facilitate  cooperation  at  Community  level.  Namely, 
these structures will “implement territorial cooperation projects co-financed by the 
Community  or  undertake  territorial  cooperation  measures  at  the  initiative  of  the 
Member States”86. The understanding of the legal nature and the functioning of the 
EGTC Regulation is fundamental to recognise its potentialities and weaknesses. 
In  general,  what  has  been  underlined  as  the  main  outward  feature  of  the 
EGTC is the creation of a common legal model for territorial cooperation within the 
EU. However, we will see that, besides its undoubted importance, the Regulation on 
the EGTC does not introduce uniform solutions for territorial cooperation. Of course, 
several  good  results  are  expected.  But  a  detailed  analysis  of  Reg.  1082/2006 
underlines  the  existence  of  uncertainties,  legal  ambiguities  and  difficulties  of 
implementation. Thus, the new legal framework remains extremely complex.
84 See  L.  VAN DEN BRANDE,  Per  un'Unione  europea  politica:  valori,  governance  inclusiva  e  
partenariato  con  le  sue  regioni  e  città,  in  A.  PAPISCA (cur.),  Il  gruppo europeo  di  cooperazione  
territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 35 et seq.
85 N.  LEVRAT,  Fact  Finding  on  the  EGTC and  Territorial  Pacts,  cit.,  p.  181,  explains  that  “[a] 
combined 'pressure' and support approach form regional/local governments on the one side, the CoR 
on the  other,  could  be developed  by in  order  to  make maximal  use  of  this  provision”;  here  the 
reference  goes  to  Article  16,  paragraph  1  of  the  EGTC  Regulation  about  the  Member  States' 
responsibility to take appropriate national provisions in order to ensure the effective application of the 
Regulation.
86 See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/it/lvb/g24235.htm.
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Moreover, it seems relevant to think about the role of the EGTC in relation to 
three main aspects that  the further analysis is going to take into consideration as 
cross-cutting issues.
One first  issue concerns the  general  context  of  cohesion,  representing the 
wider background under which the EGTC Regulation was adopted. Namely, the field 
of territorial cooperation has been introduced as one of the main main objectives of 
the cohesion policy 2007-2013. In this respect, the analysis is directed to understand 
the interaction between the implementation of EGTCs and the cohesion policy, in 
particular  the  potential  added  value  of  this  new  tool  within  the  realization  of 
European cohesion and multilevel governance. One of the questions that has been 
raised  after  the  adoption  of  this  Regulation  is  its  concrete  contribution  towards 
territorial cohesion within and also beyond the frame of Structural Funds87. This issue 
is then related to the multilevel governance, since the actors of territorial cohesion 
and  cooperation  are  not  only  represented  by  Member  States  or  Community 
institutions, but also by regional and local communities and other subjects, as active 
components for realizing integration88. Although this topic can be seen as a general 
political-science theme behind the EGTC proper legal functioning, it is significant to 
evaluate its effects  on a larger  scale,  even if  not always in a strict  legal  manner, 
within the process of European integration89.
A second argument of analysis seeks to evaluate the institutional process that 
has  lead  to  the  adoption  of  the  EGTC Regulation – in  particular  the  role  of  the 
Committee  of  the  Regions  as  consultative  body  –  in  relation  to  the  legal  basis 
provided by the Treaties. Although the complexity of the legal aspects concerning 
cross-border cooperation between sub-national authorities and although the potential 
87 As already mentioned, the Regulation n. 1082/2006 was approved in the same context, among the 
2007-2013 Cohesion Policy,  with Council  Regulation (EC) No  1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying 
down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and 
the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999,.
Even if  the EGTC Regulation doesn't  directly deal  with Structural  Funds, being a specific  action 
outside them, it has anyway relevant connection to them, as a part of the general Cohesion Policy.
88 See COMMITEE OF THE REGIONS, Territorial Cohesion in Europe, Brussels, 2002, p. 7.
89 See F. MORATA, First Fact Finding on the EGTC and Territorial Pacts, in COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 
The Contributions to the 2008 Ateliers, February 2009, p. 183-188. Also concerning the EGTC the 
author  explains  that  “au-delà  des  formules  juridiques,  les  études  disponibles  sur  les  eurorégions 
montrent l'importance des réseaux en tant que mécanismes fonctionnels adaptés a la gouvernance de 
la Coopération Territorial (CT). Ceux-ci représentent un approche non hiérarchique et intégrée aux 
politiques publiques et un instrument utile pour affronter les questions qui traversent les divisions 
administratives”.
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reluctance of Member States, the approval of the EGTC Regulation – under the co-
decision procedure – was extremely fast in respect, for instances, to other similar 
instruments such as the European Economic Interest  Groupings and the European 
Cooperative Society.
Thirdly, the implementation of the Regulation within the Member States will 
be  taken  into  consideration.  As  already  mentioned,  even  if  the  adoption  of  the 
Regulation was extremely rapid, the same rapidity does not concern the concrete 
application of this legal tool. The reasons are twofold, both political and juridical. As 
the intervention of Member States is concerned, some hesitations could be noticed 
with regard to the adoption of national legislation and to the constitution of new 
EGTCs.
Next paragraphs will be dedicated to the detailed analysis of the Regulation 
from a legal perspective, trying to find out some feedbacks also regarding the issues 
mentioned above as a general background.
2.2. The adoption of the EGTC Regulation 
One of the main reasons for the adoption of the EGTC Regulation was the 
necessity to create an instrument of territorial cooperation based in public law. The 
problematic applicability of the Council of Europe's legal instruments and the limited 
scope of bi-or multilateral inter-state treaties accelerated the process leading to the 
adoption of the EU Regulation on EGTC. Considering territorial cooperation as a 
domestic Community policy, rather than a States' foreign activity, the added value of 
a Community legal instrument has been primarily found in the possibility to build up 
general  strategic  cooperation  and  specific  project-oriented  cooperation.  However, 
this didn't require only the involvement of EU institutions. Regional associations, in  
primis the  Association  of  European  Border  Regions  (AEBR),  highlighted  the 
exigency to create  ex novo a Community legal instrument. In particular the role of 
the  AEBR  has  been  crucial  during  the  phase  that  anticipated  the  institutional 
procedure for the adoption of the EGTC Regulation. The activity of this lobbying 
subject had a strong impact on the action of the Committee of the Regions, which 
explicitly  and officially  makes  references  to  this  important  external  contribution. 
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According to the AEBR's vision “a new instrument under Community law would 
create a homogeneous legal basis  that could be applied directly in all EU Member 
States for decentralised trans-European cooperation on a cross-border, interregional 
and  transnational  basis  at  regional  and/or  local  authority  level”90.  The  system of 
INTERREG, which didn't provide for an adequate and clear legal basis, needed also 
to  be  revised  in  order  to  open  the  field  of  cross-border  cooperation  to  other 
experiences that are not necessarily linked to the Community initiatives and to the 
related funding resources91.  The AEBR supported the idea to adopt a Community 
regulation in order to set down general rules for all forms of cooperation (namely 
cross-border,  interregional  and transnational) and for both strategic and long-term 
cooperation realizable on any topic, in any form and without territorial or temporal 
limits. In this regard, two new solutions have been proposed, as legal instruments 
based  in  public  law  and  with  general  scopes:  the  European  Special  Purposes 
Association (ESPA) and the European Public Law Agreement (EPLA)92. None of the 
two purposes has been concretely realized.
The first official document dealing with the creation of a Community legal 
act is the Commission's proposal of 14 July 2004 for a Regulation on a European 
Grouping of Cross-border Cooperation (EGCC)93. First of all, it is interesting to note 
that  already  in  2004  and  without  an  explicit  legal  base  in  the  Treaties  the 
Commission  made  references  in  this  document  to  the  concept  of  territorial 
cohesion94. Regarding this proposal in particular, as the title itself suggests, the aims 
90 See  ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS,  Towards  a  new  Community  legal  instrument  
facilitating  public-law-based  transeuropean  cooperation  among  territorial  authorities  in  the  
European Union, Gronau, 2004, p. 5.
91 Ibid., p. 5. After an evaluation of cross-border cooperation's state of the play, the AEBR concluded 
that “[i]improvements to existing legal instruments or a special solution for EU programmes  cannot 
generate the desired value added. Consequently, a far-reaching, new legal solution is required”.
92 Ibid., p. 6. Some characteristics of the two models proposed seem to remember certain elements of 
the  final  version  of  the  EGTC.  Namely,  according  to  the  intentions  of  the  AEBR,  “[t]hese  two 
solutions  allow  each  regional/local  authority  to  choose  the  public  law  solution  that  suits  their 
capabilities  and  means  and  the  development  stage  of  their  cooperation,  be  it  cross-border, 
interregional or transnational cooperation. Existing forms of cooperation and agreements will not be 
excluded. Via the  ex-novo legal instrument, the EU is creating the basis and stating the conditions 
under which a special purpose association can be set up or a public law agreement can be concluded 
and registered under EU law at national level. The EU regulation does not go into detail, but merely 
describes the general requirements that have to be met. This will allow flexibility to suit the different 
conditions applying across the whole of Europe”.
93 Commission's  Proposal  of 14 July 2004 for a Regulation of the European Parliament  and the 
Council establishing a European Grouping of Cross-border Cooperation (EGCC), COM(2004) 496 
final.
94 Ibid., p. 2.
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of cooperation were limited, at least from a terminological point of view, to merely 
cross-border relations. However, the document was not conceptually clear, since it 
made  also reference to  the  possibility  of  pursuing  interregional  and transnational 
scopes. As a quite revolutionary element, the proposal provided for the possibility for 
States  to  be  members  of  an  EGCC.  In  this  sense,  the  perspectives  of  territorial 
cooperation begun to change in order to consider the national authorities as partners 
in the cooperation rather than only as supervisory subjects. This aspect in particular 
has to be kept in mind as a rather revolutionary element within territorial cooperation 
at EU level. 
The Commission's proposal received some suggestions. Namely the Opinion 
of the Committee of the Regions95 and the Resolution of the European Parliament96, 
adopted  under  the  co-decision  procedure,  submitted  important  contributions97.  In 
particular, the CoR asked for more clarity in relation to the textual formulation of the 
Regulation. The Committee urged to introduce some changes, mainly with reference 
to  the  name  of  the  new  instrument,  which  should  be  adopted  with  the  term  of 
European Grouping of  Trans-european Cooperation  instead  of  Cross-border.  The 
Parliament, then, proposed to amend the term with Territorial in order to preserve a 
kind  of  terminological  coherence.  The  new  term  of  “European  Grouping  of 
Territorial Cooperation (EGTC)” was, thus, created as a new general category for 
different forms of trans-boundary relations. In general, the CoR and the European 
Parliament agreed on the amendments to the Regulation's proposal and pointed out 
that the new instrument should be open to local and regional authorities also without 
the obligatory participation of Member States. Despite the provision of the possible 
95 Opinion of  the  Committee  of  the Regions on the  Proposal  for  a  Regulation of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European grouping of cross-border cooperation (EGCC), 
adopted at the 57th plenary session of 17 and 18 November 2004, (2005/C 71/11). Actually, the CoR 
was concerned already some years before 2004 about the necessity to find proper instruments for 
territorial  cooperation;  see  the  Opinion  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  of  13  March  2002  on 
Strategies for  promoting cross-border  and inter-regional  cooperation in an enlarged  EU – a basic 
document setting out guidelines for the future (CdR 181/2000 fin). In that opinion the CoR stressed 
the attention on the lack of political  will,  in particular at  national  level,  to remove existing legal 
barriers in order to implement territorial cooperation and, at the same time, the lack of a proper EU 
legislation in this sense.
96 European  Parliament  legislative  resolution  on  the  proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European grouping of cross-border cooperation (EGCC) 
(COM(2004)0496 - C6-0091/2004 – 2004/0168(COD)).
97 Making reference to the complete procedure, it is also necessary to mention the intervention of the 
Economic and Social Committee:  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
grouping of cross-border cooperation (EGCC) (COM(2004) 496 final – 2004/0168 (COD)).
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participation of Member States, the grouping was mainly thought as a legal solution 
for sub-national authorities. The suggestions made by the CoR and by the Parliament 
didn't brake off the extremely fast adoption of the last  and official  version of the 
EGTC Regulation. The AEBR assessed the benefits  of this new legal instrument, 
underlying its added value in order to build a long-standing cooperation between sub 
national authorities98.
2.3. Legal basis of the EGTC Regulation within the Treaties
The legal ground of the EGTC Regulation is quite important in order to have 
a  better  comprehension  both  of  the  legal  approach  to  territorial  cooperation  at 
Community level and at national level. As already mentioned several times, there is 
not  an  explicit  reference  to  territorial  cooperation  within  the  Treaties  before  the 
amendments of the Lisbon Treaty. The unique reference in the TEC about this issue 
is  Article  265  concerning  the  mandatory  consultation  of  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions on matters related to “cross-border cooperation”. According to the opinion 
of N. Levrat, this provision is relevant in the sense that it confers to the Committee a 
particular legitimacy to deal with the matter  of territorial  cooperation as far as it 
represents the development of cross-border cooperation. But the same provision is 
also relevant for the so-called “effet utile”: in fact, “the existence of this provision 
could  be  of  particular  relevance  if  the  validity  of  the  EGTC  Regulation  was 
questioned  in  front  of  the  Community  judiciary  authority.  If  the  Member  States 
accepted this wording for Article 265 TEC, they must have specifically envisaged a 
kind  of  Community  attribution  in  this  field”99.  Nonetheless,  Article  265  is  not 
sufficient as a legal base for a Community legislative act100 and a more substantive 
legal  base  is  needed in  order  to  cover  the  Community  initiatives  in  the  field  of 
territorial cooperation. 
As far  as no other provision does explicitly concern territorial  or, at least, 
cross-border cooperation, other potential general legal grounds could be Article 308 
98 J.  GABBE,  V.  VON MALKUS ET AL. , Cooperation  between  European  border  regions:  review  and 
perspectives, cit., p. 79.
99 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, Study 
carried out by GEPE under the supervision of Prof N. Levrat, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 60.
100 Ibid., p. 60.
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or Articles 94-95, which usually cover actions of the Community when it  has no 
specific  competences.  However,  none  of  these  two  articles  has  been  considered 
suitable for the purposes concerned101. In particular, the main reason for this choice 
concerns  the  fact  that  those  mentioned  dispositions  are  mostly  linked  with  the 
implementation of  the internal  market  and,  therefore,  less appropriate for  public-
institutional aims such as territorial cooperation102.
Regulation No 1082/2006 refers to Article 159 TEC103 as legal basis for its 
adoption;  in  particular,  the  reference  goes  to  the  third  paragraph.  This  provision 
allows the Community, within the field of the economic and social cohesion, to take 
actions outside the Funds under certain specified conditions104: these actions shall be 
proved to be necessary and shall not create prejudice to other Community' policies. 
Thus, the EGTC Regulation and its implementation, in order to constitute a valid 
Community act, shall follow the general framework of cohesion policy, especially 
the  objective  related  to  territorial  cooperation.  Should  this  requirement  be 
overstepped, the EGTC Regulation has to be considerate not legitimized, as well as 
the  respective  implementation  by  other  subjects.  In  paragraph  1.4.  the  priorities 
related to the territorial cooperation objective within the ERDF have been mentioned.  
As  it  has  been  said,  territorial  cooperation  is  not  necessarily  connected  to  that 
101 See S. ALOISIO, Il GECT: disciplina comunitaria e attuazione italiana, un'analisi giuridica, in A. 
PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 97.
102 About the analysis of these articles, in particular with regard to the role of Article 308 and the 
erosion of the strict conception of the competences see, among others,  M. CARTABIA, J.H.H. WEILER, 
L’Italia in Europa, Bologna, 2001, p. 118 et seq. 
103 Article 159 ECT, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, recites:
Member States shall conduct their economic policies and shall coordinate them in such a way as, in 
addition, to attain the objectives set out in Article 158. The formulation and implementation of the 
Community's  policies  and  actions  and  the  implementation  of  the  internal  market  shall  take  into 
account  the  objectives  set  out  in  Article  158  and  shall  contribute  to  their  achievement.  The 
Community shall also support the achievement of these objectives by the action it takes through the 
Structural Funds (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section; European 
Social Fund; European Regional Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and the other 
existing Financial Instruments. 
The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions every three years on the progress made towards 
achieving economic and social cohesion and on the manner in which the various means provided for 
in this Article have contributed to it. This report shall, if necessary, be accompanied by appropriate 
proposals.
If specific actions prove necessary outside the Funds and without prejudice to the measures decided 
upon within the framework of the other Community policies, such actions may be adopted by the 
Council acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
104 Preamble of the Reg. n. 1082/2006, point 1).
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enumeration of activities, rather, it could be implemented also through other actions 
as long as complying with the principles of cohesion. In the same sense, with regard 
to  Article  159,  paragraph  3  TEC,  the  EGTC  Regulation  should  be  considered 
legitimate as long as complying with cohesion policy or other Community policies. 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the TEC Title on economic and 
social cohesion was introduced by the SEA, modified by the Treaty of Nice105 and 
lastly amended by the Lisbon Treaty in line with the developments of the European 
cohesion policy. Because the achievement of cohesion requires appropriate actions in 
order  to  pursue the objectives  laid  down in  art.  158 TEC, the major  part  of  the 
Community interventions related to cohesion has been, and still is, taken within the 
Structural Funds. Namely, the Funds represent in general a way to exercise European 
policies  within  Member  States  and  their  territorial  communities  without  the 
necessary implication of the constitution of new legal structures or entities. Rather, 
the  Funds  could  be  considered  as  a  strategic  path  for  cohesion  policies  to  be 
implemented  and  spread  out  across  Europe.  Apart  from actions  financed  by  the 
Community with Structural Funds, paragraph 3 of Article 159 allows other actions 
that have proved to be necessary without creating any prejudice to other Community 
policies106. The adoption of these actions require the specific procedure of Article 251 
TEC107 – co-decision procedure – and the mandatory consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and of the Committee of the Regions. Therefore, although it 
can be considered still unsatisfactory, Article 159 TEC seems to be, up to now, the 
most adequate legal base for the EGTC Regulation108.
In conclusion, according to the TEC, two norms form the legal ground of the 
EGTC Regulation. Article 159 enshrines a kind of substantive nature, while Article 
251 concerns the procedural aspect. A brief consideration of these two dispositions, 
as conceived within the Regulation, follows.
Besides  the  application  of  the  co-decision  procedure  together  with  the 
Council  and  the  Parliament,  Art.  159  requires  the  consultative  opinion  of  the 
105 See A. TIZZANO, D. VIGNES, Code de l'Union européen, Bruxelles, 2001, p. 94.
106 See P. LÉGER, Commentaire article par article des traités UE et CE, Bruxelles, 2000, p. 1288.
107 Co-decision procedure.
108 The AEBR suggested also the use  of  Article  308 as  a  legal  base  for  the  EGTC Regulation. 
Namely, the reference to this legal base could open the way to a potentially broader margin of action, 
which should not necessary bound to the policy of economic, social (and territorial) cohesion. See 
ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS/  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  Trans-European  cooperation 
between local and regional authorities, Luxembourg, 2002, p. 217.
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Committee of the Regions. As the same role of the Committee is also provided by 
Article 265 TCE it is quite strange that nor article 159 ECT, neither Reg. 1082/2006 
make any references to this article109. Various hypothesis could be proposed in this 
regard. The most plausible, in any case, concerns the fact that, as far as the provision 
is respected, it is not necessary to recall it in the preamble of the Regulation. 
With regard to the substantive parameters, Article 159, paragraph 3 displays a 
quite general provision, allowing a multiple range of actions outside the Funds, as 
long  as  these  actions  are  proved  to  be  necessary  and  in  conformity  with  other 
Community policies. Given this, the Regulation dedicates specific provisions in this 
sense,  mainly  concerning  the  objectives  and  tasks  of  an  EGTC  that  shows  the 
necessity of measures directed to “reduce the significant difficulties encountered by 
Member State and, in particular, by regional and local authorities in implementing 
and managing actions of territorial  cooperation within the framework of different 
laws and procedures”110.  Thus, the Regulation itself  motivates its role in order to 
achieve the objective of economic and social cohesion policy.
Community actions or interventions adopted under Article 159, paragraph 3 
have a so-called residual function as far as they are allowed to be pursued under 
specific “negative” conditions. It is relevant to notice that before to the adoption of 
the EGTC Regulation, this legal basis has never been the ground for specific long-
lasting normative provisions,  rather it  has been an instrument  for devolving non-
structural and temporary financing111. On the contrary, the Regulation sets up a legal 
basis for potentially permanent structures of territorial cooperation. Therefore, some 
doubts could emerge with regard to the legitimacy of this norm as legal base for 
founding long-term and multi-task structures of territorial  cooperation. Anyway, if 
the necessary consistency with the cohesion policy seems to be a limiting element, it 
is also true that a certain degree of flexibility is present with regard to the possibility 
to undertake a various range of activities. Namely, there is no specific or explicit list 
of tasks,  scopes or objectives that the EGTC cannot deal with.  In this sense, the 
109 The preamble of the regulation refers to the opinion of the CoR, OJEC C 71, 22.3.2005, p. 46, 
without mentioning art. 265 ECT.
110 See point 2) of the preamble Reg. 1082/2006.
111 M.  PERTILE,  Il  GECT:  verso  un  organismo  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera?,  in  Diritto del commercio internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto interno, 
2005, p. 122.
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clause of Article 159, paragraph 3 has a residual nature112, which confers the EGTC 
Regulation a clear normative ground in the TEC113.
2.4. The role of the Committee of the Regions
Despite  its  scarce  legal  commitments114,  it  is  not  possible  to  forget  the 
involvement  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  (CoR)  when  speaking  about  sub-
national  authorities  in  Europe and,  in particular,  about  the  EGTC115.  Namely,  the 
Committee has had a fundamental role during the phase of adoption of the EGTC 
Regulation.  The  activity  of  the  CoR,  which  has  produced  the  strongest  effective 
results,  is  the  Opinion  given  during  the  preliminary  phase  for  adopting  the 
Regulation  after  the  Commission's  proposal.  This  Opinion,  together  with  the 
Parliament's  Resolution  had  some  weight  in  order  to  modify  the  Commission's 
proposal.  Despite  its  mere  consultative  function,  the  CoR  is  still  one  of  the 
Community  organs  which  are  mostly  concerned  with  the  implementation  of  the 
EGTCs116.  As the unique  seat  representing sub-national  authorities at  Community 
level its enthusiasm seems to be quite obvious117. However, it is rather difficult for 
112 Decades of EC legislative actions have shown the capacity of EC/EU to expand its competencies 
both indirectly through acts of soft law and even through norms provided by the Treaties, conferring 
them a broader impact of influence on Member States sovereignty, outside the strict conferred powers. 
Art. 308 TEC (prior Art.  235) is a good example of the EC power development, representing the 
clause of so called “implied powers”, see M. CARTABIA, J.H.H. WEILER, L’Italia in Europa, cit., p. 113. 
Another, although less relevant, clause is Art. 151, par. 4 TEC on culture, enabling EC cultural actions 
within Member States even indirectly through other interventions, which are not necessarily requested 
for cultural purposes. Such clauses denote the capacity of the EC/EU order to expand the area of its 
conferred powers.
113 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC – cit., p. 
61.
114 The literature about the Committee of the Region is huge. In this case, see  J. NERGELIUS,  The 
Committee of  the Regions Today and in the Future – A Critical  Overview,  in  S. WEATHERHILL,  U. 
BERNITZ, The Role of Regions and Sub-national Actors in Europe, Oxford, 2005, p. 119-129; see also, 
T. COLE,  The Committee of the Regions and Subnational Representation to the European Union, in 
Maastrict Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2005, vol. 12 n. 1, p. 49-72.
115 See the interview with  M. DELEBARRE,  Le Comité des Régions définit une stratégie offensive, in 
Inter-Régions, N. 266, Mai-Juin 2006, p. 16-18.
116 The  CoR  assigned  to  one  of  its  departments  (Unit  3)  the  monitoring  of  the  EGTC's 
implementation. The activities that have been carried out are several: organisation of conferences and 
seminars, development and commission of different studies on the subject, collaboration with sub-
national associations, providing information for different public and private actors, etc. The activity of 
the CoR and the main information on the EGTC are available at CoR's official webpage:
http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx?view=folder&id=1ae87373-d198-4bf5-b26c-
7e9930fb813e&sm=1ae87373-d198-4bf5-b26c-7e9930fb813e.
117 “The Committee of the Regions is calling on all Member States to implement national provisions 
on the EGTC so that all regions and cities in Europe can participate in the scheme. (…). The EGTC 
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this  consultative  body  to  face  the  different  attitudes  of  Member  States  and  the 
reluctance of some of them to adopt national provisions in order to assure a fast 
application of the Community Regulation. 
The CoR's active function towards the issue of territorial cooperation started 
officially  in  2001118.  Currently  the  CoR  follows  all  the  processes  related  to  the 
implementation  of  the  EGTC  Regulation  and  the  creation  of  new  EGTC's  on 
Community territory. In this regard, the CoR represents the natural interface for sub-
national authorities to receive information and clarifications about the argument. The 
huge  number  of  internal  and  official  documents  reveal  its  deep  involvement.  In 
particular,  a  group  of  international  independent  experts  from  regional  and  local 
authorities has been created as a consultative group on the main issues of EGTCs for 
facilitating  the  exchange  of  experiences119.  The  CoR  keeps  highlighting  to  the 
Commission and to the Member States the necessity to improve and implement the 
EGTC Regulation120. According to the words of L. Van den Brande121 “the CoR has 
been a major political driving force behind the approval of the Regulation on EGTC. 
Afterwards, the CoR has been capable to keep the EGTC dossier high on the inter-
institutional agenda”122. This active involvement of the Committee demonstrates the 
relevance of the political and soft-law background as base for an effective application 
of the legal instrument. For this reason, the analysis of the legal aspects of the EGTC 
will help to get rid of red tape and enable partners to realize joint projects that meet public needs” 
CoR  President,  Luc  Van  den  Brande,  at:  http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx?
view=folder&id=1ae87373-d198-4bf5-b26c-7e9930fb813e&sm=1ae87373-d198-4bf5-b26c-
7e9930fb813e. See also the Resolution of the Committee of the Regions, Cooperation beyond national 
borders makes Europe a reality – An appeal to adopt the Regulation on the European Grouping on 
Territorial Cooperation, Brussles, 22 February 2006, CdR 72/2006 fin.
118 In 2001 the CoR published the study Trans-European cooperation between territorial authorities, 
realised  by  the  AEBR.  In our  opinion,  the  CoR  seems  to  be  more  active  than  the  European 
Commission. One point is  interesting in this regard.  Due to the delay of many Member States to 
enforce  the  EGTC Regulation,  the  Commission  didn't  open  any  infringement  procedure.  On  the 
contrary,  the CoR,  even from its  consultative position,  underlined the necessity  to  implement the 
Regulation as soon as possible.
119 See the Report on the First Meeting of the Committee of the Regions' EGTC Expert Group held in 
Brdo on 17 January 2008 and the Report on the Second Meeting of the Committee of the Regions' 
EGTC Expert Group held in Brussels on 11 March 2008.
120 See  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Unit  3,  EGTC in  the  contributions  to  the  Green  Paper  on  
Territorial Cohesion. Considering the state of the play and future of the EGTC from different actors'  
perspectives,  Brussels,  29  May 2009,  CdR 169/2009,  p.  1.  See  also,  Committee  of  the  Regions, 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state of the play and political strategy and  
supporting actions, Brussels, 28 January 2009, CdR 15/2009.
121 President of the Committee of the Regions at the time of writing.
122 See  the  interview  with  L.  Van  den  Brande  on  Regions  Magazine  –  hors  sèrie  spècial – 
Coopération territoriale transfrontalière/ GECT.
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cannot forget to keep in mind these backgrounds as far as they represent its living-
conditions.
The main interests of the CoR are devoted to the effective participation of 
sub-national  actors  within  the  European  decision-making  process  and  to  the 
implementation  of  multilevel  governance.  The  EGTC,  in  this  sense,  represents  a 
perfect example of multilevel integration, legal dynamic and potential coordination 
between different national systems123. Some internal CoR's documents underline its 
twofold role  in the context  of the EGTC. Namely,  “[o]n the one hand, it  further 
encourages Member States to adopt national measures and candidate  countries to 
quickly adopt the Regulation in their acquis communautaire through the activities of 
the CoR members, the publication of studies and the different initiatives proposed. 
On the other hand, it enhances the policy-learning process between parties interested 
in setting up EGTCs, or those that have already established the Grouping but are still 
facing problems”124. After the adoption of the Regulation in 2006, the CoR dedicated 
many efforts to implement and develop a first comprehension of the new instrument 
for  territorial  cooperation.  In  fact,  notwithstanding  the  already  long  practice  of 
transfrontier cooperation, many sub-national actors required an introduction to the 
functioning of the EGTC and to the understanding of its pretended added value125. 
Apart from the specific Opinion realised under the procedure for the adoption 
of the EGTC Regulation, where peculiar amendments have been proposed by the 
CoR, most of the official documents that has been analysed have a general political 
aim without entering into the legal details of the EGTC Regulation126. The Opinion 
123 See Committee of the Regions, Unit 3, Note to the attention of the COTER Commission on the 
state of the play of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, Brussels, 29 May 2009, CdR 
168/2009, p. 2.
124 Ibid., p. 5.
125 The seminars and following debates during the Open Days 2007, 2008 and 2009 had a deep 
importance for exchanging opinions, asking questions and arising doubts on the implementation of the 
EGTC Regulation  and  on  the  effective  establishment  of  EGTCs.  In  this  regard,  one  of  the  first 
workshops on the subject has been held on 5 October 2007 with the title “EGTC: from Regulation to 
its  implementation”.  Such  meetings  are  extremely  important  as  they  help  to  understand  the 
mechanisms regarding the EGTC. Our opinion after the attendance to several seminars is that many 
potential stakeholders have difficulties to understand how to implement Community legal rules within 
national systems.
126 This  statement refers  to  the  official  documents  adopted by  the  CoR and  to  the  internal  and 
preliminary drafts. Of course, the CoR incentives the proliferation of the literature about the EGTC 
and the analysis of the legal aspects. Namely, the most detailed and accurate legal analysis of the 
EGTC Regulation has been commissioned by the CoR (see the already mentioned COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, Study carried out by GEPE 
under the supervision of Prof N. Levrat, Bruxelles, 2007). However, in such cases, the analysis doesn't 
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adopted  on  18-19  June  2008  during  the  75th Committee's  Plenary  session  is 
emblematic in this sense127. Namely, the main attention is driven on the future role 
that the EGTC's will have in the panorama of territorial cooperation within the EU 
territorial  agenda,  cohesion policy and regional diversity. The legal  impact of the 
Regulation is considered only in general terms, as a vehicle for a better regulation of 
territorial cooperation. Likewise, the CoR tends not to stress on the legal potential 
difficulties arising from the application of the Regulation. The emphasis that is put 
on the general and positive elements of the new instrument reveals a clear strategic 
intent to pursue the interests of local and regional authorities as well as an attempt to 
foster  European  multilevel  integration.  Besides  the  legal  effects  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation,  the  subject  of  territorial  cooperation  represents  a  test  for  the  future 
development  of  multilevel  governance.  The action of the Committee towards the 
development of a better instrument of territorial cooperation, which could be mostly 
suitable for regional and local authorities, has a major political and strategic value in 
conformity to the scopes of this institution128. However, in the case of the EGTC this 
role seems to have displayed a relevant influence. In this regard it is remarkable to 
observe the possible effects of the actions of a consultative body and of the so-called 
soft law during the process of adoption and implementation of an EC legislative act. 
The intervention of the CoR in this process is prescribed by Article 265 TEC and its 
constant  involvement  is  somehow  legitimized  by  the  sub-national  interests 
concerned. From this point of view the case of the EGTC is, anyway, peculiar and 
paradigmatic to understand the dynamics that take place within the Community legal 
order between European institutions, Member States and sub-national authorities. 
2.5. Some observations about the political ambition of the EGTC Regulation
Before  entering  into  the  legal  details  of  the  EGTC  Regulation,  it  seems 
interesting  to  spend  some  words  about  the  political  implications  of  this  legal 
normally reproduce the official position of the Committee.
127 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation: new 
impetus for territorial cooperation in Europe, adopted at the 75th plenary session of 18 an 19 June 
2008, CdR 308/2008 fin.
128 L. BEKEMANS, Cooperazione territoriale e multilevel governance. Il ruolo propulsore del Comitato  
delle Regioni, in  A. PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo  
spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 59-60.
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instrument.  Actually,  the EGTC Regulation is  the first  legal  document  of general 
application  that  provides  for  a  detailed  regulatory  mechanism  for  transfrontier 
relations between sub-national authorities within the EU. In this sense, it overcomes 
the  already  existing  legal  instruments:  the  CoE's  system  of  the  Madrid  Outline 
Convention with its two Protocols (it has to be kept in mind that when the EGTC 
Regulation has been adopted the Third Protocol was not in force) and the bilateral or 
multilateral inter-state agreements based in international law. The first framework, 
although pioneering, has proven to be hardly enforceable; the second type of tools 
provided only ad hoc  solutions and, therefore, covering a limited geographic area. 
Thus, the EGTC Regulation shows a clear political (before than legal) intent to be 
considered  as  the  standard  reference  and  the  future  legal  model  for  territorial 
cooperation, which should be valid and applicable on the entire EU territory. Two 
obstacles limit this aspiration: it needs to cope with national legislations in order to 
be fully applicable and it doesn't substitute the other existing instruments or solutions 
for  territorial  cooperation.  In  this  sense,  the  EGTC Regulation  requires  a  strong 
political  emphasis  that  can  make  it  more  attractive.  For  this  reason,  the  EU 
institutions,  especially  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  stress  its  positive 
characteristics. Namely, the following prerogatives of the EGTC are often pointed 
out: “it gives legal stability to cooperation and, at the same time, it allows a variety 
of  multilevel  institutional  formatting;  it  incorporates  the  genetics  of  the  'soft 
cooperation' and, at the same time, it  has the legal capacity to deliver structuring 
development projects; for the first time we have an instrument of European nature 
which is also strongly anchored to the territory. In short, the EGTC […] can be a 
powerful  tool  to  rationalize  and  better  coordinate  investments  and  to  ensure  a 
coherent and efficient use of limited resources”129.
Due to its direct applicability, the political implications of the implementation 
of  the  EGTC  Regulation  are  mainly  inherent  to  the  dichotomy  between  the 
Community and the Member States. On the one hand, the EU institutions encourage 
the development of territorial cooperation. On the other hand, some Member States 
seem  to  be  very  prudent  before  the  adoption  of  national  measures  for  the 
129 See the Speech of L. Van den Brande on the occasion of the First Meeting of the Committee of 
the Regions' Expert Group, held in Brdo on 17 January 2008; see also the speech of  L. Coen,  La 
cooperazione territoriale come risorsa economica,held on the occasion of the seminar about “Public 
powers and local economic development, in Udine on 14 November 2008.
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implementation of the Regulation130. Namely, the main fear of Member States seems 
to be the potential uncontrolled action of sub-national authorities outside the national 
borders. Even if the Regulation is explicit in highlighting the necessary respect of the 
national  legal  orders,  sometimes  a  crawling  feeling  of  mistrust  is  perceivable131. 
Anyway, as the EGTC is mostly targeting territorial communities, the debate about 
the conferral of an effective right attributed by the EGTC Regulation to sub-national 
authorities for the development of territorial  cooperation is typically left out from 
debates.  Namely,  this  issue  is  quite  sensitive  and  can  cause  some  conflicts  or 
antagonisms between the central authorities and the sub-national entities132.
Thus,  the  political  aim that  has  spread  out  around  the  EGTC  Regulation 
intends to focus on the major positive peculiarities of the new instrument without 
concentrating the attention on the possible issues of friction. Within this perspective, 
the  EGTC  can  spend  its  entire  political  credibility  for  the  cause  of  European 
integration, for the future development of a multilevel system of powers and inter-
institutional  cooperation.  However,  the  establishment  and proliferation of  EGTCs 
can encounter institutional concerns, even coming from the sub-national authorities. 
The  successful  development  of  territorial  cooperation needs a  strong institutional 
commitment,  mutual engagement  and trust between the subjects  involved.  In this 
sense, the legal feasibility of the new instrument has its necessary counterpart in the 
political  –  and  also  emotional  –  dimension.  The  legal  self-determination of  the 
EGTCs depends, as a primary condition, from the political agreement between its 
stakeholders133. As we will see further on, the scale of this institutional and political 
coordination  deals  with  two different  aspects.  On the  one  hand,  a  mere political 
coordination between institutions is linked to a high degree of directionality. This is 
both vertical  (i.e.  between the  different  level  of  government)  and horizontal  (i.e. 
between the actors involved in territorial cooperation). On the other hand, a more 
legally-bounded concept is also concerned. It takes the form of what could be called 
130 See  R.  DEGRON,  Le  gruopement  européen  de  coopération  territoriale:  consécration  des  
eurorégions?,  in  AIDA hebdo: L’Actualité juridique. Droit Administratif,  2007 année 63, n. 25, p. 
1376.
131 See V. COCUCCI, Nuove forme di cooperazione territoriale transfrontaliera: il Gruppo Europeo di  
Cooperazione Territoriale, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 2008, p. 925.
132 See Ibid., p. 924.
133 See J. MAIER, European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) – Regions’ new instrument  
for ‘Co-operation beyond borders’. A new approach to organize multi-level governance facing old  
and new obstacles, cit., p. 20.
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“constitutional  cooperation”  between  institutional  authorities  belonging  to  the 
different levels in each national system. With reference to the attribution and exercise 
of competences, the principle  of trusted cooperation could be applied in order to 
arrange a better coordination between tiers of government. We will see that it could 
be useful also for the implementation of the EGTC Regulation,  as a soft-rule for 
managing the  competences'  exercise.  Namely,  this  principle,  although not  always 
explicitly foreseen and anyway difficultly enforceable, is a preliminary and necessary 
condition  for  good  inter-institutional  relations  and  for  realizing  an  effective 
coordination134.
Conclusively, summarising what has been said in this paragraph, the EGTC 
Regulation's political implication concern a complex system of institutional relations. 
Thus, the application of this instrument implies, as a primary condition, the approach 
to a multiple political dimension.
3. Analysis of the Regulation 1082/2006
3.1. Flexibility and optionality
As already  mentioned  in  the  first  part  of  this  work,  the  use  of  the  term 
“territorial”  in  a  legal  document,  which  is  directly  applicable  to  transfrontier 
relations,  embodies  the  relevant  development  that  has  been made in  this  field135. 
Namely,  this  new  legal  tool  has  been  created  for  managing  cross-border, 
transnational and interregional programmes or projects, providing an unprecedented 
path for cooperation between States, regional and local authorities, without replacing 
the already existing instruments136.
134 The mentioned concept is technically known as “sincere cooperation” and mainly inserted in the 
Constitutions of federal countries in order to display some general methods for the relations between 
the tiers of government. A similar concept has been introduced in the EU legal order trough Article 10 
of the TEC. Without opening a too long digression on the argument, it is quite clear that this principle 
is  borderline  between  the  political  and  legal  dimension.  Maybe  it  is  one  of  the  most  difficult 
constitutional  principles  in  order  to  set  the  relations  among  different  authorities.  However,  and 
opportunely in this historical moment, it is necessary as a guide to solve physiological discrepancies 
that have a pathological dimension in the judiciary settlement of competences.
135 See  J.I.  LUACES FERNÁNDEZ,  La  Agrupación  Europea  de  Cooperación  Transfronteriza  y  las  
implicaciones  del  nuevo  instrumento  jurídico:  ¿bases  para  una  integración  efectiva?,  in  Unión 
Europea Aranzadi, 2005, año XXXII, n. 12, Octubre, p. 22-23.
136 MISSION OPÉRATIONELLE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE (MOT),  European grouping of territorial  cooperation, 
Paris, 2008, p. 8-9.
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The Regulation (EC) No. 1082/2006 is composed of 18 Articles which define 
its nature, its structure and its working procedures. The rather basic content of the 
Regulation  aims  at  setting  down the  fundamental  elements  of  an  EGTC,  which 
should be common to every structure. Other aspects will be anyhow defined jointly 
by  its  prospective  members  (in  the  Convention  and  in  the  Statutes)  and  by  the 
respective  national  laws  of  implementation.  Thus,  the  rules  on  the  EGTC  are 
basically  of  two  types:  a  part  of  them is  fixed  according  to  the  general  norms 
contained in the Regulation, while the other part is constituted by variable normative 
elements. Regarding the first group of rules, the Regulation sets down a core system 
of norms that should represent the general and common legal framework for each 
EGTCs. Subsequently, the joint agreement of its members and the national laws will 
give to the EGTC its peculiar identity. The originality of this instrument excludes, 
then, the multiplications of identical structures; rather, several types of EGTC are 
going to be set up, according to the content of its variable normative elements. 
As we have already mentioned, the peculiarity of the Regulation 1082/2006 
resides in the fact that it resembles more a directive rather than a regulation. Namely, 
according to Article 16, paragraph 1 “Member States shall make such provisions as 
are appropriate to ensure the effective application of this Regulation”. According to 
this aspect, the EGTC is a Community instrument that should also follow national 
rules in order to be effectively implemented. In this perspective, the new Regulation 
is  evidently  a  flexible  instrument.  Anyway,  it  contains  at  the  same  time  some 
ineluctable  elements,  which  confer  to  the  Regulation  its  nature  of  peculiar 
Community instrument  devoted to set  down some standard rules.  Namely,  as the 
Regulation itself points out, an intervention for the establishment of common norms 
in this field was highly desirable.
In fact, the second recital of the Preamble states: “[m]easures are necessary to 
reduce the significant difficulties encountered by Member States and, in particular, 
by regional and local authorities in implementing and managing actions of territorial 
cooperation within the framework of differing national laws and procedures”.  By 
underlying this occurrence, the Regulation remembers the significant contributions 
given  by  the  already  existing  Community  instruments,  such  as  the  European 
Economic  Interest  Grouping and the INTERREG programmes, as well  as by the 
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Council  of  Europe's  acquis137.  Afterwards,  the  Preamble  continues:  “[i]n order  to 
overcome the obstacles hindering territorial cooperation, it is necessary to institute a 
cooperation instrument at Community level for the creation of cooperative groupings 
in Community territory, invested with legal personality, called European Grouping of  
Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). Recourse to an EGTC should be optional”138. Thus, 
the Regulation introduces a new structure for territorial cooperation – the EGTC – 
which  represents,  on  the  one  hand,  the  desired  instrument  for  overcoming  the 
existing obstacles and, on the other hand, an optional solution. The EGTC Regulation 
begins in the pursuit of flexibility, without the explicit aim of replacing other tools. 
Despite its flexible and optional nature, one of the first purposes of an EGTC 
is the intention to create a common and general legal standard applicable to relations 
of territorial cooperation139. In this regard, the following observation of N. Levrat is 
enlightening in order to explain the complex nature of the Regulation. “Now that the 
need of these national rules is clear, there are two possible approaches. One would be 
to  attempt  to  harmonise  cross-border  cooperation  structures  across  the  European 
Union  […].  The  Community  approach  is  not,  on  the  other  hand,  aimed  at 
harmonisation;  the  fifth  recital  of  Regulation  No.  1082/2006  states  that  the 
instrument 'is not intended to... provide a set of specific common rules which would 
uniformly govern all such arrangements throughout the Community'.  It  should be 
pointed out, however, that the obligation laid down in Article 16 of the Regulation 
could well led to harmonisation of solutions at Community level, much more quickly 
and effectively than a hypothetical Council of Europe convention, whose ratification 
process […] would undoubtedly be lengthy and not uniform.”140 
According to what has been said, it is possible to conclude that the EGTC 
Regulation introduces an instrument which tends to pursue harmonization without 
imposing it. Some scholars, however, see in the Regulation a true instrument for the 
137 Recital no. 4 and 5.
138 Recital no. 8.
139 Actually the lack of a common legal basis among EC Member States is one of the difficulties for 
cross-border cooperation stressed either by scholars and practitioners since decades, see J. GRIX, V. 
KNOWELS,  The Euroregion and the Maximization of social capital: pro Europa Viadrnia, in AA.VV., 
Regioni e Territori in Europa. Gli effetti territoriali delle politiche europee visti dalle regioni, ARE, 
Strasburgo, 1995, p. 166.
140 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., 
p. 51.
234
THE EUROPEAN GROUPING OF TERRITORIAL COOPERATION
harmonization  of  transfrontier  relations141.  But  a  consideration  needs  to  be  done. 
According  to  our  opinion,  such  a  conception  of  harmonisation  should  not  be 
considered  as  related  to  the  nature  of  the  various  regulatory  instruments  for 
transfrontier activities: namely, it is rather patent that a multiplicity of tools remains 
available  and  that  the  EGTC  Regulation  itself  doesn't  provide  for  a  real  legal 
harmonisation of the phenomenon. To be precise,  this kind of “harmonisation” is 
somehow special and concerns the creation of a new instrument that has a general 
aim to create some common rules and that is applicable to a wide range of situations. 
Thus, a kind of potential model has been provided without the possibility to be a 
“normalizing” tool. Moreover, there are no legal grounds to eliminate the already 
existing  legal  tools  as  far  as  they  are  legitimately  applied.  In  regard  to  the  last 
statement, the EGTC Regulation represents, more than a mandatory rule, a set of 
homogeneous  rules142 and  the  official  recognition  of  territorial  cooperation  as  a 
legislative object instead of a spotted phenomenon. Namely, the optional and flexible 
nature of the EGTC's rules grants a variable adaptation to a multilevel system of 
different legal orders. 
3.2. Nature and scope of an EGTC
First  of  all,  it  is  important  to  remember  what  could  be  perceived  as  an 
obvious  observation.  Article  1,  paragraph  1  of  the  Regulation  affirms  that  “the 
objective of an EGTC shall be to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational 
and/or  interregional cooperation, hereinafter referred to as  territorial cooperation, 
between its members […] with the exclusive aim of strengthening economic and 
social  cohesion”.  Since the different  transfrontier  approaches  are  not  going to be 
replaced by the new instrument but are incorporated in it, it has to be stressed again 
that the EGTC has necessarily a cross-border nature in the broader meaning (i.e. not 
only between neighbourly territorial communities, but also between non-contiguous 
141 See  R.  DEGRON,  Le  gruopement  européen  de  coopération  territoriale:  consécration  des  
eurorégions?, cit., p. 1373-1374.
142 “Urge, por tanto, una nueva concepción, que abandone la idea de cooperación transfronteriza  en 
términos de política exterior nacional, y que asuma el contexto de la cooperación como una verdadera 
política  interior  europea”,  see  I.  LUACES FERNÁNDEZ,  La  Agrupación  Europea  de  Cooperación 
Transfronteriza y  las  implicaciones del  nuevo instrumento  jurídico:  ¿bases  para una integración  
efectiva?, cit., p. 24.
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territories)143.  In  this  sense,  territorial  cooperation  incorporates  a  dimension  that 
essentially comprehends and transcends national borders. An EGTC must, therefore, 
be established among at least two members belonging to different Member States. 
Moreover,  as  already quoted from Article  1,  the  unique  aim of  an EGTC 
should be the support towards economic and social cohesion. Also the 11th recital of 
the Preamble has to be analysed according to this condition.  Namely,  “an EGTC 
should be able to act, either for the purpose of implementing territorial cooperation 
programmes or projects co-financed by the Community, notably under the Structural 
Funds in conformity with Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 and Regulation (EC) No 
1080/2006 […] on the European Regional Development Fund, or for purposes of 
carrying out actions of territorial cooperation which are at the sole initiative of the 
Member States and their regional and local authorities with or without a financial 
contribution  from the Community”144.  The quoted provisions are  very relevant  in 
order to understand the scopes of an EGTC and, eventually, to evaluate if it has been 
legitimately established and if it acts correctly. Generally speaking, these provisions 
represent a declination of Article 159 TEC that represents the legal base of the EGTC 
Regulation. As a consequence of Article 159, paragraph 3 TEC, the activities of an 
EGTC shall  be conform with the cohesion policy145.  However,  the content  of the 
Regulation  doesn't  provide  for  a  specific  set  of  matters  that  an EGTC should or 
should not deal with. Therefore, as far as territorial cooperation could cover different 
forms of activities, this residual clause has to be subject to evolving interpretations. 
In this perspective, the potential application of this legal tool and the creation of new 
EGTCs is far from being limited by the Regulation itself, rather they also depend 
from other “external” conditions, which should be identified within the policies of 
cohesion. With regard to this presumptive limitation of the EGTC it is possible to 
143 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., 
p. 73. The study remembers that only “territorial cooperation” has a necessary transfrontier nature, 
while  the  concept  of  “territorial  cohesion”  “doesn't  necessarily  have  a  dimension  that  transcend 
national borders”.
144 See  R.  DICKMANN,  Il  Gruppo  Europeo  di  Cooperazione  Territoriale  (GECT),  in  Foro 
Amministrativo: Consiglio di Stato, n. 10, 2006, p. 2902.
145 “The European territorial cooperation objective aims to reinforce cooperation at  cross-border, 
transregional and interregional level. It acts as a complement to the two other objectives [...]. It aims 
to promote common solutions for the authorities of different countries in the domain of urban, rural 
and coastal  development,  the development of  economic relations and the setting up of small  and 
medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs):  The  cooperation  is  centred  on  research,  development,  the 
knowledge-based  society,  risk  prevention  and  integrated  water  management.”,  see  EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Cohesion policy 2007-20013, Commentaries and official texts, cit. p. 20.
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make a comparison with the CoE's Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention 
establishing a Euroregional Cooperation Groupings (EGC). In particular, the idea of 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is that the EGTC Regulation has a 
restricted scope if compared with the Third Protocol. Namely, while the EGTC is 
subject to the mentioned limiting factors of economic and social cohesion, the ECG 
has  wider  purposes  that  aim  at  “promoting,  supporting  and  developing,  for  the 
benefit of populations, territorial cooperation”146. According to such view, the ECG 
could seem (once ratified by the States parties) a more flexible and open instrument 
for stakeholders. However, according to our opinion, it is important not to fall into 
the trap to consider the EGTC as an excessively constrained tool. Namely, on the one 
hand,  the  objectives  of  economic  and  social  cohesion,  territorial  cooperation 
included,  are  quite  broad.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
functioning of these instruments  in the  praxis.  From this  point  of view,  it  seems 
logical  to  think  that  the  effective  use  of  these  two instruments  will  not  have  so 
different purposes, as far as they deal with the same typical transfrontier issues, and 
shall principally comply with sub-national authorities' tasks and competences147. 
Another important condition, which is settled down in the 15th recital of the 
Preamble,  is  the  respect  of  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  as 
enshrined in Article 5 TEC. The Regulation “does not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to achieve its objectives, recourse to an EGTC being optional, in accordance 
with the constitutional system of each Member State”. As far as this provision could 
seem a  quite  obvious  statement  attached to  the  Regulation,  it  has,  anyway,  high 
relevance  as  a  final  coherency clause.  In  fact,  the  optional  recourse  to  the  legal 
structure of the EGTC is justified by the reference to the subsidiarity/proportionality 
principle:  the  provision  of  a  mandatory  recourse  to  this  instrument  would  have 
evidently  violated  such  peculiarity  of  Community  law,  thus  exceeding  what  is 
necessary to pursue the objectives of the Regulation148. 
146 See  COUNCIL OF EUROPE,  Report  on  European legal  instruments  of  interregional  cooperation, 
drawn up at the request of the Congress of Local an Regional Authrities by Prof. Y. Lejeune, cit., p. 3.
147 See  I.  OTTAVIANO,  Riflessioni  sul  Gruppo  Europeo  di  Cooperazione  Territoriale,  in  Studi 
sull'integrazione europea, v. I, n. 3, 2006, p. 545-562.
148 See  N. WISMER,  Les modalités d'intervention de l'Etat dans la coopération transfrontalière, in 
RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État et la coopération 
transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., p. 98.
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Moreover, the Regulation adopted the necessary provision in order to respect 
the national legal orders and the constitutional systems of competences of central and 
sub-national authorities. The issue concerning the conformity to the constitutional 
system of the Member States is quite sensitive due to the direct applicability of the 
EGTC  Regulation.  Namely,  one  of  the  key  questions  related  to  the  legal 
consequences of this Regulation is weather a new right for sub-national authorities to 
engage in territorial cooperation has been created149. This question is more relevant 
for the reason that the normative act setting up the legal base for cooperation is a 
Regulation, thus,  per se  directly applicable within the Member States. Conversely, 
the issue can be raised otherwise, by considering whether a new and strengthened 
power-exercise for sub-national entities has been created with the adoption of the 
Regulation. 
According to one possible interpretation, the facultative/optional utilization of 
this instrument  for territorial  cooperation could imply the possibility for Member 
States to prevent local and regional authorities to be member of an EGTC. On the 
contrary, as this tool has been adopted under the form of a Regulation, the direct 
applicability would leave the faculty for sub-national authorities to create or take part 
in an EGTC without a discretional assent of Member States. However interpreted, 
these two characteristics of the EGTC Regulation seem to be quite conflicting150. As 
far as it is not clear if a new right for sub-national authorities to engage in territorial 
cooperation has been created or not, anyway it is quite clear that the Regulation (EC) 
No 1082/2006 generates,  at  least,  the obligation for  Member States to create  the 
conditions established in the Regulation and not to hinder its application151.
149 Both of the thesis, the positive and the negative, could be potentially supported. From a certain 
perspective,  the  direct  applicability  of  the  Regulation  seems to  offer  a  new opportunity  for  sub-
national  authorities  to  develop territorial  cooperation  in  the  form of  EGTCs.  However,  the  strict 
references  to  the  conformity  with  national  systems  prevent  regional  and  local  authorities  from a 
complete autonomous commitment towards transfrontier relations.
150 N. WISMER, Les modalités d'intervention de l'Etat dans la coopération transfrontalière, in RÉSEAU 
D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI),  L’État  et  la  coopération  
transfrontalière: actes de la journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, cit., p. 98.
151 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
85. Would Member States obstruct the application of the EGTC Regulation, a potential violation of 
Article 10 TEC could be recognized.
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3.3. Direct applicability and national rules of implementation: the problematic path  
for the application of the Regulation at national level
A peculiarity of the Regulation No 1082/2006 concerns the strong connection 
with  the  national  legal  systems.  Namely,  as  already  remembered,  Article  16, 
paragraph  1  requires  Member  States  to  adopt  the  appropriate  provisions  for  the 
effective  application  of  the  Regulation.  With  other  words,  the  EGTC Regulation 
cannot be correctly implemented without the correspondent national provisions. It 
has to be kept in mind, then, that also the sub-national authorities could be in charge 
of  the  normative  implementation  of  the  Regulation  according  to  the  internal 
structures of the different countries and to the attribution of the competences among 
the  tiers  of  government.  Nevertheless,  the  intervention  of  central  authorities  is 
necessary required in order to adopt some general and uniform provisions within the 
national territory about the establishment of an EGTC. This is particularly true for 
what  concerns  the  procedure  of  notification  and  authorisation  from  the  central 
authorities as provided by Article 4 of Regulation 1082/2006.
Various scholars have seen in the necessity of a national implementation the 
typical  nature of  a  Community directive.  However,  according to our opinion,  it's 
quite unimportant to wonder about the real character of the EGTC Regulation, as far 
as its formal denomination and structural nature are those of a Regulation (although a 
little  sui generis)152. Also the attempt to define the exact nature of the Regulation 
coming  from  national  institutional  authorities  or  jurisdictional  subjects  is  rather 
misleading153.  In  any  case,  it  is  relevant  to  observe  the  normative  effects  of  the 
152 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., p. 
133 affirms that  such a provision is  not  really  clear,  but  it's  not  equivalent  to those contained in 
directives. The interpretation proposed in the study commissioned by the CoR is interesting. “In our 
view, the obligation contained in a directive to transpose legislation by a stipulated deadline does not 
apply  here,  and  the  Commission  would  probably  not  be  able  to  regard  the  absence  of  national 
measures (within the meaning of TEC Article 226) as constituting failure to comply. In contrast to the 
situation with a directive, it will not be possible here to invoke the absence of national legislative or 
regulatory  provisions  in  order  to  prevent  the  implementation within  a  national  legal  system of  a 
measure provided for in the Regulation”.
153 During the process to implement the Regulation, the Italian Government asked for a consultative 
opinion from the Consiglio di Stato about the possibility to implement the Community act in form of 
an  administrative  act  or  of  a  legislative  act.  The opinion  rejected  the  possibility  to  implement  a 
Community Regulation with an administrative act. Moreover, throughout the opinion (see Consiglio 
di Stato, Sezione Consultiva per gli Atti normativi, Adunanza  del 9.10.2007, Sezione N. 3665/2007) 
the  Consiglio di Stato indirectly touched the issue of the normative nature of the Regulation and 
affirmed its easiest assimilation with a directive rather than with a regulation. However, it has been a 
constant assumption that national institutions or jurisdictions are not entitled to admonish about the 
formal character of a Community legislative act.
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Regulation  within  the  national  legal  orders,  rather  than  to  dispute  about  formal 
epithets. Since the Community act concerned is directly applicable, it is necessary to 
distinguish two different sets of norms, some of which have a direct effect at national 
level, while some others need national implementation154. In this regard, according to 
some interpretations of the EGTC Regulation, this Community act wouldn't leave so 
much space of assessment for the national means of application though155.
So far, it is well known that Member States have been generally in delay with 
the adoption of the necessary national provisions. As the deadline to comply with this  
obligation  was fixed within 1 August  2007,  most  States  have a  delay  of  several 
months  (and  also  years)  concerning  the  conformation  with  the  Regulation156. 
However, no infringement procedures have been opened against any of the Member 
States involved. What is quite surprising within this scenery is the incredibly fast 
adoption of the EGTC Regulation in comparison with the slow adaptation of the 
national legislations. A possible hypothesis in this sense could be the hesitation of 
central  authorities to adopt concrete legislative measures in order to support sub-
national  authorities  in  their  activities  with  a  foreign  dimension.  But  another 
reasonable supposition is the real difficulty to introduce the EGTC as a new legal 
subject within the national legal systems. Namely, as far as the interaction with the 
domestic legislation of Member Stated is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that the 
new entity has a strong symbolic implication as stemming from the European level. 
In  this  sense,  the EGTC Regulation,  by recognising the  legal  value of  territorial 
cooperation, imposes Member States to provide for some mechanisms in order to 
devise  the  establishment  of  EGTCs'  structures.  In  particular,  this  concerns  a 
necessary complex interaction with sub-national authorities.
154 It seems quite reasonable to make a differentiation between the so-called “transposition” of a 
directive into the national legislation and, as in this case, the national implementation of a Regulation 
that is directly applicable, but some of whose provisions have no direct effect. In fact, as the direct 
applicability  concerns  the  act  (the  Regulation),  the  direct  effect  concerns  the  legal  effect  of  the 
provisions entailed in the act. The fact that the provisions of a Community act have no direct effect 
doesn't invalidate the direct applicability of the act.
155 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
67.
156 The CoR keeps an updated list of the national provisions regarding the implementation of the 
Regulation 1982/2006 on its official web-page at:
http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx?view=folder&id=2a35663b-5cd7-41e7-88e5-
a148f1747e43&sm=2a35663b-5cd7-41e7-88e5-a148f1747e43.  At  the  time  of  writing  12  Member 
States haven't implemented the EGTC Regulation yet.
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Several doubts surround a plain development of the EGTC Regulation. First 
of  all,  the  Community  nature  of  the  new  structure  provides  for  a  possible 
cohabitation of  States and sub-national  authorities  as members of  the same legal 
subject,  thus  implying  a  certain  degree  of  parity  that  is  not  really  an  ordinary 
circumstance. This is the first time that territorial cooperation is considered from this 
point of view, contemplating the cooperation between sub-national authorities and 
States within the same legal structure. As far as the main attention is drawn on the 
development of cooperation between territorial communities, the potential presence 
of  central  authorities  has  not  to  be  underestimated.  Beside  this,  however,  other 
difficulties remain pending for quite a long time within each Member State.
With regard to the procedure for the adoption of the national provisions, some 
States  showed  hesitations  concerning  the  type  of  act  suitable  to  implement  a 
Community  Regulation  within  the  national  system.157 Moreover,  the  potential 
application  of  foreign  national  law  or  the  foreign  relations  between  national 
territorial authorities create some perplexities when these relations are not covered by 
an inter-state agreement. As sub-national authorities typically need the State's assent 
to be involved in an EGTC, the form of such approval is not patent according to the 
different  national  constitutional  systems and national  legislations158.  The  fact  that 
Community  law  governs  the  rules  of  territorial  cooperation  together  with  the 
following development of foreign relations between sub-national authorities seems to 
be still a doubtful matter. Another doubt concerns the legal capacity of the EGTC. 
Namely, the Regulation is lacking in this regard as it doesn't oblige to the public law-
personality or the private law-personality159. 
So far, some difficulties about the effective adoption of the EGTC Regulation 
have been pointed out. There are some political concerns as well as other technical 
complications160.  However,  since  the  Regulation  leaves  a  certain  degree  of 
157 This  was,  for  example,  the  case  of  Germany.  While  the  Länder decided  to  implement  the 
Regulation  throughout  an  ordinary  law,  the  Federal  Government  didn't  provide  for  a  piece  of 
legislation. Namely, at central level, Germany adopted the requested provisions by an ordinance of the 
Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology.
158 The implementation of the EGTC Regulation required the abolition of the Article L1115-5 of the 
General Code of territorial communities.
159 See J.M. PÉREZ MEDINA, El Estado y la cooperación transfronteriza, in RÉSEAU D’ÉTUDE DES NORMES 
TRANSFRONTALIÈRE ET INTER-TERRITORIALES (RENTI), L’État et la coopération transfrontalière: actes de la  
journée d’étude du 13 septembre 2006, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 52-56.
160 Ibid., p. 55. Some of the technical problems are the same encountered in the framework of the 
Council of Europe. Namely, the issue about the liability of the body, the personal recruitment, the 
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discrectionality for Member State to carry out national provisions, nevertheless the 
exercise of such discretional faculties remains hesitant.
3.4. The normative hierarchy established by the Regulation about the law applicable  
to an EGTC
Once more it is better to remember the difference between the law concerning 
the  legitimacy  for  public  subjects  to  develop  territorial  cooperation  and  the  law 
applicable to the activities and relations concerning cooperation. In this paragraph we 
will deal with the second argument. The issue concerning the law applicable to the 
relations of transfrontier cooperation has always been, and still is, one of the most 
complex question to approach, mainly with regard to the function of public law. All 
the  legal  solutions  that  have  been  elaborated  for  the  development  of  territorial 
cooperation and, in general, for transfrontier relations try to overcome the obstacles 
concerning the law applicable to these relations as far as different legal systems are 
concerned. However, despite the various attempts and the different legal means that 
have been proposed, several questions remain still open. Also with reference to the 
Council  of Europe's  acquis  and in particular to the Third Protocol to the Madrid 
Outline Convention, it is quite difficult to find clear solutions only in one regulatory 
source. In fact, the legal implications of a legal subject involving members belonging 
to  different  countries,  concerning  different  national  territories  and  acting  under 
different  legal  systems  are  multi-fold.  The  adoption  of  the  EGTC  Regulation, 
according to its promoters, should have helped to find a clear and definitive legal 
solution to this issue. However, in the opinion of N. Levrat, the provisions of the 
Regulation are quite misleading because they do not resolve the issues concerning 
the applicable law161.
Article 2 of the EGTC Regulation concerns the applicable law and recites at 
paragraph 1: “An EGTC shall be governed by the following: a) this Regulation; b) 
where expressly authorised by this Regulation, the provisions of the convention and 
the statutes referred to in Articles 8 and 9; c) in the case of matters not, or only partly,  
effects of the acts taken by the EGTC present the same problems for every transfrontier structure that 
involves different subjects and different legal systems. 
161 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, Study 
carried out by GEPE under the supervision of Prof N. Levrat, cit., p. 100.
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regulated by this Regulation, the laws of the Member State where the EGTC has its 
registered  office”162.  This  provision  clearly  sets  down  a  normative  hierarchy 
concerning the possible legal sources applicable to the EGTCs. In particular, Article 
2 deals with the law applicable to an EGTC, but not with the law applicable to the 
establishment  of  an  EGTC163.  The  ranking  order  listed  in  Article  2,  paragraph 1 
draws a general criterion for the law applicable, but there are other provisions in the 
Regulation concerning the rules applicable to the EGTC's activities and liabilities, 
such as the rules related to the financial control or the law applicable to the relation 
between the members. Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind the that other different 
sources  determine the  law applicable  to  the  relations  with third parties164.  In  this 
sense, Article 2, paragraph 1 a), b) and c) provides only for a partial and extremely 
wide clause, which doesn't exclude the occurrence of other provisions, also under the 
various national legislations.
The  Article  under  consideration  establishes  the  first  precedence  of  the 
Regulation's  provisions over national  law,  which is  only charged to  complete  the 
blanks left by the Regulation.  The second rank is  up to the rules entailed in the 
conventions and in the statutes as funding acts of an EGTC, agreed and submitted by 
its members. National law comes in third place and is intended as a complement or 
as an alternative to Community law165. In this sense, the national legislations could 
display  two  alternatives:  either  there  are  already  existing  provisions  which  are 
applicable to the EGTCs or new national provisions should be drafted in this regard. 
162 Article 2 continues with the following provisions: “Where it is necessary under Community or 
international private law to establish the choice of law which governs the EGTC's acts, an EGTC shall 
be treated as an entity of the Member State where it has its registered office. Where a Member State 
comprises several territorial entities which have their own rules of applicable law, the reference to the 
law applicable under paragraph 1(c) shall include the law of those entities, taking into account the 
constitutional  structure  of  the  Member  State  concerned”.  Although important  and  clarifying,  this 
provisions are just repeating what has explicitly affirmed in other parts of the Regulation.  
163 See  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, 
Study carried out by GEPE under the supervision of Prof N. Levrat, cit., p. 100.
164 Ibid., at p. 100-109, different categories of the law applicable to an EGTC are mentioned under 
the  general  title  “law  applicable  to  an  EGTC  and  to  its  acts”,  namely:  law  applicable  to  the 
establishment of an EGTC; law applicable to the interpretation of the convention and the statutes 
governing  the  EGTC;  law  applicable  to  an  EGTC  in  accordance  with  Article  2  of  Regulation 
1082/2006; law applicable to the control of an EGTC's activities (comprising the rules applicable to 
the financial control of an EGTC and the extraordinary control aimed in particular  at defending the 
public  interest);  law applicable  to  the  relations  between  members;  law  applicable  to  an  EGTC's 
relations with third parties; liability of the authorities that are members of an EGTC; liability of the 
Member States; law applicable to the dissolution of an EGTC.
165 Ibid., p. 121.
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Moreover,  another  complex question  generated by the  legal  hierarchy among the 
Regulation  and  the  national  provisions  in  general  is  the  dynamic  related  to  the 
Regulation's rules having direct effect and those that need an implementation. The 
subsidiary role of national law, then, can create some differences in the homogeneous 
application of the Regulation insofar as national existing legislations on territorial 
cooperation could be extremely dissimilar. 
As the normative hierarchy established by Article 2 seems to be apparently 
quite clear, some difficulties and paradoxes can emerge. In fact, the rules contained 
in the statutes and conventions are said to prevail over national law. However, as far 
as regional and local authorities can be member of EGTCs and determine the content 
of  those  funding  acts,  provisions  coming  from  sub-national  authorities  could 
theoretically  overcome national  provisions,  according  to  the  words  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation. The opinion stemming from the study directed by N. Levrat highlights 
this occurrence as paradoxical and stresses the eventuality of future difficulties166. A 
reasonable solution for possible antithesis between national law and the content of 
conventions  and  statutes  adopted  by  sub-national  authorities  could  be  the  strict 
respect  of  the  competences  and  functions  attributed  to  the  different  territorial 
authorities under national law. However, even in this case the remaining problems 
are, at least, twofold. On the one hand, it is quite difficult to establish a priori the 
exact limit of the matters that are object of the respective competences of national or 
sub-national  authorities.  Therefore,  in  a  conflicting  situation  the  intervention  of 
jurisdictional  bodies  will  take  place.  On  the  other  hand,  there  could  be  some 
complications between national laws and those acts in the creation of which also 
foreign sub-national authorities take part.
Summarising what has been said until now about the EGTC Regulation, the 
direct  applicability  combined  with  the  direct  effect  of  many  provisions  and  the 
166 Another interesting observation, which also concerns Article 2 of the EGTC Regulation and the 
relations  between  Community  law  and  national  law,  is  the  following.  “The  question  of  the 
interpretation which might arise will be how to establish whether a legal issue relating to the existence 
or life of an EGTC is fully dealt with or not by Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006. This question, which 
would be raised by the operator or if necessary the national court, can be presented to the Community 
court for a preliminary ruling (Article 234 TEC) for interpretation of the provision concerned. In 
practice, the management of questions that are only partly governed by the Regulation are likely to be 
complex.  We  would  emphasise  that  determining  the  extent  to  which  a  matter  is  partly  or  fully 
governed by the EGTC Regulation is a question of Community law, not national law”, see  ibid., p. 
121.
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necessary national implementation of other provisions individuate a double kind of 
obligatory  effects.  On the  one  hand,  the  EGTC Regulation imposes  its  standard: 
directly according to the general ranking order of Article 2 or coming from other 
specific provisions. On the other hand, the Regulation prescribes (and this is also an 
obligation)  the  subsidiary  contribution  of  national  provisions  in  conformity  with 
each national legal systems. In this case it is possible to speak about an “imposed 
discretionality”. How wide this space of discretion would be, it is not really clear. 
According  to  some  interpretations,  the  EGTC  Regulation  doesn't  leave  a  big 
autonomy to  the  national  activities  of  implementation167.  In  fact,  as  we  will  see 
further  on  there  are  several  Articles  of  the  Regulation  that  impose  strict  and 
compelling rules in regard to which the national provisions could provide only for 
exceptional  conditions.  On  the  contrary,  other  interpretations  consider  the 
Community  Regulation  as  an  act  with  moderate  direct  effects,  thus  being 
substantially depending on the national application168. For this reason, it should be 
possible  to  see  in  these  national  requirements  some  necessary  and  discretionary 
condition for the validity of the constitution of EGTCs. Moreover, as far as also sub-
national legislation is concerned in the implementation of the Regulation according 
to each national constitutional system169, it is also possible that the application of the 
Regulation is partially developed by sub-national provisions. However, considering 
this potential ambiguity of the EGTC Regulation it is not possible, at this time of the 
survey, to be in favour of one of the two mentioned interpretations. 
In conclusion to this paragraph about the normative hierarchy introduced by 
Article 2, it is possible to affirm that the issue is much more complex than how it is 
presented  in  the  EGTC  Regulation.  Actually,  when  speaking  about  normative 
hierarchy within the EC legal order, it is almost obvious that Community law has the 
precedence  over  national  law.  Thus,  the  Regulation  doesn't  really  introduce 
something new in relation to the traditional dynamic between Community law and 
national law. 
167 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
137.  According  to  this  interpretation  it  seems that  Member  States  lack  enough discretionality  in 
comparison  with the  instruments of  the Council  of  Europe,  i.e.  the  Third Protocol to  the Madrid 
Outline Convention.
168 See  M.  PERTILE,  Il  GECT:  verso  un  organismo  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera?, cit., p. 126.
169 See Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 at Article 2, paragraph 2.
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More interesting, instead,  is to evaluate the space of discretionality left  to 
national  law  and  the  subsequent  effect  on  the  activities  of  regional  and  local 
authorities.
3.5. The members of an EGTC
Article 3 of Regulation 1082/2006 regarding the composition of an EGTC 
affirms:  “1.  An EGTC shall  be  made up  of  members,  within  the  limits  of  their 
competences  under  national  law,  belonging  to  one  or  more  of  the  following 
categories: Member States; regional authorities; local authorities; bodies governed by 
public  law  within  the  meaning  of  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article  1(9)  of 
Directive 2004/18/EC […]170. Associations consisting of bodies belonging to one or 
more of these categories may also be members. 2. An EGTC shall be made up of 
members located on the territory of at least two Member States”.
Starting from the last paragraph of Article 3, it  is clear that the minimum 
composition of an EGTC shall  consist  of at least two members of the mentioned 
categories belonging to two different Member States. As far as such a provision has a 
reasonable justification in order not to allow the establishment of an EGTC within 
the same country, the same provision is also relevant for another reason. Namely, the 
Regulation  1082/2006 foresees the potential  participation of entities belonging to 
third  countries.  Without  being  contemplated  by  the  words  of  Article  3,  these 
authorities are not comprehended in the list of so-called ordinary members, but their 
participation  is  allowed  under  other  particular  conditions171.  In  this  regard,  then, 
170 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service  contracts.  For  what  concerns  the  mention  in  the  EGTC  Regulation  Article  1(9)  of  this 
Directive provides that a “body governed by public law” means any body: (a) established for the 
specific  purpose of  meeting needs in  the general  interest,  not  having an industrial  or  commercial 
character; (b) having legal personality; and (c) financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or 
local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law; or subject to management supervision by 
those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose 
members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by 
public law. Non-exhaustive lists of bodies and categories of bodies governed by public law which 
fulfil the criteria referred to in (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph are set out in Annex III. 
Member States shall periodically notify the Commission of any changes to their lists of bodies and 
categories of bodies.
171 The 16th recital of Preamble affirms: “ The third subparagraph of Article 159 of the Treaty does 
not allow the inclusion of entities from third countries in legislation based on that  provision. The 
adoption of a Community measure allowing the creation of an EGTC should not, however, exclude 
the possibility of entities from third countries participating in an EGTC formed in accordance with 
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Article  3,  paragraph  2  prescribes  the  conditions  under  which  an  EGTC  can  be 
legitimately  composed.  Would  it  be  founded by members  belonging  to  the  same 
Member State or by members belonging to one Member State and to a third country, 
this occurrences wouldn't be permitted.
The ordinary members of an EGTC could be, basically of four types. The first 
three  types  consists  of  national,  regional  and  local  authorities.  According  to  the 
CoR's  study,  the  variety  of  potential  members  could  lead  to  both  positive  and 
negative  consequences.  On  the  one  hand,  multilevel  governance  gains  a  new 
instrument and a new method in order to develop European integration. On the other 
hand,  the  differences  among  the  various  actors  could  lead  to  potential,  but  also 
practical, imbalances172. This is the case, for instance, of the contextual membership 
of States  and sub-national authorities  or  the case  of  the  presence  of sub-national 
authorities belonging to different countries and having differentiated competences, 
powers and responsibilities according to the respective national structures.
Insofar as territorial cooperation has been developed between and in favour of 
sub-national territorial subjects, the instruments that have been elaborated before the 
Regulation 1082/2006 normally aim at strengthening transfrontier relations between 
local  and  regional  institutional  entities.  The  EGTC  Regulation  introduces  the 
possibility for Member States to become members of an EGTC. This is an innovation 
within the panorama of territorial cooperation and revises the traditional paradigms 
of  transfrontier  cooperation.  Namely,  the  intrinsic  sub-national  nature  has 
progressively brought to the conception of territorial/transfrontier cooperation as a 
peculiar  phenomenon  and  as  a  peculiar  “sub-national”  legal  matter;  conception 
which is going to be partially revised by the potential presence of States.173. In the 
same  perspective,  also  the  new  instrument  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  Third 
Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention, provides for the possible participation of 
this Regulation where the legislation of a third country or agreements between Member States or third 
countries so allow.
172 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 
88.
173 As it has been already explained in the first chapter, territorial cooperation has developed as a 
phenomenon which substantially linked to sub-national authorities. The States, for both political and 
legal reasons, have been traditionally considered out of the issue.  As a direct consequence of this 
exclusion, the analysis about the legal nature of transfrontier/territorial cooperation mostly concluded 
that it was not a matter of international law. Of course, Member States have been constantly present as 
regulators or supervisors towards sub-national authorities (both within the national system and mostly 
trough covering inter-state agreements), but they were not direct actors of cooperation. 
247
CHAPTER V
States  in  the  European  Cooperation  Grouping  (ECG).  However,  as  it  has  been 
already  explained,  such  a  participation  in  this  case  is  submitted  to  a  particular 
condition  and,  thus,  it  is  substantially  different  from the  provision  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation. In fact, Article 3 of the Third Protocol affirms that the members of an 
ECG shall be territorial communities or authorities of a party to the Protocol and may  
also include the respective Member State concerned of the CoE174.  The condition 
required for the participation of a State is, thus, the membership of the sub-national 
authorities belonging to that State175. But this is not the case for the EGTC which 
doesn't entail such a condition and which can potentially be formed only by States.
The participation of  national  central  authorities within an EGTC could be 
interpreted as a kind of supervisory function towards sub-national authorities. The 
exact effects of the provision concerning the States' presence, anyway, are not really 
predictable and cannot be defined  ex ante.  In fact,  the role  of States,  as  entailed 
within  the  EGTC Regulation,  is  rather  complex  and  it  is  linked to  the  dynamic 
coming up with regard to Community law – the provisions of the Regulation with 
direct effects –  and national law – the domestic rules of implementation. As we will 
see,  the  States  will  maintain,  in  any  case,  a  general  supervisory  role  about  the 
participation of sub-national subjects in the establishment of EGTCs.
At  this  point,  it  is  necessary to  remember  what  Article  3  says  about  the 
“capacity” of the members in an EGTC. Namely, each member shall remain within 
the  limits  of  their  competences  under  national  law.  In  this  sense,  the  potential 
participation of States could be considered in the perspective of widen the extent of 
the spectrum of competences available for the EGTC in case the attributions of sub-
national  authorities seem too narrow to develop the required activities and tasks. 
However,  also  the  States'  role  has  to  be  dimensioned  in  relation  to  the  eventual 
decentralisation  of  competences  according  to  the  respective  constitutional 
structures176.  In  this  regard,  speaking  about  competences,  it  is  necessary  to 
174 The reason for the potential State's participation within an ECG could be twofold. On the one 
hand, this participation can be used as an instrument of supervision towards the activities of sub-
national authorities. On the other hand, it is useful with regard to the fact that sub-national authorities 
have  limited  competences  and,  therefore,  the  State's  membership  could  grant  the  approach  to  a 
broader set of tasks.
175 See also the Explanatory Report to the Third Protocol about Article 3.
176 According  to  the  interpretation  given  by  N.  Levrat  this  is  the  key  for  comprehend  that  the 
participation  of  the  States  is  not  so  revolutionary  as  it  has  seemed  at  a  first  view.  Namely,  the 
supervisory role of central authorities is not really different from the role that has been played in the 
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distinguish  between  the  national  provisions  concerning  determined  substancial 
subjects as a matter of sub-national competence (i.e. public services, environmental 
protection, transports, waste management, etc.) and the (eventual) national provisions 
attributing to sub-national entities some specific powers for transfrontier cooperation 
with correspondent  foreign authorities.  In any case,  also the existence of the last 
mentioned general attribution shall be exercised within the limits of the “substantial” 
competences, namely within the limits of the subject-matters that are attributed to 
sub-national authorities. In this sense, the legitimation regarding the membership of 
an EGTC of both central or sub-national authorities should be solved according to 
each single national law177. Even for what concerns possible disputes, they have to be 
treated under national law and by the competent national jurisdictions. 
In  parallel  to  the  attribution  of  competences,  the  national  constitutional 
structures concern also the exact qualification of “regional” and “local” authorities as 
mentioned in the Regulation. Recalling what has been said above in this paragraph, 
insofar  as  it  competes  to  the  national  system to  define  and  qualify  sub-national 
authorities  as  legal  entities  separated  from  the  State,  possible  imbalances  could 
emerge within an EGTC and affect its activities178. In particular, it is interesting to 
observe  that  some  national  provisions  have  introduced  new  figures  of  territorial 
authorities allowed to be member of an EGTC according to the respective national 
legislation.  It  is  the  case,  for  instance,  it  is  possible  to  mention  the  Portuguese 
Metropolitan  areas  or  the  Greek  Communities179.  According  to  our  opinion,  the 
eventual  national  addition  of  territorial  authorities  is  not  in  contrast  with  the 
Regulation as far as this circumstance reflects the internal territorial subdivision of 
each State180.
past, see COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 
89.
177 The following study could be useful in order to have an updated description about the different 
Sate-structures in Europe:  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  Study on the Division of Powers between the 
Euroepan  Union,  the  Member  State,  and  Regional  and  Local  Authorities,  Study  realized  by  the 
European University Institute (Florence), Luxembourg, 2008.
178 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state  
of the play and prospects, Study carried on by METIS GmbH, Bruxelles, 2009, p. 31.
179 Ibid., p. 34. 
180 For example, this is the case of Italy. Namely, the Italian Constitution remembers at Article 114 
the composition of the Italian Republic, which consists of Municipalities, Provinces,  Metropolitan 
Cities, Regions and State. The law of implementation of the Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 (Legge 
comunitaria 2008 of the 23 June 2008) provides for the definition of some correspondences between 
the EC Regulation and the Italian legislation about the EGTC members in conformity with the Italian 
system. “Regional authorities and local authorities” as considered by Article 3 of the Community 
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Furthermore, concerning the fourth type of members – the bodies governed 
by public law according to the Directive 2004/18/EC – the range of possible subjects 
is really huge and manifold. 
The justification for such a provision seems to  be the decision to  leave a 
flexible and open range for the inclusion of various subjects having some connection 
with public aims. Namely, besides the legal personality, other two basic conditions to 
be considered as a public-law-body are the purposes of general interest (i.e. without 
commercial or industrial scopes) and the connection with a territorial or other public-
law authority in terms of financing, management or supervision. In this case, there 
are not so many differences with the CoE's Third Protocol on ECG. Namely, the 
Protocol considers the possibility to include other public-oriented entities in the same 
line with the EGTC. Listing the possible combination of non-institutional members 
with reference to the EGTC and to the ECG is not a really useful exercise. What can 
be observed, in general, is the determination of the EC Regulation to be linked to the 
public institutional and territorial asset also with reference to the additional members.  
Thus  the  ECG seems also  to  leave  some more  flexibility,  but,  according  to  our 
opinion, it should not be considered as an over-estimated peculiarity. 
The  last  figure  of  members  is  represented  by  the  association  of  bodies 
belonging to  the precedent  categories.  Actually,  it  seems not to be a problematic 
category. The interesting point of this issue is the possibility to consider not only 
national  associations  (i.e.  associations  of  municipalities  belonging  to  the  same 
country),  but  also  associations  comprehending  authorities  belonging  to  different 
States.  It  is  the  case  of  the  already mentioned AEBR and AER, but  many other 
associations  exists.  With  regard  to  the  constitution  of  EGTCs it  seems that  two 
possibilities are available for this kind of subjects. On the one hand, the associations 
considered by Article 3 can take part to an EGTC with other members as a single 
partner.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  potentially  possible  the  transformation  of  these 
associations  into  EGTCs.  General  consequences  of  such  eventualities  are, 
respectively, a simplification of the composition of EGTCs and a clearer and more 
Regulation correspond to the Italian Regions, the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano, and 
the Local Authorities as provided by Article 2, paragraph 1 of the legislation about local authorities 
(D.Lgs.  n.  267/2000),  which intends for  local  authorities  all  the Italian Municipalities,  Provinces, 
Metropolitan  Cities,  Mountain  Communities,  Insular  Communities  and  Associations  of 
Municipalities. 
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uniform definition  of  the  legal  nature  of  the  “international”  associations  of  sub-
national authorities.
3.6. Partners belonging to Third Countries
The expansion of EGTCs outside the territory of the European Union could 
represent a great potential for territorial cooperation. Not only for third States, but 
also for territorial communities belonging to these countries. As already mentioned, 
the Regulation 1082/2006 considers the possibility to include institutional partners 
belonging to non-Community countries. For the reason that Article 159 TEC would 
have been violated, these subjects cannot be considered as real ordinary members of 
an EGTC on the same ground of the Community subjects. Namely, the possibility to 
include  non-Community  partners  is  not  foreseen  in  the  Articles  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation, but, as already alluded to in the previous paragraphs, it is foreseen by the 
16th Recital of the Preamble. Besides the respect of the provisions set down by the 
Regulation  for  the  establishment  of  an  EGTC,  the  conditions  alowing  the  non-
exclusion of this possibility  are two: either the permission according to  the third 
country's legislation or an agreement between the Member States and third countries 
concerned. As the study of the Committee of the Regions observes, this provision 
doesn't have direct effects, but it is limited to the non-exclusion of a possibility181. 
Furthermore,  as  far  as  one of  the  conditions  for  the  EGTC's  set  up requires  the 
participation  of  at  least  two members  belonging  to  EU Member  States,  bilateral 
cooperation between Member States and Third Countries is  per se  excluded in the 
form of an EGTC182. 
For reasons of territorial contiguities and political opportunities the presence 
of  this  clause  is  necessary.  Of  course,  the  relation  of  the  EU/EC  with  Third 
Countries, also in the field of transfrontier cooperation, is not new and the existence 
of several funding programmes in parallel with the INTERREG Initiative has been 
delineated  in  the  chapters  above.  Thus,  the  Community  has  a  strong  policy  of 
neighbourhood with the contiguous and non contiguous areas outside the borders of 
its  territory,  mainly  with  interest  to  the  Eastern  borders  and  to  the  countries  of 
181 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 93.
182 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state  
of the play and prospects, cit., p. 37.
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Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, such disposition is necessary to grant the perpetration 
of  a  strong  tradition  of  transfrontier  cooperation  with  territorial  communities 
belonging to  European third countries (i.e. Switzerland and Norway) and,  in any 
case,  to  deepen  cooperation  with  countries  that  are  members  of  the  Council  of 
Europe.  In  this  regard,  the  provision  of  the  Third  Protocol  on the  ECG is  quite 
different, allowing the possible participation of members that do not belong to States 
parties to the Protocol under the condition of a previous inter-state agreement with 
the  State  where  the  ECG  will  have  or  has  the  headquarters.  In  this  case,  the 
differentiation is also originated from the international-law nature of the instrument. 
However, the intent of both the EGCT and the ECG seems to be, in substance, the 
same:  the  potential  broader  expansion  of  the  two  instruments  of  territorial  and 
transfrontier cooperation. Sometimes, besides the attempts of the Council of Europe 
to develop compatible measures with the Community Regulation, the Third Protocol 
appears to be the European instrument representing the most flexible and open legal 
means to set up transfrontier cooperation. 
In any case, for both the instruments the practice of the inclusion of “third” 
partners  depends  mainly  from  additional  conditions  in  respect  to  the  ordinary 
membership and it is not currently possible to make an abstract evaluation about the 
expansion of the two instruments outside the territories covered by the European 
Union and by the Council of Europe. Concerning the national implementation of the 
EGTC Regulation, the national provisions adopted do not necessarily make reference 
to the partnership of non-Community subjects.  “The participation of entities from 
third countries (bordering countries outside the EU territory) is neither mentioned nor 
explicitly excluded in the overall majority of national provisions.”183 Namely, only 
Romanian  and French legislations  have  adopted  a  clause  in  regard  to  this  issue. 
While  Romanian  legislation  has  adopted  a  general  statement  authorising  third 
countries to join the EGTC only when their  national legislation so allows  184,  the 
French legislation speaks about the frontier States that are Member of the Council of 
183 Ibid., p. 37. Another critical point concerns the existence of such inter-state agreements. Namely, 
the study commissioned by the Committee of the Region doesn't mention any kind of agreement. At 
the moment, thus, the participation of third countries seems to be more theoretical than effective.
184 See the English version of Official Journal of Romania, Part I, No 769/13.XI.2007, Article 2, 
paragraph, 2, available at:
http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/NationalProvisions/Pages/Adopted.aspx.
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Europe185.  Thus,  it  is  possible  that  Member States  limit  the  scope  of  application 
regarding third countries. Namely, the Community Regulation make references to the 
possible participation of “entities” belonging to third countries, whereas the French 
provisions seem to allow only States, which are at the external border with the EU 
and which are at the same time members of the CoE. In addition, another element of 
complexity of the EGTC Regulation can be observed. In fact, the national provisions 
about the application of the Regulation concern mainly the EGTCs to set up in the 
respective  national  territories.  But,  what  about  a  French  territorial  authority 
participating in an EGTC under a foreign national law, which allows the partnership 
of a sub-national authority belonging to a State, which is a non-member of the CoE? 
We leave an open question, just to underline the almost uncountable variabilities that 
characterize the concrete establishment of EGTCs and the multiplicity of its legal 
combinations.  For  the  moment,  as  we will  deal  with  in  the  paragraph about  the 
already established EGTC, the issue of the participation of members belonging to 
Third Countries is not a reality yet. However, mainly with regard to the relations at 
the Eastern borders of the Community, this will probably be a relevant issue. 
3.7.  The  procedure  for  the  establishment  of  an  EGTC  and  the  minimum 
arrangements prescribed by the Regulation
Article 4 of Regulation 1082/2006 prescribes a detailed procedure to follow 
for the creation of an EGTC. The Community Regulation sets down a combination of 
formal  and  substantial  duties  that  imply  a  mutual  agreement  of  the  prospective 
185 The French implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1082/2008 modified the  Code Généal des  
Collectivités  Territoriales.  For  what  concerns  the  participation  of  non-Community  partners  to  an 
EGTC, Article L. 1115-4 recites that “Les collectivités territoriales et leurs groupements peuvent, dans 
les limites  de leurs compétences et  dans le respect  des  engagements internationaux de la  France, 
adhérer à un organisme public de droit étranger ou participer au capital d’une personne morale de 
droit étranger  auquel adhère ou participe au moins une collectivité territoriale ou un groupement de 
collectivités territoriales d’un Etat membre de l’Union européenne ou d’un Etat membre du Conseil de  
l’Europe”. Moreover, Article L. 1115-4-2 recites that “Dans le cadre de la coopération transfrontalière, 
transnationale ou interrégionale, les collectivités territoriales, leurs groupements et, après autorisation 
de leur autorité de tutelle,  les organismes de droit public au sens de la directive 2004/18/CE […] 
peuvent, dans les limites de leurs compétences et dans le respect des engagements internationaux de la 
France,  créer avec les collectivités territoriales, les groupements de collectivités territoriales et  les 
organismes  de  droit  public  des  Etats  membres  de  l’Union  européenne,  ainsi  qu’avec  les  Etats 
membres  de  l’Union  européenne  ou  les  Etats  frontaliers  membres  du  Conseil  de  l’Europe,  un 
groupement européen de coopération territoriale de droit français, doté de la personnalité morale et de 
l’autonomie financière […]”.
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members and the involvement of the respective States. This procedure, anyway, has 
to be considered also with reference to other provisions of the Regulation in order to 
have a more complete perspective about the setting up and structure of the EGTC.
According to Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, the first constitution's phase, after 
the common initiative of the future members to constitute an EGTC, requires the 
notification  from  each  member  to  the  respective  State.  This  communication 
represents a preliminary obligation for the potential members to set up a valid and 
effective agreement186.  Thus,  sub-national  authorities are  subject  to  this condition 
before setting up a legitimate transfrontier structure. The information shall contain 
the  declaration  of  the  intention  to  participate  to  an  EGTC  and  the  copy  of  the 
proposed convention and statutes187. 
In particular, the convention shall be concluded unanimously by its members 
and shall specify several aspects, as listed in Article 8 of the Regulation. The most 
important  specification  regards  the  law  applicable  to  the  interpretation  and 
enforcement of the convention; this law shall be the law of the Member State where 
the EGTC has its registered office188. The Regulation, thus, confers to the prospective 
members of an EGTC the possibility to choose the seat of the headquarters among 
the  Members  States  to  which  at  least  one  of  the  members  belongs.  This  choice 
determines  the  national  law  applicable  to  the  general  functioning  of  an  EGTC. 
According  to  the  study  commissioned  by  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  this 
provision is quite unnecessary because it is “the Regulation that governs this matter, 
and  its  inclusion  in  the  text  of  the  convention  cannot  under  any  circumstances 
diverge  form  this  Community  provision”189.  However,  we  cannot  consider  this 
specification as a dangerous provision, just because it seems not to determine real 
186 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
95.
187 Article 4, paragraph 2. Paragraph 4 of the same Article states that it is up to the Member States to 
designate the competent national authorities to receive the notification required under paragraph 2. 
188 According to Article 8, paragraph 2, the other necessary specifications require that the convention 
shall entail are: the name of the EGTC and its registered office, which shall be located in a Member 
State under whose law at least one of the member is formed; the extent of the territory in which the 
EGTC may execute  its  tasks;  the  specific  objective and  tasks  of  the EGTC, its  duration and the 
conditions governing its dissolution; the list of the EGTC's members; the appropriate arrangements for 
mutual recognition, including for the purposes of financial control; the procedures for amending the 
convention, which shall comply with the obligations set out in Articles 4 and 5.
189 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 
82.
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effects  against  the  normative  structure  and  application  of  the  Regulation. 
Furthermore, as it has been already said, this is not the only law applicable, as far as 
the reality of legal relations is more complex. Namely, in particular with regard to 
relations with third parties, the application of other national laws could be necessary.
Regarding the statutes, Article 9 of the Regulation prescribes that it shall be 
adopted on the basis of the convention by the unanimous action of the members. The 
statutes shall have a minimum content, which is also set down in Article 2, paragraph 
2, in order to fix the basic rules for the EGTC functioning such as the decision-
making procedures, the management of personnel, etc190. In this regard, Community 
law provides for a minimum standard framework while the basic rules are decided by 
the  members  and,  obviously,  in  conformity  to  the  national  rules  applicable.  Of 
course,  members  are  free  to  add other  specifications  or  to  provide  for  a  stricter 
organisation  of  an  EGTC.  With  regard  to  the  organisation  of  the  EGTC,  the 
Regulation provides for a minimum requirement as well. Namely, Article 10 states 
that the necessary organs are the assembly (made up of members' representatives) 
and the director (representing the EGTC and acting on its behalf). Other organs can 
be provided by the statutes.
Going back to Article 4 with regard to the convention and statutes, paragraph 
5 establishes that members shall agree on their content as required under Articles 8 
and 9 “ensuring consistency with the approval of the Members States in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this Article”. This is a not very clear provision, indeed. Namely, 
it is quite obvious that the content of the convention and statutes shall be compatible 
with  the  prescriptions  of  the  Regulation.  In  this  regard,  the  procedure  for  the 
establishment of an EGTC goes on. In fact,  after the member of the EGTC have 
notified their intentions and have sent a copy of the convention and statutes to the 
Member States, Article 4 paragraph 1 and 2, paragraph 3 deals with the “active” role 
190 According to Article 9, paragraph 2, the Regulation prescribes that statutes shall contain, as a 
minimum, the following: the operating provisions of the EGTC's organs and their competencies, as 
well as the number of representatives of the members in the relevant organs; the decision-making 
procedures of the EGTC; the working language or languages; the arrangements for its functioning 
notably  concerning  personnel  management,  recruitment  procedures  and  the  nature  of  personnel 
contracts; the arrangements for the members' financial contributions and the applicable accounting 
and budgetary rules, including on financial issues, of each of the members of the EGTC with respect 
to  it;  the  arrangements  for  members'  liability  in  accordance  with  Article  12(2);  the  authorities 
responsible for  the designation of independent external auditors;  the procedures  for  amending the 
statutes, which shall comply with the obligations set out in Articles 4 and 5.
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of  the  Sates  during  this  constitutive  phase.  Namely,  “[...]  the  Member  State 
concerned  shall,  taking  into  account   its  constitutional  structure,  approve  the 
prospective  member's  participation  in  the  EGTCs,  unless  it  considers  that  such 
participation is not in conformity with this Regulation or national law, including the 
prospective member's powers and duties, or that such participation is not justified by 
reasons of public interest or of public policy of that Member State. In such a case, the 
Member State shall give a statement of its reasons for withholding approval”191. The 
form of the approval, as well as the competent authority, is left to the choice of the 
Member States.
Apparently, this provisions is quite clear and contains what the Regulation 
already affirms in other provisions: the necessary respect of the Regulation itself and 
of the national legislations from the point of view of the prospective members. In 
fact, the prospective members of an EGTC are entitled to participate in this legal 
structures only in conformity to the constitutional order of the respective States. So 
far, nothing new192. For this reason, maybe, the study of the CoR doesn't dedicate so 
much space to the provision. However, according to our opinion, Article 4, paragraph 
3  represents  a  potentially  problematic  issue.  In  fact,  the  Regulation,  besides  the 
argument  of  the  necessary  conformity  to  the  national  constitutional  systems, 
introduces an active role of States about the establishment of an EGTC. Namely, the 
already  mentioned  respect  of  the  national  subdivision  of  competences  and  the 
conformity  to  the  national  law  applicable  are  a  kind  of  “passive”  elements  of 
legitimacy with regard to the constitution of an EGTC. On the contrary, Article 4 
191 Paragraph 3 also provides that  Member States shall generally reach their decision within the 
deadline of three months from the date of the receipt of an admissible application. 
192 The Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention sets down a similar  procedure for  the 
constitution of the ECG. In particular, the first version of Article 4 has been changed in order to make 
it more compatible with the EGTC Regulation. Namely, the final version of Article 4, paragraph 5 of 
the Protocol is very similar to Article 4, paragraph 3 of the Regulation: “Authorisation may be refused 
if membership of the ECG would violate this Protocol or provisions of national law, including the 
powers and responsibilities of prospective members, or if membership is not justified for reasons of 
public interest or of public policy of the party concerned. In such case, the party shall give a statement 
of its reasons for withholding approval”. As far as the CoE's an EU's provisions are identical, it is 
possible to wonder if the respective effects are different considering the different nature of the two 
legal instrument for transfrontier/territorial cooperation. With regard to the EGTC Regulation, it has 
been said that Member States have the general duty to approve the participation to an EGTC with the 
exception of the enumerated case in which it can refuse the approval. The general duty, thus, derives 
form the direct applicability of the Regulation as Community normative act. With regard to the Third 
Protocol, the conclusion could be the same, but it's important to remember that the Madrid Outline 
Convention leaves to the State the faculty to exclude sub-national authorities form the possibility to 
engage in transfrontier cooperation. 
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introduces a kind of “active” role of the State, which shall approve the participation 
of the prospective members of an EGTC that fall under its sovereignty. Beside the 
compatibility  with  the  constitutional  order,  the  condition  provided  for  the  State's 
approval are two. Firstly, the participation is allowed unless it is not in conformity 
with the Regulation or the national law. Secondly, the participation is allowed unless 
it is non-justified for reasons of public interest or public policy of the Member State. 
In these cases the State may, by explaining its reasons, impede the participation to an 
EGTC to regional and local authorities and other  bodies.  Apparently neutral,  this 
provision represents the closing element of the system and a kind of balance to the 
potential power of sub-national authorities to be involved in territorial cooperation.
First of all, Article 4, paragraph 3 imposes to the States the control regarding 
the conformity to the Regulation. Thus, it is up to the Member States to implement 
the  Regulation  with  national  provisions  and  also  to  watch  over  its  rightful 
application. The references to “national law”, “public interest” and public policy” are 
general concepts, differently defined according to each national system. Trying to 
make a comparison among the 27 different constitutional systems within this survey 
could distract from the main point of this analysis. Namely, what is interesting at this 
point is the equilibrium between the sub-national authorities' legitimation to form an 
EGTC and the power of the State to limit their membership. The main problem is to 
comprehend the level of discretionality left to the State in this case in connection to 
the form of the approval required by the Regulation. 
In this regard, the best interpretation of the concerned provision, which seems 
to be more literally in line with the text of paragraph 3, is the following. The State 
must,  as  a  general  rule,  approve  the  establishment  of  an  EGTC.  Thus,  the 
participation of the prospective members to an EGTC doesn't solely represent a right 
for  them,  but  the  grant  of  the  approval  represents  an  obligation  for  the  State 
concerned. 
Only  in  the  mentioned  cases  Member  States  may  deny  the  EGTC's 
constitution  and  there  are  no  other  reasons  that  can  justify  the  withholding  of 
consensus.  Thus,  the  Member  State  concerned  is  obliged  to  authorize  the 
participation  to  the  prospective  member  of  the  EGTC  unless  the  circumstances 
strictly mentioned by Article 4, paragraph 3 occur. Some literature sees in this clause 
257
CHAPTER V
a very stringent enumeration – respect of the Regulation, national law, public interest 
and  public  policy  –  which  doesn't  leave  much  discretion  to  the  State's  action. 
According to this interpretation, this lack of discretionality is the direct consequence 
of  the  enumerated  cases  under  paragraph 3.  With  other  words,  the  State  has  no 
discretionality in order to deny its authorisation193. 
However, if it is quite easy to agree to the first part of this reasoning, namely 
the general obligation of Member States to give their approval, the final consequence 
is not really so patent, actually not so certain. Namely, it is possible to argue that, 
although  the  possibilities  to  hamper  an  EGTC  are  not  numerous  and  shall  be 
motivated,  the  respective  concepts  are  broad  enough  to  leave  a  high  margin  of 
discretional  action.  The  research  of  this  equilibrium  –  faculty  of  sub-national 
authorities vs. State's power – are an issue of national law and should be solved by 
the competent national jurisdictions according to the national legal principles. In any 
case, as far as concepts such as public interest or public policy are generally not 
flexible but quite versatile and they often depend from changing variables across the 
time. Therefore, an eventual conflict between a prospective member of an EGTC and 
the respective State would be better defined, as we have already mentioned in the 
previous  chapters,  on  the  basis  of  reasonableness,  proportionality  and  mutual 
cooperation. 
3.8. The legal nature of an EGTC: legal personality 
One of the most important characteristics of an EGTC is its legal personality, 
as foreseen in Article 1, paragraph 3. This means that an EGTC is a legal entity, 
distinct  from its  members.  According  to  Article  5,  paragraph 1 “the EGTC shall 
acquire legal personality on the day of registration or publication, whichever occurs 
the first”. The registration's procedure follows the national law of the State where the 
EGTC has its headquarters. The completion of the registration's procedure ends with 
the publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The 
EGTC  itself  shall  comply  with  this  duty  of  information,  which  is  not  the  legal 
193 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
125 et seq.
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condition  for  its  constitutions,  but  a  subsequent  obligation  regarding  a  form  of 
cognitive publicity.
It  is  not  the  first  time that  a  legal  subject  is  established  as  “transfrontier 
structure” in order to develop territorial cooperation between its members. Namely, 
the possibility to create a common body with legal personality has been provided by 
the Additional Protocol to the Madrid Outline Conventions, but also by inter-state 
agreements, such as the Bayonne Agreement or the Karlsruhe Agreement. Moreover, 
the  Third  Protocol  to  the  MOC  has  created  the  new  figure  of  the  European 
Cooperation Groupings, which is also provided with legal personality. It has been 
mentioned in the previous chapters that the legal nature of these bodies is linked to 
the national legislations of reference. In comparison to these instruments, however, 
the EGTC presents some peculiarities. 
According to the study commissioned by the Committee of the Regions, the 
main  feature  of  the  EGTC concerns  the  fact  that  its  legal  personality  has  to  be 
considered  under  Community  law  and  not  under  national  law.  The  first 
acknowledgement in this sense is given by Recital No 8 of the EGTC Regulation, 
which  affirms:  “[...]  it  is  necessary  to  institute  a  cooperation  instrument  at 
Community level for the creation of cooperative groupings in Community territory, 
invested  with  legal  personality  [...]”.  Namely,  it  is  the  Regulation  itself  that 
represents the first condition for the validity of an EGTC. In fact, the Community 
Regulation creates a legal subject which didn't  exist before.  Even if bound to the 
national  legislations and even if  the issues regarding the law applicable are quite 
complex in terms of legal hierarchy, the legal personality of an EGTC finds its first 
ground in Community law. The study directed by N. Levrat proposes some reasons in 
order to justify this statement. 
Firstly,  although  the  Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  doesn't  contain  a 
complete  legal  framework,  it  founds  the  legal  existence  of  EGTCs:  namely  the 
Regulation  creates  a  new legal  subject  and,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  the  the  first 
normative act applicable out of the ranking order that it sets down194. To be precise, 
194 This reasoning derives, analogically, from the conclusion presented by the Advocate General in 
the Case C-436/03 between the European Parliament and the Council on the validity of the Regulation 
on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SEC). Namely, the Regulation establishing the 
SEC has  many  things in  common with the  EGTC Regulation,  in  particular  the  references  to  the 
domestic law of Member States. See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial  
Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 75. See also Judgement of the Court of Justice of 2 May 2006 - European 
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the Regulation prevails upon the national disciplines. In particular, for two reasons. 
On the one hand, we already spoke about the ranking order established in Article 2, 
which explicitly confers to the Regulation the primary role of regulatory source for 
the EGTCs. On the other hand, the general principles of Community law establish 
that a Regulation as such has the prevalence over the national legislation. Moreover, 
also  the  funding  acts  of  the  EGTC  –  conventions  and  statutes  –  shall  have  a 
prevalence over national provisions. 
Theoretically speaking, in order to contradict this reasoning it is possible to 
recall the elements of complexity deriving from the application of national law and 
its necessary role to permit the concrete end effective establishment of an EGTC. In 
this  sense,  also  the  national  legislation  seems  to  represent  a  condition  for  the 
existence  of  EGTCs.  However,  from a  formal  and substantial  point  of  view,  the 
conclusion of N. Levrat is decisive. Namely, “[i]t is therefore established that the 
EGTC is a legal person governed by Community law and that certain aspects of an 
EGTC  are  governed  by  national  law,  either  because  this  is  stipulated  in  the 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  or  because  the  Regulation  says  nothing  about 
them195. In this sense, the normative character of the Regulation is confirmed as the 
first legal condition for the existence of the EGTC196.
Another issue concerns the nature of the legal personality. The establishment 
of  a  legal  subject  under  private  law  or  public  law  have  often  been  object  of 
reflections in the field of territorial cooperation. In this regard, it has been already 
highlighted that several institutional subjects have expressed a demand of a public-
law  instrument  in  order  to  develop  a  better  interaction  between  sub-national 
Parliament v.  Council  of  the European Union, Case C-436/03,  OJ C 143 of 17.06.2006,  p.  4,  in 
particular at paragraph 40 “In the present case, it is apparent from the content and the purpose of the 
contested regulation that it aims to introduce a new legal form in addition to the national forms of 
cooperative societies, as it  is also indicated in recitals 12 and 14 in the preamble to the contested 
regulation, according to which the European cooperative society must be considered to be a European 
legal form for cooperative societies which has specific Community character”. The analogy with the 
Regulation (EC) No 1802/2006 on EGTC is clearly patent.
195 Ibid., p. 76. In this regard, the legal personality of the ECG as provided in the Third Protocol to 
the Madrid Outline  Convention is  substantially  different.  In fact,  both legal personality  and legal 
capacity are accorded under the national law of the State where the ECG has its headquarters.
196 A. EMBID IRUJO, C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ, Las agrupaciones europeas de cooperación  
territorial:  consideraciones  desde  el  Derecho  comunitario  y  el  derecho  espanol,  cit.,  p.  105-114 
confirms through a  long digression  the Community legal  personality  of  the  EGTC. In particular, 
according to this analysis, the EGTC doesn't correspond to any precedent existing legal figures within 
the national legal systems and,  a contrario, the main aspects regarding its regulation and functioning 
are not provided by national legislations, but by the Regulation.
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authorities  and  and  in  order  to  grant  a  wider  and  long-lasting  approach  to 
cooperation197.  However,  such  demands  have  to  be  balanced  with  the  existent 
multiple forms available and suitable for territorial cooperation and with the national 
provisions about legal persons. In particular, it could be quite difficult to find in all 
the  27  EU  Member  States  similar  figures  to  impose  as  legal  structures  for  the 
EGTCs198. 
These circumstances need a flexible approach. In fact, the Regulation nothing 
provides about the public- or private-law nature of the legal personality. Thus, the 
legal nature of an EGTC is acquired according to each national system. In this sense, 
the peculiar nature of this new legal subject is visible. On the one hand, the EGTC 
takes roots from the Community law. On the other hand, the combination with the 
national law is essential. And this dynamic shows the phenomenon of a complex, but 
necessarily effective integration.
Even if the recourse to private law is possible, the content of the Regulation 
seems to be more suitable with the public law's option for the scope and nature of the 
subjects and tasks concerned. In fact, several provisions of the Regulation refer to 
aspects of public law199. On the contrary, the recourse to public law could be difficult 
in case of the participation of more than one States in case of conflicts of legislations. 
In  particular,  N.  Levrat  analyses  the  issue  from a  peculiar  point  of  view. 
Namely, in the silence of the Regulation, the Member States are not really charged to 
define  the  private  or  public  legal  nature  of  an  EGTC in  their  respective  acts  of 
implementation. In fact, the legal form of the EGTC is concretely determined by the 
convention between the members according to the law of the Member State where 
197 See  ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS,  Towards  a  new  Community  legal  instrument  
facilitating public-law-based transeuropean cooperation among territorial authorities in the Eropean 
Union, cit., p. 4.
198 In this regard, a mandatory rule on the public or private law nature of an EGTC wouldn't have 
been neither easily practicable nor desirable. From a formal point of view, the choice for one or the 
other for could have caused some difficulties of implementation within the national systems. From a 
substantial  point of view, such an homogenising attempt would have generated conflicts with the 
principle of subsidiarity, as far as it could be considered not necessary. Namely, the definition of the 
public or private nature of an EGTC is really not necessary, if the same establishment of an EGTC has 
to be itself considered as non-necessary. See  A. EMBID IRUJO, C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ, 
Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de  cooperación  territorial:  consideraciones  desde  el  Derecho  
comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 166.
199 A couple of examples: Article 4, paragraph 3 about the conditions under which the Members 
States can impede the establishment of an EGTC for reasons of public interest or public order; Article 
7, paragraph 4 about the potential tasks of an EGTC, which is interdicted to exercises the typical 
regulatory  functions  of  public  law,  such  as  those  regarding  the  State's  general  interests,  public 
authority, administration of justice, etc.
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the EGTC is registered200. The legal form of the EGTC could be established through 
different criteria, namely: the tasks given to the EGTC, the legal solutions offered by 
the State where the EGTC has its registered office or the intention of the members201. 
Anyway,  it  is  more coherent to leave the choice to the State about the public or 
private nature of the legal personality202 and the choice about the legal form (e.g. 
association  or  something  else  according  to  the  legal  figures  provided  by  the 
respective national systems) to the members' agreement. In particular, it's up to the 
decision  of  the  members  to  determine  the  legal  status  of  the  EGTC  within  the 
national law. 
Although a wide range of possibilities is left open by the Regulation, the legal 
personality  established  according  to  the  principles  of  public  law seems the  most 
suitable  for  this  kind  of  cooperation  between public  subjects.  In  this  regard,  the 
analysis  of  the  different  national  rules,  which  have  been  adopted  up  to  now, 
“suggests  that  a  non-profit  legal  entity  governed  under  public  law  becomes  the 
rule203,  while  only in  a few Member States is  the EGTC permitted under private 
law”204.
200 See Regulation (EC) No 1982/2006, Article 8, paragraph 2, 1st and 5th alinea.
201 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 
77-78.
202 The national  provisions  use  different  approaches  in  order  to  indicate  the legal  nature  of  the 
EGTCs established on their territory. In particular, some States provide for more detailed procedures 
for the acquisition of the legal personality (examples: Hungary and Greece), while other States remain 
more vague (examples: Romania and Portugal).  
203 The choice to establish a public-law-based legal subject confers also an added value if put in 
relation with the possibility to manage EC Funds. Namely, Article 18 of the Regulation (EC) No 
1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional 
Development  Fund recites:  “Member  States  participating  in  an  operational  programme under  the 
European  territorial  cooperation  objective  may  make  use  of  the  European  grouping  of  territorial 
cooperation  under  Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  […]  on  a  European  grouping  of  territorial 
cooperation (EGTC) with a view to making that grouping responsible for managing the operational 
programme by conferring on it the responsibilities of the managing authority and of the joint technical 
secretariat.  In  this  context,  each Member  State  shall  continue to  assume financial  responsibility”. 
Generally speaking, managing authorities are public subjects. See: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
manage/authority/authority_en.cfm.
204 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state of  
the play and prospects, cit., p. 38. In general, the EGTC is constituted as a non-profit legal entity, 
without the specification of its private or public nature. Provisions in this sense make a clear reference 
to the national law about non-profit legal subjects. For instance, the legislation of Bulgaria affirms that 
shall be registered as associations, pursuing activities for public or private benefit on the basis of the 
law on non-profit legal entities; Greece affirms that the EGTC is organised as a company of non-profit 
making character. United Kingdom do not refer to a particular legal form under national (or regional) 
law. In any case, less States affirm that the EGTC shall have a private law personality: it's the case of 
Romania (non-profit legal  entity of private law) and Hungary (not for-profit business organisation). 
Other States refer to a public law body, for example: Portugal (public collective associational body); 
Italy (public law personality); France ( public law personality); Spain (public legal person). 
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3.9. The legal capacity
The recall  to national  law about the legal personality concerns also to the 
legal capacity. As written in Article 1, paragraph 2, an EGTC “shall have in each 
Member State the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under that 
Member State's national law. It may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and 
immovable property and employ staff and may be party to the legal proceedings”. In 
this sense, an EGTC can have contractual and employment relations according to 
private law. For this reason, Article 2, paragraph 1 establishes at  the second sub-
paragraph that “where it is necessary under Community or international private law 
to establish the  choice of  law which governs an EGTC's act,  an EGTC shall  be 
treated as an entity of the member State where it has its registered office”.
 “The most extensive legal capacity” intends to confer to the EGTCs a broad 
field of action within the national legislation in order to develop as much as possible 
the activities of territorial cooperation. However, different kinds of limitation occur 
with regard to the effective activity of an EGTC.
Firstly,  the  very connection  with  the  single  national  legal  orders  plays  an 
essential role towards the effective extension of the legal capacity. In particular, the 
limitation  is  twofold.  On the  one  hand,  without  entering  into  details,  it  is  quite 
obvious that different models of legal persons have differently acting legal capacities 
depending on their specific tasks. In fact, a non-profit association is quite different 
from a private-law person dealing with public transport. On the other hand, even if 
the  legal  capacity  should be  as  extensive  as  possible,  the  tasks  of  an EGTC are 
limited by the extent of the competences attributed to its members. Namely, Article 
7, paragraph 2 of the Regulation affirms that the tasks attributed to an EGTC shall 
“be determined by its members on the basis that they all fall within the competence 
of every member under its national law. Furthermore, the same Article states that an 
“EGTC shall act within the confines of the tasks given to it, which shall be limited to 
the facilitation and promotion of territorial cooperation to strengthen economic and 
social cohesion”.  Also a territorial limitation is foreseen as Article 8, paragraph 2 b) 
provides  that  the  Convention  shall  indicate  the  territory  where  the  EGTC  may 
execute its tasks.
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Without deepen the analysis about the tasks of the EGTC, it is quite clear that 
the  legal  capacity,  albeit  rewarded  as  extensive  as  possible205,  is  confined  within 
flexible  but  strict  conditions.  These  limitations,  however,  do  not  only  concern 
restrictions  coming  from the  national  legislation,  whereas  they  also  concern  the 
provisions directly coming from the Community Regulation. Thus, as for the other 
characteristics of the EGTC, the first glance at the text of the Regulation should be 
followed by a careful analysis of the legal consequences and combination of articles. 
3.10. The tasks of an EGTC
The tasks assigned to an EGTC represent the condition for its prospective 
action. The matter is explicitly ruled by Article 7 of the EGTC Regulation. The issue 
regarding the tasks of an EGTC is, like many other aspects of this legal instrument, 
quite complex. Namely, the tasks attributed to an EGTC determine its concrete and 
effective capacity to act, with other words, its feasible field of action. It has to be 
kept  in  mind  that,  besides  the  causes  of  dissolution  of  an  EGTC defined  by  its 
members within the convention, the violation of the tasks is considered by Article 14 
of the Regulation as an explicit reason enabling an order of dissolution coming from 
the  competent  court  or  authority of  the State where the EGTC has its  registered 
office206.
As stated by the Regulation under  Article  7,  paragraph 1,  the tasks of an 
EGTC are defined by its members and specified in the convention. It is quite clear 
from the content of Article 7 that the Regulation doesn't provide any list of possible 
activities  of  an  EGTC,  but  it  establishes  the  tasks  in  a  “negative”  form,  thus, 
considering the limits beyond which the tasks conferred have to be considered as 
non-legitimised. Basically, it is possible to consider the attribution of tasks under two 
205 The Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention has a quite similar provision. Namely ECG 
shall have the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under the state's national law. 
The only parallelism with the EGTC concerns the fact that also in this case the provision is not very 
clear. Or rather, in the CoE's framework it is a little clearer than in the EU context as far as the legal 
capacity of an ECG is directly bounded to the national law concerned. However, the same reasoning 
that has been done about the EGTC with regard to the tasks and to the competences of its members is 
also valid for the ECG.
206 Moreover, as stated in paragraph 2 of Article 14, “the competent court or authority may allow the 
EGTC time to rectify the situation. If the EGTC fails to do so within the time allowed, the competent 
court or authority shall order it to be wound up”.
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different perspectives: on the one hand, Community aspects have some influence on 
the determination of the tasks; on the other hand, the definition of tasks needs to 
respect national principles. 
a) Tasks defined according with Community aspects
Something  about  the  tasks  of  an  EGTC  has  been  already  anticipated  in 
paragraph 4.3.2. about the nature and the general scope of an EGTC with reference to 
the 11th Recital of the Preamble and to Article 1, paragraph 3. According to the last 
provision the objectives of the new legal structure shall be devoted to the promotion 
and support of territorial  cooperation – comprehending cross-border, transnational 
and/or interregional cooperation – with the exclusive aim of strengthening economic 
and social  cohesion207.  Article  7,  paragraph 2  confirms  this  by  saying  that  “[a]n 
EGTC shall act within the confines of the tasks given to it, which shall be limited to 
the facilitation and promotion of territorial cooperation to strengthen economic and 
social  cohesion and be determined by its members on the basis  that  they all  fall 
within the competence of every member under its national law”. The promotion of 
territorial cooperation represents, thus, the general objective of the EGTC and such 
an aim could be considered as a comprehensive framework for the activities that will 
be undertaken. However, according to the interpretation of the study commissioned 
by  the  CoR,  this  determination  is  too  restrictive  as  far  as  it  is  “limited  to  the 
facilitation and promotion of territorial cooperation”. In this regard, within the logic 
of cohesion policy and EU integration, the general aim of the EGTC should concern 
not only the promotion, but mainly the implementing territorial cooperation208. This 
interpretation finds a “soft” confirmation in the 1st Recital of the EGTC Regulation, 
where it is affirmed that “[...] the harmonious development of the entire community 
territory  and  the  greater  economic,  social  and  territorial  cohesion  imply  the 
strengthening of territorial  cooperation.  To this  end it  is  appropriate  to  adopt  the 
measures  necessary  to  improve  the  implementation  conditions  for  actions  of 
territorial cooperation”.
207 According  to  the  study  COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,  The  European  Grouping  of  Territorial  
Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 94, the formulation of Article 1, par. 3 is excessively vague and should 
have included, beside the scope of the promotion, also the implementation of territorial cooperation in 
order to confer to the EGTC a kind of proactive role.
208 Ibid., p. 93-100.
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The detailed reasoning proposed by the study, explains how the achievement 
of  economic  and  social  cohesion  requires  more  than  a  simple  “promotion”  of 
territorial  cooperation,  rather,  an  active  and  dynamic  “implementation”.  The 
components of territorial cooperation – cross-border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation – are specified in detail by Article 6 of the ERDF Regulation, but do not 
represent  a  strict  enumeration  of  activities  excluding  other  types  of  actions  to 
reinforce  the  respective  field  of  action.  In  any  case,  the  activities  of  an  EGTC 
shouldn't strictly follow such specifications that have been primarily set down as a 
general guiding framework for the funding programmes of the Community. Thus, if 
the aim of territorial cooperation represents the general scope of an EGTC, it shall be 
pursued throughout a flexible range of activities. But also the even more general aim 
of  cohesion  policy  could  be  implemented  trough activities  that  are  not  listed  as 
typical of this subject but still compatible with it209. 
As  a  confirmation  of  the  proposed  interpretation,  the  analysis  of  some 
national provisions that have already been adopted in relation to the general scopes 
of the EGTC show the possibility for Member States to broaden the scope of an 
EGTC by mentioning  the  “implementation”  of  territorial  cooperation  as  its  main 
objective210.  However  the  majority  of  the  States  has  kept  the  wording  of  the 
Regulation almost   unchanged, but has added some specifications concerning the 
tasks. The objective of territorial cooperation is, anyway, the biggest container or a 
larger framework of the EGTC's activities, which needs to be specified in detail in 
order to be concretely realized. In this regard, it could be theoretically possible to 
establish EGTCs with different tasks/purposes. In general, two ways are feasible: on 
the  one  hand,  the  constitution  of  EGTCs with  general  tasks;  on  the  other  hand, 
209 The study quoted above explains that economic and social cohesion do not officially include 
matters like environment or  research.  However,  it  is  still  possible  to affirm that environment and 
research could be sectors of activity within cohesion policy. Thus, an analogy could be made with 
territorial cooperation, which could be compatible, and even necessary, with regard to fields that are 
not officially considered as part of territorial cooperation. In this sense, the disappointment towards 
the provision of  Art.  7,  par.  2 is  justified,  as  far  as  it  seems too constraining towards a  positive 
implementation of territorial cooperation. 
210 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state  
of the play and prospects, cit., p. 46: “Although article 7 is rather restrictive, and a strict application 
could hinder the implementation of a number of potential EGTC projects, the Member States have the 
possibility of interpreting this article more broadly: only in two cases (HU, PT) there is a further 
definition of the tasks given by either excluding tasks that a grouping may not undertake (business and 
public  authority  activities  in  Hungary)  or  by  specifying  in  detail  what  an  EGTC can  undertake 
(Portugal). Generally, the limitation to tasks concerning the facilitation and promotion of territorial 
cooperation in order to strengthen economic and social cohesion is respected”.
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EGTCs with more specific aims. Up two now, most of the EGTCs display general 
tasks and only sometimes the addition of more specific aims is foreseen211. As an 
example,  the  first  established  EGTC  Lille-Kortrjik-Tournai has  very  broad  tasks 
concerning institutional coordination and its convention doesn't report very specific 
missions or activities in order to leave a wider scope of activity within the flexible 
limits provided by the convention itself and by the Regulation212. The attribution of 
general tasks has, without doubts, several advantages. Namely it is adaptable and 
flexible to changing situations with regard to the concrete actions of the EGTC and it 
could  hardly  configure  patent  violations  of  the  Regulation  and  of  national 
legislations, included the competences of sub-national authorities. 
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 7 concern the tasks in relation to Community 
funding programmes or to other systems of funding. Both of the cases are possible. 
The  tasks  of  an  EGTC  shall  be  limited,  primarily,  to  the  implementation  of 
programmes  or  projects  developing  territorial  cooperation  co-financed  by  the 
Community  within  the  ERDF,  the  ESF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund.  However,  other 
specific actions related to territorial cooperation could be undertaken with or without 
the financial contribution of the Community. This last statement represents a flexible 
possibility for an EGTC to expand the range of its tasks/actions outside the path 
drawn  by  Community  funds  as  long  as  limited  to  the  objective  of  territorial 
cooperation. As it has already been said, the parameters of territorial cooperation are 
defined  within  the  instrument  of  cohesion  policy  2007-2013,  but  the  matters 
concerned are quite indicative and not necessarily strict. In this sense, the Regulation 
211 In such cases, there is a mix between broad tasks and more specific missions. For examples the 
EGTC Pyrenees- Mediterranean mentions, within its missions, the innovation of technology, research, 
training and culture, the development of tourism, the management of funding programmes coming 
form the Community or the States, etc. In this view, the tasks remain quite general, but they are more 
specific than in other EGTCs. Regarding the possibility to establish structures with very specific tasks, 
there  is  an  ongoing  project  known  as  Cerdanya  joint  cross-boder  hospital  between  France  and 
Catalonia. This kind of project, which already has been launched trough an agreement between the 
French Ministry of Health and the Catalan Ministry of Health could be a prospective interesting form 
of EGTC, encompassing several of the problematic issues we have mentioned in the course of this 
chapter. 
212 Article 2 of the convention of the Lille-Kortrjik-Tournai EGTC establishes the “missions” of the 
new  structure,  namely:  “L'Eurométropole  Lille-Kortrjik-Tournai  a  pour  mission  principal  de 
promouvoir et de soutenir une coopération efficace et cohérente au sein du territoire concerné. En 
rassemblant l'ensemble des institutions compétentes l'Eurométropole Lille-Kortrjik-Tournai est un lieu 
permettant: d'assurer la concertation, le dialogue et de favoriser le débat politique; de produire de la 
cohérence transfrontalière à l'échelle de l'ensemble du territoire; de faciliter, de porter et de realisér 
des  projets  traduisant  la  stratégie  de  développement  à  élaborer  en  commun;  de  faciliter  la  vie 
quotidienne des habitants de la métropole franco-belge”.
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has foreseen an “open clause” that could be, in case, developed with reasonableness. 
Nonetheless, the provision stated in paragraph 6 seems to reduce the possible effects 
of the open clause. In fact, “Member States may limit the tasks that EGTCs may 
carry out without a Community financial  contribution. However, those tasks shall 
include at least the cooperation actions listed under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
1080/2006”213. The study promoted by the Committee of the Regions considers this 
provision  as  illogical214.  Namely,  it  seems  quite  paradoxical  to  foresee  possible 
autonomous actions of the EGTCs outside the Community cohesion policy and, then, 
to  permit  States  confining  their  limitations  within  the  territorial  cooperation's 
objectives. The main intention of this provision is to avoid EGTCs, i.e. sub-national 
authorities,  acting  against  the  Members  States'  consent.  But,  as  long  as  several 
guarantees are already provided within the Regulation (Art. 3, par. 1, Art. 4, par. 3, 
Art.  7,  par.  2  and  Art.  13),  the  5th paragraph  of  Article  7  is  redundant  and  not 
necessary.  In  this  sense  it  gives  to  the  Member  State  a  discretionary  faculty  to 
hamper the implementation of EGTCs215. 
b) Tasks defined according to national rules 
The exact specification of the tasks is decided unanimously by the members 
and defined in the convention. The 13th Recital of the Preamble anticipates that “the 
powers  exercised  by  regional  and  local  authorities  as  public  authorities,  notably 
police and regulatory powers, cannot be subject of a convention”. The intent of this 
provision is clear and it reflects a common principle that has also been provided in 
the other legal instruments of transfrontier/territorial cooperation. 
The  main  implicit  objective  of  the  EGTC  Regulation  is  to  strengthen 
territorial cooperation between sub-national authorities belonging to different States. 
Therefore, it had to be expected that an EGTC should act within the legitimate field 
of action of its members. In this sense Article 7, par. 2 provides that the tasks given 
to an EGTC shall fall within the competence of every member under its national law. 
213 As already mentioned Article 6 of the ERDF Regulation defines and lists the tasks and activities 
concerning the territorial cooperation's objective. 
214 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 
98-99.
215 Ibid.,  p.  99.  In  particular,  it  is  possible  for  Member  States to  exclude cooperation “in fields 
covered by other Community policies”, that would have represented the open-clause for a reasonable 
implementation of territorial cooperation outside its definition within economic and social cohesion.
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This is a remand to what has already been stated in Article 3, paragraph 1 about the 
respect of the national attribution of competences. Which kind of national norms this 
provision concerns is clear and vague at the same time. In fact, on the one hand it is 
clear that the issue concerning the competences is a matter of national legal order; on 
the other hand, looking at the national legal orders, it is quite difficult to find uniform 
solutions about the competences of sub-national authorities to engage in territorial 
cooperation with foreign subjects216. However, the EGTC Regulation is not helping 
in this sense and the solutions have to be found only within national legislations. But, 
if only attributions under national law count, here comes back what has been already 
said with regard to the other instruments of transfrontier  cooperation establishing 
entities  with  legal  capacity.  Namely,  the  argument  of  the  “lowest  common 
denominator”  is  still  present,  signifying  that  an  EGTC  cannot  develop  actions 
exceeding the competences attributed to the (let's say) less powerful of its members. 
As for the Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention, it could be possible to 
overcome such obstacle only with an express delegation of powers to the concerned 
member from the respective State or with the participation of the State itself in the 
EGTC. 
An excessive protection of the traditional  state attributions is contained in 
Article 7, paragraph 6, which states that tasks given to an EGTC shall not concern 
the exercise of powers conferred by public law or the exercise of duties regarding the 
safeguard of the general interest of the State or of other public authorities, such as 
police and regulatory powers, justice and foreign policy. The inclusion of this kind of 
guarantees is presumable and legitimated in order to limit the actions of an EGTC 
against possible interferences with fundamental national public powers217. However, 
the study directed by N. Levrat considers this provision as an excessive restriction 
for the reason that a similar obligation is also stated in Article 13 concerning the 
216 We remind to the analysis proposed in the second chapter about the law funding the competence.
217 A similar provision is contained in Article 7, par. 3 of the Third Protocol to the MOC. However, 
the limitation of the tasks is defined in more general terms, mentioning only the prohibition regarding 
the exercise of regulatory powers. In fact, the Protocol doesn't  foresee a detailed safeguard of the 
national  prerogatives  during the phase  of  the establishment of  an ECG, rather  it  deals with their 
eventual violation during its activities. Namely, Art. 11, par. 3 of the Protocol considers the violations 
committed by an ECG towards public policy, public security, public health or public morality and 
towards the public interest of the State concerned as causes for the prohibition of the related activities 
on the territory of the State or  as causes for the withdrawal of sub-national authorities belonging  to 
that State form the ECG. 
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violation of public interest and other state interests (i.e. public policy, public security, 
etc.) by the activities of an EGTC218. In such cases, the state authority has the full 
legitimation to forbid the EGTC's actions or to obtain the withdrawal of the members 
under its jurisdictions from the EGTC. But there is a temporal substantial difference 
between Art. 7 and Art. 13 regarding the phases of the EGTCs. 
Namely, whereas Article 13 concerns the activities of an already established 
and  functioning  EGTC,  Article  7,  par.  4  aims  at  preventing  whichever  intrusion 
within the State's prerogatives starting from the moment of the tasks' conferral. In 
any case,  such  provision seems quite  superfluous,  because  other mechanisms are 
provided  by  the  Regulation.  The  constitution-phase  is  granted  through Article  4, 
paragraph  3  concerning  the  State  approval  and  the  action-phase  is  safeguarded 
through Article 13.
Another interesting provision concerning the tasks is set down in Article 16, 
paragraph 2: “where required under the terms of that Member State's national law, a 
Member State may establish a comprehensive list of the tasks which the members of 
an EGTC within the meaning of Article 3(1) formed under its laws already have, as 
far  as  territorial  cooperation  within  that  Member  State  is  concerned”.  Although 
formulated in a complex way, this paragraph adds an ulterior form of guarantee for 
the States' prerogatives under their respective national orders. In fact, the possibility 
to introduce a comprehensive list of tasks according to the competences' attributions 
represents  a  clear  intention  to  have  a  supervision  on  sub-national  authorities. 
However, the adoption of such a list seems, on the one hand, excessively restrictive 
and, on the other hand, not fundamental. In fact, it has just been observed that the 
Regulation  provides  different  mechanisms  in  order  to  safeguard  the  national 
prerogatives. It seems sufficient, to clarify the position of sub-national subjects, that 
the members of an EGTC shall act in conformity to their competences as stated in 
Article 3, paragraph 1 according to the respective national orders. The violation of 
this provision could be presented to the competent national jurisdictional authorities 
218 Article 13 of Reg. 1082/2006 states: “Where an EGTC carries out any activity in contravention of 
a Member State's provisions on public policy, public security, public health or public morality, or in 
contravention of the public interest of a member States, a competent body of that Member State may 
prohibit that activity on its territory or require those members which have been formed under its law 
to withdraw from the EGTC unless the EGTC cases the activity in question. Such prohibitions shall 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or distinguished restriction on territorial cooperation between the 
EGTC's members. Review of the competent body's decision by a judicial authority shall be possible.” 
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in order to find an adequate legal solution. Thus, an over-safeguarding addition of 
this tasks-list could impede a positive evolution of the EGTCs actions or, at least, 
hamper an effective implementation of territorial cooperation. Moreover, the wording 
“as far as as territorial cooperation within that Member State is concerned” is not 
really clear, but it could be interpreted in a too restrictive way as well. In fact, the 
interpretation of the concept or of the praxis of “territorial cooperation” by single 
Member  States  will  generate  a  confusing  perception  of  the  phenomenon  and  a 
limiting  parameter  for  the  members  of  an  EGTC.  In  case  of  application  of  this 
provision by Member States and in the eventuality of an effective restriction of sub-
national attributions, the only solution for sub-national authorities is to submit the 
question to the competent national court for the violation of their competences. 
3.11. Other rules applicable to the EGTC
The main functions of an EGTC are determined according to the national law 
of the State where it has its registered office. Thus, the importance of having a single 
registered office is linked to the certainty of the application of determined national 
rules. In particular, the national legislation of the State that has been chosen for the 
registered office applies to the convention and the statutes and, for this reason, may 
apply to the relations between the members of an EGTC where appropriate. 
Of course, it is not possible to affirm that the national law of the State where 
the EGTC has its registered office applies to all the cases that are not ruled by the 
Regulation. In particular, referring to relations with third parties, other national laws 
can  apply.  However,  as  a  general  rule,  the  national  law  related  to  the  EGTC's 
headquarters  deals  with  some  of  its  basic  functions  according  to  the  overall 
framework of the Regulation, as in the case related to the financial control219. 
a) Financial control
In this regard, the provisions related to the control of management of public 
funds are defined rather in detail and need a transparent interaction between Member 
States and the Community. Article 6, in fact, affirms that the controls on the use of 
219 An EGTC has its own annual budget, which is adopted within the assembly, according to Article 
16 of the Regulation. 
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public funds shall be carried out according to the international audit standards. In 
particular, as the management of public funds is primarily governed according to the 
national  law of  the  registered  office,  the  competent  authorities  designed  by  that 
Member State concerned shall act in good cooperation with the other Member States, 
thus, providing for a mutual exchange of information and supporting cross-controls. 
Moreover, in case of co-financing by the Community, EC legislation concerning the 
control of funds applies220.
b) Liabilities
A general  principles  entailed  in  Article  10,  paragraph  3  provides  that  an 
EGTC is liable for the acts of its organs toward third parties, even where such acts do 
not fall within the tasks of an EGTC.
The regime of liabilities is ruled in Article 12. According to paragraph 1, the 
general rule affirms that “as regards liquidation, insolvency, cessation of payments 
and similar  procedures,  an EGTC shall  be governed by the  laws of  the Member 
States where it has its registered office, unless otherwise provided in paragraphs 2 
and 3”. The general rule about the liability of the EGTC's Member States affirms that 
they have extensive liability  as long as they maintain the membership.  However, 
some exceptions are possible. 
The Regulation, thus, establishes that an EGTC, as a legal person with legal 
capacity, shall be liable for its debts whatever their nature. In case the EGTC results 
insolvent, its members shall be liable in proportion to the respective contributions. 
The rule about the unlimited liability shows some exceptions in case national laws 
impose to the respective members a regime of limited liability. In this eventuality, 
also the other members may limit their liability in the statute and the name of the 
EGTC shall contain reference to the concept of “limited liability”; this is mainly for 
reasons  of  transparency  and information  towards  third  parties.  The  possibility  to 
introduce a system of limited liabilities has been provided because of the existence of 
very  different  national  legislations  and  in  order  to  permit  flexible  solutions221. 
However, “a Member State may prohibit the registration on his territory of an EGTC 
220 EC legislation refers to the general rules  applicable to the Community budget as well as the 
financial  rules  concerning the  Structural  Funds established  especially  in  Reg.  No 1083/2006;  see 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 104.
221 A similar provision is entailed also in the Third Protocol to the Madrid Convention on the ECG.
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whose members have limited liability”. Another interesting statement concerns the 
fact that the members of an EGTC may affirm in the statutes that they will be liable 
even after they have ceased to be members in relation to the obligations undertaken 
during their membership222. Thus, a contrario, the general rules is that the members 
are not liable for those obligations after their withdrawal from the EGTC. Maybe, 
such  a  provision,  encourages  the  participation  to  EGTCs  and,  thus,  the 
implementation of territorial cooperation.
c) Jurisdiction
Article  15  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  reports  three  important 
principles about the rules on jurisdiction concerning the acts of an EGTC. Paragraph 
1 considers the rights of third parties who have been wronged by acts or omissions of 
an EGTC. In such cases, third parties “shall be entitled to pursue their claims by 
judicial  process”.  This  provision  is  clear,  but  very  general.  The  rule  is  further 
specified in paragraph 2: “Except where otherwise provided for in this Regulation, 
Community legislation on jurisdiction shall apply to disputes involving the EGTC. In 
any case which is not provided for in such Community legislation, the competent 
courts for the resolution of disputes shall be the courts of the Member States where 
the EGTC has its registered office”. Thus, according to the words of article 15, courts  
of the Member State where the EGTC has its the registered office are competent 
unless  it  is  differently  established  by  Community  legislation  on  jurisdiction. 
However, an exception in order to safeguard citizens' rights if foreseen in paragraph 
3. Namely, “[n]othing in this Regulation shall deprive citizens from exercising their 
national constitutional rights of appeal against public bodies which are members of 
an EGTC in respect of: administrative decisions in respect of activities which are 
being carried out by the EGTC; access to services in their own language and access 
222 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, p. 159, 
proposes two possible interpretations in order to explain the introduction of such provision: “On the 
one hand it helps to strengthen the credibility of an EGTC as regards third parties, which know that in 
addition to an EGTC's legal person, all of its members are liable for the activities it carriers out. On 
the other hand, include such a provision within the statutes would also make it easier for a member to 
leave: there would be no further financial consequences for the other members if a cause of action for 
liability or  unforeseen debts were to arise following a member's  departure that  dated back to the 
period when it was still a member. For this reason, such a provision should be included in the statutes 
if the liability of an EGTC's member cannot be limited.”
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to information. In these cases the competent courts shall  be those of the Member 
State under whose constitution the rights of appeal arise”.
d) Dissolution
The  Regulation  introduces  two  clauses  concerning  the  dissolution  of  an 
EGTC:  the  first  represents  a  physiological  end  of  the  EGTC,  while  the  second 
represents a “pathological” dimension. Namely, according to Article 8, paragraph 2, 
third point, the convention shall specify the duration of an EGTC and the conditions 
governing its dissolution. Thus, it is up to the members, within the limits provided by 
the Regulation, to decide if the EGTC has a permanent or temporary duration and the 
causes  for  its  dissolution.  Differently,  Article  14  considers  another  cause  for  the 
dissolution  in  addition  to  those  mentioned  in  the  conventions.  Namely,  any 
competent authority with a legitimate interest can apply to the competent court or 
authority of the Member State where the EGTC has its registered office in order to 
obtain the order to wound up the EGTC in the case it does no longer comply with the 
requirements under Article 1, paragraph 2 or Article 7. Substantially, the reason for 
ordering the dissolution concerns the fact that the EGTC acts outside the objectives 
of the cooperation or outside the limits of its tasks. This provision has a twofold 
consequence.  Namely,  on  the  one  hand,  it  prevents  non legitimate  actions  of  an 
EGTC; on the other hand, it could represent a dangerous instrument for impede the 
EGTC's  activities in case of  too restrictive  interpretations  of the conferred tasks. 
However, as it  has already been mentioned, the practice demonstrates that several 
EGTCs have really wide tasks in order to permit a flexible implementation of the 
respective interventions.
4.  Implementation  of  the  EGTC  Regulation:  national  legislative  measures  and 
progressive establishment of EGTCs
4.1. Introduction
Before  presenting  some  conclusions  about  the  development  of  territorial 
cooperation in Europe and about the contribution brought by the EGTC Regulation, 
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it is fundamental to give some references about the implementation of the Regulation 
within the national legislations and to the following set-up of the first new EGTCs. 
The adoption of national provisions has generally encountered some delays: although 
the deadline was established within 1 August 2007, at the beginning of 2010 some 
States have not completed the process of implementation yet. 
According to various observations proposed on this topic, it has been noticed 
that in countries with federal systems the application of the Regulation involves a 
stronger role of the regional level and, for this reason, the implementation is more 
complex and raises some questions regarding the uniform application of Community 
law.  With regard to  this  last  consideration,  it  is  quite  interesting to  note  that  the 
Regulation has been faster implemented within traditionally unitary countries while, 
generally speaking, composed countries have taken more time. This delay appears 
rather  strange  as  far  as  the  difficulties  connected  to  the  structural  complexity  of 
federal countries could be compensated by the major autonomy of regional entities in 
order to apply the Regulation. In any case, such situation has to be considered as 
emblematic of the progressive evolution of the “sub-national question” in unitary 
countries. In this sense, as it has been mentioned in the second chapter of this work, 
the distinction between composed and non-composed countries is quite obsolete and 
not really functional in order to analyse or comprehend the development of territorial 
cooperation. 
Moreover,  from  a  geographical  point  of  view,  the  EU's  area  where  the 
Regulation is in the most advanced phase of implementation concerns the South East, 
while the Centre Europe and the Nordic countries needed more time223. Even in this 
case the situation seems curious for the reason that the so-called new democracies 
have granted a faster implementation of the Community Regulation if compared to 
the historic EU Member States. In this respect, the interpretation could be as follows. 
On the  one  hand,  the  evidence  of  a  fast  application  of  Community  law and the 
interest towards the promotion of territorial cooperation show a clear political intent 
to follow the process of European integration and to take advantages in this sense. 
On the other hand, the young constitutional structures of these countries, despite the 
heritage of the past centralistic perspectives, seem to be quite aware of the principles 
223 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state  
of the play and prospects, cit., p. 2.
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of  local  and  regional  self-government224.  Of  course,  this  is  only  a  very  general 
statement  and it  is  worth  to  remember  that,  even  if  the  slow implementation  of 
national provisions by the States of Central and Western Europe suggest the idea of a 
more  static  attitude,  these  legal  orders  have  demonstrated  a  peculiar  capacity  of 
adaptation to new solutions. 
With regard to the recent establishment of new EGTC, few experiences have 
materialized in the form of this new structure. Up to now the EGTC set-ups already 
in  place are about  ten and other twenty projects  are  under preparation.  Different 
realities  are  involved  in  the  application  of  such  an  instrument:  not  only  already 
existing and experienced forms of cooperation have opted to constitute an EGTC, but 
also new cooperative structures have decided to build up territorial cooperation under 
the system of an EGTC. 
In general terms, the concepts of “variety” and “adaptability” seem to be the 
best  way  to  describe  the  application  of  the  Regulation  No  1082/2006  into  real 
EGTCs. As a negative note, the mentioned delay of national provisions hinders the 
constitution  of  new  EGTCs,  mainly  in  those  cases  sub-national  authorities  are 
already determined or resolved to put in place this kind of cooperation but a lack of 
national  dispositions  persists.  In  particular,  these limitations  at  national  level  can 
occur  in  different  ways.  A  first  example  is  represented  by  the  eventuality  a 
determined Member State has been chosen for the registration of an EGTC and this 
State has not adopted the necessary measures to implement the Regulation. A second 
eventuality happens if a sub-national authority wants to take part to an EGTC, which 
is placed in the territory of a foreign Member State, but cannot participate because of 
the lack of national procedural dispositions allowing this sub-national authority to act 
legitimately as member of an EGTC. Of course, this is only a transitory problem, 
since every Member State is going to adopt the necessary measures; however, it is 
quite  functional  to  describe  the  beginning  phase  of  the  EGTC  and  the  issue 
connected in order to have a clear idea of its further evolution.
224 P.H. RUSSEL,  The future of Europe in an era of federalism, in  S. ORTINO, M. ŽAGAR, V. MASTNY 
(eds.),  The changing faces of federalism: Institutional reconfiguration in Europe from East to West, 
Manchester, 2004, p. 4-20.
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4.2. National implementations
National provisions are necessary and fundamental for two reasons. Firstly, 
they  contribute  to  settle  the  procedures  regarding  the  establishment  and  the 
functioning  of  EGTCs constituted  on the  national  territories;  secondly,  they give 
authorisation to respective sub-national authorities for the participation to an EGTC, 
in particular when established on the territory of a foreign State. 
Although such a huge reference to national provisions is rather unusual for a 
Community Regulation, however it seems the only solution to make an instrument of 
this type effective at  national  level.  Actually,  the strong connections of territorial 
cooperation to the national legal orders and the impossibility to dissociate the sub-
national  activities  from  the  national  supervision  generate  this  multidimensional 
system of legal sources, which represent a necessary condition for the creation of an 
EGTC.  Notwithstanding  the  reliance  to  national  provisions,  the  Regulation  is, 
anyway, not less direct applicable. However, several complexities have to be faced in 
order to cope with the consequences of this legal uncertainty225. From this point of 
view, it is quite curious that a legal document, which has been adopted in order create 
a common legal framework and to solve legal disparities between different national 
legal systems, introduces a further problematic  issues. The peculiar aspect of this 
particular  situation  is  given  by  the  fact  that  the  most  accessible  level  of  legal 
certainty is  reached only by a collaborative attitude of Member States.  Thus,  the 
concrete result  of a differentiated application is that the Regulation cannot assure 
uniform legal effects, but only a uniform legal approach to territorial cooperation226. 
As it has been pointed out during the previous analysis, the Regulation refers 
both  generally  and  specifically  to  national  legislations.  In  particular,  Article  16, 
paragraph  1  and  Article  2,  paragraph  1  c)  prescribe  the  adoption  of  national 
appropriate measures. This obligation, according to the study commissioned by the 
Committee of  the  Regions,  is  quite  controversial  because  it  doesn't  resemble the 
duties of a directive to reach determinate goals, but needs, at the same time, to be 
implemented. In particular, the strange aspect of this Community act resides it the 
indispensable  contribution  of  national  measures,  whose  delay  have  practically 
225 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., 
p. 113.
226 Ibid., p. 116.
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determined no penalties at all. Within this limb, it has been remarked that “a Member 
State cannot invoke the absence of national measures in order to nullify the direct 
effect of this Regulation [...]”227. But, how can be the Regulation applied in case of 
missing national provisions? This eventuality has really happened and will be further 
illustrated.
Regarding the specific national provisions, some examples are going to be 
analysed. In particular, some fundamental aspects will be taken into consideration, 
such  as  the  dispositions  concerning  the  capacity  of  sub-national  authorities,  the 
provisions about the tasks of the EGTC and the way specific technical aspects are 
implemented. The choice of the national legislations follows the criteria that have 
been used in the second chapter about the analysis on the sub-national foreign power. 
Thus, legislative provisions of traditionally federal, regional and unitary countries are 
going to be examined in order to have a categorizing parameter, but also in order to 
show how the effectiveness of these solutions does only partially depend from the 
constitutional structures of the countries involved.
a) Federal countries
The example considered are Germany and Austria. The examination of these 
two countries  demonstrates  how the  implementation  of  the  EGTC Regulation  in 
federal  countries  could  be  radically  different  due  to  the  peculiar  constitutional 
structures and the respective reactions concerning this new Community instrument. 
Moreover, the examples of federal countries denote a further element of complexity, 
which  is  represented  by  the  role  of  constituent  units  with  regard  to  the 
implementation of the Regulation. 
The adoption of national measures seems not to be particularly problematic 
for  Germany,  where  the  federal  government  has  only  established  through  an 
ordinance the competent national authorities mentioned in the Regulation as points of  
reference for the application of particular dispositions. Thus, in case the intervention 
of the central authority is required, sub-national subjects shall communicate with the 
227 Ibid.,  p. 123. See also,  A. EMBID IRUJO, C. FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las agrupaciones 
europeas  de cooperación territorial:  consideraciones  desde  el  Derecho comunitario y  el  derecho  
espanol, cit., p. 121: “En consecuencia, el Estado miembro en cuyo territorio la AECT tenga su sede 
social no puede impedir el registro de este organismo jurídico alegando la inexistencia en su Derecho 
interno de registro especifico para ello”.  
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Federal  Ministry  of  Economics  and  Technology228.  All  the  other  competent 
governmental  authorities  are  individuated  according  to  the  legislations  of  each 
Land229, in particular with reference to Articles 4, 5, 6,7, 12 and 13 of the EGTC 
Regulation. For example, the participation of a municipal authority to an EGTC will 
require the approval from the respective Land first.
In general, the German case doesn't present peculiar dispositions, both from 
the  federal  government  and  from  the  Länder  perspectives.  This  “soft” 
implementation  applied  in  Germany  aims  at  respecting  the  requirements  of  the 
Regulation without stressing the eventual legal problems connected to the relations 
between Community and national systems230. In particular, all the issues related to 
the competences of sub-national entities, i.e. the Länder, and to the tasks entrusted to 
an EGTC are absorbed by the national legal order and resolved through the ordinary 
solutions  according  to  the  existing  normative  dispositions.  Namely,  the  most 
sensitive argument about the competence to implement the Regulation and about the 
sub-national  legitimacy  to  participate  to  an  EGTC  shall  be  necessarily  settled 
according to the constitutional structure of the German legal order. On this line, also 
the rules about the formal procedures to follow for the establishment of an EGTC 
and the other functioning rules (publicity, auditing, dissolution, etc.) are individuated 
on the  basis  of  the  EGTC Regulation  and the  ordinary national  legislation.  This 
attitude demonstrates a double clear intention: on the one hand, the German system 
doesn't emphasize too much the adoption of this new instruments, thus leaving a kind 
228 See  http://www.bmwi.de/English/Navigation/root.html.  Moreover,  a summarising list  about  all 
the  authorities  competent  for  each  Land  as  mentioned  by  the  Regulation  is  available  at 
http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/NationalProvisions/Pages/Adopted.aspx.
229 The documents available are from the following federal entities: Bayern (Bayerisches Gesetz- und  
Verordnungsblatt Nr. 29/2007); Berlin (Berliner Senatbeschluss Nr. 200/2007); Brandeburg (Gesetz- 
und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Brandeburg Teil II – Nr. 27 vom 19. Dezember 2007); Rheinland-
Pfalz  (Gesetz-  und  Verordnungsblatt  für  das  Land  Rheinland-Pfalz  vom 30.  Juli  2007);  Sachsen 
(Gemeinsame  Verordnung  des  Sächsischen  Staatsministeriums  des  Innern,  des  Sächsischen 
Staatsministeriums  der  Justiz,  des  Sächsischen  Staatsministeriums  der  Finanzen,  des  Sächsischen 
Staatsministeriums für Kultus, des Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Wissenschaft und Kunst, des 
Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für  Wirtschaft  und Arbeit,  des  Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für 
Umwelt und Landwirtschaft, des Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Soziales vom 2. Januar 2008); 
Sachsen-Anhalt  (Ministerialblatt  für  das  Land  Sachsen-Anhalt  vom  13.  August  2007,  Nr.  29); 
Thüringen (Gestz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Thüringen vom 16. August 2007, Nr. 7).
230 Another impression came from the observation of the German governmental representative during 
the  drafting  phase  of  the  Third  Protocol  to  the  European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier 
Cooperation. In fact, during the meeting of the LR-IC Committee held on 23 March 2009, which has 
been mentioned in the previous chapter, he was quite careful about many details regarding potential 
legal issue connected with the implementation of the European Cooperation Grouping in Germany.
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of spontaneous development of the phenomenon; on the other hand, the absence of a 
reluctant perspective toward the creation of new EGTCs highlights the maturity of 
this legal system and its reliance in the Community instrument.
Quite  different  is  the  case  of  Austria,  where  the  exercise  of  foreign  sub-
national  powers  is  rather  complicated,  mainly  because  the  Austrian  Constitution 
doesn't recognise any grouping built by public entities, notably with other foreign 
subjects231. The adoption of the EGTC Regulation has been developed through a so-
called “9+1 model”, which is given by the sum of legislative provisions from all the 
Länder  and from the federal  level.  Up to  now, only the  Länder  Voralberg232 and 
Kärnter233 have adopted specific provisions, which, however, generate a system of 
overlapping legislations with the federal law, for example, concerning registration 
and supervision234. In fact, insofar as the law of each Land aims at implement all the 
aspects  concerning  the  EGTC  falling  under  its  competences,  the  federal  law 
introduces  some  confusing  provisions.  In  this  sense,  the  federal  law  correctly 
specifies  the  participation  of  the  State  to  an  EGTC,  but  also  provides  some 
dispositions in excess referring to the Länder. Namely, it affirms that the competent 
authority for the authorisation, registration or dissolution of an EGTC is represented 
within the Länder by the Landeshauptmann (Governor). Such dispositions, which are 
repeated  about  different  contexts  by  the  federal  law,  show  a  sort  of  excessive 
attention from the central government towards the federated units. In particular, this 
attitude,  while  trying  to  mange  the  relations  between  central  and  sub-national 
authorities,  leaves  some  important  lacks  about  other  fundamental  aspects  of  the 
EGTC such its legal nature (public or private) or its tasks. According to this general 
observations,  the Austrian implementation of the  EGTC shows all  the systematic 
difficulties regarding the exercise of a foreign power by sub-national entities rather 
than a specific reluctance for the Community Regulation as such.
The two model analysed, despite the basic differences, present some common 
aspects  with  regard  to  the  substantial  aspects  of  the  Regulation.  In  general,  the 
231 It  is  useful  to remember that  until  now no international  treaties  have been concluded by the 
Austrian Länder. 
232 Voralberger Landesgesetzblatt vo, 23. April 2009 Nr. 11.
233 Gesetz vom 18. Dezember 2008.
234 See the presentation by J. Maier, EGTC – A new legal instrument facilitating Cooperation beyond 
borders,  held  on  the  occasion  of  EURAC  Workshop  on  the  European  Grouping  of  Territorial 
Cooperation (Bozen, 15 May 2009).
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attention is drawn on the practical aspects of the EGTC's set-up (like the references 
to the competent authorities for the registration and for the financial control), while 
any statement about the competences of sub-national units, the tasks of the EGTC, 
the supervision of the central  authorities and the legal nature of the EGTC is left 
apart.
b) Regional countries
At a first reading, national provisions of regional countries are much more 
detailed and coherent with the text of the Regulation and display more systematic 
dispositions. Moreover, the major supervisory role of the central authorities is visible 
and emphasizes several  aspects  of  the EGTC Regulation in  this  sense.  However, 
despite  the  more  elaborated  reference  to  specific  norms  of  the  Regulation,  the 
national provisions emphasize certain aspects, while lacking some other important 
elements. The examples of Spain and Italy present some similarities.
Spain adopted national measures to give application to the Regulation (EC) 
No 1082/2006  trough the  Real  Decreto  37/2008  of  18  January  2008235.  This  act 
consists of 13 articles, a relevant part of which is the repetition of the dispositions 
contained in  the Community  Regulation236.  The  rest  of  the  document  establishes, 
according  to  the  text  of  the  Regulation,  the  procedure  for  the  constitution of  an 
EGTC. In particular, the duty of communication has to be fulfilled to the Ministry of 
Public Administrations by every Spanish entity aiming at participating in an EGTC. 
Furthermore,  an authorisation shall  come form the Council  of the Government in 
order to give full application to the constitutive agreement of an EGTC (Art. 4). The 
procedure  of  information,  however,  implies  also  to  inform  other  Ministries, 
according to their respective competences; the information to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation and to the Ministry of Economy and Treasury is mandatory 
in  any case  (Art.  5)237.  This procedure  is  followed by the authorisation from the 
central governmental authority and is conditioned to the control of some parameters, 
as  also  affirmed  by  the  Community  Regulation:  target  of  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  conformity  to  the  convention  and  statutes,  capacity  of  the  members 
235 BOE núm. 17, Sábado 19 enero 2008. 
236 For example, the provisions about objectives and members.
237 Article  5 is  much more detailed.  In  particular,  local  communities  shall  also inform the  Self-
governing Communities in which territory they are situated.
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according  to  their  competences,  conformity  of  the  tasks  of  the  EGTC  with  the 
competences of the members. Another form of control is managed by the Council of 
Ministries,  which is  entitled to  prohibit  all  the  EGTC's activities  on the Spanish 
territory  if  violating  the  national  law  about  public  order,  public  security,  public 
health, public morality as well as conflicting with the public interest (Art. 11). This 
brief examination of the Real Decreto suggests a couple of observations. On the one 
hand, the national provisions follow almost literally the Regulation. On the other 
hand, the intent of supervision with regard to the process of constitution of an EGTC 
removes the attention from other important aspects, such as the legal nature of an 
EGTC.  In  fact,  the  complex  system of  information/authorisation  and  the  various 
ministerial authorities are individuated within a detailed procedure. For the rest, the 
Spanish document confers to the EGTC the legal nature of public personality without 
any other specification (Art. 2). Thus, in order to complete the further legal aspects 
of the EGTC Regulation, other existing national laws are required. With regard to the 
effects of the Regulation No 1082/2006 on the Spanish system, it has been observed 
that it offers, potentially, a useful basis to strengthen the already existing instruments 
of transfrontier cooperation. In particular, the normative provisions adopted within 
the framework of the Madrid Outline Convention of the CoE, such as the Bayonne 
Treaty,  are  not  hindered  by  this  new legal  instrument.  As  far  as  they  consist  in 
different  legal  structures,  an  enrichment  of  territorial  cooperation  seems feasible, 
instead of a unfruitful competition238. 
After  some  hindrances239,  Italy  has  given  implementation  to  the  EGTC 
Regulation through the so-called Legge Comunitaria 2008 of 29 July 2009 (Articles 
46, 47 and 48)240. In particular, Article 46 completes some points that the Regulation 
has left unresolved. In particular, the EGTC constituted on the Italian territory shall 
have a public law-personality. It has been observed that such a provision, on the one 
238 See  A.  EMBID IRUJO,  C.  FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ,  Las  agrupaciones  europeas  de 
cooperación territorial: consideraciones desde el Derecho comunitario y el derecho espanol, cit., p. 
192-196. See also,  S. BELTRÁN,  Qué esperar de la figura de la Agrupación Europea de Cooperación  
Territorial  (AECT)  en  relación  a  los  organismos  de  cooperación  creados  por  las  Comunidades  
Autónomas, in Revista general de derecho europeo, 2007, n. 14, p. 21 et seq.     
239 The first attempt of the Italian Government to implement the EGTC Regulation has been drafted 
throughout a governmental decree which has been the object of a negative opinion by the Council of 
State (Opinion of 7 November 2007). In particular, this authority has fund the decree a non-suitable 
form, while an ordinary law was considered the right tool. 
240 “Legge 88 del 7 luglio 2009, concernente le Disposizioni per l'adempimento di obblighi derivanti 
dall'appartenenza dell'Italia alle Comunità europee - Legge comunitaria 2008”.
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hand, is more suitable in order to pursue the tasks of sub-national public authorities 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  could  be  at  the  same  time  restrictive  in  case  the 
establishment  of  an  EGTC under  private  law represents  an  alternative  and valid 
option241. 
Going on with the analysis, the Italian provisions define the public authorities 
allowed  to  membership  according  to  Article  3  of  the  Regulation.  Namely,  for 
“regional authorities” are intended all the Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces 
of  Trento and Bolzano and for  “local  authorities”  those  authorities  mentioned at 
Article  2,  paragraph  1  of  the  national  law  on  local  authorities242.  Despite  some 
positive  comments  on  this  provision,  it  seems,  according  to  our  view,  quite 
superfluous as far as the Regulation is already complete and clear enough: namely, it 
is not a discretionary choice of the national legislations to appoint the authorities 
entitled to be potential  members of a EGTC, but, rather,  the Regulation appoints 
national,  regional  and  local  authorities  as  already  existing  within  each  national 
system.  The  provisions  regarding  the  tasks  entrusted  to  an  EGTC are  also  quite 
useless. In fact, the text of Article 46, paragraphs 4 and 5 confirms the possibility to 
develop  actions  within the  Community  programmes frameworks  or  outside  these 
frameworks. In this case, as the Regulation also says, the activities shall comply with 
the objectives of economic and social cohesion. While leaving the broader space of 
action  to  the  EGTC243,  these  dispositions  do  not  add  relevant  aspects.  On  the 
contrary,  the provisions regarding the adoption of the convention and the statutes 
seems superfluous for the reason that the Regulation already foresees adequate and 
directly  applicable  solutions244.  The  further  procedure  of  authorization  for  the 
prospective members is rather excessive as far as it  requires the consent from the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministries and, in addition, a mandatory opinion from 
the following authorities: the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs about the conformity 
241 See S. ALOISIO, Il GECT: disciplina comunitaria e attuazione italiana, un'analisi giuridica, in A. 
PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 113.
242 D. Lgs. n. 267/2000.
243 Remember that Article 7, par. 5 of the EGTC Regulation affirms that the Member State may limit 
the tasks that an EGTC may carry out with or without Community financial contribution. However, 
the minimum content shall respect the actions listed in Art. 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 on 
ERDF.
244 Art.  46,  par.  4  states  that  the  convention  and  the statutes  are unanimously  approved by  the 
members and subsequently drafted in public form according to Articles 2699  et seq. of the Italian 
Civil Code. The non-fulfilment causes the invalidity of the act. 
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with the national  policy  in  foreign affairs,  the Ministry  of  the  Interior  about  the 
conformity  with  public  order  and  public  security,  the  Ministry  of  Economy and 
Finances about the conformity with financial and auditing legislations, the Ministry 
for the Economic Development about the conformity with the cohesion policies, the 
Council of Ministries – Department for the Community Policies about the conformity 
with  the  Community  system  –  Department  for  the  Regional  Affairs  about  the 
conformity  with  the  national  interest.  This  procedure  shall  be  completed  within 
ninety  days.  The  registration  of  the  EGTC  shall  be  accomplished  within  the 
following six months and the Presidency of the Council of Ministries shall verify the 
conformity of the approved convention and statutes with the proposed ones. Other 
provisions concern practical aspects, such as the financial details. Two observations 
come with regard to this authorizing procedure. From a practical point of view, it 
seems hard to obtain all  the complete opinions from each authority within ninety 
days and it could have been useful to introduce a form of silent consent after the 
deadline has expired245. From a substantial point of view, all these previous controls, 
while  respecting the wording of Article 4,  paragraph 3 of the EGTC Regulation, 
seem excessively complex and suggest a kind of disproportionate attention toward 
the  potential  irregularities  during  the  constitutive  phase.  With  reference  to  the 
national  dispositions  about  territorial  cooperation  in  Italy,  some  scholars  have 
highlighted the potential  legislative overlapping between the provisions about the 
EGTC, the law ratifying the Madrid Outline Convention246 and the constitutional 
discipline providing the possibilities for the Regions to conclude agreements with 
correspondent foreign subjects247. To solve the potential conflict, the analysis given 
by the Constitutional Court is clear in the identification of the Community legislation 
as a different and autonomous reference for the peculiar kind of activity concerned248, 
245 See S. ALOISIO, Il GECT: disciplina comunitaria e attuazione italiana, un'analisi giuridica, in A. 
PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 114.
246 Law no. 984/1994.
247 Article 117, paragraph 9 of the Italian Constitution and the related applicative discipline (Article 
6, paragraph 3 of the Law no. 131/2003.
248 In  this  sense,  see  the  judgement  no.  258/2004.  See  also,  M.R.  ALLEGRI,  Dalla  cooperazione 
transfrontaliera alla cooperazione territoriale: problemi di ordine costituzionale, in A. PAPISCA (cur.), 
Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 
88  and  R.  CAFARI PANICO,  Le  relazioni  internazionali  e  comunitarie  delle  Regioni  nella  recente  
giurisprudenza  costituzionale,  in  L.  DANIELE (cur.),  Regioni  e  autonomie  territoriali  nel  diritto  
internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 247.
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thus allowing a contextual coexistence of different legislations, but granting their 
autonomy and their separate applicability. 
c) Unitary countries
The  new  Community  instrument  has  not  created  particular  problems  in 
relation  to  the  peculiar  constitutional  systems  of  unitary  countries,  notably  with 
regard to the traditionally less autonomous functions of territorial communities.
France implemented the EGTC Regulation with the  Loi n. 2008-352 of 15 
April 2008 aiming at amending the General Code of Territorial Communities. This 
legislative  act  has  modified  the  chapter  about  the  decentralized  cooperation 
introducing  appropriate  provisions  for  the  setting  up  of  the  EGTCs.  Such  an 
intervention  is  rather  interesting  for  the  reason that  it  adapts  a  general  piece  of 
legislation  coherently  to  the  new Community  provisions.  In  this  sense,  the  final 
effect  appears  much  more  rational  and  understandable  within  the  legislative 
framework of decentralized cooperation.  As it  has been already mentioned in the 
second chapter with regard to the development of a sub-national foreign powers, the 
new formulation of article Article L1115-4 recites: “Les collectivités territoriales et  
leurs groupements peuvent, dans les limites de leurs compétences et dans le respect  
des engagements internationaux de la France, adhérer à un organisme public  de  
droit  étranger  ou participer  au capital  d'une  personne morale  de  droit  étranger  
auquel adhère ou participe au moins une collectivité territoriale ou un groupement  
de collectivités territoriales d'un Etat membre de l'Union européenne ou d'un Etat  
membre  du  Conseil  de  l'Europe”.  According  to  this  general  faculty  conferred to 
territorial  communities,  Article  L1115-4-2 handles in  particular  the EGTC249.  The 
authorisation is conferred by the state representative (the prefect) within the region 
where the EGTC has its headquarters. The EGTC has legal personality under public 
249 Article  L1115-4-2:  “Dans  le  cadre  de  la  coopération  transfrontalière,  transnationale  ou 
interrégionale, les collectivités territoriales, leurs groupements et, après autorisation de leur autorité de 
tutelle, les organismes de droit public au sens de la directive 2004 / 18 / CE du Parlement européen et 
du Conseil,  du 31 mars 2004, relative à la coordination des procédures de passation des marchés 
publics de travaux, de fournitures et de services peuvent, dans les limites de leurs compétences et dans 
le respect des engagements internationaux de la France, créer avec les collectivités territoriales, les 
groupements  de  collectivités  territoriales  et  les  organismes de droit  public  des  Etats  membres  de 
l'Union européenne, ainsi qu'avec les Etats membres de l'Union européenne ou les Etats frontaliers 
membres du Conseil de l'Europe, un groupement européen de coopération territoriale de droit français,  
doté de la personnalité morale et de l'autonomie financière”. 
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law.  Moreover,  Article  L1115-5  contains  a  “closing  provision”,  which  gives 
coherency  to  the  system of  decentralized  cooperation  of  territorial  communities. 
Namely, as far as these communities can only undertake cooperation with similar 
foreign  entities  and  agreements  with  other  States  are  not  allowed,  an  exception 
regarding  the  constitution  of  EGTCs  is  necessary  in  order  to  correspond  to  the 
Community Regulation250. No other dispositions are foreseen with regard to the tasks 
of  an  EGTC,  the  authorization's  procedure,  the  registration,  etc.  Thus,  once 
recognised  this  peculiar  sub-national  power  to  decentralized  cooperation,  all  the 
issues concerning the specific  implementation of the EGTC Regulation in France 
seem  to  be  connected  to  the  respect  of  the  competences  of  each  territorial 
communities and to the international engagements of France. 
The French case seems to be the only one that has adapted the new EGTC 
Regulation to the existing national  legislation about  the foreign activities of sub-
national  communities. Other unitary countries, instead,  have adopted specific  and 
detailed acts.
The  Hungarian  legislation,  for  example,  has  given  application  to  the 
Community Regulation through the Act XCIC of 2007. This document consists of 22 
articles and, in this sense, is quite elaborated. Some important dispositions concern 
essential  aspects  of  the  EGTC,  both  regarding  the  structures  established  on  the 
Hungarian territory and the authorisation for members under the Hungarian law for 
structures established abroad.  In particular, a grouping may not be established with 
the  primary  aim  of  pursing  business  activities251 and  may  not  perform  public 
authority activities; moreover the liability of the local government involved may not 
exceed the extent of its material contribution (limited liability) (Art. 2, par. 1 and 3); 
the Metropolitan Court shall decide the approval pursuant to Article 4, paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the Regulation within the scope of a non-litigation proceeding (Art. 4, par. 
1);  after  the  accomplishment  of  the  required  procedure,  the  establishment  of  an 
250 Article L1115-5: “Aucune convention, de quelque nature que ce soit, ne peut être passée entre une 
collectivité territoriale ou un groupement de collectivités territoriales et un Etat étranger, sauf si elle a 
vocation à permettre la création d'un groupement européen de coopération territoriale. Dans ce cas, la 
signature  de  la  convention  doit  être  préalablement  autorisée  par  le  représentant  de  l'Etat  dans  la 
région.”
251 The  EGTC cannot  be  established  in  order  to  reach  exclusive  business  objectives.  However, 
business  actions  can  be  performed  for  reasons  connected  to  the  EGTC's  activities.  Namely,  the 
grouping may perform business activities in line with the stipulations of its bylaws, provided that it 
does not jeopardise the aim of the grouping (Art. 7, par. 2 of the Hungarian Act).
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EGTC  may  not  be  refused  if  the  agreement  and  the  bylaws  comply  with  the 
stipulations of the Regulation and the Act, and all members have approvals pursuant 
to  Article  4,  paragraph  3  of  the  Regulation.  From a  general  point  of  view,  the 
Hungarian  dispositions  aim  explicitly  at  resolving  the  blanks  spaces  that  the 
Community has left for the national provisions. In fact, the Act displays in detail 
several formal issues concerning registration, publicity, audit, procedures in front of 
the competent authorities, while the substantial aspects are ruled through references 
to the Regulation. Regarding the membership, Hungarian sub-national authorities are 
considered,  due  to  the  constitutional  structure  of  this  country,  as  “local 
governments”252. 
The  last  national  document  under  analysis  is  the  Finnish  Act  554/2009 
adopted on 24 July 2009. This act is also quite detailed. Besides some superfluous 
provisions253, an interesting disposition is dedicated to the tasks of the grouping. In 
this regard, the tasks of an EGTC are limited, according to Article 7, paragraph 5 of 
the Regulation, to the actions related to the territorial cooperation objective that are 
listed under Article 6 of the Regulation no 1080/2006 on the ERDF. The result is, as 
Section 3, paragraph 3 of the Act specifies, that a grouping shall be given neither 
tasks other than those already mentioned nor tasks exceeding the scope of the powers 
and  duties  of  its  members.  Thus,  Finland  has  opted  for  the  most  restrictive 
attributions,  as  provided  by  the  Regulation.  However,  as  already  mentioned  in 
paragraph 1.4. of this chapter, the specific activities enumerated under Article 6 of 
the  ERDF  Regulation  allow  some  flexible  interpretations.  The  approval  for  the 
participation is given by the Ministry of Employment and Economy according to the 
following conditions: the proposal for convention and statutes of the grouping shall 
fulfil the requirements set in the EGTC Regulation, in the national Act and in other 
national legislations; the tasks of the grouping are in accordance with Section 3 of 
the Act; there is no other obstacle referred to in Article 4, paragraph 3 of the EGTC 
Regulation (Section 6). Other practical provisions concern the phase of registration, 
252 The Hungarian Act includes some “interpreting provisions” in this regard. Namely, Art. 18 states: 
“For the purposes of this Act: local government shall refer to the municipality of a village, a town, a 
town of county rank, the capital, a metropolitan district or a county”.
253 Section 2 of the first chapter, for example, affirms that “[f]or the purposes of this Act, grouping 
refers to a grouping established in accordance with the Grouping Regulation. A grouping is Finnish if 
its  registered office  is  located in  Finland and foreign if  its  registered office is  located in  another 
Member State of the European Union”.
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the  general  functioning  and  the  audit  control.  An  interesting  point  about  the 
conditions for  the  registration has to  be remarked as  an example of the possible 
contrasting  national  provisions.  In  fact,  differently  from  the  Hungarian  case,  a 
grouping where members’ liability  for the debts of the grouping has been limited 
shall  not  be  registered  in  Finland  (Section  9).  Thus,  theoretically  speaking,  the 
participation of an Hungarian local authority to an EGTC under Finnish law would 
be difficult.  Although the example proposed represent only brief and partial hints, 
they  suggest  some  interesting  ideas  for  an  overall  evaluation  about  the  national 
approach to the EGTC.
4.3. Observations about the national provisions
From this partial analysis of the national laws a first general consideration 
concerns the abstract unpredictability of all the legal aspects related to the concrete 
establishment of the EGTC. In fact, the possible combinations resulting from the law 
concerning  the  members  and from the  national  law of  the  EGTC's  headquarters, 
determine a complex system of applicable laws. 
If the common belief about the EGTC considers this instrument as an uniform 
and coherent  way of  approach towards  territorial  cooperation,  many expectations 
could  be  frustrated.  In  fact,  from this  point  of  view,  the  Community  Regulation 
doesn't really solve the lamented problems of territorial cooperation deriving from 
the existence of different national legal systems. Namely, the question of these legal 
differences will be a constant element at European level and could be considered as a 
form of inherent characteristic of the “European legal system”254. In the same way as 
it  has already been pointed out during the analysis of the EGTC Regulation, this 
overview on national provisions shows in concrete terms the reality of a persistent 
legal heterogeneity. If, theoretically speaking, the text of the Regulation doesn't allow  
a high degree of discretionality by Member States, however, the margins of actions 
left  to  the  national  provisions  are  broad  enough  to  generate  diversified  legal 
effects255. Few aspects are particularly interesting in this regard.
254 See  I. RADUCU,  N. LEVRAT,  Le métissage des ordres juridiques européens,  in  Cahiers de droit  
européen, 2007, vol. 43 n. 1-2, p. 111 et seq.
255 See INTERACT, Handbook on the European Gruoping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). What use 
for Europea Territorial Cooperation programmes and porojects?, November 2008, p. 22 et seq.
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Firstly,  the  relation  between  the  central  authorities  and  the  sub-national 
subjects is still linked to the inner constitutional dynamics of each national system 
and  the  EGTC Regulation  doesn't  weight  very  much  in  this  sense.  The  general 
condition  for  sub-national  authorities,  which  is  bound  to  the  respect  of  their 
competences and to the observation of the state international obligation, is a constant 
element in the national legislations. 
Furthermore, keeping in mind the due peculiarities of federal, regional and 
unitary  countries,  other  different  approaches  could  be  distinguished  in  the 
implementation of the EGTC Regulation. Namely, there are some cases in which the 
central  authorities  are  rather  indifferent  to  the  potential  activities  of  sub-national 
subjects within the EGTC. This is quite patent in the case of Germany, where the 
possible violations of the Regulation or of the national legislation are not stressed 
within  the  national  implementation  of  the  EGTC  and  are  considered  as  well 
manageable by the legal order involved. Other cases, like France or Spain, present a 
moderate  level  of  supervision  towards  the  respective  sub-national  entities.  This 
means that opportune remarks on the most important duties of local and regional 
authorities  are  provided,  but  without  an  excessive  emphasis,  so  to  show  an 
equilibrate balance between supervision from the central authority and autonomy of 
sub-national  subjects.  The last  approach,  on the contrary,  present  a  high level  of 
attention with regard to potential exceeding actions of sub-national subjects. In the 
case of Italy, the mandatory advise from all those ministerial authorities seems more 
an  attempt  to  discourage  the  establishment  of  an  EGTC  rather  than  to  prevent 
possible violation of Community and national law.
A similar conclusion could be proposed also in relation to the tasks conferred 
to an EGTC. As far as these tasks shall comply both with the competences of the 
members and with the general objectives of economic and social cohesion (with the 
possible extreme limitation to the objective of territorial cooperation according to 
Art. 6 of the ERDF Regulation), different national approaches are developed. In fact, 
moderate or cautious preventive approaches are visible. The case of Finland is quite 
emblematic  in  this  sense.  However,  the  specific  limit  of  Article  6  of  the  ERDF 
Regulation seems more a defensive attitude rather than a really substantial instrument 
to avoid unexpected developments of the EGTCs' activities. 
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About  the  arrangement  of  formal  and  procedural  mechanisms  for  the 
establishment,  functioning  and  control  of  an  EGTC,  two  main  national  attitudes 
could be observed. On the one hand, some national provisions intend to rule only 
some basic  aspects,  such  as  the national  competent  authorities  mentioned by the 
Regulation  (Germany,  Austria  and  France)  or  the  authorization  from  the  central 
authorities (Italy).  On the other hand, some States regulate  more in detail  all the 
procedural  elements  (Hungary  and  Finland).  In  this  regard,  only  a  partial 
correspondence between composed and non-composed countries could be observed 
about the implementation of formal/procedural dispositions. In outline, it is possible 
to affirm that  in  federal  countries,  national  provisions are less detailed,  while,  in 
regional  and  unitary  countries  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  is  more 
elaborate. However, this could not be considered as a genera rule, since there are also 
peculiar cases, like France is. 
In  general,  a  conclusive  reflection  after  this  analysis  highlights  how  the 
national  implementation  of  the  EGTC Regulation eludes almost  every attempt of 
classification within legal  categories. Even the distinction between composed and 
non-composed countries, as well as the attempt to find uniform and steady practices 
is  quite  obsolete.  Namely,  the  new  Community  instrument  embodies  all  the 
controversial aspects of territorial cooperation, which need to be assimilated rather 
than removed.
4.4. EGTC set-up
At the time of writing, eight EGTCs have been established and other twenty 
projects are under preparation256. The existing EGTC structures are briefly presented 
in order to highlight some basic peculiar aspects, which could be useful for further 
observations. The single aspects, which are mentioned for each EGTC, are traced on 
the basis of the official documents available (conventions, statutes and publications 
on the Official Bulletin of the EU)257. 
256 See the CoR official website about the EGTC at:
http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/Projects/preparation/Pages/welcome.aspx.
257 Documents and informations are available at: 
http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/Projects/already/Pages/welcome.aspx.
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• Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai EGTC
This structure is the first EGTC that has been created. It is established under 
French  law  between  partners  from  France  and  Belgium.  Different  levels  of 
authorities are involved, namely: from the French side, the State, the  région Nord-
Pas-de-Calais, the département du Nord and Lille Métropole Communauté urbaine; 
from the Belgian side,  the Federal  State,  the Flemish community and region, the 
province  of  Western  Flanders,  the  region  Wallonie,  the  French  community,  the 
province  of  Hainaut  and  four  intermunicipal  associations.  The  main  aim of  this 
EGTC is  to  favour  a  strategic  transfrontier  cooperation  in  the  geographical  area 
concerned, thus fostering a coherent development. In this regard, the objectives of 
the EGTC are the promotion and the support of an effective transfrontier cooperation 
in order to assure strategic cooperation and dialogue, to foster the political debate, to 
realize projects for a common development and to facilitate the life of citizens of the 
Franco-Belgian conurbation258. In practice, the activity of the Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai 
EGTC is  directed,  with  the  sustain  of  the  EU cohesion  policy,  towards  a  better 
coordination of the policies concerning the area,  such as transports,  employment, 
culture, etc259.
• EGTC West-Vlaanderen/Flandre-Dunkerque-Côte d'Opale
This EGTC is established under French law between partners from France 
and  Belgium.  Like  for  the  previous  example,  different  sub-national  actors  are 
involved and both the two States are part of the EGTC. According to the convention 
and  the  statutes  the  main  mission  of  the  entity  is  to  promote  and encourage  an 
effective  and  coherent  development  within  its  territory  and,  therefore,  the  main 
objectives are the coordination and cooperation between its members, the political 
representation  and  consultation  for  the  territory,  the  development  of  common 
strategic projects and the elaboration of common actions for the necessities of the 
population. Besides the concern towards its territory, the EGTC works at regional, 
national and European level as a common interlocutor for the covered geographic 
area.
258 Art. 3 of the Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai EGTC Statutes, available at:
 http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/Projects/already/Pages/LilleKortrijkTournai.aspx.
259 See http://www.lillemetropole.fr/index.php?p=986&art_id.
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• EGTC Pyrenees-Mediterranean
This  EGTC counts  four  members  (Self-governing Community  of  Balearic 
Islands, Self-Governing Community of Catalonia  for the Spanish side and  région 
Midi-Pyrenees and  région  Languedoc-Roussillon for  the  French  side)  and  is 
established under French law. According to Section E of the statutes, the EGTC aims 
at developing projects of territorial cooperation in conformity to the competences of 
the members and, in this regard, some peculiar fields of action are individuated. For 
each field, specific matters are listed: interregional economic development, research, 
culture,  tourism,  transports,  common  services,  realisation  of  studies,  etc.  Some 
peculiar  aspects  concern  activities  related  to  the  territorial  objective  of  the  EU 
cohesion policy (in particular within Community programmes) and the promotion of 
administrative, juridical and economic cooperation260.
• Duero-Douro EGTC
Established under Spanish law, this entity is composed by a huge amount of 
municipalities,  both  form the  Spanish  side  and  the  Portuguese  side.  Three  more 
public bodies complete the partnership261. Despite the very detailed content of the 
constitutive  acts,  the  nature  and  the  tasks  of  the  EGTC  are  very  generally 
individuated  in  the  development  of  transfrontier,  transnational  and  interregional 
cooperation with the exclusive aim of economic and social cohesion (Article 4 of the 
statute).  In  this  regard,  the  convention  identifies  some  fields  of  action:  equal 
opportunities,  economic  development,  local  development,  public  transport,  new 
technologies, environment, sustainable development, tourism, culture, public health, 
social services, local administration, agriculture, etc.
• Galicia-North of Portugal EGTC
The EGTC is established under Spanish law between partners from Spain and 
Portugal (Xunta de Galicia and Comisión de Coordinación y Desarrollo Regional de 
la Región Norte de Portugal). The convention makes broad and detailed references 
to the EU cohesion policy as main aim of the EGTC (Article III). In this regard, the 
260 See http://www.euroregio-epm.org/eu/AppJava/fr/sala_de_prensa/documents_oficials.jsp.
261 These  public  bodies  are:  Organismo  Autónomo  D-ARRIBES  de  España,  Asociación  de  
Municipios para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Local (for Spain); Associação de Freguesias da Raia 
e do Côa (for Portugal).
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activities are mostly identified on the basis of the Community territorial objectives, 
notably with reference to development and competitiveness. 
• Ister Granum EGTC
The  structure  is  established  as  an  EGTC  with  limited  liability  under 
Hungarian  law  between  local  authorities  from  Hungary  and  Slovak  Republic. 
According  to  Article  II  of  the  statutes  “the  primary  task  of  the  grouping  is  the 
implementation of territorial cooperation programmes  and projects co-financed by 
the European Union”. The individuation of further tasks is quite atypical with regard 
to the previous examples of EGTC. Thus, the complete list of tasks allowed in order 
to  pursue  legitimate  activities  identifies  the  following  fields  to  cope  with262:  “a) 
within  the  scope  of  its  objectives,  the  implementation  of  other  specific  actions, 
programmes,  projects  with  or  without  financial  contribution  from  the  European 
Union; b) within the framework of its independent management in order to achieve 
its  objectives,  with  consideration  to  the  limited  responsibility  role  taken  on,  the 
continuation of company activity; c) raising awareness to the competitive advantages 
occurring  at  local  and  national  level  of  the  territorial  cooperation  targeting  the 
strengthening of  economic  and social  cohesion within its  operational  territory,  as 
well as to its cross border competitive advantages, to the fundamental conditions for 
achieving these competitive advantages, the process of obtaining them and the roles 
Members can undertake in this; d) ensuring the human and financial resources and 
know-how necessary for achieving the objectives and implementing the tasks, the 
free  flow  of  and  data  and  information,  and  the  widespread  publicising  of  the 
achievements of the  Grouping;  e)  influencing  of  the decisions  involving regional 
politics within the institutional framework created by the European Union; f) in case 
of  adequate  financial  conditions  are  ensured  the  establishment  and  operation  of 
representation in Brussels”. 
Another peculiarity concerns the provision related to the so-called “mutual 
recognition”, which is directed to the non-Hungarian members for the acceptance of 
Hungarian law (Article IX).
262 The English version of this Statute is available at: 
http://www.istergranum.hu/index.php?k=admin_en/data/00000000/_fix/00000001&id=0.
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• Karst-Bodva EGTC
This  grouping  with  limited  liability  is  established  under  Slovakian  law 
between local partners from Hungary and Slovak Republic. Aim of this structure is to 
foster  the cross-border cooperation in order to sustain the economical,  social  and 
environmental development of the geographic area concerned. Some field of actions 
are especially individuated in order to develop partnership and cooperation of this 
communal rural zone.
• EGTC Amphictyony
Up to now, this Grouping is, from the geographical point of view, the most 
interesting.  Namely,  it  is  established under the Greek law between municipalities 
from Greece,  Italy, Cyprus and France. The main intent is to develop a common 
strategy for  this  Mediterranean reality,  which  joins together  non-contiguous local 
authorities,  in  order to maintain a constant environment  of peace  and sustainable 
development.
4.5. Observations about the established EGTCs
The EGTC-case  presentation  shows a  variety  of  possible  combinations  of 
members, objectives and forms of cooperation. Some groupings are constituted as a 
natural  development  of existing experiences of cooperation (e.g.  Galicia-North of 
Portugal EGTC), while other groupings are new forms of cooperation (e.g. EGTC 
Amphictyony). The establishment of EGTCs concerns partners belonging to almost 
recurrent  countries,  such  as  France,  Belgium,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Hungary.  This 
suggests  that  national  and sub-national  authorities of other countries,  which have 
already implemented the Community Regulation, need more time to get used to this 
instrument. Regarding the membership, the only cases, where the State is present as a 
member,  occur  in  France  and  Belgium,  while  several  groupings  are  composed 
exclusively by local authorities. 
From this brief outlook, it is not possible to draw typical common features of 
the various EGTCs. As it has been observed in several occasions, the Community 
Regulation  combines  the  provision  of  defined  legal  rules  with  a  high  degree  of 
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flexibility263.  For  this  reason,  the  application  of  this  instruments  is  suitable  for 
different purposes and realities, from urban areas to natural reserves, form economic 
districts to rural areas and so on. Moreover, the EGTC permits to build new binding 
forms of cooperation, even for the case this cooperation is not covered by inter-state 
agreements. In this sense, also the role of the State is changed from a supervisory 
position to an eventual partner of territorial cooperation264.
From the peculiar perspective of the legal analysis, it is possible to note that 
the  constitutive  documents  (conventions  and  statutes)  are  very  detailed  in  the 
regulation of several aspects regarding the functioning of the grouping, in particular 
the  working  modalities  of  the  organs  and  all  the  procedures  concerned.  What 
emerges  from the  examination  of  these  documents  is  the  clear  attention  for  the 
establishment  of  well  defined  binding  relations  between  the  members,  so  that 
eventual violations could be easily managed. 
Generally  speaking,  in  order  to  obtain  more  efficient  results  after  the 
constitution  of  an  EGTC,  both  in  general  and  in  legal  perspective,  some  key-
formulas need to be respected. Namely,  a clear agreement  between the members, 
detailed  convention  and  statutes,  an  aware  choice  about  the  headquarters  of  the 
EGTC and the respective national applicable law represent determinant factors for a 
better functioning. Moreover, as it has already been said several times, sub-national 
authorities  shall  remember  that,  in  theory,  Member  States  cannot  refuse  the 
constitution  or  the  participation  to  an  EGTC  for  reasons  related  to  the  lack  of 
national measures of implementation. 
Leaving  apart  the  analysis  about  the  functional  aspects,  some  important 
considerations could be drawn with regard to the identification of the objectives and 
tasks of  the  EGTC.  Namely,  it  is  quite  patent  that  the  constituent  documents  of 
almost every EGTC privilege a wide definition of the tasks. Thus, from the analysis 
of  the  conventions  or  statutes  it  is  quite  difficult  to  figure  out  all  the  possible 
concrete activities of the respective grouping. Each EGTC is required, according to 
the Regulation, to set down and respect its objectives and tasks, within the limits that 
263 See  MISSION OPÉRATIONELLE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE (MOT),  European  grouping  of  territorial  
cooperation, Paris, 2008, p. 12.
264 See  MISSION OPÉRATIONELLE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE (MOT),   Actes  de  la  Journée  d'information  et  
d'échanges sur le groupement européen de coopération territoriale, 16 novembre 2006, Ira de Metz, 
Paris, 2007, p. 66.
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are explicitly defined in the Regulation itself. In brief, those limitations concern the 
competences conferred to each member, peculiar aspects connected to the national 
interests and the national legislations and the thematic perimeter of economic and 
social cohesion. In order to avoid possible disputes about violations of the mentioned 
limitations,  the  formulations  of  objectives  and  tasks  are  as  wide  as  possible.  In 
particular, the main technique is to proclaim the general intent to pursue territorial 
cooperation and then to mention some wide fields of activities. In this way, more 
possibilities  remain,  in  theory,  open  for  the  concrete  activities  of  the  EGTC. 
Moreover, the conformity with the competences conferred to sub-national authorities 
according to the respective national law can be easier complied if the tasks of the 
EGTC are not too strictly delimited. In this sense, even if objectives and tasks seems 
not really clear enough, they left open progressive developments.
Despite the big amount of transfrontier cooperative experiences in Europe, 
two years and a half after the entry into force of the Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 
only eight EGTCs have been constituted. Of course, many other projects are under 
preparation and this is a positive aspect. However, the development of new structures 
is more cautious and restraint if compared to the initial enthusiasm. In this regard, the  
difficulties to fully comprehend and implement the legal nature of this instrument 
have played a a detracting role. In any case, the political debate about the future 
applications of the EGTC remain really positive265. 
4.6. An interesting pathologic example: the Italian case about the establishment of  
the EGTC “Euroregion Alps Mediterranean”
The  Euroregion  Alps  Mediterranean is  composed by  two French  Regions 
(Rhône-Alpes,  Provence-Alpes-Côte  d'Azur)  and  three  Italian  Regions  (Valle 
d'Aosta,  Piemonte,  Liguria).  This  territory  has  a  long  history  of  partnership  and 
transfrontier relations in different fields (economy, culture, etc.)266. The constitution 
265 See the discussions of the workshop The added value of EGTC and possible solutions to critical  
points,  held on 8 October  2009 during the Open Days 2009 at  the Committee of  the Regions in 
Brussels. Informations available at:
 http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/Pages/TheaddedvalueofEGTC.aspx.
266 See COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC): state  
of  the  play  and  prospects,  cit.,  p.  124.  See  also  the  official  website  of  the  Euroregion,  at: 
http://www.euroregion-alpes-mediterranee.eu/.
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of an EGTC represents a useful instrument for an experienced synergism, even if it 
will not represent the natural evolution of the whole Euroregion, but only of some 
activities.  Thus,  the  five  regions  have  finalised  the  drafting  of  convention  and 
statutes for the future EGTC under French law267. The setting up of the grouping has 
known a delayed procedural phase because a curious situation has occurred in Italy. 
Namely,  during  the  process  for  the  establishment  of  the  grouping,  some  legal 
quarrels between the Italian Government and the Liguria Region have happened. The 
Liguria Region confirmed its membership to the EGTC through a regional law268 
before the final adoption and entry into force of the Italian national legislation for the 
implementation  of  the  EGTC  Regulation.  In  order  to  comply  with  Article  4, 
paragraph 2 of the Community Regulation, the Region notified the communication 
regarding its intention to participate to the EGTC to the national authority according 
to the existing Italian legislative provisions about the regional foreign relations269.
Against  the  regional  law,  the  Italian  Government  has  proposed  a 
constitutionality  recourse  in  front  of  the  Italian  Constitutional  Court270.  With  the 
recourse no 30/2009 the Government contests the violation of Articles 117 and 118 
of the Constitution (about the division of the competences between national and sub-
national  level),  in  particular  with regard to  the principle  of  fair  cooperation,  and 
Article 97 (about the fair operation of public administrations)271.  The reasoning is 
founded  on  a  twofold  motivation,  which  will  be  briefly  summarized.  Firstly, 
according to the interpretation of the Government, the EGTC Regulation leaves to 
the Member States the complete discretionality to authorize the participation of sub-
national authorities to an EGTC272. According to the same interpretation, the Liguria 
267 See INTERACT, Handbook on the European Gruoping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). What use 
for Europea Territorial Cooperation programmes and porojects?, cit., p. 65 et seq.
268 Legge della Regione Liguria 16 febbraio 2009 n. 1. 
269 Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Law no 131/2003. During the absence of national provisions about 
for the adoption of the EGTC Regulation, the mentioned law was considered applicable according to 
the principle of analogy. As stated by this provision, if the central authority, after the notification from 
the  Region,  doesn't  submit  an  opinion  within  the  term of  thirty  days,  the  Region  is  allowed  to 
conclude the agreement. 
270 In  is  interesting to  note that  the question submitted  to  the  Court  concerns  the  constitutional 
conformity  of  the  regional  law and  not,  as  it  has  been  done  in  previous  cases  regarding  other 
Community  instruments  for  cooperation  such  as  Interreg  (see  the  judgement  no  258/2004),  the 
conflict of competences with violation of the governmental attributions by the region.
271 The text of the recourse is available at the official website of the Italian Constitutional Court at:
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/atti_promovimento/schedaRicorsi.doanno=2009&numero=30&nume
ro_parte=1.
272 The reasoning of the Italian Government is based on the assumption that Article 16, paragraph 1 
of  the  EGTC  Regulation  confer  to  the  Member  States  a  wide  discretionality  to  implement  the 
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Region should have  waited for  the  definitive adoption of  the  national  legislation 
about  the  EGTC.  In  this  sense,  the  regional  law  violates  the  principles  of  fair 
cooperation between the State and the Regions, and the principles of reasonableness, 
impartiality  and  fair  operation  of  the  public  administration.  Secondly,  the 
Government highlights that the regional law extends the competences of the EGTC 
as individuated according by the Community Regulation. In particular, the regional 
law  affirms  that  the  aim  of  the  interregional  cooperation  is  to  “foster  political, 
economic, social and cultural relations” and this is violating, in the governmental 
opinion, the main aim of the EGTC, namely the promotion of territorial cooperation 
within the objectives of economic and social cohesion. In this view, the regional law 
doesn't comply with the Community obligation and it is, therefore, unconstitutional 
on the basis of Article 117, paragraph 1 Const. 
Although this research is not the adequate place for discussing this recourse, 
some considerations need to be done. Given the fact that the Liguria Region, in the 
absence of national dispositions about the EGTC, has complied with the provisions 
of the Regulation about the communication with the central authorities, the lack of an  
authorisation  from  the  central  authority  seems  more  a  non-fulfilment  of  the 
Government  rather  than a  violation of  the  principle  of  fair  cooperation from the 
Region. By the way, the State was in delay with the adoption of adequate national 
provisions. Furthermore, from a substantial point of view, the authorisation of the 
national  authority  cannot  be  considered  as  completely  discretional,  but  it  is 
conditioned according to the text of Article 4, paragraph 3, which affirms that “the 
Member  State  concerned  shall,  taking  into  account  its  constitutional  structure, 
approve the prospective member's participation in the EGTC, unless it considers that 
such participation is not in conformity with this Regulation or national law, including 
the prospective member's powers and duties, or that such participation is not justified 
for reasons of public interest or of public policy of that Member State. In such a case, 
the Member State shall give a statement of its reasons for withholding approval”. In 
this regard, the Italian Government has not given any statement. About the second 
reasoning,  it  seems quite  doubtful  the  possibility  to  consider  the  development  of 
Community act at national level, also according to the principle of subsidiarity as affirmed within the 
Treaties.  On  the  basis  of  the  literature  analysed  for  this  research  and  according  to  our  personal 
opinion, this reasoning is completely wrong from a legal point of view.
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political,  economic,  social  and  cultural  relations  as  a  violation  of  the  cohesion 
objectives: the analysis about the cohesion policy at the beginning of this chapter has 
demonstrated how its objectives are not so different from the formulation proposed 
by the regional law.
However it will end, this case is interesting in order to see the possible legal 
effects of the Regulation, in particular concerning the relations between national and 
sub-national authorities. According to our opinion, the intention for the recourse of 
the  Italian  Government  is  based  more  on  a  political  decision  rather  than  on  an 
effective legal claim and demonstrates a kind of reluctance to the constitution of the 
EGTC. Furthermore, the issue is not proposed by the Government as a violation of 
the existing legal rules about the procedures which allow the regions to conclude 
agreements with foreign sub-national  subjects  and the matter  about  the  exclusive 
competence of the State in foreign relations is not mentioned273. Instead, the Italian 
Government proposes its recourse on the basis of a misinterpretation of the legal 
effects of the EGTC Regulation. 
However, given that the legal reasoning of the recourse seems not to find a 
proper legal ground and motivation in the text of the Regulation or in some other 
legal  rules according to  national provisions,  this  Italian case highlights  a kind of 
immaturity  of  the  relations  among  level  of  governments,  in  particular  from  the 
perspective of a “mutual loyalty principle” from the centre towards the sub-national 
subjects274. The solution that are going to be taken in order to solve this problem will 
be  particularly  relevant  to  observe  how the  legal  system is  able  to  react  in  this 
peculiar situation, notably with regard to the implementation of the principle of fair 
cooperation. 
273 In this regard, see  P. GIANGASPERO,  Specialità regionale e rapporti internazionali, in  L. DANIELE 
(cur.), Regioni e autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 108-109.
274 In  this  regard,  no  relevant  national  interests  seem  to  justify  the  approach  of  the  Italian 
Government. Thus, the principle of fair cooperation seems to have been violated not from the regional 
side, but from the national side, since no motivations and no privileged national interest explicitly 
occur.  As  a  background,  see  J.  WOELK,  Konfliktregelung  und  Kooperation  im  italienischen  und 
deutshcen Verfassungsrecht.  “Leale collaborazione” und Bundestreue im Vergleich,  Baden-Baden, 
1999, p. 276-277; despite the constitutional frameworks have progressively recognised the principle 
of fair cooperation in Italy, this seems to privilege more the central State than the reasons of sub-
national actors.
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5. Cross-cutting issues: some conclusions about the EGTC 
5.1. Community law and the legal acknowledgement of territorial cooperation within  
the national systems
The analysis about the Italian case presented in the previous paragraph shows 
in concrete terms how the implementation of the EGTC Regulation involves several 
ambiguities and possible  legal  misunderstandings275.  After  the examination of the 
Community  Regulation  and  its  effective  application  it  is  possible  to  draw some 
general  and  conclusive  observations  about  the  new  instrument  of  territorial 
cooperation as a whole and, in particular, with regard to its legal effects  on sub-
national  communities.  Two  main  cross-cutting  issue  concern  in  particular  the 
implementation  of  the  Regulation  and  have  important  effects  on  the  concrete 
establishment of EGTCs across Europe.
The first  argument handles with the relation between Community law and 
national  law and the settlements of legal  standard for territorial  cooperation.  The 
second  issue  deals  with  the  “feasibility”  for  sub-national  authorities  to  develop 
territorial cooperation through the EGTC as a form of own capability. As it is quite 
easily understandable, these two issues cannot be treated separately since they have a 
reciprocal conditional influence. Namely, the interaction between Community law, 
national law and the dynamics among the various level of government determine 
jointly  the effective results  concerning the EGTCs.  Furthermore,  these to aspects 
regard both the possible answer to the initial hypothesis of this research, namely the 
contribution of the EGTC Regulation to the development of the “law of territorial 
cooperation” and to the attributions of sub-national subjects in this field. According 
to a cautious positive approach, the Regulation has been acknowledged as a way for 
the development of socio-economic integration of frontier communities276. However, 
despite the correctness of this affirmation, the positive character of this instrument is 
much more complex and relevant. In particular, the major improvement brought by 
the Regulation pertains to the effects on the national legal systems. In fact, as it has 
275 See  M. VELLANO,  Il  Gruppo Europeo di  Cooperazione  Transfrontaliera,  in L.  DANIELE (cur.), 
Regioni e autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 433.  In comparison to 
the draft versions of the Regulation, several provisions have acquired a more clear legal meaning. 
276 M. VELLANO, Il Gruppo Europeo di Cooperazione Transfrontaliera, in L. DANIELE (cur.), Regioni e 
autonomie territoriali nel diritto internazionale ed europeo, cit., p. 434.
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been observed during the different phases of this research, territorial cooperation as 
such doesn't originally have a significant legal approach by the national legislations. 
In this regard, two preventive objections could be proposed. On the one hand, it is 
possible to affirm that the phenomenon of territorial cooperation doesn't really need 
an apposite legal framework, but could be developed in a spontaneous way as it has 
been  for  several  years.  On the  other  hand,  it  is  also possible  to  say that  a  truly 
common legal approach in this field is a kind of utopia and, therefore, the eventual 
contribution of Community instruments is not decisive in the context of territorial 
cooperation. These two objections are partially true. Namely, it is a matter of fact 
that, being an optional solution, the EGTC Regulation doesn't replace any existing or 
future alternative form of spontaneous or formal cooperation between sub-national 
authorities. And it is a matter of fact as well that the Regulation doesn't introduce an 
autonomous  and  self-ruling  set  of  legal  measures.  However,  although  apparently 
subjected  to  the  traditional  limitations  of  territorial  cooperation,  the  Community 
Regulation displays new perspectives and responds to a strong demand from sub-
national  communities.  As  a  Community  normative  act,  the  Regulation  imposes, 
within  the  national  systems  of  the  EU Member  States,  a  specific  instrument  for 
territorial  cooperation.  The  term “impose”  has  been  chosen  on  purpose.  In  fact, 
despite  its  optionality  as  a  form  of  cooperation,  the  EGTC,  as  a  legal  form,  is 
perfectly valid and applicable and cannot be refused without a reason founded in the 
Regulation. Thus, the EGTC shall be considered as an effective legal tool in each 
Member State. This quite banal statement is full of implications. Especially, all the 
national  legal  orders,  from the  entry  into  force  of  the  EGTC  Regulation,  know 
explicitly the legal subject of territorial cooperation and have a legal framework in 
this field as a domestic element. 
Concerning the creation of a new right for sub-national authorities, despite 
the  existence  of  ambiguities  and  limitations,  the  need  of  a  further  national 
implementation  and  the  relations  between  the  Regulation  and  the  national 
legislations could be considered as a sort of false-problem, namely as an operative 
difficulty. Or, with other words, it needs to be intended as a mere applicative issue, 
rather  than  a  question  on  the  theoretical  feasibility  of  the  EGTC.  In  fact,  the 
Regulation is not, as could be the case of a directive, dependent from the national 
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provisions; neither its legal existence is submitted to the national implementation. 
Rather, it is the Regulation that is per se legitimising the introduction of a new legal 
figure  and  imposes  national  applicative  measures.  Furthermore,  the  national 
intervention should not be intended as a form of mere state discretionality, but as a 
legal effect which derives from the typical nature of territorial cooperation. From a 
theoretical perspective, the normative hierarchy established according to Article 2 of 
the Regulation resolves the relation between Community and national legislations, 
being the second a residual and operative factor of the first. 
To be precise, two aspects of the national legal orders are relevant. On the one 
hand, the operative national measures for the effective functioning of the EGTC are 
indicated by the Regulation. On the other hand, some dispositions of the Regulation 
mention the respect  of legal parameters related to substantial  aspects within each 
national order. The necessary respect of substantial prerogatives of Member States, 
such as their constitutional structure, the division of competences between tiers of 
government,  the  national  interest  or  the  public  order,  etc.,  represent  the  intrinsic 
character of the Community integrated system as a whole, namely composed by the 
Community  and by  the  Member  States277.  In  this  sense,  the  definition of  a  new 
Community  instrument  of  territorial  cooperation  with  direct  application  in  each 
Member  State  has  the  necessary  counterbalance  in  the  respect  of  the  national 
constitutional  structures  and  principles.  As  a  kind  of  analogy,  with  the  due 
differentiations,  the  development  of  territorial  cooperation  at  EU  level  partially 
remembers  the  development  of  other  legal  disciplines,  such  as  human rights.  Of 
course, the constitution of the EGTC, and territorial cooperation in general, doesn't 
have  a  fundamental  value  as  the  development  of  personal  rights.  However,  the 
essential relevance of national prerogatives highlights some similarities in the effort 
to preserve own constitutional structures from the destabilizing intrusion of EU rules. 
This is generated by the inevitable respect of the national systems and their internal 
subdivision, as also remembered in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the consolidated version 
of the Treaty on European Union after the approval of the Lisbon Treaty278. In this 
277 A third interpretation could be followed between the so-called monistic or dualistic principle, 
namely the consideration of the integration between the Community legal order and the legal system 
of the Member States as a “moderate dualism” (dualismo temperato) as proposed by  M. CARTABIA, 
Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea, Milano, 1995, p. 234.
278 The text of Art. 4, par. 2 recites: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before 
the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
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sense, the concrete application of Regulation 1082/2006 is emblematic and stands 
within  this  fragile  equilibrium  of  the  Community  law's  development  within  the 
national orders. In this regard, the legal meaning of the EGTC Regulation represents 
a new component for the progressive development of constitutional principles about 
territorial communities279.
From the point of view of the eventual violations of the rules provided by the 
Regulation,  many  references  are  made  to  the  national  judiciary  authorities,  in 
particular  with  regard  to  the  violation  of  the  national  law  applicable  to  the 
functioning  of  the  EGTC.  Also  disputes  regarding  the  legitimation  of  potential 
members of an EGTC are decided by national jurisdictions according to the national 
legislations. However, although, national courts are competent to settle disputes on 
the basis of the Regulation, the competence regarding the exact interpretation of this 
Community  act  pertains  to  the  EU Court  of  Justice,  which  is  the  only authority 
legitimized to give a coherent interpretation of the Regulation. 
The  EGTC  doesn't  represent  all  the  forms  and  methods  of  territorial 
cooperation, but it is a procedural instrument to establish, in the form of a codified 
structure,  different  modalities  of  territorial  cooperation.  Thanks  to  the  entry  into 
force of the EGTC Regulation, the concept of territorial cooperation is not only a 
factual  experienced phenomenon,  but  it  is  a  legal  concept  and  a  juridical  reality 
within each legal order of the EU Member States. In this sense, the Member States 
and the national authorities are required to recognise territorial cooperation from a 
legal perspective and cannot avoid to deal with it. This is the real innovation of the 
Community Regulation; thus, not the introduction of a common legal framework for 
territorial cooperation, rather to have brought a widespread acknowledgement of the 
legal notion and the respective instrument of territorial cooperation within national 
systems independently from the national discretionality. In particular, although some 
interpretations could be inclined to conceive a certain degree of discretionality of the 
central authorities, according to our opinion, the relation between central and sub-
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions,  including ensuring  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  State,  maintaining law and  order  and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State.”
279 See  A.  PAPISCA,  L'avvento  del  gruppo  europeo  di  cooperazione  territoriale,  GECT.  Nuovi  
orizzonti  per  la  multilevel  governance  democratica,  in  A.  PAPISCA (cur.) ,  Il  gruppo  europeo  di  
cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 11-29.
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national authorities regarding the establishment of EGTCs is based on the conformity 
to the national legal order as a system ruled by the law and not on a discretional 
approach from the central powers.
5.2. The capacity of regional and local authorities to develop territorial cooperation  
according to the EGTC Regulation
From the point of view of the competences of sub-national  authorities the 
adoption EGTC Regulation doesn't change a lot. In fact, the attributions of local and 
regional  authorities  remain  formally  the  same  within  each  national  constitutional 
system. However, it is undoubted that new paths are open for the development of 
new perspectives regarding the possibility to develop territorial cooperation.
The capacity of sub-national authorities to create (or become members of) an 
EGTC concerns the legitimacy of these entities to become parts of a legal person that 
is not necessarily governed by the respective national law. As it has been pointed out 
in  the  second  chapter,  this  issue  is  primarily  ruled  according  to  each  national 
constitutional system and national legislation. In other words, the first limitation for 
sub-national territorial authorities to engage in territorial cooperation deals with their 
substantial competences within the domestic legislation280. The argument has been, 
an still is, one of the key-questions regarding territorial cooperation. As far as the 
EGTC Regulation doesn't involve an expansion of these inner subject-matters (on the 
contrary, it emphasizes the necessity of their respect), the new situation concerns the 
introduction of procedural legal modalities to develop these competences in the form 
of territorial cooperation. In this regard, it is now possible to “close the circle” that 
has been opened at the beginning of this research. Thus, as it has been observed, the 
issue of territorial cooperation doesn't represent a field of competence, rather it is a 
set of various procedures. From this perspective, the EGTC Regulation creates a new 
and relevant alternative for sub-national communities.
Namely, it is possible to wonder if the EGTC Regulation has brought some 
modifications  into  the  national  systems  about  the  feasibility  for  sub-national 
authorities to get involved in territorial cooperation. From a theoretical point of view, 
280 N.  LEVRAT,  Droit  applicable  aux  accords  de  coopération  transfrontalière  entre  collectivités  
publiques intra-étatiques, cit., p. 235 et seq. 
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it is quite a hard challenge to evaluate the exact impact of the Community Regulation 
on  the  national  legal  orders.  In  particular,  it  is  really  difficult  to  evaluate  if  the 
Regulation  is  going  to  increase  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  development  of 
territorial cooperation. This issue is at the heart of the complex dynamic that sees, on 
the one hand, the positive means offered by the Regulation and, on the other hand, 
the limitations connected to the national systems. In fact, several problematic points 
are  still  present.  In  particular,  the  dimension  of  the  capability  of  sub-national 
authorities to become members of an EGTC is determined according to the national 
systems.  The  main  condition  in  this  sense  is  represented  by  the  preventive 
authorisation of Member States according to the wording of Article 4, paragraph 3 of 
the  Regulation.  Namely,  the  Member  State  concerned  “shall  […]  approve  the 
prospective  member's  participation  in  the  EGTC,  unless  it  considers  that  such 
participation is not in conformity with this Regulation or national law […] or that 
such participation is not justified for reasons of public interest or of public policy 
[...]”. We already noticed in this regard that the State is subject to an obligation of 
approval  unless  some  circumstances  occur.  More  than  the  conformity  with  the 
Regulation and the reasons of public interest and policy, the most problematic issue 
concerns the parameter of “national law” and its potential expansion281. 
A general conformity with the single national legislations, in particular the 
respect of the competences of sub-national subjects, is comprehensible, but the exact 
implications of this provision are not very clear. Moreover, it is possible to wonder if 
this “conformity to national law” includes the conformity with the national existing 
procedures about the sub-national foreign power. In this sense, it has already been 
highlighted that territorial cooperation represents a kind of separate field, especially 
in this case ruled under Community law. Thus, for the eventuality that the Member 
States condition their approval to the respect of national rules, which somehow limit 
or violate the provisions and the further execution of the Regulation, these national 
rules  shall  not  be  applied  in  this  case  and  sub-national  authorities  shall  not  be 
requested  to  comply  with  these  norms.  The  study  commissioned  by  the  CoR 
proposes  a  clear and interesting interpretation.  Namely,  “[t]he  question  is  that  of 
281 S. ALOISIO,  Il  GECT: disciplina comunitaria  e  attuazione  italiana,  un'analisi  giuridica,  in  A. 
PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 110.
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direct  effect:  if  it  exists,  then the rights  derived from Community law must  take 
precedence over the interests of the Member States authority; but if the production 
of  legal  effects  is  made  conditional  on  respecting  certain  national  rules,  e.g.  in 
relation  to  the  approval  procedure  provided  for  in  Article  4(3)  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation, then a prohibition under national law may take precedence”282. However, 
recognising the validity of this legal reasoning, in any case a national rule which is 
patently  incompatible  with  the  Regulation  shouldn't  be  considered  applicable, 
according to the principles of Community law. 
For what concerns the question of sub-national foreign powers in particular, 
not so many difficulties seem to emerge for the reason that this matter is scarcely 
codified in the national systems. What is  quite clear in this vague scenery is  the 
autonomy of the Regulation in relation to other forms or procedures concerning the 
exercise of sub-national foreign powers within the various national legislations. In 
this  regard,  it  seems  also  clear  that  the  competence  about  sub-national  foreign 
relations  according  to  each  national  system should  not  be  considered  within  the 
competences that the Regulation requires about the members of an EGTC: namely, 
“it  is  Community  law  founding  the  right  to  territorial  cooperation  without  any 
implication of the national law about sub-national international relations”283.
The fact that Community law could constitute a self-sufficient legal base for 
the institutionalization of territorial cooperation between sub-national authorities is 
denied by the EGTC Regulation itself284. However, it seems not necessary that the 
Member State confer an apposite and explicit competence to sub-national authorities 
in order to set up an EGTC as far as sub-national entities act within their general 
attributions and under the conditions established by the Regulation. 
From a concrete point of view, this issue remains anyway quite difficult to 
approach. The question concerning the capability of sub-national authorities to set up 
282 COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC –, cit., p. 
131.
283 See S. ALOISIO, Il GECT: disciplina comunitaria e attuazione italiana, un'analisi giuridica, in A. 
PAPISCA (cur.),  Il gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione  
Europea, cit., p. 110.
284 See  M.  PERTILE,  Il  GECT:  verso  un  organismo  di  diritto  comunitario  per  la  cooperazione  
transfrontaliera?,  p.  124.  As  a  general  principle,  Community  law cannot  directly  alter  the  inner 
structure of national constitutional systems. However, Community acts have been recognised some 
indirect effects on the repartition of competences between sub-national authorities and the central 
State. But this seems not the case regarding the EGTC Regulation, which make explicit references to 
the respect of the internal articulation of States. 
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an  EGTC  requires  in  any  case  a  strong  relation  with  the  national  legal  orders. 
Although this seems to frustrate the direct effects of the Regulation No 18082/2006, 
however,  the  most  important  legal  effects  are  related  to  the  provision  of  an 
alternative  operative  solution  for  sub-national  authorities  to  deal  with  territorial 
cooperation through a new subject with legal personality285, which, actually, could be 
intended as a true right for sub-national subjects286. Therefore, in case an EGTC is 
established according to one national law, it  couldn't be contested as legal subject 
when  acting  within  the  territory  of  the  Community.  Moreover,  as  far  as  some 
Member States provide local or regional authorities with modest attributions, it will 
be anyway difficult for those States to prohibit the constitution of EGTCs to these 
sub-national  subjects,  if  not  under  precise  legal  reasons.  In  this  sense,  the 
development  of  territorial  cooperation  is  feasible  for  sub-national  authorities 
regardless of how their powers are considered – namely, inherent quality of territorial 
communities or “octroyé” from the State287 – and how limited those powers are. In 
practice, the exercise of territorial cooperation, as developed with the EGTC, is not 
submitted to the question “if” (it can exist), but to the question “how” (namely, to 
what extent those powers can legitimately be exercised). 
After this reasoning, a general observation could be proposed as follows. The 
Regulation creates and a right for sub-national authorities to establish and EGTC. 
This right has various limitations. However, it is not the existence of this right as 
such, but its dimension and extension to be conditioned by the national legislations.
285 The Commission's Proposal of 14 July 2004 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council establishing a European Grouping of Cross-border Cooperation (EGCC) was more clear in 
this sense. Namely, it provided at Article 8 that after the publication on the Official Journal of the 
European  Union  “the  legal  capacity  of  the  EGCC  is  recognised  in  each  Member  State”.  The 
formulation of the adopted version of the Regulation seems to have forgotten this brief statement. 
Although the legal effects are quite the same, the Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 provides at Article 5 
that  the EGTC shall  be registered and/or  published in accordance with the applicable law in the 
Member States where it has its registered office. The EGTC shall acquire legal personality on the day 
of registration or publication, whichever occurs the first.
286 A. PAPISCA, L'avvento del gruppo europeo di cooperazione territoriale, GECT. Nuovi orizzonti per  
la  multilevel  governance  democratica,  in  A.  PAPISCA (cur.) ,  Il  gruppo  europeo  di  cooperazione 
territoriale. Nuove sfide allo spazio dell'Unione Europea, cit., p. 15, highlights the transformation of 
the concept of sub-national territorial cooperation from the connotation of a mere “faculty” to the 
recognition of a “right”. 
287 Ibid., p. 14.
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5.3. Is the EGTC a legal revolution for territorial cooperation?
Speaking  about  revolutions  implies,  most  of  the  times,  some  hypocrisies 
deriving from the real meaning of the concept and its following contextualization. 
Namely,  “revolution”  means  a  rupture,  a  break  with  the  past.  A radical  change. 
Trying to understand if the EGTC represents a revolutionary instrument in the field 
of territorial cooperation involves an evaluation about its relation with the previous 
situation. In this regard, the analysis about the specific instruments and the general 
context of sub-national transfrontier relations has been broad enough to suggest some 
ideas about the role of the EGTC Regulation. In particular, two main observations 
can be proposed. From a first point of view, the role of this Community Regulation 
within the general trend of transfrontier/territorial cooperation is situated within a 
progressive  acknowledgement  of  the  phenomenon,  mainly  within  the  European 
territorial dimension. Secondly, as a specific legal instrument, the EGTC Regulation 
represents an important legal achievement for the EU and its Member States. This 
observations are quite vague, but both of them intend to highlight the double nature 
of  the  Regulation,  namely  its  new and  original  peculiarities,  but  also  its  strong 
connections with the previous aspects of territorial cooperation. In this sense, more 
than  a  break  with  the  past,  the  EGTC  Regulation  is  an  example  of  additional 
continuity  and  an  example  of  coherent  evolution.  In  this  sense,  the  aims  of  the 
Regulation are basically grounded in the intention to improve the past solutions of 
cooperation without the necessity to forget or overcome these experiences. Thus, the 
EGTC contains almost all the components of the past and the purposes of the future. 
Namely, the EGTC entails each positive character and suffers from every disease of 
territorial  cooperation  as  European  phenomenon.  Therefore,  speaking  about  a 
revolution in this field seems, at least for the moment, excessive and inexact from a 
conceptual point of view.
These general observations, are valid even from a legal perspective. What has 
been mentioned in the previous paragraphs about the role of the EGTC as a new legal 
frame of reference for sub-national authorities confirms the considerations proposed 
in this paragraph. In fact, the legal value of this new instrument is fundamentally 
rooted and derives from the progressive evolution of partial factors rather than from 
radical changes. 
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1.  The  state-of-the-play  and  the  legal  perspectives  of  territorial  cooperation  (in 
particular after  the adoption of the EGTC Regulation):  objective accomplished or 
starting point?
Territorial cooperation is a multi-form and multi-dimensional reality. Every 
attempt to define new legal instruments is not going to change the nature of this 
phenomenon and is not going to offer a uniform and definitive solution. Namely, 
theoretically speaking, all the different forms of territorial cooperation, both formal 
and informal, and all the respective legal sources coexist at European level. Despite 
this  constant  multiplicity,  the  concept  of  territorial  cooperation  embodies  some 
steady elements,  which have been originated from the progressive evolution of a 
day-to-day cooperative praxis between sub-national communities. The principle of 
correspondence  between  the  inner  competences  and  the  foreign  activities  of 
territorial  communities,  the  qualification  of  territorial  cooperation  as  a  legal 
dimension outside the frame of international law, the progressive legitimization of 
sub-national authorities to deal with trans-national relations, the necessary reference 
to national legislations with regard to the law applicable to the agreements between 
sub-national  subjects  and the  peculiar  public-law-dimension represent  only a few 
common elements of the legal aspects concerning territorial cooperation. 
The elaboration of legal notions in this sector has developed following the 
evolution  of  sub-national  relations  and  the  expansion  of  an  European  territorial 
dimension, with their limits and potentialities. In this regard, the legal approach has 
been  required  to  modify  the  traditional  notions  based  on  the  territoriality  as  an 
identifying element  of  the  State  for  recognizing  other  centers  of  interest,  mainly 
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based in the inter-regional or extra-national spaces, i.e. besides the national frontiers 1. 
In particular, as far as the geographical dimension has rapidly abandoned the idea of 
the border as a restrictive element, the political dimension has evolved from a mere 
functional approach towards a more integrated institutional perspective. In this sense, 
the adoption of some standard frameworks has been also possible  because of the 
progressive changes within the European scenario about the role and the function of 
sub-national subjects. The development of legal solutions suitable for transfrontier 
issue has certainly revealed, and still  reveals, many difficulties, which are mainly 
connected to (or hindered by) some national or particular interests, and require strong 
political commitments2.
From a legal perspective, due to the lack of specific national provisions, the 
development of new European instruments adopted by the Council of Europe and by 
the European Union is currently the most important result for sub-national authorities 
in order to develop coherent and permanent transfrontier activities. In particular, the 
adoption  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No  1082/2006  on  the  European  Grouping  of 
Territorial  Cooperation  (EGTC)  has  changed  the  legal  approach  to  territorial 
cooperation  within  the  national  systems.  In  fact,  the  Community  Regulation  has 
permitted to rationalize the phenomenon of territorial cooperation at national level. 
In this perspective it is possible to wonder if the attempt to find standard legal 
solutions  by  the  European  institutions  and  the  adoption  of  the  most  recent 
instruments represent the end of a long process or if future perspectives are still open. 
As  far  as  the  new instruments  could  be  considered  as  an  achieved  goal  for  the 
Council of Europe and for the European Union, they do not certainly represent the 
final step of a long path, rather they constitute an important, but partial target during 
a dynamic process. In particular, the development of territorial cooperation has two 
big issues  to  deal  with at  this  moment.  On the one hand,  the  implementation of 
European instruments within national legal orders is still on the way on and it is quite 
problematic.  In  this  regard,  the  questions  concerning  the  legitimization  of  sub-
national authorities and the law applicable to the relations of cooperation have still to 
1 See C. BARBATI, G. ENRDICI, Territorialità positiva. Mercato, ambiente e poteri subnazionali, cit., p. 
20 et seq. In this regard see also M.R. FERRARESE, Le istituzioni della globalizzazione, Bologna, 2000.
2 See  G.N.  TOGGENBURG,  La  dimensione  europea  dell’accordo  De  Gasperi-Gruber:  tentativo  di  
approfondimento,  in  Federalismi.it n.  3/2008,  http://www.federalismi.it and  B.  LUVERÀ,  Oltre  il  
confine.  Euregio e conflitto etnico:  tra regionalismo europeo e nuovi nazionalismi in Trentino-Alto  
Adige, Bologna, 1996, p. 9 et seq.
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cope with the conformation of national dispositions in concrete terms. On the other 
hand, the effective application of the new instruments is at its very beginning: the 
new experiences need to be tested and new projects have to be launched. In fact, the 
CoE's Third Protocol  on the ECG has  been approved but  needs to  be ratified in 
several countries and the EGTC Regulation has not be implemented by some States 
yet and only a few projects have been put into practice. Thus, the legal approach to 
territorial cooperation has reached important achievements. However, various issues 
are still in progress and will be constantly in this condition as far as the matter of 
territorial dimension in Europe will be a continuously emerging filed of experience.
2. Council of Europe and European Union: competition or cooperation?
The Council of Europe and the European Union have been involved in the 
development  of  transfrontier/territorial  cooperation  for  several  years.  These  two 
institutions  represent  the  driving  force  for  the  setting  down  of  suitable  legal 
instruments  in  the  field  of  the  relations  between  local  and  regional  authorities. 
Different attitudes have been displayed towards the territorial dimension and towards 
the legal framework of sub-national cooperation. From a general point of view, it 
could be observed that the development of territorial cooperation is fundamental to 
achieve the main objectives of the two institutions,  namely democracy and good 
governance for the Council of Europe and the European integration and cohesion for 
the Community3. Despite these diverse institutional natures, the interventions related 
to the definition of legal frameworks for cooperation have progressively converged 
and the most similar approach has verified quite recently with the adoption of the EC 
Regulation on the European Grouping of Territorial  Cooperation (EGTC) and the 
CoE's  Third  Protocol  to  the  European  Outline  Convention  on  Transfrontier 
Cooperation establishing the Euroregional Cooperation Groupings (ECG). The fact 
that such legal means have been adopted at international/Community level is quite 
emblematic of the legal complications at  national level  and demonstrates that the 
3 See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TRANSFRONTIER CO-OPERATION, Similarities and differences of instrument  
and policies  of  the Council  of  Europe and the European Union in  the field of  Transfrontier  Co-
operation, Council of Europe, 2006, p. 33 et seq.
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intervention of non-state subjects is necessary in order to solve those legal issues 
going  beyond the  national  approach towards  the  exercise  of  sub-national  foreign 
powers.  In  particular,  the  EGTC  Regulation,  displaying  its  peculiar  nature  of 
Community act with direct legal effects, has founded an explicit “rationalization” of 
territorial cooperation within the national legal orders. In this regard, the EGTC has 
some  added  value  if  compared  to  the  application  of  the  ECG.  However,  the 
development of this instrument by the Council of Europe at international level has 
not  to  be underestimated.  Namely,  it  has to be kept  in  mind that  the Council  of 
Europe has firstly given a legal value to transfrontier cooperation between territorial 
communities and that the acknowledgement of a European dimension of territorial 
cooperation has begun within this framework. On the contrary, the European Union 
has only recently proposed a real legal approach in the field, thus, overcoming the 
previous mainly promotional approach towards interregional relations.
Regarding the EGTC and the ECG in particular, despite some fundamental 
differences given by the nature of the two normative acts – international law and 
Community law – and despite  some differences in  the legal details,  the concrete 
functioning of these instruments is, in outline, almost identical and both of them are 
suitable for almost the same cases. In this sense, the potential concurrence between 
the two European institutions, notably between the Committee of the Regions and the 
Congress  of  the  Local  and  Regional  Authorities,  could  be  an  object  of  analysis, 
mainly because the two instruments are really quite competitive. In particular, the 
EGTC  and  the  ECG  seem  to  realize,  in  their  different  perspectives,  the  natural 
evolution of the so-called Euroregions. In this scenario, the Congress has strongly 
supported  the  recent  constitution  of  two  new  Euroregions,  namely  the  Adriatic 
Euroregion (AE) and the Black Sea Euroregion (BSE), comprehending sub-national 
authorities of non-EU countries4. From this point of view, a diplomatic viewpoint 
could try to dissipate the idea concerning any kind of conflict between the CoE and 
the EU. However, as far as some friction between these institutions is perceivable, 
according to our opinion, the existence of a certain degree of competition is positive 
if  targeting  to  constructive  results.  Anyway,  a  mutual  attempt  to  collaboration is 
4 These two experiences  of  transfrontier  Euroregions have been  connoted as  “Council  of  Europe 
Euroregions”; see informations available at:  
http://www.coe.int/t/congress/specific-programmes/Euroregion/default_en.asp.
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clearly visible. In this sense, the Council of Europe has demonstrated a particular 
attention to the analysis of the Community Regulation before the definitive adoption 
of the Third Protocol in order to facilitate the compatibility of the two normative 
documents. Conversely, the European Union is aware of the peculiar role played by 
the  Council  in  the  definition  of  international  standards  about  transfrontier 
cooperation  and  has  recognized  this  role  also  in  the  Preamble  of  the  EGTC 
Regulation. 
Anyway, it is a matter of fact that the EU, with the adoption of the EGTC 
Regulation, has earlier completed the establishment of a European standard structure 
for territorial cooperation. Following this path, the Council has adapted its project to 
the EU Regulation already in force. A malicious intention could see in this approach 
of the CoE an attempt to duplicate the provisions established by the Regulation and 
to establish a direct  correspondence between the ECG and the EGTC in order to 
propose  a  competitive  instrument.  Although  such an  opinion  cannot  be  radically 
excepted, I consider this approach rather unfruitful. Thus, however the institutional 
relations are, it would be better to look at the concrete results concerning territorial 
cooperation  and,  in  this  sense,  both  the  institutions,  within  their  respective 
potentialities  and  limitations,  have  permitted  a  significant  and  progressive  legal 
acknowledgement  to  territorial  cooperation  and  to  the  sub-national  dimension 
according to non-traditional legal categories.
3. Legitimizing sub-national authorities...
The legitimization of local and regional authorities represents a never-ending 
issue concerning each form of territorial cooperation exceeding the national frontiers. 
From a substantial point of view, the first fundamental element, which needs to be 
underlined as a  theoretical  outcome, is  the principle of necessary correspondence 
between the internal and external competences. Namely, the capacity of sub-national 
actors  to  establish  territorial  cooperation  consists  in  the  exercise  abroad  of  the 
attributions accorded within the respective national systems. 
From the procedural point of view, as a form of exception to the exclusive 
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competence of the State to the exercise of foreign powers, the faculty of sub-national 
subjects  to  cooperate  with  homologous  foreign  authorities  has  hardly  had  a 
constitutional or legislative acknowledgement within the national systems in Europe. 
However, in the lack of explicit  national provisions, the progressive expansion of 
alternative solutions and the increasing role of sub-national authorities at European 
level have brought, firstly, to a substantial tolerance of the phenomenon of territorial 
cooperation at  national  level  and,  secondly,  to  its  progressive  legitimization.  The 
various legal systems have shown different  reactions and many times the role of 
Constitutional Courts has been fundamental in order to admit alternative forms of 
international  relations  at  sub-national  level.  In  particular,  the  exclusion  of  sub-
national foreign powers from the concepts of international law has opened new paths 
for the acceptance of territorial cooperation as a legitimate sub-national capacity.
Moreover,  the  present  research  has  shown  that  territorial  cooperation 
represents  a  peculiar  aspect  within  the  notion  of  sub-national  foreign  power  as 
affirmed  within  the  national  systems.  Namely,  from a  substantial  point  of  view, 
territorial  cooperation between sub-national  authorities is  one of the possible  and 
different examples of sub-national foreign power. However, from a legal perspective, 
territorial cooperation is not necessarily ruled by the national normative provisions 
regarding and legitimizing the foreign sub-national relations, but it has traditionally 
followed  autonomous  paths  from the  traditional  categories  of  public  law.  In  this 
sense,  the  legal  question  concerning  territorial  cooperation  has  been  dealt  as  a 
question  of  public  law  after  a  consolidated,  but  mostly  informal  or  alternative 
material  praxis.  Conversely,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  every  juridical  disposition 
admitting and regulating territorial  cooperation recognizes a manifestation of sub-
national  foreign  power.  In  this  regard,  the  establishment  of  European  standard 
frameworks  have  introduced  new  forms  of  legitimation  for  local  and  regional 
subjects to undertake interterritorial relations.
Despite the different reactions and adaptations of the national legal systems in 
relation  to  the expansion of  this  phenomenon,  only  a  general  approach from the 
European institutions has been capable to give an answer to the strong demand of a 
common legal framework for cooperation at sub-national level. If the dispositions of 
the Council of Europe remain limited from the legal international approach and from 
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the consequent prevailing position of States, the Community Regulation introduces a 
hierarchic normative order giving the national law a residual position. In this regard, 
although the Regulation requires a strong national contribution in order to enable its 
concrete  implementation,  national  provisions  have  to  cope  with  Community 
dispositions first. In particular the Community Regulation on the EGTC has created a 
new extra-national form of legitimation for sub-national authorities by introducing a 
new  legal  structure  for  cooperation  based  in  Community  law.  This  has  been 
considered as a new right for local and regional authorities. However, such a right, 
far from altering the inner structures of EU Member States, has its counterbalance in 
the national constitutional dimension. As far as the legal effects of the Community 
Regulation are conditioned to the conformity to the national legal orders and the 
necessary  legitimation  of  sub-national  authorities  according  to  their  competences 
under  national  law,  it  is  possible  to  speak  about  a  “conditioned  obligation”  for 
Member States to approve the establishment of an EGTC on their territory or to give 
the consent for the participation of a local or regional authority to an EGTC on a 
foreign territory.  This means that,  while the respect of national constitutional and 
legislative dispositions represents a necessary condition for the legitimate creation of 
an EGTC, the accomplishment of these duties creates an obligation for States not to 
impede the constitution of this kind of cooperative structures between sub-national 
subjects.  In  particular,  the  fact  that  the  constitution  of  an  EGTC  is  determined 
according  to  the  conformity  to  the  national  legal  orders  binds  the  national 
supervision  towards  sub-national  authorities  with  legal  parameters  and 
jurisdictionally verifiable norms instead of imposing conditions that pertain to a mere 
discretional act of central authorities. 
Regarding  the  different  national  constitutional  structures  of  the  European 
countries,  the phenomenon of  territorial  cooperation shows that the composite  or 
unitary form of  the various States  is  not  really  functional  to  the  development  of 
cooperation  between  sub-national  subjects  and  doesn't  mirror  the  effective 
quantitative  and  qualitative  dimension  of  cooperation.  With  other  words,  the 
traditional conception, which considers the more or less wider power of territorial 
communities to undertake foreign relations depending from the federal, regional or 
unitary constitutions, is only partially applicable in the case of territorial cooperation. 
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In this regard, what plays an essential role is the effective and concrete establishment 
of  cooperation,  which  is  not  really  conditioned  from  the  national  constitutional 
structures, but, rather, by the national dynamics between levels of government and 
the capacity of legal orders to react to new and dynamic situations. 
4 . The  crucial  role  of  “meta-legal”  principles  for  the  effectiveness  of  codified 
provisions
The  general  capacity  of  sub-national  authorities  to  become  involved  in 
territorial  cooperation is  concretely resulting from the sum of all  the  instruments 
available  for  this  kind  of  activities.  However,  as  it  has  been  exemplified  in  the 
previous paragraph with regard to the EGTC, every legal instrument designed for 
cooperation between sub-national subjects – at international, Community or national 
level – requires or provides for different, but constant,  forms of state-supervision 
over the foreign activities of those subjects. This peculiarity has been observed in 
almost  every  legal  provision  regarding  territorial  cooperation  and  different 
mechanisms of control have been settled down, depending on the nature of the legal 
source concerned. For example, in the case of international law, the state supervision 
reaches  the  highest  degree,  whereas  in  the  case  of  Community  law  the  relation 
between  Community  acts  and  national  legislations  is  more  complex.  Generally 
speaking, the national legal orders determine the attributions of competences to sub-
national subjects and establish, or contribute to establish, certain procedural means 
for  the  setting  up  and  for  the  concrete  functioning  of  territorial  cooperation. 
However,  a  strict  definition  of  competences  and  procedures  doesn't  prevent  or 
resolve  every  possible  conflict  between  levels  of  government  or  physiological 
incongruities of the legal provisions. In this regard, since the political dimension is 
also  involved,  a  mature  relationship  between central  authorities  and  sub-national 
entities  seems  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  consent  a  positive  development  of 
territorial cooperation. 
The  adoption  of  European  instruments  cannot  eradicate  these  necessary 
interactions and potential frictions, as far as the contribution of national legislations 
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and central authorities are in any case required. The implementation of the EGTC 
Regulation is quite emblematic in this sense and demonstrates the unavoidability of 
such a complex dimension insofar as an act of central authorities is required to allow 
territorial  cooperation.  Thus,  in  order  to  manage  the  relations  between  tiers  of 
government and to foster mutual cooperation instead of jurisdictional conflicts, the 
contribution of guiding criteria is fundamental for establishing a balance within the 
normative provisions and the political dimension. In this regard, it is necessary to 
realize the limits of strict legal frameworks and to admit the essential role of guiding 
principles that are not directly binding.
“Meta-legal” principles consist in all those criteria, norms or rules, which are 
not  really  –  or  hardly  –  enforceable,  but  which  have  a  strong  programmatic  or 
political meaning. With regard to the concrete development of territorial cooperation 
as an active form of multilevel governance,  effective partnership and institutional 
coordination,  two  principles  with  a  fundamental  role  are  represented  by  fair 
cooperation and subsidiarity.  Without resuming the respective origin of these two 
concepts, it is undoubted that they constitute common components of the European 
legal tradition of public law. The function of these two principles within the multi-
level dynamics could be essential to prevent legal disputes. 
In particular, the contribution of fair cooperation and subsidiarity represents 
an effective and practicable method for managing the competences-exercise and to 
settle inter-level relations. As far as these “meta-legal” principles (even in case they 
are set down in normative provisions, like in the EU Treaties) are hardly enforceable, 
they have also a constructive legal function. Namely, this legal character is visible 
when they get involved within the procedural phase of normative implementation 
and  could  serve  as  determinant  factor  for  the  application/interpretation  of  legal 
provisions. For example, regarding the EGTC, the notions of fair cooperation and 
subsidiarity could be particularly helpful in the relation between central  and sub-
national authorities with regard to the competences dimension or the approval for the 
constitution  of  an  EGTC.  In  this  sense,  such  an  approach  cannot  eliminate  the 
political and legal issues deriving from the existence of different tiers of government. 
However, a mature utilization of these “meta-legal” criteria can contribute to a better 
and efficient development of inter-institutional relations, in particular for overcoming 
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forms  of  state  supervision  and control  in  favor  of  shared  and efficient  forms  of 
collaboration. Thus, the application of such concepts could be intended as a matter of 
opportunity to approach legal issues rather than as mere political arguments.
A step forward in this sense could be recognized in the provisions, established 
by the EGTC Regulation and by the Third Protocol on the ECG, which enables the 
participation of States as members of the new cooperative structures. In this regard, 
this form of membership, although being potentially  a supervisory method,  could 
also be intended as a new feasible form of partnership at the same level. A distinction 
of functions among different authorities should not correspond to an authoritative 
role towards sub-national subjects. 
The development of new instruments of cooperation, in particular the EGTC, 
shows that the realization of a multilevel governance is not a theoretical exercise or 
en  enthusiastic  political  conception,  rather  it  is  a  necessary  vision  of  the 
contemporary system of powers in Europe, where strict forms of government need to 
be implemented in the light of feasibility-oriented solutions within the composite and 
asymmetric European legal panorama5.
5. Territorial cooperation: a new “jus commune” or “acquis européen”?
As a conclusion to this research, a general evaluation about the legal status of 
territorial  cooperation  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view  is  unavoidable.  The 
development of transfrontier relations between territorial communities has begun and 
has spread out as a material phenomenon. The adoption of legal instruments and the 
attempt of legal categorizations have been approached later on and are progressively 
evolving.  After  a  process  of  more  than  twenty  years  (since  the  adoption  of  the 
European Outline Convention in 1980), it is possible to say that a general legal frame 
is  visible  in  this  field.  In  particular,  the  recent  adoptions  of  the  Third  Protocol 
establishing  the  ECG  and  the  EGTC  Regulation  have  contributed  to  a  more 
5 See  H.  COMTE,  N.  LEVRAT,  Aux  coutures  de  l'Europe.  Defis  et  enjeux  del  la  coopération  
transfrontalière, cit., p. 37-38, and see also J. MAIER,  European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 
(EGTC) – Regions’ new instrument for ‘Co-operation beyond borders’. A new approach to organize  
multi-level governance facing old and new obstacles, 2008, published at:
 http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/EventTemplate.aspx, p. 80 et seq.
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structured approach.  In this sense,  the notion of a European sub-national right to 
territorial  cooperation  has  been  progressively  established  and,  although  having  a 
multi-dimensional nature, is the product of the existing legal instruments and legal 
sources involved in this field. Thus, the matter of territorial cooperation between sub-
national  authorities  presents  a  theoretical  background,  which  is  given  by  the 
development of the concept both at European and at national level. In particular, this 
background  results  from  an  inductive  conceptualization  of  the  different  legal 
dimensions.  In  this  sense,  it  is  possible  to  speak  about  a  “law  of  territorial 
cooperation”, identified as the legal norms regulating this matter,  and a “right of 
territorial cooperation, meaning the capacity for sub-national authorities to develop 
these activities. Some problematic aspects remain, however, still open. 
Qualifying this legal field as a modern form of “jus commune” in Europe 
seems  to  be,  for  the  moment,  quite  excessive,  as  far  as  it  is  lacking  the  main 
fundamental aspect of uniformity. Of course, some common frameworks have been 
progressively acquired and some theoretical concepts are becoming a common legal 
reality among the European States, but fundamental differentiations are still existing. 
In particular, the strong connections to the single national legal orders and to their 
peculiar constitutional identities generates a constant factor of differentiation, which 
constitutes the intrinsic nature of territorial cooperation. Given this, is not possible to 
forget or to minimize the fundamental progress which has been made in the legal 
perspective  and the  peculiarity  of  the European reality,  where  the activity  of  the 
European Union and the Council of Europe has contributed to define the legal basis 
of a factual situation. In this regard, the best way to qualify the current general legal 
nature of territorial cooperation is represented by the concept of “acquis européen” in 
broader terms, thus comprehending all the distinctive and dynamic characters, praxis 
and legal aspects of territorial cooperation in Europe. In this sense, all the acquired 
experiences, which have been achieved during the evolution of territorial cooperation 
between sub-national authorities, represent a fundamental contribution to the actual 
state of the matter and represent at the same time the ground for future evolutions.
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